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United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) leaders have tried to manage their respective approaches to China to avoid creating problems in bilateral relations and in the U.S.-ROK alliance. U.S. policymakers have been careful not to place Seoul in the position of having to choose between Washington and Beijing. However, a U.S. military conflict with China would bring differences in U.S. and ROK interests to the fore and force South Korean leaders to make tough choices in response to U.S. requests for diplomatic, economic, and military support. This paper considers what types of diplomatic and economic support the United States might expect from the ROK in the event of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. It then examines potential U.S. requests for military support from the ROK in three scenarios: 1) a PRC joint firestrike campaign intended to inflict sufficient damage to compel Taiwan to negotiate its political status with Beijing; 2) a PRC joint blockade intended to inflict sufficient damage to Taiwan's economy to compel negotiations; and 3) a joint island landing campaign intended to seize Taiwan and bring it under PRC control. Each involves a different type of military conflict, a different projected duration, and different military demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the United States and China emphasize the significance of multilateral frameworks, they have not departed from power politics. As the confrontation between U.S.-led and Chinese-style multilateralism intensifies, the practice of multilateral cooperation based on openness and responsibility is losing ground. In this context, this paper compares U.S.-led multilateralism and Chinese-style multilateralism to examine U.S.-China rivalry in multilateral mechanisms. It then zooms in on the rivalry in the context of the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. President Biden's key strategy in his China policy is represented by the catchphrase "cooperate, compete, confront," dubbed the "3C framework," reflecting the complexities of U.S.-China relations. While the two states tend to show a mix of competition and cooperation relative to global multilateral mechanisms, they exhibit a mix of competition and conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The paper analyzes recent United States and Chinese approaches towards topical multilateral issues: on climate change issues for the former and on cybersecurity and advanced technology for the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper evaluates the key factors that have predominantly increased the maritime competition between the United States and China. The authors argue that, due to the diverging naval interests in the South and the East China Seas and the growing competition to acquire maritime security technology, the momentum of maritime rivalry has immensely escalated between the two states. Based on strategic maneuverability in maritime security, this paper evaluates the rising strategic ambiguity posed by China's anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) system vis-à-vis the United States. It further illustrates U.S. All Domain Operation (ADO) and China's rapid emergence as a maritime competitor in Asia. The evaluation demonstrates the repercussions of miscalculations and highlights that the perceived mutual rivalry has come to the point that both sides are muddling through the dynamics of misperception and security-dilemma scenario which has increased the likelihood of strategic miscalculations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study presents measures to evaluate the power of states from a network perspective. Several indicators have been used for such analysis, including GDP, GNP, and the CINC. However, these indicators have limitations in that they do not take into account relational factors. Therefore, we provide three measures developed from a network perspective at the macro, meso, and micro levels to overcome these limitations. Furthermore, we explore the applicability of network theory-based measurement by analyzing changes in network power in the United States and China and present the following results. First, considering the economic domain, we conclude that China has surpassed the United States at the micro level, and the results of the centrality analysis indicate that the United States and China are very close at the other two levels. Second, in the military trade and cultural trade sectors, the United States has consistently been the most powerful state at all levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Biden administration has in general been operating both “strategic ambiguity” and “strategic clarity,” prompting the question: Is the United States being strategically ambiguous or strategically clear towards Taiwan? This paper believes the discussion should start with the clarification of “U.S. policy regarding Taiwan.” However, U.S. policy towards Taiwan involves the highly sensitive One–China policy. Thus, the United States will evaluate its “core interest” in relation to China when dealing with the One–China policy, as mishandling it may trigger a war between the United States and China or the rest of the world. This is the reason why the United States must devise its Taiwan policy at a macro-level and cautious manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intensification of U.S.-China relations marked by severe competition and sanctions in the Trump administration has continued in the Biden administration. As stated in the United States' 2018 National Defense Strategy, strategic competition with China has become Washington's top defense policy priority. Against this backdrop, United States' competition with China over the space domain will require much of the world's attention, as Washington continues to augment its space power in the context of its overall security strategy against China today. Therefore, it is crucial for countries like South Korea to understand how the United States is constructing its own space power and how this may influence South Korea's national security in the years ahead. The purpose of this paper is thus to analyze the current state of U.S. space power in the context of increasing U.S.