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The last two decades saw multiple attempts to explain how the self is represented in the brain within the framework of the Bayesian brain. However, these attempts largely focused on describing a developed, adult self-representation. The current paper argues that looking at the developmental trajectory is crucial for understanding the structure of self-representation. It argues that emergence of self-representations should be understood as an instance of the process of acquisition of new internal models of hidden causes of sensory input. The paper proposes how such models emerge and develop over the course of life by looking at different stages of development of bodily and extra-bodily self-representations. It argues that the self arises gradually in a series of discrete steps: from first-person multisensory representations of one's body to third-person multisensory body representation, and from basic forms of the extended and social selves to progressively more complex forms of abstract self-representation. It discusses how each of them might emerge based on domain-general learning mechanisms, while also taking into account the potential role of innate representations. Finally, it discusses how predictions of the proposed model might be experimentally tested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peripersonal space (PPS) is a dynamic multisensory representation of the space around the body, influenced by internal and external sensory information. The malleability of PPS boundaries, as evidenced by their expansion after tool use or modulation through social interactions, positions PPS as a crucial element in understanding the subjective experiences of self and otherness. Building on the existing literature highlighting both the cognitive and bodily effects of mindfulness meditation, this study proposes a novel approach by employing focused-attention meditation (FAM) and a multisensory audio–tactile task to assess PPS in both the extension and sharpness of its boundaries. The research hypothesis posits that FAM, which emphasizes heightened attention to bodily sensations and interoception, may reduce the extension of PPS and make its boundaries less sharp. We enrolled 26 non-meditators who underwent a repeated measure design in which they completed the PPS task before and after a 15-min FAM induction. We found a significant reduction in the sharpness of PPS boundaries but no significant reduction in PPS extension. These results provide novel insights into the immediate effects of FAM on PPS, potentially shedding light on the modulation of self–other representations in both cognitive and bodily domains. Indeed, our findings could have implications for understanding the intricate relationship between mindfulness practices and the subjective experience of self within spatial contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can't proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what's the significance of this result for the concept of self patently at work in these self-ascriptions? In this paper, I argue that these cases show that bodily awareness grounding employment of the self-concept in self-ascriptions of action can be fundamentally third-personal and concern a body that is not presented as one's own, but as an object among others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Setting is the property of FrancoAngeli srl and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Background: Experiences of felt presence (FP) are well documented in neurology, neuropsychology and bereavement research, but systematic research in relation to psychopathology is limited. FP is a feature of sensorimotor disruption in psychosis, hypnagogic experiences, solo pursuits and spiritual encounters, but research comparing these phenomena remains rare. A comparative approach to the phenomenology of FP has the potential to identify shared and unique processes underlying the experience across these contexts, with implications for clinical understanding and intervention. Methods: We present a mixed-methods analysis from three online surveys comparing FP across three diverse contexts: a population sample which included people with experience of psychosis and voice-hearing (study 1, N = 75), people with spiritual and spiritualist beliefs (study 2, N = 47) and practitioners of endurance/solo pursuits (study 3, N = 84). Participants were asked to provide descriptions of their FP experiences and completed questionnaires on FP frequency, hallucinatory experiences, dissociation, paranoia, social inner speech and sleep. Data and code for the study are available via OSF. Results: Hierarchical linear regression analysis indicated that FP frequency was predicted by a general tendency to experience hallucinations in all three studies, although paranoia and gender (female > male) were also significant predictors in sample 1. Qualitative analysis highlighted shared and diverging phenomenology of FP experiences across the three studies, including a role for immersive states in FP. Conclusions: These data combine to provide the first picture of the potential shared mechanisms underlying different accounts of FP, supporting a unitary model of the experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Disembodiment and socio-emotional deficits are core features of the schizophrenia spectrum from the prodromal stages to chronic illness. A recent study documented anomalous emotional embodiment in individuals with schizophrenia. Although bodily self disturbances have been shown to precede and predict psychosis onset in at-risk populations, the