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Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flowinducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study assesses the reliability of resting‐state dynamic causal modelling (DCM) of magnetoencephalography (MEG) under conductance‐based canonical microcircuit models, in terms of both posterior parameter estimates and model evidence. We use resting‐state MEG data from two sessions, acquired 2 weeks apart, from a cohort with high between‐subject variance arising from Alzheimer's disease. Our focus is not on the effect of disease, but on the reliability of the methods (as within‐subject between‐session agreement), which is crucial for future studies of disease progression and drug intervention. To assess the reliability of first‐level DCMs, we compare model evidence associated with the covariance among subject‐specific free energies (i.e., the 'quality' of the models) with versus without interclass correlations. We then used parametric empirical Bayes (PEB) to investigate the differences between the inferred DCM parameter probability distributions at the between subject level. Specifically, we examined the evidence for or against parameter differences (i) within‐subject, within‐session, and between‐epochs; (ii) within‐subject between‐session; and (iii) within‐site between‐subjects, accommodating the conditional dependency among parameter estimates. We show that for data acquired close in time, and under similar circumstances, more than 95% of inferred DCM parameters are unlikely to differ, speaking to mutual predictability over sessions. Using PEB, we show a reciprocal relationship between a conventional definition of 'reliability' and the conditional dependency among inferred model parameters. Our analyses confirm the reliability and reproducibility of the conductance‐based DCMs for resting‐state neurophysiological data. In this respect, the implicit generative modelling is suitable for interventional and longitudinal studies of neurological and psychiatric disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the conceptualisation and measurement of goal-directedness. Drawing inspiration from Ernst Mayr’s demarcation between multiple meanings of teleology, we propose a refined approach that delineates different kinds of teleology/teleonomy based on the temporal depth of generative models of self-organising systems that evince free energy minimisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Goal-directed actions are characterized by two main features: the content (i.e., the action goal) and the form, called vitality forms (VF) (i.e., how actions are executed). It is well established that both the action content and the capacity to understand the content of another's action are mediated by a network formed by a set of parietal and frontal brain areas. In contrast, the neural bases of action forms (e.g., gentle or rude actions) have not been characterized. However, there are now studies showing that the observation and execution of actions endowed with VF activate, in addition to the parieto-frontal network, the dorso-central insula (DCI). In the present study, we established--using dynamic causal modeling (DCM)--the direction of information flow during observation and execution of actions endowed with gentle and rude VF in the human brain. Based on previous fMRI studies, the selected nodes for the DCM comprised the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the premotor cortex (PM), and the DCI. Bayesian model comparison showed that, during action observation, two streams arose from pSTS: one toward IPL, concerning the action goal, and one toward DCI, concerning the action vitality forms. During action execution, two streams arose from PM: one toward IPL, concerning the action goal and one toward DCI concerning action vitality forms. This last finding opens an interesting question concerning the possibility to elicit VF in two distinct ways: cognitively (from PM to DCI) and affectively (from DCI to PM). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the ubiquity and importance of narratives for human adaptation is widely recognized, there is no integrative framework for understanding the roles of narrative in human adaptation. Research has identified several cognitive and social functions of narratives that are conducive to well-being and adaptation as well as to coordinated social practices and enculturation. In this paper, we characterize the cognitive and social functions of narratives in terms of active inference, to support the claim that one of the main adaptive functions of narrative is to generate more useful (i.e., accurate, parsimonious) predictions for the individual, as well as to coordinate group action (over multiple timescales) through shared predictions about collective behavior. Active inference is a theory that depicts the fundamental tendency of living organisms to adapt by proactively inferring the causes of their sensations (including their own actions). We review narrative research on identity, event segmentation, episodic memory, future projections, storytelling practices, enculturation, and master narratives. We show how this research dovetails with the active inference framework and propose an account of the cognitive and social functions of narrative that emphasizes that narratives are for the future--even when they are focused on recollecting or recounting the past. Understanding narratives as cognitive and cultural tools for mutual prediction in social contexts can guide research on narrative in adaptive behavior and psychopathology, based on a parsimonious mechanistic model of some of the basic adaptive functions of narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher–order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Natural language syntax yields an unbounded array of hierarchically structured expressions. We claim that these are used in the service of active inference in accord with the free-energy principle (FEP). While conceptual advances alongside modelling and simulation work have attempted to connect speech segmentation and linguistic communication with the FEP, we extend this program to the underlying computations responsible for generating syntactic objects. We argue that recently proposed principles of economy in language design—such as “minimal search” criteria from theoretical syntax—adhere to the FEP. This affords a greater degree of explanatory power to the FEP—with respect to higher language functions—and offers linguistics a grounding in first principles with respect to computability. While we mostly focus on building new principled conceptual relations between syntax and the FEP, we also show through a sample of preliminary examples how both tree-geometric depth and a Kolmogorov complexity estimate (recruiting a Lempel–Ziv compression algorithm) can be used to accurately predict legal operations on syntactic workspaces, directly in line with formulations of variational free energy minimization. This is used to motivate a general principle of language design that we term Turing–Chomsky Compression (TCC). We use TCC to align concerns of linguists with the normative account of