-China security competition and provide relevant policy recommendations for South Korea. This research suggests South Korea 1) to establish a military organization with space security focus to promote the country's prospective space power augmentation and maximize the effectiveness of its joint military operations, 2) to construct its own space power and enhance its strategic value in the midst of U.S.-China space competition, and 3) to implement specific U.S.-South Korea space cooperation plans to develop advanced space technology and space industry capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the U.S.-China rivalry intensifies, South Korea has faced unprecedented pressure from both countries, and how it should respond has become a key issue. This study explores China's emergence as a challenger to U.S. dominance in the Gulf region and its implications for South Korea. Since the establishment of the Carter Doctrine in 1980, the United States has recognized the strategic importance of the Gulf and assumed the role of guardian to the entire region. However, President Obama's "Pivot to Asia" and Trump's retrenchment from costly foreign commitments marked a substantial shift in U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, this paper will assess the growing cooperation between China and the Gulf states in the midst of a perceived withdrawal of the United States from the region. It also attempts to reveal China's strategies that have the potential to challenge U.S. hegemony and growing U.S. vigilance against China's assertiveness in the region. By examining these questions, it is able to suggest implications for the South Korean government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea's nuclear weapons program, growing nuclear arsenal, and ongoing egregious violations of international nonproliferation treaties pose a significant threat to U.S. and South Korean security and a continual irritant to U.S. and Chinese relations. In the event of a collapse of the North Korean regime, Pyongyang's nuclear weapons and nuclear complex--and the vital importance of securing both--could serve as a catalyst for conflict between the United States and China, with significant negative repercussions for South Korea. Washington and Beijing, however, have found common ground to cooperate on a range of nuclear security and nonproliferation issues and initiatives in the past. The ROK can play an important diplomatic role in encouraging future dialogues and diplomacy on nuclear issues between the United States and China that could forestall a potential North Korean internal collapse from also becoming a major power nuclear crisis. Quiet but deliberate diplomacy aimed at encouraging bilateral or trilateral cooperation on securing beleaguered nuclear complexes and "loose nukes" could lay the groundwork for Washington and Beijing to tacitly agree on responses to a North Korea collapse scenario which realize mutually beneficial outcomes on nuclear issues--while also avoiding misunderstandings that could result in armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This preliminary study focuses on the change in the regional security order caused by the U.S.-China competition and its impact on South Korea-Japan relations. The ongoing U.S.-China relations has expanded beyond the discussion of cooperation and competition between existing and emerging powers, as well as the debate over the influence and resilience of the U.S.-led liberal international order. The significance of the U.S.-China competition in the security order in East Asia depends on whether China will accept the existing U.S.-led bilateral alliance system and take a status quo attitude. As a result, the U.S. allies, South Korea and Japan, need to respond sensitively to the changing nature of the security order. In this vein, this study explains the East Asian security order as elements of power structure, institutions, and actors. In addition, it explains the emergence of China as a new hegemonic power due to the U.S.-China competition, the hub-and-spokes system changes according to the U.S. rebalancing policy, and the emergence of Trumpism. Through this, the author argues two claims. First, the change in U.S.-China relations has led to different expectations between Seoul and Tokyo for cooperation with the U.S., which has hindered bilateral cooperation between them. Second, divergent views on China also hinder South Korea-Japan cooperation. Through the Senkaku dispute between Japan and China and the missile deployment dispute between South Korea and China, the two countries later showed different directions in their policy toward China. In the current competitive situation, restrictions on South Korea-Japan relations are inevitable. However, if the opportunity to promote security cooperation between South Korea and Japan is sought, it will be able to show the cooperation of middle power countries that can develop the security order to mitigate the intensity of U.S.