etiology of anomalous emotional embodiment remains largely unexplored. The present study investigated bodily maps of emotions in relation to schizotypy to extend our understanding of embodied emotions in the schizophrenia spectrum. Methods: A total of 419 participants (312 female; 19.50 ± 1.22 years) completed a topographical body mapping task where they reported patterns of embodiment experienced in the context of eleven different emotions and a neutral state (EmBODY). Embodied emotions were investigated in relation to multidimensional schizotypy. Results: Individuals with elevated negative schizotypy experienced embodied emotions with higher intensity (r = 0.16, p = 0.003) but lower clarity (i.e., endorsing activation and deactivation in the same bodily location; β = -0.28, 95% CI [-0.54, -0.03], Z = 2.25, p=0.02) and endorsed more incongruent bodily sensations of emotions (i.e., reporting bodily activation in the context of a low-arousal emotion, r = 0.12, p = 0.05; reporting bodily deactivation in the context of high-arousal emotions, r = 0.13, p = 0.02). In line with the anomalous emotional embodiment documented in individuals with schizophrenia, some of these differences were particularly notable for low-arousal emotions. Discussion: These results reveal negative schizotypy as a significant correlate of differences in emotional embodiment. More work is needed to link these differences to the anomalous bodily sensations of emotions documented in schizophrenia and assess their functional impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An increasing amount of recent research has focused on the multisensory and neural bases of the bodily self. This pre‐reflective form of self is considered as multifaceted, incorporating phenomenal components, such as self location, body ownership, first‐person perspective, agency, and the perceptual body image. Direct electrical brain stimulation (EBS) during presurgical evaluation of epilepsy and brain tumor resection is a unique method to causally relate specific brain areas to the various phenomenal components of the bodily self. We conducted a systematic review of the literature describing altered phenomenal experience of the bodily self evoked by EBS. We included 42 articles and analyzed self reports from 221 patients. Three‐dimensional density maps of EBS revealed that stimulation in the middle cingulum, inferior parietal lobule, supplementary motor area, posterior insula, hippocampal complex/amygdala, and precuneus most consistently altered one or several components of the bodily self. In addition, we found that only EBS in the parietal cortex induced disturbances of all five components of the bodily self considered in this review article. These findings inform current neuroscientific models of the bodily self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When attention is focused on self representation(s), the ability to evaluate one's internal sensations is enhanced, according to previous research by Ainley and colleagues (Consciousness and Cognition, 22(4), 1231–1238, 2013). Self-representations are usually distinguished between bodily and narrative. Both bodily and narrative representations improve decision-making processes, in that the consideration of alternatives is informed by sensations experienced deep inside the body (e.g., anxiety) as suggest by the literature (Noël, Brevers & Bechara in Frontiers in Psychiatry, 4, 179, 2013). The objective of the present study is to analyze the decision-making process in multiple conditions of stimulated self-representations. Participants played the Iowa Gambling Task three times (a baseline without stimuli and two randomly ordered stimulations to prime bodily and narrative self-representations). While no significant differences emerged regarding advantageous choices, participants showed loss frequency bias in the condition with bodily-self representation priming. Two interpretations are proposed: bodily-self focus acted as a distractor diminishing participants' commitment to long term outcomes or enhanced interoception promoted aversion to losses. Directions are given for future research and clinical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Bodily self-recognition requires the individual to be able to refer to himself through a reflexive representation, typically a schema or an image of one's own body. Body ownership results from an interplay between exteroception and interoception (i.e., the ability to perceive one's own body from the inside). It has been demonstrated that perceiving sensations inside the body could be associated with better regulation of emotions. Also, it has been reported that interoceptive awareness may be affected by gender. Therefore, this pilot study aimed to investigate gender differences in the interoceptive awareness among Italian people. Methods: 114 Italian volunteers (57 males and 57 females) completed the 32-item Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) questionnaire to measure the multiple dimensions of interoceptive awareness. Results: The findings showed higher scores among females than among males for the ability to notice interoceptive input and the awareness of the relationship between bodily sensations and emotional states. Conclusions: Results suggested that women could be more inclined to notice and focus on internal cues. Also, the gender differences could be related to physical and hormonal changes that women experience during development. Future research on the relationship between gender and physiological responses (e.g., heartbeat, skin conductance) for a specific ethnographic sample is