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This paper aims to discern, clarify, criticise, and advocate some uses of phenomenology in sociological research. Phenomenology is increasingly evoked or implicitly employed in sociological endeavours. Little attention, however, is paid to what is entailed in taking a phenomenological approach, and whether it is employed to advance empirical or theoretical knowledge. I build an analytic typology of different empirical and theoretical uses of phenomenology, criticise a range of these uses, and argue that other uses bear significant potential for the advancement of theoretical and empirical knowledge. The paper's main contribution lies in comparing and contrasting the many invocations of phenomenology in contemporary social scientific research to discern their benefits and shortcomings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions on the body frequently foreground in empirical studies of social representations. However, there is scarce theoretical literature within social representations theory focusing on embodied social representation. This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of embodied, sensory experiences as part of social representation. More precisely, it attempts to elaborate how individual, social, bodily, and material layers work together in embodied social representation. This paper approaches the topic from four viewpoints: (1) social representation as action, (2) phenomenology, (3) embodied and socially situated cognition, and (4) sensory epistemologies and sensescapes. These approaches are used to provide insight into the conscious and unconscious processes of social representation and the multimodality of social representation. The paper contributes to the understanding of the role of sensory experiences and embodiment in the theory of social representations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I attempt to shed more light in Bourdieu's habitus and doxa, by drawing on phenomenological and Bourdieusian‐based literature, social theory and some findings from sociological research. Despite the fact that there is a vast work concerning the examination of these two concepts, there are still some misunderstandings about them. For that reason, I have tried to draw a clearer picture of habitus, by linking it with phenomenological "being‐in‐the‐world" and describing its elements. As for doxa, I discuss its conceptual relation with habitus and phenomenology's natural attitude. Also, attention is given to some aspects of both habitus and doxa, which have not addressed in detailed fashion yet, but they are nevertheless theoretically useful for empirical qualitative research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper engages with the theme of individual disenchantment, that is, the process of falling out of love with something that once gave pleasure and purpose. Drawing on the conceptual tools of Pierre Bourdieu, it sketches the process by which individuals become 'enchanted' with the stakes of different fields, the phenomenology of enchantment and disenchantment and several ideal typical modes of genesis of disenchantment. Attention is given to intra‐field dynamics but also, going beyond Bourdieu, inter‐field dynamics too. The final section considers the epistemological consequences of constructing trans‐field objects of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bourdieu's concept of habitus relies heavily on insights from phenomenology, yet his theoretical effort falls short of existing phenomenological solutions to the problems of cognition, agency, and reflexivity in social action. These shortcomings are evident in the analytical and descriptive failures of the concept of habitus documented by critics. Turning to the work of Alfred Schutz, this paper offers his concept of pragma, meaning context, and theory of relevances as an alternative way to describe the embodied and temporal nature of social action and accounting for social determinations. The paper further parses out key differences between Schutz's social phenomenological understanding of embodied action and Bourdieu's habitus, including differences in understanding schemas of standardization and their relation with objectivities of the social world. The paper ends with a call for a critical reassessment of Schutz's social phenomenology, with potentially wide ranging implications not only for understandings of agency, but also of meaning and the constitution of objectivities of the social world, as well the underlying interpretive method of social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenological sociology is one of the most recognized approaches for explaining the constitution of social behaviour and the construction of social reality. To this day, phenomenological sociology usually belongs to the tradition of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and to Alfred Schütz's mundane phenomenology, thus generally presenting itself as sociology of lifeworld, sociology of everyday life, and sociology of knowledge. In contrast to this, this paper intends to outline an alternative kind of phenomenological sociology that finds its philosophical foundation in Hermann Schmitz's "New Phenomenology". With regards especially to Schmitz's theory of the felt body ("Leib") and his theory of situation, the basic principles of Neophenomenological Sociology (NPS) will be introduced. Their main components are (1) felt body and affective involvement as the pre‐personal apriori of sociality, (2) felt‐bodily communication as the basic unit of sociality, and (3) joint situations as the socio‐ontological foundation and empirical manifestation of sociality. With these specific key concepts, NPS proves itself to be a socio‐theoretical approach whose foremost strength is that it can identify and properly analyse the pathic dimensions of social behaviour and social situations that social sciences tend to overlook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scientists and philosophers of science have argued that metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism represent distinct and separable philosophical commitments. This claim is true in the sense that