-China competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has a long coastline of approximately 18,000 kilometers and hence an extensive continental shelf as well as an EEZ. Its coastline is said to be the tenth longest coastline in the world. The total sea area in the China Seas is about 4.7 million square kilometers. Despite these advantageous circumstances in geography, China failed to become a maritime power like Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK. So it remained a land power for a long time except when Zheng He, the great seafarer in Chinese history, led the greatest ocean-going fleets of the world of that time, sailing to the Pacific and Indian Oceans during the years of 1405-1433. As a result, China suffered foreign invasions several times from the sea, being defeated in the Opium War as well as at the Sino--Japanese War in the nineteenth century. It is only natural that China has opposed the traditional freedom of the seas claimed by the maritime powers since the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. When China took part in all the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) sessions, its policy and position on the major issues were almost identical with those of the developing countries: creeping jurisdiction policy. With regard to the breadth of the territorial sea, China supported and complied with the 12 nautical mile territorial sea. It has established straight baselines since it proclaimed territorial sea in 1958. Also it argued that several disputed islands were its territories by the 1958 declaration as well as by the 1992 law on the territorial sea. China's policy on the law of the sea, however, might change dramatically in accordance with the general trends of the law of the sea. China ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) in 1996, 14 years after signing it. Thus China has committed itself to developing its domestic laws and regulations on maritime affairs in accordance with the 1982 LOSC and to meet the demands and changed circumstances in the use of oceans. Given the foregoing, this paper attempts to provide China's policy on the territorial sea in the context of its change in the law of the sea. To be more specific, it examines relevant issues on the breadth of the territorial sea, baselines as well as innocent passage of warships in terms of U.S.--China relations, with special emphasis on the comparison with Korea's relevant policy on the law of the sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia has become more salient on the international stage, economically and strategically. Considering its significance, many scholars have paid attention to the regional security environment. They consider East Asia a peaceful region because there has been no inter–state war, and attempt to explore factors preventing wars in East Asia. We believe that the focus on the absence of war would not only fail to provide a whole picture of the current East Asian security condition but also give a false impression that this region is stable and secure. Accordingly, we attempt to provide a detailed descriptive look at the current security environment of East Asia by focusing on various aspects of the security environment. We show that East Asia suffers from intense tensions, while it has avoided serious interstate conflict. By drawing on various perspectives, we attempt to explain the seemingly contradictory phenomenon in this region, a co-existence of intense hostility and negative peace. The U.S.–China competition, territorial disputes, and the ineffectiveness of regional institutions have intensified intra–regional tension, undermining potentials for developing security cooperation. Nevertheless, the security role of the United States and a high level of intra–regional economic integration have prevented the occurrence of serious militarized conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the new era of the U.S.–China strategic rivalry, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is attempting to transform itself into a world class defense unit by constructing a self-organizing system of defense innovation. Translating its global lead in digitization and economic achievements into military power will entail the integration of critical and emerging technology into its existing weapon clusters and processes, the fielding of new and modified equipment, and the reinforcement of industrial applications such as robotics and autonomous vehicles. Building on developments in the PLA’s reform and modernization, this study conducts a systemic examination of China’s intelligentization strategy to prevail in the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR). Hard and soft inputs that shape China’s ecosystem of defense–innovation, including material, financial, and technological inputs, process factors of plans, strategies, and acquisition, and institutional factors have been examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since late 2016, the Philippine and U.S. military establishments have effectively circumvented the crisis in the two countries' alliance stemming from the Duterte Administration's appeasement policy toward China. This appeasement policy was designed to foster closer diplomatic and economic relations with China and to distance the Philippines from the United States and its allies (Japan and Australia) relative to the South China Sea dispute. Despite the refocusing of the alliance agenda from external defense and maritime security to counter-terrorism and HADR, the U.S. military succeeded in strengthening the pro-American elements in the Philippine government and the AFP and averted the crisis. This was evidenced by the resumption of warfighting scenarios in the 2019 Balikatan exercises, and Manila's outrage over the persistent Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. In February 2020, however, President Duterte unilaterally abrogated the 1999 Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This move triggered another crisis in the alliance. Recently, the Philippines and the United States adopted the November 16, 2021 Joint Vision for a 21st Century United States-Philippines Partnership which reaffirmed their commitment to a security relationship between sovereign equals despite President Duterte's ambivalent attitude towards the alliance. Its urgent task is to ensure that the Philippine-U.S. alliance remains intact, and vibrant