recommended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background and Hypothesis A primary disruption of the bodily self is considered a core feature of schizophrenia (SCZ). The "disembodied" self might be underpinned by inefficient body-related multisensory integration processes, normally occurring in the peripersonal space (PPS), a plastic sector of space surrounding the body whose extent is altered in SCZ. Although PPS is a malleable interface marking the perceptual border between self and others, no study has addressed the potential alteration of its plasticity in SCZ. We investigated the plasticity of PPS in SCZ patients after a motor training with a tool in the far space. Study Design Twenty-seven SCZ patients and 32 healthy controls (HC) underwent an audio-tactile task to estimate PPS boundary before (Session 1) and after (Session 3) the tool-use. Parameters of PPS, including the size and the slope of the psychometric function describing audio-tactile RTs as a function of the audio-tactile distances, were estimated. Study Results Results confirm a narrow PPS extent in SCZ. Surprisingly, we found PPS expansion in both groups, thus showing for the first time a preserved PPS plasticity in SCZ. Patients experienced a weaker differentiation from others, as indicated by a shallower PPS slope at Session 1 that correlated positively with negative symptoms. However, at Session 3, patients marked their bodily boundary in a steeper way, suggesting a sharper demarcation of PPS boundaries after the action with the tool. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of investigating the multisensory and motor roots of self-disorders, paving the way for future body-centred rehabilitation interventions that could improve patients' altered body boundary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medicine usually looks at the body as a biochemical and physical apparatus – from a distant third-person perspective, with fragmented, reductionist positions, unidirectional causal models, and highly selective foci. Even psychiatrists and psychotherapists focus more and more on the brain as an organ, look at genes and colourful pictures. And just as biomedical medicine stares at physical and chemical facts and ignores the person, one could say that psychotherapy stares at personality, cognition, and behaviour and ignores the body. But the lowlands where being-a-person and having-a-body meetmatter a lot for becoming ill, staying, and getting well. What attitudes and what approaches can help us understand the bodily self? After very briefly summarizing current understandings of embodiment and enactivism, we will suggest some practical consequences for everyday clinical diagnostics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fibromyalgia (FM) is characterised by chronic, continuous, widespread pain, often associated with a sense of fatigue, non-restorative sleep and physical exhaustion. Due to the nature of this condition and the absence of other neurological issues potentially able to induce disorders in body representations per se, it represents a perfect model since it provides an opportunity to study the relationship between pain and the bodily self. Corporeal illusions were investigated in 60 participants with or without a diagnosis of FM by means of an ad hoc devised interview. In addition, motor imagery was investigated and illusions relating to body part movements and changes in body size, feelings of alienness, and sensations of body parts not belonging to one's own body (disownership and somatoparaphrenic-like sensations) were found. Crucially, these symptoms do not correlate with any of the clinical measures of pain or functional deficits. The results showed that motor imagery was also impaired, and the severity of the deficits found correlated with the functional impairment of the participant. This indicates that disorders in body representations and motor imagery are part of the clinical expression of FM. However, while motor imagery seems to be linked to reduced autonomy and functional deficits, bodily illusions are independent and potentially represent a concurrent symptom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self. In this perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the development of the minimal self in humans. To do so, we first provide a comparative overview of the central accounts addressing the link between interoception and the minimal self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the development of the minimal self. We present empirical findings on interoception in development and discuss the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. Moreover, we make theoretical predictions that can be tested in future experiments. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive view on the mechanisms underlying the minimal self by explaining the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Surgical treatment of tumors, epileptic foci or of vascular origin, requires a detailed individual pre-surgical workup and intra-operative surveillance of brain functions to minimize the risk of post-surgical neurological deficits and decline of quality of life. Most attention is attributed to language, motor functions, and perception. However, higher cognitive functions such as social cognition, personality, and the sense of self may be affected by brain surgery. To date, the precise localization and the network patterns of brain regions involved in such functions are not yet fully understood, making the assessment of risks of related post-surgical deficits difficult. It is in the interest of neurosurgeons to understand with which neural systems related