metaphysics and epistemology reflect different philosophical projects. The major question of interest to psychologists, however, is whether at the pragmatic level of research designed to discover the psychological sphere in which we live our lives, the metaphysical and the methodological realms are so tightly interwoven that some important aspects of our humanity cannot be faithfully revealed without distortion, or even missed altogether. This paper argues that, in light of its intellectual origins, methodological naturalism is informed by metaphysical naturalism at the level of its formulation, and, thereby, is by its nature more apt to reveal phenomena of certain ontological types and less apt to faithfully reveal phenomena of other ontological types. In this sense, metaphysical naturalism cannot help but subtly shape psychological investigation and thus insert itself to some degree into our understanding of many important psychological phenomena. The work of the French phenomenologist Jean‐Luc Marion, particularly his concept of "saturated phenomena," is briefly discussed by way of a call for greater methodological openness in psychological research – an openness that will permit psychological scientists to better "save the phenomena" in their accounts of human experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aron Gurwitsch's four‐domain model of consciousness is placed in political‐economic context to theorize how social forces influence perception. Along with clarifying key concepts in cognitive sociology like "relevance" and "the taken‐for‐granted," the model explains the processes through which social structures—despite being vaguely understood, ignored, or unknown by the typical subject on a typical day—condition thematization and what items are considered relevant or irrelevant to the given theme. A capitalist "social horizon" influences attention by structurally imposing themes on consciousness as well as filters what items are considered relevant to the given theme through hegemonic frames—which select theme‐relevant items conducive to encouraging actors to consensually reproduce the status quo—and reificatory processes, or discursive and material practices that constitute items as fixed and inalterable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenological sociology was founded at the beginning of 1930s by Alfred Schutz. His mundane phenomenology sought to combine impulses drawn from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Weber's action theory. It was made famous at the turn of 1960s and 1970s by Garfinkel's ethnomethodology and Berger & Luckmann's social constructionism. This paper deals with the notable accomplishments of Schutz and his followers and then proceeds to a shared shortcoming, which is that the phenomenological approach is unable to understand meaning in any other way but as actors's knowledge. Therefore, phenomenological sociologists are forced to describe the actor's interpretations of meaning as transparent to the actor him/herself, even if they sometimes make heroic attempts to escape the limitations of the phenomenological conception. The limitation is apparent in Husserl's and Schutz's definition of meaning as a 'reflective intentional act', Garfinkel's use of the term 'accounting' to refer to a signifying effect, and the way Berger and Luckmann describe their social theory as 'sociology of knowledge'. Today, similar confusions are present in Michael Polanyi's 'tacit knowledge'and in Giddens' structuration theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent developments in the psychological and social sciences have seen a surge of attention to concepts of embodiment. The burgeoning field of embodied cognition, as well as the long-standing tradition of phenomenological philosophy, offer valuable insights for theorising how people come to understand the world around them. However, the implications of human embodiment have been largely neglected by one of the key frameworks for conceptualising the development of social knowledge: Social Representations Theory. This article seeks to spark a dialogue between Social Representations Theory and embodiment research. It outlines the position the body occupies in the existing theoretical and empirical social representations literature, and argues that incorporating concepts gleaned from embodiment research may facilitate a more comprehensive account of the aetiology of social representations. The value of analytic attention to embodiment is illustrated with reference to a recent study of social representations of neuroscience, which suggested that embodied experience can shape the extent to which people engage with certain topics, the conditions under which they do so, and the conceptual and affective content of the ensuing representations. The article argues that expanding Social Representations Theory's methodological and conceptual toolkit, in order to illuminate the interplay between embodied experience and social communication in the development of common-sense knowledge, promises productive directions for empirical and theoretical advancement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frédéric Vandenberghe, The Nature of Culture. Towards a Realist Phenomenology of Material, Animal and Human Nature, pp. 461–475 In an ironic rejoinder to the postmodern politics of nature, I will adopt an anthropological perspective on culture, which is conspicuous by its absence in the latest wave of science studies, and reformulate the distinction between nature and culture as a reflexive distinction within culture that emerges with modernity. In order to countering the hypertextualism of the (de)constructivists, I will next sketch out a realist theory of nature. Combining the transcendental realism of Roy Bhaskar with the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, I will then try to outline the contours of a realist phenomenology of the ontological regions of physical, animal and human nature. Resuming my anthropological considerations on culture, I will finish the article with a progressive account of how the opposition between regional ontologies and regional typologies could be overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]