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Through a quantitative analysis of Taiwan–related legislation between 1979 and 2020, the article finds that the degree of Taiwan–related legislation is significantly correlated with the degree of tension in U.S.—China relations. While a deteriorating cross–Taiwan Strait relationship is clearly associated with the increasing legislative activities for the sake of Taiwan, an improving relationship from the state of fair to good cannot guarantee a decrease of such activities. A unified government and the extent of the Taiwan lobby are both helpful in passing pro–Taiwan acts but statistically insignificant. A content analysis of pro–Taiwan bills approved by the Trump administration suggests a creeping movement to "normalize" U.S–Taiwan relations with congressional activism and the less-restrained White House as a co–engine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US public holds more nuanced views about China than are typically captured in public opinion surveys. Empirical investigation of a nationwide online survey of US adults shows that the American public is sharply divided over the US–China trade war, despite reporting high support for international trade with China (76%). Using survey questions on US–China trade and the trade war, a typology was developed that indicates more than 40% of US adults support trade with China but oppose the trade war. A slightly smaller share has a more economically militant view of trade with China, supporting trade and the trade war. Political identity is strongly associated with attitudes toward the trade war, but only weakly associated with attitudes toward trade with China. Perceptions about China and its government, people, and culture are highly correlated with views on trade with China but are unrelated to views on the trade war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the effects of the United States (U.S.) anti-dumping policy targeting China's steel products, based on the HS 10-digit code monthly data from 1995 to 2015. It shows that as soon as the U.S. government implemented the affirmative preliminary ruling of an anti-dumping case, the volume of Chinese exports to the U.S. decreased regardless of the outcome of the final ruling. In the meantime, the U.S. imports of the involved products from other competing countries increased. It further finds that China's exports of the impacted products were diverted to the third-party countries, most of which were developing countries. This finding is contrary to those of studies from other industries such as textiles and agricultural products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China–US financial contention or confrontation comes to the fore, given the pivotal role of finance in the international system and the current international order transition. Will there be destructive conflicts or a Thucydides Trap in China–US financial relations? By adopting a power analysis framework, the China–US financial contention is observed from four types of international financial power: structural, relational, institutional and ideational. The competition for these powers results in reform divergence of global financial governance and thus international financial insecurity. The contention and consequent insecurity, however, do not necessarily mean an inevitable 'Thucydides Trap' in China–US financial relations. Elaborated and issue-specific ways of management could alleviate the contention, including shunning RMB-USD strategic confrontation, refraining from a debt weapon and aggressive imbalance adjustment, enhancing the legitimacy of international financial institutions and avoiding a new Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Sino–Japanese relations have been on a recovery course, the deterioration of ties in the first one and a half decades since 2000 should not be forgotten. This article aims to unpack China's perception formation mechanism toward Japan during these turbulent fifteen years by introducing the perspective of strategic perception. Because China's strategic perception toward Japan is largely derived from its overall perceptions of the international system, this article focuses on China's strategic elites to systemically trace the evolution of China's perception of Japan and its policy implications, and to provide a new perception equilibrium that reduced the US factor in the formation of a mutual Sino–Japanese perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's military presence and seaport constructions in the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean have prompted hostile reactions from the US, Japan, Australia, and India. Conversely, its dual-use base in Djibouti has not generated as much controversy hitherto. To decipher this enigma, the article analyzes the base within the context of China's 'latent power.' China cultivates latent power for economic interests in the Middle East and Africa, while downplaying the military dimension of its growing global power. The study of Djibouti supports the hypothesis, which reflects China's risk-aversion, pragmatism, low-key behavior, and emphasis on the security-economy nexus. With latent power at its core, China's foreign policy in regions beyond its immediate borders advances its strategy of co-existence while avoiding conflict with its rivals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intensifying disputes between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands today have reminded both academia and the general public of the Ryukyu problem. Reportedly, during the Cairo Conference in 1943, Chiang Kai-shek let slip opportunities to recover the Ryukyus, which later resulted in Japanese control of the Diaoyu Islands. Until now, scholarship has maintained that Chiang narrowly missed regaining Okinawa at Cairo, which never again appeared on his agenda. However, a more nuanced historical account can be found in rarely accessed primary resources such as Chiang's diaries and presidential papers, which yield a different conclusion—that he was, in fact, committed to the Ryukyu issue throughout his political career. However, Chiang lost multiple opportunities to resolve the issue as a result of competition with his communist rival, the security dynamics of the Cold War, and his personality. Chiang eventually failed to stop America from returning the Ryukyus to Japan, which, thereafter, generated the Diaoyu Islands disputes and continues to serve as a primary source of nationalist friction today in Sino–Japanese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Washington-Beijing rivalry of the early twentieth century was neither pre-ordained nor an aberration. It was constructed as domestic constituencies in each country were socialized toward confrontation. Pro-cooperation coalitions, which had emerged in each country to support alignment against a mutually perceived Soviet threat, were undermined by the final chapter of the Cold War. Yet a simmering U.S.