to selfhood and personality they are interfering during surgery. Recent neuroscience research using virtual reality and clinical observations suggest that the insular cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and temporo-parietal junction are important components of a neural system dedicated to self-consciousness based on multisensory bodily processing, including exteroceptive and interoceptive cues (bodily self-consciousness (BSC)). Here, we argue that combined extra- and intra-operative approaches using targeted cognitive testing, functional imaging and EEG, virtual reality, combined with multisensory stimulations, may contribute to the assessment of the BSC and related cognitive aspects. Although the usefulness of particular biomarkers, such as cardiac and respiratory signals linked to virtual reality, and of heartbeat evoked potentials as a surrogate marker for intactness of multisensory integration for intra-operative monitoring has to be proved, systemic and automatized testing of BSC in neurosurgical patients will improve future surgical outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exteroceptive and interoceptive signals shape and sustain the bodily self‐awareness. The existence of a set of brain areas, supporting the integration of information coming from the inside and the outside of the body in building the sense of bodily self‐awareness has been postulated, yet the evidence remains limited, a matter of discussion never assessed quantitatively. With the aim of unrevealing where in the brain interoceptive and exteroceptive signals may converge, we performed a meta‐analysis on imaging studies of the sense of body ownership, modulated by external visuotactile stimulation, and studies on interoception, which involves the self‐awareness for internal bodily sensations. Using a multilevel kernel density analysis, we found that processing of stimuli of the two domains converges primarily in the supramarginal gyrus bilaterally. Furthermore, we found a right‐lateralized set of areas, including the precentral and postcentral, and superior temporal gyri. We discuss these results and propose this set of areas as ideal candidates to match multiple body‐related signals contributing to the creation of a multidimensional representation of the bodily self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective Embodied emotions arise from interoceptive and somatosensory processes, and are essential to the development of a stable sense of self. Emotional embodiment is therefore inherently interwoven with our sense of bodily self-awareness, and allows us to navigate complex social situations. Given that the core feature of schizophrenia (SZ) is characterized by the presence of bodily self-disturbances and social-emotional deficits, we hypothesized that embodiment of emotion would be disrupted in SZ. Method Twenty-six medicated individuals with SZ and 26 demographically matched controls used a computerized topographical mapping tool ("EmBODY") to indicate on a body outline where they felt bodily sensations while experiencing an emotion. There were 13 different emotions plus a neutral state. The resulting bodily maps of emotions were quantitatively compared between groups using linear discriminant analysis and similarity scores. Results Bodily maps of emotions were anomalous in SZ as indicated by indistinguishable maps across different emotions. Relative to the control group, patients reported less discrete and less clear bodily sensations across emotions. In particular, bodily maps for low-arousal emotions were atypical in comparison with healthy controls. Conclusions Anomalous and undifferentiated mapping of embodied emotions in SZ could lead to deficits in linking bodily sensations to conceptual categories of emotions. Disrupted emotional embodiment could also contribute to poor social functioning. Abnormal bodily sensations of emotions might therefore be a promising target for future psychosocial interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some people diagnosed with "schizophrenia" showed a fundamental alteration of the sense of self. From a psychodynamic perspective, it has been hypothesized that patients diagnosed as schizophrenic have disorders of the embodied self and its boundaries. Phenomenologically, it has been observed a self-disorder, at an implicit and pre-reflective level of bodily awareness. Neuroscientific evidence seems to confirm the aforementioned aspects. The mean levels of Interoceptive Accuracy (IA), which is an objective empirical measure of interoception, namely a measure of basic awareness distinct from subjective measures, are significantly lower in patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia than among healthy controls. Affiliative touch is crucial for constructing a basic sense of self and its boundaries, and it affects interoception. In order to reduce the disturbance of the sense of self, Angelo participated for three years in an experimental intervention plan including Amniotic Therapy (AT) and individual psychodynamic psychotherapy. AT is a group-therapy based on sensory-motor interactions, especially affiliative touch, similar to those involved in "holding". Results showed an increase in the Angelo's IA and global functioning, as well as a significant decrease in positive symptoms. In Angelo, AT seems to strengthen a basic sense of self, reducing self-disorder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experimentally induced strange-face illusions can be perceived when two individuals look at each other in the eyes under low illumination for about 10 minutes. This task of subject-other eye-to-eye