self-organization furnished by the FEP, by marshalling evidence from theoretical linguistics and psycholinguistics to ground core principles of efficient syntactic computation within active inference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Collective motion is ubiquitous in nature; groups of animals, such as fish, birds, and ungulates appear to move as a whole, exhibiting a rich behavioral repertoire that ranges from directed movement to milling to disordered swarming. Typically, such macroscopic patterns arise from decentralized, local interactions among constituent components (e.g., individual fish in a school). Preeminent models of this process describe individuals as self-propelled particles, subject to self-generated motion and "social forces" such as short-range repulsion and long-range attraction or alignment. However, organisms are not particles; they are probabilistic decision-makers. Here, we introduce an approach to modeling collective behavior based on active inference. This cognitive framework casts behavior as the consequence of a single imperative: to minimize surprise. We demonstrate that many empirically observed collective phenomena, including cohesion, milling, and directed motion, emerge naturally when considering behavior as driven by active Bayesian inference--without explicitly building behavioral rules or goals into individual agents. Furthermore, we show that active inference can recover and generalize the classical notion of social forces as agents attempt to suppress prediction errors that conflict with their expectations. By exploring the parameter space of the belief-based model, we reveal nontrivial relationships between the individual beliefs and group properties like polarization and the tendency to visit different collective states. We also explore how individual beliefs about uncertainty determine collective decision-making accuracy. Finally, we show how agents can update their generative model over time, resulting in groups that are collectively more sensitive to external fluctuations and encode information more robustly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we unite concepts from Husserlian phenomenology, the active inference framework in theoretical biology, and category theory in mathematics to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding social action premised on shared goals. We begin with an overview of Husserlian phenomenology, focusing on aspects of inner time-consciousness, namely, retention, primal impression, and protention. We then review active inference as a formal approach to modeling agent behavior based on variational (approximate Bayesian) inference. Expanding upon Husserl's model of time consciousness, we consider collective goal-directed behavior, emphasizing shared protentions among agents and their connection to the shared generative models of active inference. This integrated framework aims to formalize shared goals in terms of shared protentions, and thereby shed light on the emergence of group intentionality. Building on this foundation, we incorporate mathematical tools from category theory, in particular, sheaf and topos theory, to furnish a mathematical image of individual and group interactions within a stochastic environment. Specifically, we employ morphisms between polynomial representations of individual agent models, allowing predictions not only of their own behaviors but also those of other agents and environmental responses. Sheaf and topos theory facilitates the construction of coherent agent worldviews and provides a way of representing consensus or shared understanding. We explore the emergence of shared protentions, bridging the phenomenology of temporal structure, multi-agent active inference systems, and category theory. Shared protentions are highlighted as pivotal for coordination and achieving common objectives. We conclude by acknowledging the intricacies stemming from stochastic systems and uncertainties in realizing shared goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background and purpose: In acute spinal cord injury (SCI), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) reveals tissue bridges and neurodegeneration for 2 years. This 5‐year study aims to track initial lesion changes, subsequent neurodegeneration, and their impact on recovery. Methods: This prospective longitudinal study enrolled acute SCI patients and healthy controls who were assessed clinically—and by MRI—regularly from 3 days postinjury up to 60 months. We employed histologically cross‐validated quantitative MRI sequences sensitive to volume, myelin, and iron changes, thereby reflecting indirectly processes of neurodegeneration and neuroinflammation. General linear models tracked lesion and remote changes in volume, myelin‐ and iron‐sensitive magnetic resonance indices over 5 years. Associations between lesion, degeneration, and recovery (using the Spinal Cord Independence Measure [SCIM] questionnaire and the International Standards for Neurological Classification of Spinal Cord Injury total motor score) were assessed. Results: Patients' motor scores improved by an average of 12.86 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 6.70–19.00) points, and SCIM by 26.08 (95% CI = 17.00–35.20) points. Within 3–28 days post‐SCI, lesion size decreased by more than two‐thirds (3 days: 302.52 ± 185.80 mm2, 28 days: 76.77 ± 88.62 mm2), revealing tissue bridges. Cervical cord and corticospinal tract volumes transiently increased in SCI patients by 5% and 3%, respectively, accompanied by cervical myelin decreases and iron increases. Over time, progressive atrophy was observed in both regions, which was linked to early lesion dynamics. Tissue bridges, reduced swelling, and myelin content decreases were predictive of long‐term motor score recovery and improved SCIM score. Conclusions: Studying acute changes and their impact on longer follow‐up provides insights into SCI trajectory, highlighting the importance of acute intervention while indicating the potential to influence outcomes in the later stages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers neural representation through the lens of active inference, a normative framework for understanding brain function. It delves into how living organisms employ generative models to minimize the discrepancy between predictions and observations (as scored with variational free energy). The ensuing analysis suggests that the brain learns generative models to navigate the world adaptively, not (or not solely) to understand it. Different living organisms may possess an array of generative models, spanning from those that support action‐perception cycles to those that underwrite planning and imagination; namely, from explicit models that entail variables for predicting concurrent sensations, like objects, faces, or people—to action‐oriented models that predict action outcomes. It then elucidates how generative models and belief dynamics might link to neural representation and the implications of different types of generative models for understanding an agent's cognitive capabilities in relation to its ecological niche. The paper concludes with open questions regarding the evolution