in the face of the changing nature of the 21st century Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes American defense and security strategy towards China and assesses its policy impact on security on the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The rapid rise of the People's Republic of China as a geopolitical power and its aggressive foreign policy has considerably heightened fears among U.S. policymakers that China poses a threat. The intensifying strategic rivalry and distrust between Washington and Beijing since the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump in 2017 is leading to worsened relations between the two countries. This trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, and it is also expected that the American grand strategy will view China as the new global adversary, drawing down the "War on Terror" in the process. China is indeed fast emerging as the target of sustained deterrence, and this shift in American strategic thinking will likely continue even after the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections. Intensifying Sino-American geopolitical competition is resulting in a new Cold War posture, reflecting in turn a lack of strategic dialogue. As a result, the risk of Sino-American military conflict in geopolitical hotspots around the world (including the Korean Peninsula) is rapidly increasing, and countries in the region are worried about being entangled in a Great Power conflict between the two countries. In the meantime, the United States is soliciting countries in the region to join an "anti-Beijing" grouping of sorts, seeking to integrate pre-existing alliances (e.g., the ROK-U.S. Alliance) into this new grouping. Beijing, for its part, is attempting to weaken those traditional alliances with Washington, through measures such as economic coercion. Seoul is bearing the brunt of such sustained pressure from Beijing and is being pressured by both countries to "pick" one side over the other. Practically speaking, rather than pick sides, Seoul ought to chart a middle course, proceeding with "strategic confidence" that draws on a clear delineation of national interest and backing of the South Korean public. In particular, it would behoove Seoul to provide opportunities for deliberation on Korean Peninsula security issues, enhancing the prospects for meaningful strategic dialogue between Washington and Beijing. Concurrently, Seoul would also benefit from vigilant monitoring of the changing balance of power between United States and China, utilizing insights drawn from keen monitoring to further enhance its defense capabilities. In so doing, it is expected that Seoul will enhance its strategic value and military deterrence capabilities. Concurrently, by way of proactive military-to-military diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, cooperative deterrence capabilities also would have to be significantly enhanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper constructs a two-level model to explain China-U.S. relations. We find that at the state level, the interdependence between China and the United States, which comes from their bilateral trade and foreign direct investment, is asymmetric. Such asymmetric interdependence favors the United States in pushing the Chinese government to make concessions when they have conflicts. However, at the society level, China can penetrate into American society to intervene or influence American foreign policymaking. In this paper, it is argued that the outcome of China-U.S. relations is determined not only by the asymmetric interdependence at the state level or societal penetration respectively, but also by the interaction of these two factors in the process. Finally, the new development of China-U.S. relations since the inauguration of the Obama administration is also examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The election of an opposition party candidate into the White House usually leads to friction between China and the United States. This paper argues that Barack Obama's election will serve as an exception. Instead of taking a harsher line on China, President Obama would inherit many of Bush's pragmatic policies on China. This has already been proven by the stable development of relations between the two countries during the better part of Obama's first year in office. However, by the end of the year, relations between China and the United States appeared to be heading into some troubled waters. This paper begins with some thoughts on the election of an opposition candidate in general and that of Obama in particular in terms of its impact on China-U.S. relations. Then, it discusses the opportunities and challenges the election of Obama posed to China-U.S. relations. Afterward, it comes up with some speculations on the prospects for China-U.S. relations. And finally, it makes a preliminary assessment of the impact of Obama's election on China-U.S. relations during the first year of the Obama administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses reports within the issue including the policies adopted by the alliance of the U.S. and South Korea, the role and diplomacy of China as a world power, and the re-balancing policy strategy of the U.S. under the Obama administration.