gazing produces the following perceptions by the subject: (i) mild to huge deformations and color/shape changes of face and facial features; (ii) lifeless, unmoving faces and immaterial presences akin to out-of-body experiences; (iii) pseudo-hallucinations, enlightened 'idealized' faces and personalities – rather than the other's actual face. Dissociative phenomena seem to be involved, whereas the effects of non-pathological dissociation on strange-face illusions have not yet been directly investigated. In the present study, dissociative perceptions and strange-face illusions were measured through self-report questionnaires on a large sample (N = 90) of healthy young individuals. Results of correlation and factor analyses suggest that strange-face illusions can involve, respectively: (i) strange-face illusions correlated to derealization; (ii) strange-face illusions correlated to depersonalization; and (iii) strange-face illusions of identity, which are supposedly correlated to identity dissociation. The findings support the separation between detachment and compartmentalization in dissociative processes. Effects of gender show that strange-face illusions are more frequent in men with respect to women if dyads are composed of individuals of different-gender. Furthermore, drawings of strange-faces, which were perceived by portrait artists in place the others' faces, allowed a direct illustration of examples of dissociative identities. Findings are discussed in relation to the three-level model of self-referential processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anomalous or weakened sense of self was central to early theories of schizophrenia. Recent studies have also documented disturbances in body ownership and increased susceptibility for dissociative experiences, such as the out‐of‐body experience in individuals with schizophrenia, but further research is necessary to clarify components of bodily self‐disturbances in the schizophrenia spectrum, and the stability of these experiences over time. With respect to methodology, self‐disturbances research in schizophrenia tends to rely exclusively on verbal self‐report questionnaires and interviews. Given that individuals with schizophrenia suffer from language and communication difficulties, verbal self‐report measures may be insufficient. To bridge this gap, we have developed a new picture‐based instrument, the Benson et al. Body Disturbances Inventory (B‐BODI), designed to quantify bodily self‐disturbances with respect to the frequency and vividness of these experiences, as well as the degree of distress associated with them. Drawings that depicted different aspects of aberrant bodily self‐experiences were presented with accompanying captions. Participants were asked to indicate the frequency, vividness, and distressfulness of the experience captured by the picture using a 5‐point scale. Individuals with schizophrenia, older healthy controls, and college students participated in two alternative versions of the B‐BODI. Participants were also asked to complete a battery of established questionnaires that probed psychosis proneness and a range of self, body, and perceptual aberrations. The results suggest that the B‐BODI is a useful tool that accurately captures bodily self‐disturbances and has the potential to predict psychosis risk in healthy young individuals. Furthermore, anomalous self‐disturbances seem to be relatively stable across time in individuals with chronic schizophrenia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pathological embodiment (E+) is a specific contralesional delusion of body ownership, observed following brain damage, in which patients embody someone else's arm and its movements within their own body schema whenever the contralesional 'alien' arm is presented in a body-congruent position (i.e., 1st person perspective and aligned with the patient's shoulder). This disorder is often associated with spatial neglect, a neurological syndrome in which patients are unaware of stimuli presented in the contralesional (often the left) space. Capitalizing on previous evidence demonstrating that prismatic adaptation of the ipsilesional arm to right-deviating prisms is effective in ameliorating neglect symptoms, here we investigated whether such amelioration also occurs in E+ patients with neglect when prismatic training is performed by the 'alien' embodied arm. Four left neglect patients (one with and three without pathological embodiment) underwent visuomotor prismatic training performed by an 'alien' arm. Specifically, while patients were wearing prismatic goggles shifting the visual field rightward, a co-experimenter's left arm presented in a body-congruent perspective was repeatedly moved toward visual targets by another examiner. In a control condition, the co-experimenter's arm was moved toward the targets from a body-incongruent position (i.e., 3rd person perspective). Neglect symptoms were assessed before and after training through paper-and-pencil tasks. In the E+ patient, neglect improved significantly more in 1st than in 3rd person perspective training, suggesting that prismatic adaptation of the 'alien' embodied arm is effective in modulating spatial representation. Conversely, for control E- patients (not embodying the 'alien' arm), we observed more limited improvements following training. These findings indicate that the 'alien' embodied arm is so deeply embedded in the patient body and motor schema that adaptation to prismatic lenses can affect multiple processing stages, from low level sensory-motor correspondences, to higher level body, motor and spatial maps, similarly as it occurs in normal