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Many coasts are eroding. In the Comoros, as in many other small island developing states (SIDS), communities frequently respond to coastal erosion by building seawalls-yet seawalls and other coastal defence structure are controversial, especially in a SIDS context, where they typically are poorly designed and constructed and thus tend to increase rather decrease erosion and are often unable to prevent flooding. Through an exploratory qualitative case study of Grande Comore, the main island of the Comoros (West Indian Ocean), we compare and contrast how local stakeholders, national elites and donors understand coastal erosion and flooding in the context of a changing climate and how they experience and perceive seawalls as a response measure. Our analysis suggests that although stakeholders are aware of different drivers of coastal erosion and flooding, including sand mining, seawalls are a frequent and customary response to coastal erosion and flooding. Little is known about their disadvantages or alternative response measures, especially among local community members. Further, a lack of capacity and resources leads not only to poorly designed and constructed seawalls but also to difficulties in enforcing rules and regulations such as bans on sand mining. From our exploratory study, three conclusions emerge: (1) local drivers of coastal erosion and flooding are more visible than global climate change while funding is more readily available for adaptation to climate change; (2) a mix of context and site-specific measures would be needed to adequately respond to coastal erosion and flooding; and (3) further information and knowledge about the extent and causes of coastal erosion and flooding as well as about the effects of different response measures would be needed to allow such context and site-specific measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wealthy countries spend increasing amounts of aid to support adaptation to climate change in developing countries and have committed under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to prioritize adaptation aid to those 'particularly vulnerable' to climate change. While research has started to track this aid, it has not yet examined its allocation across all donor and recipient countries. We thus do not know to what extent vulnerable countries indeed receive more support for adaptation. We address this research gap and ask: how does this commitment to prioritizing particularly vulnerable countries translate into actual adaptation aid allocation? To what extent do vulnerable countries receive more adaptation aid? We address these questions though a quantitative analysis of data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on bilateral adaptation aid from 2011 through 2014. In contrast to other studies, we find that vulnerability-or more precisely, vulnerability indicators-matter for adaptation aid allocation. Countries that are more exposed to climate change risks, such as extreme weather events or sea level rise, receive more adaptation aid, both on a per capita basis and as a percentage of all adaptation aid. These results indicate that collectively (even if not at the level of each individual donor) donors align their bilateral adaptation aid allocation with global promises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports published within the issue which include the dynamics of climate finance system, the emergence of climate finance in international negotiations, and the systemic perspective on climate change.

Press conferences are an important element of a government's communication strategy at climate change summits. From a theoretical perspective, press conferences should serve two main functions: exerting pressure in negotiations and informing the public. These functions correspond to two logics of action: a logic of consequence where governments use press conferences as negotiation tools and a logic of appropriateness where governments organize press conferences to increase transparency. Based on new data from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change archives, we find limited support for these two logics of action. Neither democracies, which, we argue, are more likely to follow a logic of appropriateness, nor vulnerable countries, which are more likely to follow a logic of consequence, organize systematically more press conferences. Other factors, such as capacity and a government's function in the negotiation structure, seem to play a more important role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Small island developing states (SIDS) are among the first and worst affected by climate change. SIDS are thus also among the first to adapt, and as 'early adaptors' can provide key lessons for adaptation efforts elsewhere. This article reviews the growing literature on climate change, adaptation and small island states. It first discusses migration - which increasingly is seen as part of adaptation rather than a failure to adapt. Mobility has long been part of island life, and remittances can for example fund adaptation measures back home. Yet, adaptation in situ is not as forthcoming as would be necessary. The article identifies different barriers to effective adaptation, and discusses them under three distinct but interrelated categories: perceptions and awareness, institutions, and (lack of) resources. For effective, sustainable and successful adaptation, we need to overcome these barriers, and in particular provide information and resources to the local level. With appropriate information and resources, island communities can take and implement informed decisions and successfully adapt to a changing climate - as they have adjusted to social and environmental changes in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyzes the lobbying behavior of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during international climate change negotiations. With limited resources, these NGOs need to strategically invest their resources to maximize impact. A key decision concerns the target of lobbying efforts: Whom do ngos lobby, and why? Two possible explanations are contrasted: influence