of generative models and the development of advanced cognitive abilities—and the gradual transition from pragmatic to detached neural representations. The analysis on offer foregrounds the diverse roles that generative models play in cognitive processes and the evolution of neural representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the realm of law enforcement, the "police hunch" has long been a mysterious but crucial aspect of decision-making. Drawing on the developing framework of Active Inference from cognitive science, this theoretical article examines the genesis, mechanics, and implications of the police hunch. It argues that hunches -- often vital in high-stakes situations -- should not be described as mere intuitions, but as intricate products of our mind's generative models. These models, shaped by observations of the social world and assimilated and enacted through active inference, seek to reduce surprise and make hunches an indispensable tool for officers, in exactly the same way that hypotheses are indispensable for scientists. However, the predictive validity of hunches is influenced by a range of factors, including experience and bias, thus warranting critical examination of their reliability. This article not only explores the formation of police hunches but also provides practical insights for officers and researchers on how to harness the power of active inference to fully understand policing decisions and subsequently explore new avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bayesian inference typically focuses upon two issues. The first is estimating the parameters of some model from data, and the second is quantifying the evidence for alternative hypotheses—formulated as alternative models. This paper focuses upon a third issue. Our interest is in the selection of data—either through sampling subsets of data from a large dataset or through optimising experimental design—based upon the models we have of how those data are generated. Optimising data-selection ensures we can achieve good inference with fewer data, saving on computational and experimental costs. This paper aims to unpack the principles of active sampling of data by drawing from neurobiological research on animal exploration and from the theory of optimal experimental design. We offer an overview of the salient points from these fields and illustrate their application in simple toy examples, ranging from function approximation with basis sets to inference about processes that evolve over time. Finally, we consider how this approach to data selection could be applied to the design of (Bayes-adaptive) clinical trials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are considerable gaps in our understanding of the relationship between human brain activity measured at different temporal and spatial scales. Here, electrocorticography (ECoG) measures were used to predict functional MRI changes in the sensorimotor cortex in two brain states: at rest and during motor performance. The specificity of this relationship to spatial co-localisation of the two signals was also investigated. We acquired simultaneous ECoG-fMRI in the sensorimotor cortex of three patients with epilepsy. During motor activity, high gamma power was the only frequency band where the electrophysiological response was co-localised with fMRI measures across all subjects. The best model of fMRI changes across states was its principal components, a parsimonious description of the entire ECoG spectrogram. This model performed much better than any others that were based either on the classical frequency bands or on summary measures of cross-spectral changes. The region-specific fMRI signal is reflected in spatially and spectrally distributed EEG activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can one conciliate the claim that humans are uncertainty minimizing systems that seek to navigate predictable and familiar environments with the claim that humans can be creative? We call this the Enlightened Room Problem (ERP). The solution, we suggest, lies not (or not only) in the error-minimizing brain but in the environment itself. Creativity emerges from various degrees of interplay between predictive brains and changing environments: ones that repeatedly move the goalposts for our own error-minimizing machinery. By (co)constructing these challenging worlds, we effectively alter and expand the space within which our own prediction engines operate, and that function as 'exploration bubbles' that enable information seeking, uncertainty minimizing minds to penetrate deeper and deeper into artistic, scientific and engineering space. In what follows, we offer a proof of principle for this kind of environmentally led cognitive expansion. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How to account for the power that art holds over us? Why do artworks touch us deeply, consoling, transforming or invigorating us in the process? In this paper, we argue that an answer to this question might emerge from a fecund framework in cognitive science known as predictive processing (a.k.a. active inference). We unpack how this approach connects sense-making and aesthetic experiences through the idea of an 'epistemic arc', consisting of three parts (curiosity, epistemic action and aha experiences), which we cast as aspects of active inference. We then show how epistemic arcs are built and sustained by artworks to provide us with those satisfying experiences that we tend to call 'aesthetic'. Next, we defuse two key objections to this approach; namely, that it places undue emphasis on the cognitive component of our aesthetic encounters—at the expense of affective aspects—and on closure and uncertainty minimization (order)—at the expense of openness and lingering uncertainty (change). We show that the approach offers crucial resources to account for the open-ended, free and playful behaviour inherent in aesthetic experiences. The upshot is a promising but deflationary approach, both philosophically informed and psychologically sound, that opens new empirical avenues for understanding our aesthetic encounters. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This white paper lays out a vision of research and development in the field of artificial intelligence for the next decade (and beyond). Its denouement is a cyber-physical ecosystem of natural and synthetic sense-making, in which humans are integral participants—what we call "shared intelligence." This vision is premised on active inference, a formulation of adaptive behavior that can be read as a physics of intelligence, and which inherits from the physics of self-organization. In this context, we understand intelligence as the capacity to accumulate evidence for a generative model of one's sensed world—also known as self-evidencing. Formally, this corresponds to maximizing (Bayesian) model evidence, via belief updating over several scales, that is, inference, learning, and model selection. Operationally, this self-evidencing can be realized via (variational) message passing or belief propagation on a factor graph. Crucially, active inference foregrounds an existential imperative of intelligent systems; namely, curiosity or the resolution of uncertainty. This same imperative underwrites belief sharing in ensembles of agents, in which certain aspects (i.e., factors) of each agent's generative world model provide a common ground or frame of reference. Active inference plays a foundational role in this ecology of belief sharing—leading to a formal account of collective intelligence that rests on shared narratives and goals. We also consider the kinds of communication protocols that must be developed to enable such an ecosystem of intelligences and motivate the development of a shared hyper-spatial modeling language and transaction protocol, as a first—and key—step towards such an ecology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mechanistic insight is achieved only when experiments are employed to test formal or computational models. Furthermore, in analogy to lesion studies, phantom perception may serve as a vehicle to understand the fundamental processing principles underlying healthy auditory perception. With a special focus on tinnitus—as the prime example of auditory phantom perception—we review recent work at the intersection of artificial intelligence, psychology and neuroscience. In particular, we discuss why everyone with tinnitus suffers from (at least hidden) hearing loss, but not everyone with hearing loss suffers from tinnitus. We argue that intrinsic neural noise is generated and amplified along the auditory pathway as a compensatory mechanism to restore normal hearing based on adaptive stochastic resonance. The neural noise increase can then be misinterpreted as auditory input and perceived as tinnitus. This mechanism can be formalized in the Bayesian brain framework, where the percept (posterior) assimilates a prior prediction (brain's expectations) and likelihood (bottom-up neural signal). A higher mean and lower variance (i.e. enhanced precision) of the likelihood shifts the posterior, evincing a misinterpretation of sensory evidence, which may be further confounded by plastic changes in the brain that underwrite prior predictions. Hence, two fundamental processing principles provide the most explanatory power for the emergence of auditory phantom perceptions: predictive coding as a top-down and adaptive stochastic resonance as a complementary bottom-up mechanism. We conclude that both principles also play a crucial role in healthy auditory perception. Finally, in the context of neuroscience-inspired artificial intelligence, both processing principles may serve to improve contemporary machine learning techniques. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both classic and contemporary models of auditory word repetition involve at least four left hemisphere regions: primary auditory cortex for processing sounds; pSTS (within Wernicke’s area) for processing auditory images of speech; pOp (within Broca’s area) for processing motor images of speech; and primary motor cortex for overt speech articulation. Previous functional-MRI (fMRI) studies confirm that auditory repetition activates these regions, in addition to many others. Crucially, however, contemporary models do not specify how regions interact and drive each other during auditory repetition. Here, we used dynamic causal modelling, to test the functional interplay among the four core brain regions during single auditory word and pseudoword repetition. Our analysis is grounded in the principle of degeneracy—i.e., many-to-one structure-function relationships—where multiple neural pathways can execute the same function. Contrary to expectation, we found that, for both word and pseudoword repetition, (i) the effective connectivity between pSTS and pOp was predominantly bidirectional and inhibitory; (ii) activity in the motor cortex could be driven by either pSTS or pOp; and (iii) the latter varied both within and between individuals. These results suggest that different neural pathways can support auditory speech repetition. This degeneracy may explain resilience to functional loss after brain damage.A fMRI analysis of human participants performing speech repetition tasks provides evidence for the existence of multiple, degenerate neural pathways capable of facilitating auditory repetition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The definition of a brain state remains elusive, with varying interpretations across different sub-fields of neuroscience—from the level of wakefulness in anaesthesia, to activity of individual neurons, voltage in EEG, and blood flow in fMRI. This lack of consensus presents a significant challenge to the development of accurate models of neural dynamics. However, at the foundation of dynamical systems theory lies a definition of what constitutes the 'state' of a system—i.e., a specification of the system's future. Here, we propose to adopt this definition to establish brain states in neuroimaging timeseries by applying Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM) to low-dimensional embedding of resting and task condition fMRI data. We find that ~90% of subjects in resting conditions are better described by first-order models, whereas ~55% of subjects in task conditions are better described by second-order models. Our work calls into question the status quo of using first-order equations almost exclusively within computational neuroscience and provides a new way of establishing brain states, as well as their associated phase space representations, in neuroimaging datasets. Author summary: There is a deceptively simple question that remains unasked at the heart of computational neuroscience—what exactly is a 'brain state'? This question is motivated by the various and seemingly unrelated definitions of brain states: ranging from the level of wakefulness in anaesthesia, to activity of individual neurons, voltage in EEG, and blood flow in fMRI. There is, however, a precise definition of the state of a dynamical system that often remains overlooked: some piece(s) of information that allow us to say what the system does next. Here, we show that this same definition can be used to quantify the information required to predict the future in neuroimaging timeseries. We demonstrate, with the aid of simulations, that this theoretical framework can be used to extract the characteristic features constituting dynamical system states in a range of scenarios. We then apply the same methodology to fMRI datasets and show that task conditions require more information about a neural system's history to constitute a brain state, as compared with rest conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Learning to self-regulate brain activity by neurofeedback has been shown to lead to changes in the brain and behavior, with beneficial clinical and non-clinical outcomes. Neurofeedback uses a brain-computer interface to guide participants to change some feature of their brain activity. However, the neural mechanism of self-regulation learning remains unclear, with only 50% of the participants succeeding in achieving it. To bridge this knowledge gap, our study delves into the neural mechanisms of self-regulation learning via neurofeedback and investigates the brain processes associated with successful brain self-regulation. Methods: We study the neural underpinnings of self-regulation learning by employing dynamical causal modeling (DCM) in conjunction with real-time functional MRI data. The study involved a cohort of 18 participants undergoing neurofeedback training targeting the supplementary motor area. A critical focus was the comparison between top-down hierarchical connectivity models proposed by Active Inference and alternative bottom-up connectivity models like reinforcement learning. Results: Our analysis revealed a crucial distinction in brain connectivity patterns between successful and non-successful learners. Particularly, successful learners evinced a significantly stronger top-down effective connectivity towards the target area implicated in self-regulation. This heightened top-down network engagement closely resembles the patterns observed in goal-oriented and cognitive control studies, shedding light on the intricate cognitive processes intertwined with self-regulation learning. Discussion: The findings from our investigation underscore the significance of cognitive mechanisms in the process of self-regulation learning through neurofeedback. The observed stronger top-down effective connectivity in successful learners indicates the involvement of hierarchical cognitive control, which aligns with the tenets of Active Inference. This study contributes to a deeper understanding of the neural dynamics behind successful self-regulation learning and provides insights into the potential cognitive architecture underpinning this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical applications of the free-energy principle are not straightforward because they entail a commitment to a particular process theory, especially at the cellular and synaptic levels. Using a recently established reverse engineering technique, we confirm the quantitative predictions of the free-energy principle using in vitro networks of rat cortical neurons that perform causal inference. Upon receiving electrical stimuli—generated by mixing two hidden sources—neurons self-organised to selectively encode the two sources. Pharmacological up- and downregulation of network excitability disrupted the ensuing inference, consistent with changes in prior beliefs about hidden sources. As predicted, changes in effective synaptic connectivity reduced variational free energy, where the connection strengths encoded parameters of the generative model. In short, we show that variational free energy minimisation can quantitatively predict the self-organisation of neuronal networks, in terms of their responses and plasticity. These results demonstrate the applicability of the free-energy principle to in vitro neural networks and establish its predictive validity in this setting. Empirical applications of the free-energy principle entail a commitment to a particular process theory. Here, the authors reverse engineered generative models from neural responses of in vitro networks and demonstrated that the free-energy principle could predict how neural networks reorganized in response to external stimulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a variational formulation of natural selection, paying special attention to the nature of 'things' and the way that different 'kinds' of 'things' are individuated from—and influence—each other. We use the Bayesian mechanics of particular partitions to understand how slow phylogenetic processes constrain—and are constrained by—fast, phenotypic processes. The main result is a formulation of adaptive fitness as a path integral of phenotypic fitness. Paths of least action, at the phenotypic and phylogenetic scales, can then be read as inference and learning processes, respectively. In this view, a phenotype actively infers the state of its econiche under a generative model, whose parameters are learned via natural (Bayesian model) selection. The ensuing variational synthesis features some unexpected aspects. Perhaps the most notable is that it is not possible to describe or model a population of conspecifics per se. Rather, it is necessary to consider populations of distinct natural kinds that influence each other. This paper is limited to a description of the mathematical apparatus and accompanying ideas. Subsequent work will use these methods for simulations and numerical analyses—and identify points of contact with related mathematical formulations of evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Synaptic loss occurs early in many neurodegenerative diseases and contributes to cognitive impairment even in the absence of gross atrophy. Currently, for human disease there are few formal models to explain how cortical networks underlying cognition are affected by synaptic loss. We advocate that biophysical models of neurophysiology offer both a bridge from preclinical to clinical models of pathology and quantitative assays for experimental medicine. Such biophysical models can also disclose hidden neuronal dynamics generating neurophysiological observations such as EEG and magnetoencephalography. Here, we augment a biophysically informed mesoscale model of human cortical function by inclusion of synaptic density estimates as captured by 11C-UCB-J PET, and provide insights into how regional synapse loss affects neurophysiology. We use the primary tauopathy of progressive supranuclear palsy (Richardson's syndrome) as an exemplar condition, with high clinicopathological correlations. Progressive supranuclear palsy causes a marked change in cortical neurophysiology in the presence of mild cortical atrophy and is associated with a decline in cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobe. Using parametric empirical Bayesian inversion of a conductance-based canonical microcircuit model of magnetoencephalography data, we show that the inclusion of regional synaptic density—as a subject-specific prior on laminar-specific neuronal populations—markedly increases model evidence. Specifically, model comparison suggests that a reduction in synaptic density in inferior frontal cortex affects superficial and granular layer glutamatergic excitation. This predicted individual differences in behaviour, demonstrating the link between synaptic loss, neurophysiology and cognitive deficits. The method we demonstrate is not restricted to progressive supranuclear palsy or the effects of synaptic loss: such pathology-enriched dynamic causal models can be used to assess the mechanisms of other neurological disorders, with diverse non-invasive measures of pathology, and is suitable to test the effects of experimental pharmacology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Active inference is a probabilistic framework for modeling the behavior of biological and artificial agents, which derives from the principle of minimizing free energy. In recent years, this framework has been applied successfully to a variety of situations where the goal was to maximize reward, often offering comparable and sometimes superior performance to alternative approaches. In this article, we clarify the connection between reward maximization and active inference by demonstrating how and when active inference agents execute actions that are optimal for