subjects and neglect patients without pathological embodiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study is to investigate the bodily-self in Restrictive Anorexia, focusing on two basic aspects related to the bodily self: autonomic strategies in social behavior, in which others' social desirability features, and social cues (e.g., gaze) are modulated, and interoception (i.e., the sensitivity to stimuli originating inside the body). Furthermore, since previous studies carried out on healthy individuals found that interoception seems to contribute to the autonomic regulation of social behavior, as measured by Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia (RSA), we aimed to explore this link in anorexia patients, whose ability to perceive their bodily signal seems to be impaired. To this purpose, we compared a group of anorexia patients (ANg; restrictive type) with a group of Healthy Controls (HCg) for RSA responses during both a resting state and a social proxemics task, for their explicit judgments of comfort in social distances during a behavioral proxemics task, and for their Interoceptive Accuracy (IA). The results showed that ANg displayed significantly lower social disposition and a flattened autonomic reactivity during the proxemics task, irrespective of the presence of others' socially desirable features or social cues. Moreover, unlike HCg, the autonomic arousal of ANg did not guide behavioral judgments of social distances. Finally, IA was strictly related to social disposition in both groups, but with opposite trends in ANg. We conclude that autonomic imbalance and its altered relationship with interoception might have a crucial role in anorexia disturbances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internal sensations, especially organic ones, are not only the foundation of our consciousness of life and self but also an integral part of each feeling. This is probably the origin of the genuine affinity between feelings and consciousness of life and self, an affinity that manifests itself even in speech. Indeed, the expression "sense of self" is more natural than saying "representing" or even "imagining one's self". It is also easier and neater to talk in French about "sentiment du moi" than "representation du moi"; the expression "das Ichgefühl" is less grating than "die Ichvorstellung", the latter being rather used to mean the conceived self as opposed to the self of which one is conscious all the time. The self is not a feeling, however, if only because there are no feelings that would be equally constant or, to be more precise, that would recur with equal constancy. Even so, we can say it is closer to emotive states than to any representation or mental image. [...]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study focuses on the multifaceted concept of self-disturbance in schizophrenia, adding knowledge about a not yet investigated aspect, which is the interoceptive accuracy. Starting from the assumption that interoceptive accuracy requires an intact sense of self, which otherwise was proved to be altered in schizophrenia, the aim of the present study was to explore interoceptive accuracy in a group of schizophrenia patients, compared to healthy controls. Furthermore, the possible association between interoceptive accuracy and patients' positive and negative symptomatology was assessed. To pursue these goals, a group of 23 schizophrenia patients and a group of 23 healthy controls performed a heartbeat perception task. Patients' symptomatology was assessed by means of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). Results demonstrated significantly lower interoceptive accuracy in schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls. This difference was not accounted for participants' age, BMI, anxiety levels, and heart rate. Furthermore, patients' illness severity, attention and pharmacological treatment did not influence their interoceptive accuracy levels. Interestingly, a strong positive relation between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptoms severity, especially Grandiosity, was found. The present results demonstrate for the first time that interoceptive accuracy is altered in schizophrenia. Furthermore, they prove a specific association between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptomatology, suggesting that the symptom Grandiosity might be protective against an altered basic sense of self in patients characterized by higher sensibility to their inner bodily sensations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans experience their own body as unitary and monolithic in nature. However, recent findings in cognitive neuroscience seem to suggest that body awareness has a complex and multifaceted structure that can be dissociated in several subcomponents, possibly underpinned by different brain circuits. In the present paper, we focus on a recently reported neuropsychological disorder of body ownership in which patients misattribute to themselves someone else’s arm and its movements. As first, we briefly review the clinical and functional features of this disorder. Secondly, we attempt to explain the nature of the delusion and to gain new hints regarding the mechanisms subserving the construction and the maintenance of the sense of body ownership in the intact brain functioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present paper, we review the recent empirical evidence on the neurobiological basis of a minimal notion of the self, the bodily self. We show the relationship between the body, its motor potentialities and the notion of minimal self. We argue that this approach