East Asia is now fully engaged in a competition between a rising China and the other powers--the United States and Japan--while the regional order is in a transition from a super primacy of the United States to the asymmetric bipolar structure of the United States and China. China is changing a lot in terms of capabilities and behavior; but China also shows its benevolence, such as benefit-sharing initiatives on regional institutionalization development. The "American rebalancing strategy" has partly reversed the overall situation in East Asia in favor of the United States, but as 57 countries have joined the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Beijing has now recovered some ground from this overwhelming tide of the U.S. strategy. China's military modernization and Sino-Japanese confrontation over the Diaoyu Islands offer a big excuse and incentive for Japan's acceleration of this process of becoming a normal country. The future of Northeast Asia lies mainly in the four variables and their interactions: the Chinese Communist Party's capability to balance its goal of national rejuvenation and nationalistic emotion in protecting its sovereignty interests; the United States' genuine attitude toward China's power development; Japan's goal of its nationalistic resurgence and its complicated strategic ties with China and South Korea; and North Korean regime stability and nuclear capability development. In spite of the Sino-American competition relations, there always exists a demand of condominium and strategic interdependence on global governance and other hot issues in the international arena. Therefore, management of China-U.S. competition is key to stability of the regional order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to discuss whether the Korean Peninsula is included among the core interests claimed by China. The core interests of China are those interests that it is unwilling to negotiate over, and interests that they will even use military power to protect. China's official core interests have so far been limited to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, but their list of core interests has been expanding in scope since the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. Furthermore, including the Korean Peninsula among China's core interests leads to an immense ripple-effect on not only South Korea but also the security of Northeast Asia and U.S.-China relations. This study analyzes the following research questions: What are the core interests of China? Is the Korean Peninsula included in China's core interests? Will the Korean Peninsula only be included in China's core interests in the event of an emergency? If it is included, what is the specific object or likely scenario? This study conducts an in-depth analysis of the questions above and provides policy implications for the South Korean government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article outlines the general framework of bilateral relations between China and the United States, and identifies their central strategic interests that are embodied in their respective policies toward the Korea Peninsula. Based on this elaboration, the authors further explore the divergences and convergences of the Chinese and American security strategies and foreign policies on issues related to Korea, with a focus on the effects of North Korea's latest nuclear test in February 2013 on their respective interests and attitudes. In conclusion, the authors offer some practical approaches that might be jointly implemented by China and the United States in their handling of Korea-related issues. The authors argue that, despite the complexities of China-U.S. bilateral relations and some potential sources of hostility between them, China and the United States can still manage to establish a mechanism to stabilize the Korea Peninsula through joint efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The world is moving toward a new bipolarity between the United States and China. Under the bipolar structure, China is building Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities against the United States, while the Americans are pursuing an AirSea Battle doctrine. However, the U.S. strategy is faced with a triple dilemma. First, the United States builds military power to penetrate China's A2/AD, which requires offensive rather than defensive capabilities in character. Such military capabilities do not reflect America's status-quo political objectives and distort the signals from Washington into more offensive ones. Second, with local allies located close to China, the United States pursues capabilities to come to rescue them in case of Chinese "emergencies." The U.S. capabilities would aggravate the security dilemma between Beijing and Washington. Third, when the Americans disengage from East Asia in order to solve the dilemma with China, the U.S. allies--potential and formal alliance partners--in East Asia would go for independent nuclear programs rather than security cooperation among themselves. The historical legacy and mutual antagonism--in particular, South Korea's anti-Japanese sentiment--would prevent a regional coalition against China from arising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article surveys some of the challenges that President Obama or his successor will face over the next several years as the United States attempts to "pivot toward Asia." In view of the ongoing shift in power from West to East, Washington can no longer assume that it can preserve or transform Asia-Pacific security by its unilateral actions. Rather, the United States must develop a "lead from behind" strategy that will assist America's Asia-Pacific friends and allies to "make room for China" while at the same time encouraging them to take greater responsibility for regional security. As it develops its plans for the Asia-Pacific region, the United States will have to accord special attention to three legacy issues (the China-Taiwan relationship, the unresolved confrontation between North and South Korea, and the incompatibility of American and Chinese values) which have confounded U.S.-China relations for six decades. If managed properly, a U.S. pivot toward Asia can be beneficial to both the United States and America's regional friends and allies. But this will require Washington to pursue what President Obama recently described as a "more centered course" that leverages America's assets in the Asia-Pacific while avoiding policies that force regional governments to choose between Washington and Beijing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the impact of the Asian security architecture in the development of the U.S. and China relations in the 21st century. Topics discussed include the U.S.-China relationship in the East Asian context, China's strategy of multilateralism and its challenges to the U.S. Other topics include the security order in East Asia, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and international politics.