maximizing reward. Precisely, we show the conditions under which active inference produces the optimal solution to the Bellman equation, a formulation that underlies several approaches to model-based reinforcement learning and control. On partially observed Markov decision processes, the standard active inference scheme can produce Bellman optimal actions for planning horizons of 1 but not beyond. In contrast, a recently developed recursive active inference scheme (sophisticated inference) can produce Bellman optimal actions on any finite temporal horizon. We append the analysis with a discussion of the broader relationship between active inference and reinforcement learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives Schizophrenia is a mental illness that presents with thought disorders including delusions and disorganized speech. Thought disorders have been regarded as a consequence of the loosening of associations between semantic concepts since the term "schizophrenia" was first coined by Bleuler. However, a mechanistic account of this cardinal disturbance in terms of functional dysconnection has been lacking. To evaluate how aberrant semantic connections are expressed through brain activity, we characterized large-scale network structures of concept representations using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Study Design We quantified various concept representations in patients' brains from fMRI activity evoked by movie scenes using encoding modeling. We then constructed semantic brain networks by evaluating the similarity of these semantic representations and conducted graph theory-based network analyses. Study Results Neurotypical networks had small-world properties similar to those of natural languages, suggesting small-worldness as a universal property in semantic knowledge networks. Conversely, small-worldness was significantly reduced in networks of schizophrenia patients and was correlated with psychological measures of delusions. Patients' semantic networks were partitioned into more distinct categories and had more random within-category structures than those of controls. Conclusions The differences in conceptual representations manifest altered semantic clustering and associative intrusions that underlie thought disorders. This is the first study to provide pathophysiological evidence for the loosening of associations as reflected in randomization of semantic networks in schizophrenia. Our method provides a promising approach for understanding the neural basis of altered or creative inner experiences of individuals with mental illness or exceptional abilities, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neural mass models are used to simulate cortical dynamics and to explain the electrical and magnetic fields measured using electro- and magnetoencephalography. Simulations evince a complex phase-space structure for these kinds of models; including stationary points and limit cycles and the possibility for bifurcations and transitions among different modes of activity. This complexity allows neural mass models to describe the itinerant features of brain dynamics. However, expressive, nonlinear neural mass models are often difficult to fit to empirical data without additional simplifying assumptions: e.g., that the system can be modelled as linear perturbations around a fixed point. In this study we offer a mathematical analysis of neural mass models, specifically the canonical microcircuit model, providing analytical solutions describing slow changes in the type of cortical activity, i.e. dynamical itinerancy. We derive a perturbation analysis up to second order of the phase flow, together with adiabatic approximations. This allows us to describe amplitude modulations in a relatively simple mathematical format providing analytic proof-of-principle for the existence of semi-stable states of cortical dynamics at the scale of a cortical column. This work allows for model inversion of neural mass models, not only around fixed points, but over regions of phase space that encompass transitions among semi or multi-stable states of oscillatory activity. Crucially, these theoretical results speak to model inversion in the context of multiple semi-stable brain states, such as the transition between interictal, pre-ictal and ictal activity in epilepsy. Author summary: There is collecting evidence that the electrical activity of the brain is highly complex. Electro- and magnetoencephalography, being non-invasive methods, are often used to measure brain function in humans and have provided a large amount of data indicating complexity. Furthermore, a quantitative framework is required to understand the interactions between the different features of electrical activity of the brain. Neural mass models can provide a quantitative framework required to further understand brain activity and complexity, and in this paper we provide a mathematical form that can be used to understand some of the complex electrical dynamics of the brain. Crucially, these theoretical results improve our understanding of multiple semi-stable brain states, as seen in epilepsy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accumulating evidence suggests that the brain is highly dynamic; thus, investigation of brain dynamics especially in brain connectivity would provide crucial information that stationary functional connectivity could miss. This study investigated temporal expressions of spatial modes within the default mode network (DMN), salience network (SN) and cognitive control network (CCN) using a reliable data-driven co-activation pattern (CAP) analysis in two independent data sets. We found enhanced CAP-to-CAP transitions of the SN in patients with MDD. Results suggested enhanced flexibility of this network in the patients. By contrast, we also found reduced spatial consistency and persistence of the DMN in the patients, indicating reduced variability and stability in individuals with MDD. In addition, the patients were characterized by prominent activation of mPFC. Moreover, further correlation analysis revealed that persistence and transitions of RCCN were associated with the severity of depression. Our findings suggest that functional connectivity in the patients may not be simply attenuated or potentiated, but just alternating faster or slower among more complex patterns. The aberrant temporal–spatial complexity of intrinsic fluctuations reflects functional diaschisis of resting-state networks as characteristic of patients with MDD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the increase in the use of dynamical modeling in the literature on cultural evolution makes current models more mathematically sophisticated, these models have yet to be tested or validated. This paper provides a testable deep active inference formulation of social behavior and accompanying simulations of cumulative culture in two steps: First, we cast cultural transmission as a bi-directional process of communication that induces a generalized synchrony (operationalized as a particular convergence) between the belief states of interlocutors. Second, we cast social or cultural exchange as a process of active inference by equipping agents with the choice of who to engage in communication with. This induces trade-offs between confirmation of current beliefs and exploration of the social environment. We find that cumulative culture emerges from belief updating (i.e., active inference and learning) in the form of a joint minimization of uncertainty. The emergent cultural equilibria are characterized by a segregation into groups, whose belief systems are actively sustained by selective, uncertainty minimizing, dyadic exchanges. The nature of these equilibria depends sensitively on the precision afforded by various probabilistic mappings in each individual's generative model of their encultured niche. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the increase in the use of dynamical modeling in the literature on cultural evolution makes current models more mathematically sophisticated, these models have yet to be tested or validated. This paper provides a testable deep active inference formulation of social behavior and accompanying simulations of cumulative culture in two steps: First, we cast cultural transmission as a bi-directional process of communication that induces a generalized synchrony (operationalized as a particular convergence) between the belief states of interlocutors. Second, we cast social or cultural exchange as a process of active inference by equipping agents with the choice of who to engage in communication with. This induces trade-offs between confirmation of current beliefs and exploration of the social environment. We find that cumulative culture emerges from belief updating (i.e., active inference and learning) in the form of a joint minimization of uncertainty. The emergent cultural equilibria are characterized by a segregation into groups, whose belief systems are actively sustained by selective, uncertainty minimizing, dyadic exchanges. The nature of these equilibria depends sensitively on the precision afforded by various probabilistic mappings in each individual's generative model of their encultured niche. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Illness course plays a crucial role in delineating psychiatric disorders. However, existing nosologies consider only its most basic features (e.g., symptom sequence, duration). We developed a Dynamic Causal Model (DCM) that characterizes course patterns more fully using dense timeseries data. This foundational study introduces the new modeling approach and evaluates its validity using empirical and simulated data. Methods: A three-level DCM was constructed to model how latent dynamics produce symptoms of depression, mania, and psychosis. This model was fit to symptom scores of nine patients collected prospectively over four years, following first hospitalization. Simulated subjects based on these empirical data were used to evaluate model parameters at the subject-level. At the group-level, we tested the accuracy with which the DCM can estimate the latent course patterns using Parametric Empirical Bayes (PEB) and leave-one-out cross-validation. Results: Analyses of empirical data showed that DCM accurately captured symptom trajectories for all nine subjects. Simulation results showed that parameters could be estimated accurately (correlations between generative and estimated parameters >= 0.76). Moreover, the model could distinguish different latent course patterns, with PEB correctly assigning simulated patients for eight of nine course patterns. When testing any pair of two specific course patterns using leave-one-out cross-validation, 30 out of 36 pairs showed a moderate or high out-of-samples correlation between the true groupmembership and the estimated group-membership values. Conclusion: DCM has been widely used in neuroscience to infer latent neuronal processes from neuroimaging data. Our findings highlight the potential of adopting this methodology for modeling symptom trajectories to explicate nosologic entities, temporal patterns that define them, and facilitate personalized treatment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I enjoyed reading this compelling account of Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT). As a theoretical neurobiologist, I recognised – and applauded – the tenets of CNT. My commentary asks whether its claims could be installed into a Bayesian mechanics of decision-making, in a way that would enable theoreticians to model, reproduce and predict decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During resting-state EEG recordings, alpha activity is more prominent over the posterior cortex in eyes-closed (EC) conditions compared to eyes-open (EO). In this study, we characterized the difference in spectra between EO and EC conditions using dynamic causal modelling. Specifically, we investigated the role of intrinsic and extrinsic connectivity—within the visual cortex—in generating EC-EO alpha power differences over posterior electrodes. The primary visual cortex (V1) and the bilateral middle temporal visual areas (V5) were equipped with bidirectional extrinsic connections using a canonical microcircuit. The states of four intrinsically coupled subpopulations—within each occipital source—were also modelled. Using Bayesian model selection, we tested whether modulations of the intrinsic connections in V1, V5 or extrinsic connections (or a combination thereof) provided the best evidence for the data. In addition, using parametric empirical Bayes (PEB), we estimated group averages under the winning model. Bayesian model selection showed that the winning model contained both extrinsic connectivity modulations, as well as intrinsic connectivity modulations in all sources. The PEB analysis revealed increased extrinsic connectivity during EC. Overall, we found a reduction in the inhibitory intrinsic connections during EC. The results suggest that the intrinsic modulations in V5 played the most important role in producing EC-EO alpha differences, suggesting an intrinsic disinhibition in higher order visual cortex, during EC resting state. Author summary: One of the strongest signals that can be measured using EEG are so called alpha rhythms. These are neural oscillations that fall within the 8-12Hz frequency range. Alpha rhythms are most prominent when the eyes are closed and are seen at the electrodes placed at the back of the head. In this study, we studied the mechanism of alpha rhythms changes when going from eyes-open to an eyes-closed state. We used a biologically plausible model including different neural populations. We focused on modelling connections within and between different neural sources of the visual cortex and how they are modulated when going from eyes-open to an eyes closed state. We found evidence that inhibitory neurons play an important role in alpha rhythms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we aim to conceptualize and formalize the construct of resilience using the tools of active inference, a new physics-based modeling approach apt for the description and analysis of complex adaptive systems. We intend this as a first step toward a computational model of resilient systems. We begin by offering a conceptual analysis of resilience, to clarify its meaning, as established