Search

In the contemporary era marked by the pervasive use of digital devices, safeguarding electronic identity has become indispensable for ensuring secure and dependable interactions within federated systems. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of identity assurance frameworks, with a specific focus on the perspectives provided by Kantara, eIDAS, and REFEDS systems concerning Levels of Assurance (LoA), which involves examining various aspects of their identity assurance frameworks, standards, and implementations. Although Kantara, eIDAS, and REFEDS share a common goal of increasing identity assurance and trust in federated systems, they differ in their scope, regulatory mandates, LoA frameworks, and approaches to adoption and implementation. Understanding these differences is essential for organizations looking to navigate the complex landscape of identity management and choose the most appropriate frameworks for their specific needs. Through a meticulous review of each framework, this study delves into the foundational principles, methodologies, and implementations underpinning identity assurance within federated systems. By scrutinizing the perspectives of Kantara, eIDAS, and REFEDS, this analysis elucidates the similarities, distinctions, strengths, and limitations of each framework in tackling identity assurance challenges. Furthermore, this study explores the implications for future research and development in federated identity management, providing higher security of the electronic identities of users of federated systems. By fostering a deeper understanding of identity assurance frameworks, this comparative analysis contributes to the advancement of secure and trusted digital interactions in various organizational systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the management of national electronic identity (eID) infrastructure, cooperation between public and private parties becomes more and more important, as the mutual dependencies between the provision of e-services and the provision of the national public key infrastructure (PKI) continuously increases. Yet, it is not clear which key factors affect the public-private collaboration in the eID field, as existing studies do not provide insight into this particular matter. Therefore, we aim to identify the factors that affect public-private partnership (PPP) in the field of eID. We also describe feasible formats that help to improve the cooperation between the two sectors, based on insights from the case of Estonia. In service of that study, we conducted twelve qualitative interviews with high-level experts representing several parties from the public and the private sector. By conducting a thematic analysis of the interviews, we identified five key factors for successful PPP in the eID field, i.e., engagement, joint understanding, two-way communication, clear role division, and process orientation. Furthermore, we generalize our results by discussing, in how far the found cooperation formats can be used by stakeholders to manage state-critical information technology (IT) infrastructure components similar to eID such as mobile phone services, data transmission services and digital signature services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electronic authentication (e-authentication) is a process to provide electronic identity trust to users who register electronically in an information system. Verifying the identity of students and the veracity of their work is very important for academic institutions because only in this way can academic misconduct be reduced and on the other hand ensure the quality of education. In recent years there has been increasing research into technological innovations that combat fraud and copying. Currently, password-based credentials are one of the most widely used authentication mechanisms, despite their weaknesses. Today digitalization is pervasive in all parts of modern society. One of the main ways to keep this process safe is the verification process. This process begins with the evolution of authentication systems ranging from One Factor Authentication (SFA), and Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) to Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). All these systems have their advantages and disadvantages which negate the lawful use of the user. It can often happen that passwords are forgotten, the wrong placement of the code on the smart cards can be done or biometrics can become temporarily unavailable, such as loss of fingerprint quality. Moreover, biometrics is not safe if used as a single authentication factor as it can be copied (an attacker can take a copy of a fingerprint and build a copy). The purpose of the document is to analyze the level of electronic identity security and electronic identity verification for users who wish to have certain resources using many authentication factors as well as the credentials given to users after successful verification of their identity by a party providing the credentials service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its 2020 report on a digital euro, the European Central Bank (ECB) created a starting point for a broader dialogue on the topic. The initiative behind the digital euro, supported by the European Commission, draws on best practices and promising approaches, but is also predicated upon the idea that electronic identity schemes and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) should be developed in concert. This paper discusses the ECB's report, before examining other global CBDC initiatives and then proposing a possible blueprint for a digital euro. The paper argues that if the key parties continue to combine their expertise, Europe will not only have a world-class blueprint for a digital euro, but also a template for the creation of a future digital world currency based on European design principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The free movement of European citizens across member states of the European Union adds an important level of complexity to strategic efforts of health interoperability. The use of electronic health data has been marked as an important strategic activity and policy to improve healthcare in European countries. Cross-border healthcare depends on the ability to set up shared practices with respect to patient data exchange across the countries. Data flow must comply with demanding security, legal and interoperability requirements, as defined by the European Patients Smart Open Services project