Drawing support from international institution theory, this article analyzes China's new thinking about Asian diplomacy after the Cold War. Institutionalism was flexibly utilized by China in its peripheral regions—Central Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, which have adopted institutional models—dominant participation, deep participation, active participation, and moderate participation models. China tries to handle the presence of U.S. interests well and has responded reasonably to U.S. pragmatic institutional engagement. To realize the aim of compatibility and coexistence between China and the United States in Asia, the two countries should establish interconnecting institutions in both economic and political fields. With regard to the future interactive trends of China and the United States in Asia, the author, from the dimension of international institutionalism, works out an institutional interplay—nested and overlapping institutions—for China and the United States to achieve accommodation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite decades of military-to-military talks and the creation of several China-U.S. defense confidence-building measures, clashes between Chinese and American military units operating in the international waters and airspace near China have repeatedly disrupted their bilateral relations. Since the mid-1990s, the two defense communities have negotiated a series of bilateral defense and security agreements and confidence-building measures seeking to reduce mutual tensions and advance their common security interests. These measures have promoted a better understanding of each party's security concerns, but they remain highly constrained and vulnerable to disruption from external shocks. Several factors have impeded their development. The most important obstacle has been the underlying contentious nature of the Chinese-U.S. relationship, which is manifested most acutely by tensions over Taiwan. As leaders of the weaker power, moreover, Chinese policymakers fear that excessive transparency could provide Americans with insights into their military vulnerabilities. Influenced by a strategic tradition that emphasizes deception, many Chinese strategists also believe that opaqueness assists in deterring potential adversaries by complicating their military planning. Furthermore, Chinese policymakers do not want to draw foreign attention to their continued military buildup. Finally, defense policymakers in both countries have generally resisted measures that constrain their military operations and capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China in Asia (and the world) is one of the principal challenges facing U.S. foreign policy. The multiple roles China now plays in Asia have been felt in a number of areas—diplomatically, economically, culturally, militarily, and multilaterally. These roles and the issues they present for Washington have been hotly debated in the United States. A consensus has emerged that there are both cooperative as well as competitive dimensions to the Sino-American regional relationship in Asia. This article explores these various dimensions by asking seven questions concerning the impact of China's roles on American interests. Concerning these seven key strategic questions, the author concludes that China is not trying to push the United States out of Asia; China is not undermining bilateral U.S. relations in the region; Beijing's multilateral diplomacy is a challenge to the U.S. regional role; China's economic strength is important but still small compared with the United States and Japan; Beijing's soft power is rising but not eclipsing America's; China's growing military power is an increasing challenge and concern for the U.S. military; and that a U.S. policy that seeks to forestall China's regional rise is counterproductive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europe-China relationships have gone from praise to disappointment, from talk about lifting the European arms embargo to worries about trade deficit, monetary undervaluation and investment. A strategic partnership has never been fully achieved. The relationship is important in some areas, such as trade and finance; in others, it remains lightweight. The European Union has become China's first market abroad, while China is moving rapidly to the position of first supplier. China needs to maintain access to the European market, while Europe struggles for a share of the Chinese market. Europe is not a major strategic actor in Asia-Pacific security issues, and has been thought to exercise a soft influence that would complement the Sino-American strategic relationship. European leverage is actually quite limited. The causes within the European institutional setup include complex policymaking at the European level and competition among national leaders, particularly those of France, Germany and the UK. The European market itself provides some leverage, limited by the fact that Chinese exports include many parts from other Asian producers. Europe should reinforce policy coordination and transatlantic dialogue, including economic issues; attract Chinese investment to balance trade; and forge ties with the fast-growing Asian democracies. Interdependence with a rising China is a common interest, but its terms should strengthen the rules and values of the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]