in the literature. We examine an orthogonal, threefold distinction between meanings of the word "resilience": (i) inertia, or the ability to resist change (ii) elasticity, or the ability to bounce back from a perturbation, and (iii) plasticity, or the ability to flexibly expand the repertoire of adaptive states. We then situate all three senses of resilience within active inference. We map resilience as inertia onto high precision beliefs, resilience as elasticity onto relaxation back to characteristic (i.e., attracting) states, and resilience as plasticity onto functional redundancy and structural degeneracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a version of neurophenomenology based on generative modelling techniques developed in computational neuroscience and biology. Our approach can be described as computational phenomenology because it applies methods originally developed in computational modelling to provide a formal model of the descriptions of lived experience in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy (e.g., the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, etc.). The first section presents a brief review of the overall project to naturalize phenomenology. The second section presents and evaluates philosophical objections to that project and situates our version of computational phenomenology with respect to these projects. The third section reviews the generative modelling framework. The final section presents our approach in detail. We conclude by discussing how our approach differs from previous attempts to use generative modelling to help understand consciousness. In summary, we describe a version of computational phenomenology which uses generative modelling to construct a computational model of the inferential or interpretive processes that best explain this or that kind of lived experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mainstream science of consciousness offers a few predominate views of how the brain gives rise to awareness. Chief among these are the Higher-Order Thought Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, and hybrids thereof. In parallel, rapid development in predictive processing approaches have begun to outline concrete mechanisms by which interoceptive inference shapes selfhood, affect, and exteroceptive perception. Here, we consider these new approaches in terms of what they might offer our empirical, phenomenological, and philosophical understanding of consciousness and its neurobiological roots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans display astonishing skill in learning about the environment in which they operate. They assimilate a rich set of affordances and interrelations among different elements in particular contexts, and form flexible abstractions (i.e., concepts) that can be generalised and leveraged with ease. To capture these abilities, we present a deep hierarchical Active Inference model of goal-directed behaviour, and the accompanying belief update schemes implied by maximising model evidence. Using simulations, we elucidate the potential mechanisms that underlie and influence concept learning in a spatial foraging task. We show that the representations formed–as a result of foraging–reflect environmental structure in a way that is enhanced and nuanced by Bayesian model reduction, a special case of structure learning that typifies learning in the absence of new evidence. Synthetic agents learn associations and form concepts about environmental context and configuration as a result of inferential, parametric learning, and structure learning processes–three processes that can produce a diversity of beliefs and belief structures. Furthermore, the ensuing representations reflect symmetries for environments with identical configurations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of evidence highlights the intricate linkage of exteroceptive perception to the rhythmic activity of the visceral body. In parallel, interoceptive inference theories of affective perception and self-consciousness are on the rise in cognitive science. However, thus far no formal theory has emerged to integrate these twin domains; instead, most extant work is conceptual in nature. Here, we introduce a formal model of cardiac active inference, which explains how ascending cardiac signals entrain exteroceptive sensory perception and uncertainty. Through simulated psychophysics, we reproduce the defensive startle reflex and commonly reported effects linking the cardiac cycle to affective behaviour. We further show that simulated 'interoceptive lesions' blunt affective expectations, induce psychosomatic hallucinations, and exacerbate biases in perceptual uncertainty. Through synthetic heart-rate variability analyses, we illustrate how the balance of arousal-priors and visceral prediction errors produces idiosyncratic patterns of physiological reactivity. Our model thus offers a roadmap for computationally phenotyping disordered brain-body interaction. Author summary: Understanding interactions between the brain and the body has become a topic of increased interest in computational neuroscience and psychiatry. A particular question here concerns how visceral, homeostatic rhythms such as the heart beat influence sensory, affective, and cognitive processing. To better understand these and other oscillatory brain-body interactions, we here introduce a novel computational model of interoceptive inference in which a synthetic agent's perceptual beliefs are coupled to the rhythm of the heart. Our model both helps to explain emerging empirical data indicating that perceptual inference depends upon beat-to-beat heart rhythms, and can be used to better quantify intra- and inter-individual differences in heart-brain coupling. Using proof-of-principle simulations, we demonstrate how future empirical works could utilize our model to better understand and stratify disorders of interoception and brain-body interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Computational models of visual attention in artificial intelligence and robotics have been inspired by the concept of a saliency map. These models account for the mutual information between the (current) visual information and its estimated causes. However, they fail to consider the circular causality between perception and action. In other words, they do not consider where to sample next, given current beliefs. Here, we reclaim salience as an active inference process that relies on two basic principles: uncertainty minimization and rhythmic scheduling. For this, we make a distinction between attention and salience. Briefly, we associate attention with precision control, i.e., the confidence with which beliefs can be updated given sampled sensory data, and salience with uncertainty minimization that underwrites the selection of future sensory data. Using this, we propose a new account of attention based on rhythmic precision-modulation and discuss its potential in robotics, providing numerical experiments that showcase its advantages for state and noise estimation, system identification and action selection for informative path planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]