-China rivalry was subsumed by an unsustainable accommodation of mutual self-interest by Washington and Beijing during the first two decades of the post-Cold War era. By the 2010s, the rivalry had become quite visible as pro-cooperation coalitions in the United States and China had splintered and been supplanted by pro-confrontation coalitions. U.S. and Chinese geostrategic reassessments also contributed to the emerging rivalry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Will the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy lead to an extensive alliance network against China? This article shifts focus to non-Quad Asian states—in particular, Indonesia, Vietnam, and South Korea—that face a strategic dilemma in the US-China competition and examines their positions regarding a rising China and the Indo-Pacific strategy. While reluctant to join the US strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, Asian middle powers now aim to tame, rather than contain, China despite their slight variations of response to the Indo-Pacific strategy. The US and its three partners—Japan, India, and Australia—have not been successful yet in recruiting new members to their coalition, mainly because of the declining hegemon's (seemingly) weakened commitment to a liberal international order and the rising challenger's (potential) opposition and punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the historical institutionalists' emphasis on the effects of ideas on policy making, this paper focuses on the importance of economic ideas and ideologies on China's trade policy making with regard to the signing of the WTO agreement with the United States in 1999. The paper argues that trade liberalization in China was a result of top Chinese leaders' embrace of neoclassical economic ideas which conceive a small role for the state in the marketplace, mainly as the regulator of the macro-economic environment and as the enforcer of the rule of law, rather than as a major player in the marketplace. Top Chinese leaders' socialization with neoclassical economic ideas enabled them to forge a political consensus to link state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms with speedy WTO accession and led to China's major concessions in WTO negotiations with the United States in 1999 which were inconceivable just a few years ago. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although China and the US are starting their fourth decade of energy cooperation, it is only recently that there has been a concerted US effort to create a framework for US-China bilateral energy relations. The past 30 years have witnessed many successful energy projects that have lacked follow through and institutionalization, often becoming 'one-off' exercises that duplicated previous projects. Recent initiatives intend to establish long-term linkages between US and Chinese energy bureaucracies, linking energy efficiency, energy security, and environmental issues. The US is nesting the bilateral relationship in global and Asia-Pacific multilateral energy and environmental regimes, and is also using bilateral agreements as mechanisms to promote domestic energy and environmental reform. This paper will examine US-China relations in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate and the Five-Country Energy Ministerial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of US-China wartime relations, the Stilwell Incident has become 'hard evidence' that the Nationalist Government had no intention of fighting against Japan and would exploit Allied resources to expand its strength. Interestingly enough, Stilwell's successor, Albert C. Wedemeyer, despite taking command in a difficult and awkward situation, succeeded in strengthening the Nationalist armies to fight the Japanese and kept Sino-American relations out of a state of crisis. With the availability of Chiang Kai-shek's newly-released diaries and the Wedemeyer Papers, historians are now in a good position to explore how and why Wedemeyer could successfully fulfill his mission. The basis of Wedemeyer's success becomes clear upon close examination of his perception of and attitude toward the Chinese situation and of his dealings with Chiang Kai-shek, the ongoing offensive of the Japanese troops, and KMT-CCP conflicts. Wedemeyer's case provides insight into the nature of the US-China wartime relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While much has been written about US–China strategic rivalry, no study to the authors' knowledge has conducted an empirical analysis of this rivalry. This article fills this gap by investigating whether and how this rivalry affects a country's response to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The findings of this article indicate that certain aspects of bilateral strategic ties indeed have strong effects on a country's reaction to the Chinese bank. More specifically, shorter distance to higher a level of partnership with, and more arms purchase from Beijing lead to faster accession to the AIIB, while the shorter distance to Washington results in slower accession, controlling for other factors. In addition, economically developed countries appear to be consistently more eager to join the Beijing-led bank than economically underdeveloped countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, arms embargoes have typically been imposed on isolated and relatively weak states. Exceptionally, the 1989 US-led arms embargo on China is imposed on an influential world power that has various