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This article examines the approaches that Hong Kong and Singapore are taking to develop themselves as ‘regional hubs of higher education’ and the implications of their approaches. It starts with a delineation of how the internationalization of higher education structurally alters the landscape of the global higher education market. These changes drive both Hong Kong and Singapore to compete for the higher education pie. Despite many similarities in the vision and policy instruments, the article argues that there are significant differences in terms of their implementation approaches. More importantly, such differences reflect the different mindsets of the two governments in their governance of the university sector.Higher Education Policy (2008) 21, 487–503. doi:10.1057/hep.2008.19 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ideology of American primacy is not new with the Bush administration. Rather it draws upon a long tradition of American exceptionalism. Yet, the unilateralism built into this ideology is not viable as a foundation on which to build a global order, since it assumes that US behaviour is based on broadly-held values and interests, not those of a single state. With the end of the cold war many of the factors that tied the United States to Europe dissolved; moreover, the United States in effect, as its demographic and political centre moved south and west, abandoned many of the values that it shared with Europe. In many ways America's repudiation of multilateralism and welfare capitalism could be seen as a return to the default setting of its founding values. Some analysts argue that Europe faces but two alternative paths in its relationship with the United States — to accept a subservient position, while attempting to broaden Washington's agenda, or a form of ‘Euro-Gaullism’ in which Europe would break free from US domination. In fact, a third, and preferable approach, exists that would be based on strengthening Europe's position vis-à-vis the United States, while working with the United States in those areas where common values and interests exist. There is no doubt that a united Europe has the potential to play a more independent global role if it is willing to create the necessary decision-making structure and deploy its collective resources more efficiently.International Politics (2008) 45, 276–291. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.4 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current debates and discussions of the emerging security–development nexus tend to portray this as signifying the increased importance of the problems of non-Western states to Western policy-makers. This article seeks to challenge this perspective and analyses how the policy ‘nexus’ reflects a retreat from strategic policy-making and a more inward-looking approach to foreign policy, more concerned with self-image than the policy consequences in the areas concerned. Rather than demonstrating a new seriousness of approach to tackling the security and development problems of the non-Western world, the discussions around this framework betray the separation between policy rhetoric and policy planning. This reflects the rise of anti-foreign policy: attempts to use the international sphere as an arena for self-referential statements of political mission and purpose, decoupled from their subject matter, resulting in ad hoc and arbitrary foreign policy-making.Journal of International Relations and Development (2007) 10, 362–386. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800135 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developmental capitalism is not only a question of a shared vision of economic nationalism and a shared strategy of national growth among economic and political elites, and their cooperation. Its success also depends on the degree of mobilization and integration in the population. Post-war Japan saw little continuity in the social basis of developmental capitalism, which was institutionalized in two steps following the socio-political crisis of 1960. In the first period of 1960–1973, national economic growth was redefined from a project for national greatness depending on individual sacrifice into a path of shared growth towards general well-being. Then, during the late 1970s and 1980s, the social basis was strengthened through the institutionalization of the Japanese way of life. The social basis of developmental capitalism in Japan is showing symptoms of stress. Provided that the current return to growth is not a short-term interlude, these symptoms may be overcome and an adapted version of developmental capitalism reestablished. However, in the medium term, demographic development and the end of general social upward mobility may well lead to a disintegration of the social basis of developmental capitalism.Asian Business & Management (2007) 6, 35–55. doi:10.1057/palgrave.abm.9200207 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today there is a consensus that the foreign policy of leading Western powers cannot be understood by considering nation states as egoistic actors pursing narrow self-interest. Since the end of the Cold War, major states have increasingly stressed the importance of ethics and values in the shaping of international goals and have intervened internationally on the basis of ‘other-regarding’ concerns such as human rights and international justice. Many commentators have understood this shift to ‘value-led’ or ‘ethical’ foreign policy through an ‘outside/in’ approach to the question, viewing this value shift as a response to international pressures of globalization and the creation of new cosmopolitan constituencies. This article instead employs an ‘inside/out’ approach, which suggests that the shift away from the articulation of national interests and the drive to defend ‘values’ through international intervention can be understood as products of and responses to the domestic political malaise at the heart of Western politics, often referred to in the US as an outcome of the ‘Culture Wars’.International Politics (2004) 41, 354–374. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800082 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]