specifications. The aim of this article is to propose a novel design of healthcare data warehouse based on the restructured Extract–Transform–Load process. We describe a portal framework that offers a comprehensive set of interoperability services to enable national e-Health platforms to set up cross-border health information networks compliant with European Patients Smart Open Services. The presented approach incorporates the technical and organizational interoperability by interconnecting Health Level Seven standard and Open National Contact Points framework in order to provide a modular, scalable and inter-operating architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, due to the development of technology and the intense use of computers and other electronic devices, the internet has become a very important aspect of human society. The participation of social media has enabled individuals to identify themselves in wider geographic space, creating a new communion world, which has helped to connect and stay in touch with others. Generally, an electronic identity is a tool that allows people electronically to identify themselves and thus have access to various services. Identity enables a person to be distinguished from another. The purpose of this document is to analyze the importance of electronic identity, related issues such as reliability of information, privacy, fraud, wealth, etc., as well as the role of virtual life with real life. Two aspects of digital identities are also taken into account: encrypted identity (passwords) as well as virtual personal identities used in forums, chat blocks created by different users. The purpose of the paper is to raise awareness related to potential problems in the area of electronic identities for appropriate actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the strategies used by governments to enhance eGovernment Programs (eGov) is to define an Electronic Identity Management (IdM) system. Brazil has not yet defined a National Strategy for Identity Management. This work aims to propose a Mobile Identity Management (Mobile eID) System aligned with the Brazilian eGov Program, through a solution that prioritizes security, privacy and usability. As a proof of concept, a prototype was developed in software, which was evaluated through functional test cases and a user satisfaction survey. The results show that it is possible to guarantee the security, privacy and the usability of the Mobile eID through the use of FIDO UAF, TEE and SAML standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Providing quality government and administrative services to citizens is a goal of the current trends in terms of creating conditions for a social environment smart, inclusive and sustainable. In this context, the e-government is the main pillar of the information society and one of the main pillars of the knowledge society. The work that we propose aims to provide an analysis of the concept, characteristics and values in the current e-government. Thus, the following objectives are targeted: description of the phenomenon of e-government features and values involved him, in closely related to services provided to citizens and facilitate their participation; analysis of certain aspects of the phenomenon of e-government implementation in Romania, in close connection with the evolution of the phenomenon in an international context and in particular, in the European context; analyzing the main aspects of the methodology for implementing e-government phenomenon in public administration, contained in the National Strategy for the Digital Agenda for Romania 2020. The results of this study follow the outline of the instrument egovernment can contribute to social sustainability and determine the impact this phenomenon has on our society in accordance with current trends and conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY Traditionally, call authentication and security have not raised user concerns because wiretapping requires physical access to the phone line and special equipment. However, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communications are becoming increasingly popular, and there is the perception that they may be easier to intercept or impersonate (thus creating higher demand for security solutions), especially if the connection occurs over wireless links. The Session Initiation Protocol is widely used for managing voice and video communications over the Internet, and the Real-time Transport Protocol is used to carry voice and/or video streams. Session Initiation Protocol, however, was not designed with security in mind and is vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore, there are cases in which it is necessary to authenticate the call participants (e.g., when they are asked to disclose confidential information). There are few practical solutions to this problem, essentially because they require complex infrastructures to manage keys and certificates. In this paper, we solve this problem with a novel approach: the use of national public key infrastructures in combination with national Electronic Identity smart cards, created by governments to execute trusted electronic transactions and establish trusted identities. In addition, we will show how our approach enables new use cases (e.g., institutions - hospitals, banks, government, etc. - can be confident that they exchange confidential information to the intended person and vice versa) and simplifies the steps necessary to secure and authenticate a VoIP communication with ZRTP, simplifying and therefore encouraging the use of secure VoIP communications between authenticated users. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many European states have issued electronic identities (eID) to its citizens since the early 2000s. Several have reached full coverage and usually high assurance credentials, such as smartcards, USB crypto tokens, or mobile phone eIDs are used. This lead to an impressive security infrastructure to authenticate at online services that, however, evolved as national silos - interoperability was no priority for a while. To overcome this, 18 European states have joined forces in the large scale pilot STORK. A SAML-based technical solution for cross-border eID federation between states has been designed, implemented, and finally piloted in a number of production services. In this paper we present the STORK middleware architecture that has been developed by Austria and Germany. Its main characteristic is a decentralized deployment that gives some end-to-end security and privacy advantages, but also needs particular attention to meet scalability challenges. This is compared to the STORK proxy model, an alternative centralized deployment approach that was chosen by other states. Federation between the two architectures is described, with particular attention to security and privacy aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Web 2.0 in its various shades is being embraced in the domain of e-government; sophisticated transaction services are becoming mainstream interactions and creating new challenges, particularly regarding security and privacy. The emerging field of electronic identity management (e-IDM) addresses these issues, while governments are introducing e-IDM systems at national level to support service provision. This paper conceptualizes the transition to such a system in Austria as a "system innovation" and uses the approach of "actor-centered institutionalism" to analyze the innovation process and its outcome. It identifies major particularities of the Austrian system such as the technology-neutral approach using multiple tokens and an ID-model with special provisions for privacy protection, traces their origin in the interplay of institutional context and actor constellations and assesses the pattern of this transformation. The current system represents a niche innovation, indeed with a transformation pattern implying considerable change for public administration as well as for citizens. Still controversial privacy implications and insufficient user value, reflected in slow take-up, remain the challenges. The system innovation perspective proved particularly valuable in identifying demands for adaptation by revealing barriers in the transition process towards the e-IDMS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper summarizes the development of the national electronic Identity Management System (eIDMS) in Estonia according to a conceptual framework developed in an European comparative research project outlined in the first chapter of this special issue. Its main function is to amend the picture of the European eIDMS landscape by presenting a case with high involvement of the private sector and thereby checking the generalizations from the comparisons of Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain, presented by Kubicek and Noack in the previous chapter of this special issue. Starting with a short introduction into the historical background of identity documents in Estonia the national population register, the passport as well as the bank ID are described as the main pillars of the Estonian eIDMS, on which the national ID card builds on, which has been introduced in 2002. The technical features of the eID and the ID card are described in Section two as well as the areas of application and the processes for production and distribution. Section three presents the actors constellation, Section four the time line of the development process, starting from 1997. Section five deals with the diffusion and promotion of the ID card and the eID authentication function. After a very low and slow take up during the first 5 years due to a cooperation agreement between major banks, telecom operators and the government usage has increased. But still the authentication by Internet banks, which provides authentication services to third parties, including government, is the biggest competitor for the eID function on the national eID card. Only recently the major banks have announced to slowly fade out the password cards and PIN calculators as alternative modes of bank authentication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic helped countries to increase the use of their mobile eID solutions. These are based on traditional identity management systems, which suffer from weaknesses, such as the reliance on a central entity to provide the identity data and the lack of control of the user over her or his data. The introduction of self-sovereign identity (SSI) for e-government systems can strengthen the privacy of the citizens while enabling identification also for the weakest. To successfully initiate SSI, different factors have to be taken into account. In order to have a clear understanding of the challenges, but also lessons learned, we provide an overview of existing solutions and projects and conducted an analysis of their experiences. Based on a taxonomy, we identified strong points, as well as encountered challenges. The contribution of this paper is threefold: First, we enhanced existing taxonomies based on the literature for further evaluations. Second, we analyzed eID solutions for lessons learned. Third, we evaluated more recently started SSI projects in different states of their lifecycle. This led to a comprehensive discussion of the lessons learned and challenges to address, as well as further findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) Regulation 910/2014 on electronic IDentification, Authentication, and trust Services (eIDAS) for electronic transactions in the internal market went into effect on 29 September 2018, meaning that EU Member States are required to recognize the electronic identities issued in the countries that have notified their eID schemes. Technically speaking, a unified interoperability platform—named eIDAS infrastructure—has been set up to connect the EU countries' national eID schemes to allow a person to authenticate in their home EU country when getting access to services provided by an eIDAS-enabled Service Provider (SP) in another EU country. The eIDAS infrastructure allows the transfer of authentication requests and responses back and forth between its nodes, transporting basic attributes about a person, e.g., name, surname, date of birth, and a so-called eIDAS identifier. However, to build new eIDAS-enabled services in specific domains, additional attributes are needed. We describe our approach to retrieve and transport new attributes through the eIDAS infrastructure, and we detail their exploitation in a selected set of academic services. First, we describe the definition and the support for the additional attributes in the eIDAS nodes. We then present a solution for their retrieval from our university. Finally, we detail the design, implementation, and installation of two eIDAS-enabled academic services at our university: the eRegistration in the Erasmus student exchange program and the Login facility with national eIDs on the university portal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]