means to deal with it. Moreover, it has so far failed to change the behavior of and reduce arms imports by the targeted state—two basic parameters of arms embargo success. Attempting to explain the endurance of China arms embargo and building on the vast literature of international sanctions, the article closely examines the embargo's changing goals, costs, and implementation over the years. Arguing that the evolvement of these three components has kept the embargo cost-effective, the article enhances our understanding of the effectiveness of US China policy and concurrently illustrates the capacity of international sanctions to expose the true goal hierarchy, means, and political processes that underlie foreign policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iran is expected to be one of the main beneficiaries of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China and Iran had a track record of cooperation long before the announcement of BRI, developing a highly asymmetric Great Power-Middle Power partnership over the course of three decades. This article asks whether BRI will enable China and Iran to transcend the limitations faced by most Great Power-Middle Power relationships on the basis of Iran's enhanced strategic economic and geographic value. It is argued that while BRI could benefit from stronger China–Iran ties, Iran's international posturing has proven a significant hindrance to China, highlighting that entrenched patterns of engagement in Great Power-Middle Power relations are not easily shifted, even in the face of immense economic incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key feature of Asia's evolving strategic landscape is U.S. efforts to promote policy coordination and interoperability among its allies and partners, through dialogues, exercises, intelligence-sharing agreements, and other means. Though useful in addressing practical issues and underscoring shared values, a concern is that these 'minilateral' activities could exacerbate Chinese fears of 'encirclement' and lead to strategic or economic counter-moves. However, this article suggests that a new 'security dilemma' in Asia is not likely. Although Chinese officials and analysts are apprehensive about U.S. bilateral alliance developments, they have largely discounted the emergence of an 'Asian NATO' under U.S. stewardship. This is due to perceived divergences between U.S. allies, many states' economic dependence on China, and U.S. self-restraint. This should open possibilities for greater minilateral cooperation under most conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2008, Tibet erupted in the biggest challenge to Chinese rule since 1959. While Beijing and Dharamsala engaged in their familiar battle of representations, pundits speculated on the causes of the uprising, ranging from conspiracy theories to informed policy analysis. Applying the framework of the insecurity dilemma, this article argues that Tibetan identity insecurity on account of the post-1989 hard-line Chinese policies was the chief cause of the uprising. Largely peaceful protests and occasionally violent riots in Tibet have been integral to Tibetan efforts to mitigate their societal insecurities provoked by Chinese migration, 'assimilationist' policies and 'cultural imperialism'. However, Tibetan protests and riots heighten Chinese insecurities and harden Beijing's policies both inside Tibet and towards the Dalai Lama. This paper reveals the dynamic cycle of hard-line Chinese policies provoking Tibetan uprisings; the resulting hardening in Chinese policies feeds back into Tibetan insecurities and protests. The 2008 uprising was the most recent cycle in the long-running saga of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma. The article warns that unless the Tibetans and the Chinese find a way to break out of the insecurity dilemma, Tibet could explode into another frenzy of violence and counter-violence in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In charting the water of the post-Cold War world, one of the most prominent questions touches upon the likely effects of China's rise. Echoing more or less explicitly power transition theory's assumptions, the rapid and multifaceted ascent of China has popularized the idea of a likely overtaking of the American dominant power by the rising challenger. Sceptics have, however, pointed out that by most standards China remains far from being on a par with the United States. This paper argues that though a global power transition lies far beyond the horizon, the relevant level at which the transition should be considered is the East Asian region, or the Asian 'super-region'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper occupies a middle ground in the debate between regional area specialists in foreign policy analysis and international relations theorists in international studies. Based on balance of power and balance of threat theories, a 'dynamic balancing' model is introduced to explain states' foreign policy strategies. Its claims are: (1) the polarity of the international system shapes whether a state's strategic choices should be balancing with external efforts or balancing with internal efforts; (2) leaders' perceptions of external threats determine when and how a state pursues different balancing strategies. The application of the dynamic balancing model to China's balancing strategies towards the United States suggests that the future of Sino-American relations depends on the strategic interactions and mutual threat perceptions between the two nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking advantage of President Trump’s retreat from global leadership, President Xi has vowed to provide ‘China solutions’ to global governance, raising the question if China is to overhaul the post-World War II world order. This article argues that China is not ready to step into America’s shoes. Embracing the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty, the fundamental norms of the post-World War II order, while adapting to the liberal norms of globalization, China is a revisionist stakeholder, dissatisfied not with the fundamental rules of the order but its status in the hierarchy of the order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mounting