can shed new light onto self-disturbances and social deficits characterizing schizophrenia. We discuss our approach with other views on the neural correlates of self-disturbances in schizophrenia and propose that cognitive neuroscience can today address the classical topics of psychopathology by adding a new level of description, finally enabling the correlation between the first-person experiential aspects of psychiatric diseases and their neurobiological roots. © 2014 S. Karger AG, Basel [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores ideas from Marion Milner which the author has found helpful in conceptualizing work with a patient who felt tyrannized by her objects, terrified that she would be swallowed up by them never to re‐emerge. Her terror interfered with her capacity to symbolize. The paper looks at the concept of a bodily self and its creative engagement with the world especially in the form of fusion with the object. It places Milner's theory in the larger context of psychoanalytic and neuroscientific thinking from Freud and Winnicott to Damasio as well as relating it to philosophical and Romantic accounts of creative apperception and personal knowledge. Although confidentiality precludes a detailed account of the analysis, the author provides an outline of the gradual development of her capacity to symbolize alongside her growing sense of a continuous self. He further comments on her finding what Milner called ‘intuitive images’ to bridge intellect and intuition and to allow them to co‐exist peacefully. The patient brought drawings to sessions and the paper reflects on these as an index of change as well as on the importance of the process of creating them in relation to her anxiety over the tyranny of objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses basic aspects of social cognition focusing on the pivotal role played by the lived body in the constitution of our experience of others. It is suggested that before studying intersubjectivity we should better qualify the notion of the self. A minimal notion of the self, the bodily self, defined in terms of its motor potentialities, is proposed. The discovery of mirror mechanisms for action, emotions and sensations led to the proposal of an embodied approach to intersubjectivity--embodied simulation (ES) theory. ES and the related notion of neural reuse provide a new empirically based perspective on intersubjectivity, viewed first and foremost as intercorporeality. ES challenges the notion that folk psychology is the sole account of interpersonal understanding. ES is discussed within a second-person perspective on mindreading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Objective Individuals with an eating disorder experience the rubber hand illusion (RHI) significantly more strongly than healthy controls on both perceptual (proprioceptive drift) and subjective (self-report embodiment questionnaire) measures. This heightened sensitivity to visual information about the body, and/or reduced somatosensory information processing about the body, suggest an increased malleability of the bodily self. The aim of the present study was to explore whether this is a state phenomenon or a persisting individual trait that outlasts the period of acute eating disorder. Method The RHI and self-report measures of eating disorder psychopathology (EDI-3 subscales of Drive for Thinness, Bulimia, Body Dissatisfaction, Interoceptive Deficits, and Emotional Dysregulation; DASS-21; and the Self-Objectification Questionnaire) were administered to 78 individuals with an eating disorder, 28 individuals recovered from an eating disorder, and 61 healthy controls. Results Proprioceptive drift in recovered individuals was intermediate between the acutely ill and HC groups. Subjective report of the strength of the illusion in recovered individuals was similar to acutely ill individuals. Discussion These results suggest that increased malleability of the bodily self persists, at least partially, following recovery and may be a trait phenomenon in people with eating disorders. Those with a lifetime history of an eating disorder may have heightened sensitivity to visual information about the body and reduced somatosensory information processing of the body. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (Int J Eat Disord 2014; 47:400-409) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BackgroundThe rubber hand illusion (RHI) has been widely used to investigate the bodily self in healthy individuals. The aim of the present study was to extend the use of the RHI to examine the bodily self in eating disorders (EDs).MethodThe RHI and self-report measures of ED psychopathology [the Eating Disorder Inventory – 3 (EDI-3) subscales of Drive for Thinness, Bulimia, Body Dissatisfaction, Interoceptive Deficits, and Emotional Dysregulation; the 21-item Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21); and the Self-Objectification Questionnaire (SOQ)] were administered to 78 individuals with an ED and 61 healthy controls.ResultsIndividuals with an ED experienced the RHI significantly more strongly than healthy controls on both perceptual (i.e. proprioceptive drift) and subjective (i.e. self-report questionnaire) measures. Furthermore, both the subjective experience of the RHI and associated proprioceptive biases were correlated with ED psychopathology. Approximately 23% of the variance for embodiment of the fake hand was accounted for by ED psychopathology, with interoceptive deficits and self-objectification significant predictors of embodiment.ConclusionsThese results indicate that the bodily self is more plastic in people with an ED. These findings may shed light on both aetiological and maintenance factors involved in EDs, particularly visual processing of the body, interoceptive deficits, and self-objectification. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Multimedia technologies and virtual reality offer unique possibilities to manipulate sensory, motor, interpersonal, and cognitive processes contributing to atypical developmental trajectories, thus holding an explosive potential to design innovative and engaging interventions. However, there has been little progress in developing interventions that go beyond the patient's diagnosis or the fascination of technology and rather spring from a deep understanding of the specific neuropsychological processes to be nurtured in individuals. This perspective paper outlines how recent insights from developmental cognitive neuroscience can be leveraged to promote children's multidimensional development and highlight future directions and challenges for innovating both research and clinical practice. Finally, we focus on some practical examples of multimedia and virtual reality activities we have designed to stimulate bodily-self experiences, which are crucial for building up a coherent sense of self and lay the foundation for interacting with the external world. Atypical bodily self is an early marker of heterogeneous neurodevelopmental conditions (such as autism spectrum disorders) and seems to be under-targeted in research and clinical approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors offer comments on a paper which explored how bodily and social aspects may merge together in a unique account of the human self in people with disabilities. Topics covered include the impact of neurological and psychiatric diseases on the integration process between bodily and social self, the complementarity of bodily and social self in patients with spinal cord injury and the effect of wheelchair on people who chose to integrate their disability into their full sense of self.

At present, most of the neurocognitive models of human sense of agency (ie, "this action is due to my own will") have been traditionally rooted in a variety of internal efferent signals arising within the motor system. However, recent neuroscientific evidence has suggested that also the body-related afferent signals that subserve body ownership (ie, "this body is mine") might have a key role in this process. Accordingly, in the present review paper, we briefly examined the literature investigating how and to what extent body ownership contributes to building up human motor consciousness. Evidence suggests that, if required by the context, body ownership per se can act on agency attribution (ie, independently from efferent signals). Hence, a unitary and coherent subjective experience of willed actions (ie, "this willed action is being realized by my own body") requires both awareness of being an agent and of owning the body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At present, most of the neurocognitive models of human sense of agency (ie, "this action is due to my own will") have been traditionally rooted in a variety of internal efferent signals arising within the motor system. However, recent neuroscientific evidence has suggested that also the body-related afferent signals that subserve body ownership (ie, "this body is mine") might have a key role in this process. Accordingly, in the present review paper, we briefly examined the literature investigating how and to what extent body ownership contributes to building up human motor consciousness. Evidence suggests that, if required by the context, body ownership per se can act on agency attribution (ie, independently from efferent signals). Hence, a unitary and coherent subjective experience of willed actions (ie, "this willed action is being realized by my own body") requires both awareness of being an agent and of owning the body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Visual Enhancement of Touch (VET), simply viewing one's hand improves tactile spatial perception, even though vision is non-informative. While previous studies had suggested that looking at another person's hand could also enhance tactile perception, no previous study had systematically investigated the differences between viewing one's body and someone else's. The aim of this study was to shed light on the relation between visuo–tactile interactions and the self-other distinction. In Experiment 1 we manipulated the spatial location where a hand was seen. Viewing one's hand enhanced tactile acuity relative to viewing a neutral object, but only when the image of the hand was spatially aligned with the actual location of the participant's unseen hand. The VET effect did not occur when one's hand was viewed at a location other than that experienced proprioceptively. In contrast, viewing another's hand produced enhanced tactile perception irrespective of spatial location. In Experiment 2, we used a multisensory stimulation technique, known as Visual Remapping of Touch, to reduce perceived spatial misalignment of vision and touch. When participants saw an image of their own hand being touched at the same time as the tactile stimulation, the reduction in perceived misalignment caused VET effect to return, even though the spatial location of the images was not consistent with the actual body posture. Our results suggest that multisensory modulation of touch depends on a representation of one's body that is fundamentally spatial in nature. In contrast, representation of others is free from this spatial constraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]