and responsiveness. Accordingly, NGOs can focus on responsive targets that are likely to bring NGO input to the table or they can focus on influential targets whose voice is heard at the negotiation table. These two explanations are tested using data from a survey of NGOs active in international climate change negotiations. I find that NGOs strategically target their lobbying efforts, approaching both responsive and, more importantly, influential delegations. However, given that ngos primarily contact their home delegation, as well as the president of the negotiation session, further information on the nature and content of contacts between NGOs and government delegations is necessary for understanding NGO-government interactions in international climate change negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there is a substantial amount of research that studies how environmental interest groups/non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) influence international environmental negotiations, both the theoretical work and the empirical evidence were not yet able to answer comprehensively if this makes it more likely that states, in turn, commit to stronger environmental agreements. This article seeks to contribute to clarifying this. First, the authors argue that a higher degree of ENGO access to official negotiations and a larger number of ENGOs actively participating during bargaining processes can facilitate outcomes of environmental negotiations. The authors then analyze quantitative data on international environmental regimes and their members' commitment levels from 1946 to 1998 and obtain robust support for their claims. However, the rationale on the introduced explanatory factors also implies that the impact of ENGO access on states' commitment levels should vary conditional on the number of ENGOs actively participating. The paper finds evidence for such an interaction, although the results go against our expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Small island states have been able to obtain some remarkable achievements in the climate change negotiations by building a cohesive coalition, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Its cohesion, however, has been affected by changes in the UNFCCC process. The increase both in the number of issues on the climate agenda and the number of negotiation groups may have helped or hindered compromise and finding common ground. To track how AOSIS has fared in the climate change regime, the activities and positions of AOSIS, and of individual AOSIS members over three distinct periods (1995–2000, 2001–2005, 2006–2011) in the climate change regime, are compared. It is found that group activity has declined in relative terms and although there is overall agreement regarding mitigation and adaptation, there is less consensus regarding forestry (e.g. LULUCF and REDD) issues. However, despite controversies in some areas, AOSIS has remained a tightly coordinated and cohesive alliance that continues to be a key player in global climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Non-governmental organizations play an increasingly important role in the formation and implementation of environmental policies and institutions. The growing involvement of non-state actors in environmental governance is generally welcomed for two reasons: civil society presumably helps governments reach more effective and democratic agreements by providing information and legitimacy. Yet, there are reasons to doubt civil society’s capacity to fulfill these two functions. Many non-governmental organizations themselves lack democratic legitimacy; and weak international agreements are often the result not of lack of information, but of lack of political will. While non-state actors clearly have an important role to play in global environmental governance, this article calls for more research to identify when and how non-state actors indeed contribute to more effective and democratically more legitimate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While small island developing states (SIDS) are micro-contributors to anthropogenic climate change, they are among the most vulnerable to its impacts, with some islands even facing the possibility of extinction. Recognising their vital stake in an effective climate regime, small island states formed a negotiating group, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), to represent their interests in the international climate negotiations. Given their limited power, however, to what extent, and by what means, did AOSIS impact the climate regime? Assuming that both the process and outcome of negotiations depend largely on power, this article argues that low-power parties can nonetheless exert influence in international negotiations by ‘borrowing’ power, that is, by drawing on external power sources. A framework for analysis is thus developed and used to assess AOSIS's negotiating strategies and respective successes in the climate change regime from 1990 to 1997. As the analysis reveals, AOSIS made use of external sources of power over this period, and shaped the negotiations to a remarkable degree, much more so than the a priori power distribution would predict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany -- one of the largest donors in the field of climate finance - promises to prioritise the most vulnerable and poorest countries in its financial contribution for climate change adaptation. But to what extent does Germany keep its promise? Who receives German adaptation aid and why? This article analyses statistically how Germany allocated its bilateral adaptation aid from 2010 to 2012. The results suggest only a weak link between need - that is, vulnerability to climate change - and the level of adaptation aid a country receives. While poorer countries receive relatively more adaptation aid, other vulnerability indicators do not seem to matter - as opposed to economic and political factors. The results reflect not least that vulnerability is a complex concept that is difficult to measure; the question who is particularly vulnerable is fundamentally a normative decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]