import competition from China has increased unemployment in manufacturing and suppressed wages in local labor markets around the United States. This article investigates the political effects of this China trade shock, using a unique dataset of the district-level economic impact of Chinese imports to the United States. The liberalization of trade following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization increased political polarization among American voters and encouraged legislators in economically hard-hit districts to take positions hostile to China. The result is that Congress is even more hostile towards China today than in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre. After 2003, members of Congress who voted against China were more likely to come from districts that were adversely impacted by import competition, controlling for ideology and partisanship. By contrast, import competition was not a significant predictor of earlier congressional opposition to granting most-favored-nation status to China (suggesting that voting on these crucial pieces of legislation was driven by non-economic concerns such as human rights). Far from being the political win–win its proponents envisioned, trade has eclipsed human rights and Taiwan as the main driver of hostility to China in Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates US responses to President Xi Jinping’s new model of major power relations in the context of American reflections on the engagement policy toward China. It argues that while the Obama administration endorsed the goal of avoiding confrontation between the two countries, it disagreed about how to reach the goal. Facing pressure to stand up against China due to the perceived failure of engagement policy, the administration became increasingly frank on the competition with China. The Sino-US strategic mistrust intensified and the chances of mishaps triggering an escalation increased when President Obama turned the presidency to Donald Trump. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While most East Asian countries have opted for a hedge strategy to preserve a maximum range of strategic options in response to the rise of China, some countries have engaged in geostrategic balance through collective bargaining and strategic alignments with the US and with each other. The divergent threat perceptions and complicated historical animosities among East Asian countries, however, have set a limitation on the geostrategic balance. Therefore, to bandwagon with China could be a realistic choice for many countries. Historically, the most successful rising powers have been those which attracted the greatest number of bandwagoners. China cannot rise successfully without winning the support of its Asian neighbors. The long term peace and stability in the region, therefore, depends not only on whether China’s neighbors can work together to balance China but also whether China can balance its relationships in its own backyard so that its neighbors find bandwagoning a positive choice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article, in the context of sovereignty, discusses problems put to China and the Vatican in their long course of negotiations (1987–) which aim at a reconciliation. China’s past experience in negotiating with major powers (US and Great Britain) are reviewed while the Vatican’s aim of negotiating a concordat is also explained. The societal factors from the current Chinese political landscape, including social unrest as well as the Taiwan factor, are reviewed to identify problems in the ‘Sino–Vatican negotiations’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article provides a Chinese perspective on the terms of China's WTO accession, highlighting the negative impact of some discriminatory conditions that China accepted in order to join the WTO on its foreign trade and global competitiveness in the last decade. The author uses the non-market economy status of China as a case study to support the argument that these discriminatory conditions imposed on China upon accession have not only impeded the healthy development of China's foreign trade, but also violated the ‘non-discrimination’ principle of the WTO. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Exploring the causes of the China–US strategic rivalry and its possible mitigation, this article argues that President Xi's new model of big power relations represents a challenge to the US primacy in the Asia–Pacific based on China's rising power and deeply rooted suspicion of the US containment. But neither the US nor China can be the single dominant power in the region. The new model can be built only if China and the US demonstrate a strategic restraint and maintain a delicate balance of power to prevent their rivalry from boiling over into a new Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Based on an original survey conducted in the summer of 2012 in Beijing, we examine how China's America watchers—IR scholars who work on US-China relations—have viewed China's power status in the international system, US-China relations and some specific US policies in Asia. Our survey shows that almost half of the survey participants thought that America would remain the global hegemon in the next ten years. Meanwhile, a large majority was also optimistic that China is a rising great power, especially in the economic sense, in the world. More than half of the respondents saw Asian military issues, such as the South China Sea issue, as the most difficult problem between China and the US. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article systematically examines the perceptual dimension of US–China–ASEAN relations. It specifically focuses on Chinese perceptions of American intentions in Southeast Asia, Chinese perceptions of the impact on China of the US's return to Southeast Asia, and suggestions of the Chinese scholarly community as to how China should respond to the US's return. Chinese scholars believe that the US returns to Southeast Asia for a variety of reasons and one of the most important is to manage the rise of China, and that the US's return has both positive and negative impacts on China's interests and the negative impact outweighs the positive. Overall, Chinese perceptions of the US return, especially Chinese scholars’ suggested response, indicate that Chinese scholars have internalized the strategy of peaceful rise which would give us added confidence that China is seriously committed to this strategy. If both the US and China stick to their relevant commitments, the rise of China, unlike that of most great powers in the past, would quite likely be peaceful. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China's strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwan and the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China's national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China's strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This analysis of the dangerous forces increasingly dynamizing Beijing–Washington relations explains why the usual proposals for increasing the cooperative aspects of USA–PRC relations will not succeed. It builds on the policy analysis and policy proposals of others who understand what a disaster it would be if China–America relations were to continue to grow worse. It makes a suggestion for restructuring the institutions of the international political economy so as to construct fundamental over-lapping interests between America and China. The author finds that without some difficult and basic changes in the relations, worst case outcomes become ever more probable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines US policy toward the improving relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. It also analyzes several policy options that the Barack Obama administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the author suggests that, despite some arguments to the contrary, continuing the current policy supporting the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei is in the best interest of the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate 'international space'. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the 'one China' principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A review of four periods and a comparison of three regional institutions provide evidence for how serious China has become about multilateralism with its neighbors in Asia. Approval for multilateralism does not mean that China is ready to endorse strong regional organizations that bind their members, especially when it has reservations both about institutions that could undermine its narrow notion of sovereignty and norms that could support US or even Japanese efforts to impose long-feared universal values. If China calculates that limited multilateralism now provides a variety of benefits, to date its support reflects specific circumstances, not general trust in this format. Focusing on the Six-Party Talks as the presumed foundation for regionalism in Northeast Asia offers a concentrated view of strategic thinking toward the area most vital to China's security. In the standoff between North Korea and the United States we are able to assess the degree to which China accepts working with four or five states and the prospects for its active support, if circumstances permit, for the establishment of a peace and security mechanism through the fifth working group that originated in the Joint Agreement of February 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the United States remains atop the world's power hierarchy, it is becoming less dominant, both because of the rise of new power centers and because the problems are becoming larger. The United States now must function in a world of relatively greater power equality and ever-larger problems springing from interdependence. The United States and China now have to look each other straight in the eyes, with the core of their relationship resting on the strategic foundation of stabilization—stabilization of the global economy, global ecosystem, and global security. This essay makes several additional points: (1) China has made some wise domestic and foreign economic policy decisions in the context of the great economic downturn of 2007-2009 that probably will increase the PRC's relative capacities coming out of the downturn; (2) US-China relations are more fundamentally sound than they have ever been before. Both nations' leaders should seize this opportunity to recast their relationship as partners in the effort to build coalitions to address the global system's most pressing challenges; and (3), even with a relatively sound strategic foundation for bilateral relations, when one moves from the general to the specific in important policy domains, it will be exceedingly difficult for Beijing and Washington to reach agreements on how to proceed on many key issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A harmonious world will benefit the whole world including China and the United States. Building a harmonious world calls for good relations between all countries, especially favorable Sino-US relations. Even though China and the US have different perceptions with respect to building a harmonious world, the two countries need to cooperate for that to happen. The constructive partnership between China and the US provides a solid foundation for cooperation between them. For further cooperation, both should work towards building strategic mutual trust and increasing mutual understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Renowned as one of China's most eloquent and persuasive spokesmen in the United States during WWII, T. V. Soong, who served as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's personal representative in Washington, had obtained vital US aid for China when it appeared that Chinese military will was about to collapse. He had negotiated strategic loans with the US and produced critical economic and military aid packages, thus projecting a strong national image of China to the Western Allies. But historians, until now, have known almost nothing about Soong's wartime, diplomatic endeavors, especially his managing of Sino-American relations. Archival materials at the Hoover Institution have only been recently opened, allowing this author to describe some unique episodes in US-China relations during the years 1940 to 1943. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]