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Survey experiments are an important tool to measure policy preferences. Researchers often rely on the random assignment of policy attribute levels to estimate different types of average marginal effects. Yet, researchers are often interested in how respondents trade-off different policy dimensions. We use a conjoint experiment administered to more than 10,000 respondents in Germany, to study preferences over personal freedoms and public welfare during the COVID-19 crisis. Using a pre-registered structural model, we estimate policy ideal points and indifference curves to assess the conditions under which citizens are willing to sacrifice freedoms in the interest of public well-being. We document broad willingness to accept restrictions on rights alongside sharp heterogeneity with respect to vaccination status. The majority of citizens are vaccinated and strongly support limitations on freedoms in response to extreme conditions—especially, when they vaccinated themselves are exempted from these limitations. The unvaccinated minority prefers no restrictions on freedoms regardless of the severity of the pandemic. These policy packages also matter for reported trust in government, in opposite ways for vaccinated and unvaccinated citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present the PARTYPRESS Database, which compiles more than 250,000 published press releases from 68 parties in 9 European countries. The database covers the press releases of the most relevant political parties in these countries from 2010 onward. It provides a supervised machine learning classification of press releases into 21 unique issue categories according to a general codebook. The PARTYPRESS Database can be used to study parties' issue agendas comparatively and over time. We extend a recent analysis in Gessler and Hunger (2022) to illustrate the usefulness of the database in studying dynamic party competition, communication, and behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does policy-making in coalition governments affect cabinet parties' electoral performance? Previous research shows that about two thirds of all propositions promised in coalition agreements are actually enacted. But does non-compliance with pledges made in the agreement affect subsequent electoral support? Drawing on the literature on performance voting, we expect that non-compliance is punished by voters, but the effect is conditioned by the importance of the issue and by a parties' seniority status within the coalition. To test our argument, we have compiled the new comparative COALITIONPOLICY dataset on the enactment of more than 7000 policy pledges by 217 cabinet parties in 19 Western and Eastern European countries from 2000 to 2015. Across a broad range of models, we find no effect of pledge fulfillment on subsequent electoral performance. If anything, adherence to policy-promises only increases support for the prime minister party. These results have important implications for our understanding of political representation, coalition governance, and electoral competition in multiparty democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few existing datasets on parties and interest groups include data from both sides and a wide variety of interest groups and parties. We contribute to filling this gap by making several interconnected new datasets publicly available. The Party-Interest Group Relationships in Contemporary Democracies (PAIRDEM) datasets include cross-national data from three different surveys of (1) central party organizations, (2) legislative party groups, and (3) interest groups. A fourth dataset based on coding of party statutes and party finance data was established together with the Political Party Database. The datasets contain novel indicators on party-group relationships in up to 21 mature democracies. In this research note, we first present the main content of the datasets and the research design. Second, we present descriptive statistics documenting the extent of organizational ties between parties and groups in contemporary democracies. Third, we illustrate more advanced usage through a simple application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies provide evidence that income inequality is a relevant driver for the electoral success of populist parties all over Europe. In this article, we aim to understand how exactly increasing income inequality can lead to support for populist parties. More specifically, we discuss four different attitudinal mechanisms from previous research: economic insecurities, trust in political elites, social integration, and national identity. We rely on eight waves of the European Social Survey and find that economic insecurities, trust in political elites, and national identity are linked to rising income inequality and populist support as expected. However, a causal mediation analysis shows that these mechanisms are not sufficient to fully understand the impact of income inequality on support for populists. This finding raises questions regarding the empirical support of existing theories to explain how macroeconomic changes in inequality became a pre-condition for the rise of populist parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By September 2021 an estimated 32% of the global population was fully vaccinated for COVID-19 but the global distribution of vaccines was extremely unequal, with 72% or more vaccinated in the ten countries with the highest vaccination rates and less than 2% in the ten countries with the lowest vaccination rates. Given that governments need to secure public support for investments in global vaccine sharing, it is important to understand the levels and drivers of public support for international vaccine solidarity. Using a factorial experiment administered to more than 10,000 online survey respondents in Germany in 2021, we demonstrate that the majority of German citizens are against global inequalities in vaccine distribution. Respondents are supportive of substantive funding amounts, on the order of the most generous contributions provided to date, though still below amounts that are likely needed for a successful global campaign. Public preferences appear largely to be driven by intrinsic concern for the welfare of global populations though are in part explained by material considerations—particularly risks of continued health threats from a failure to vaccinate globally. Strategic considerations are of more limited importance in shaping public opinion; in particular we see no evidence for free riding on contributions by other states. Finally, drawing on an additional survey experiment, we show that there is scope to use information campaigns highlighting international health externalities to augment public support for global campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior literature points to the importance of party power and ideology for interest group-party contacts in the legislative arena. But interest groups do not often have ideologies – they are typically active in a small number of policy domains and there may be different parties that share more similar preferences across different policy areas. Therefore, we examine whether and how party power and proximity in policy preferences predict the existence of party-interest group 'lobby routines' in specific policy domains, using a novel survey of representative samples of interest groups in seven long-established democracies. We find that groups often form routines with different parties in different policy areas and that preference proximity on relevant policy dimensions is positively associated with having such area-specific lobby routines. However, the results also suggest that powerful parties are more likely allies and that the effect of policy proximity on routines is positively conditioned by power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is a correction notice for an article titled "Trading Liberties: Estimating COVID-19 Policy Preferences from Conjoint Data." The correction addresses an error in the original publication where an affiliation was incorrectly attributed to one of the authors. The corrected version of the article is available online and is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution license. [Extracted from the article]

While a multitude of studies have investigated the link between opinion and policy, we have little knowledge of how and when organised interests affect this linkage. We argue that the alignment of organised interests affects opinion–policy congruence by influencing the weight decision‐makers attach to citizen preferences. Moreover, we propose that alignment between majorities of groups and the public matters the most when status quo bias must be overcome for the public to obtain its preferred policy. We test our theoretical claims drawing on a comprehensive media content analysis of 160 policy issues in Germany and Denmark. Our results present a more sceptical picture of the ability of groups to suppress the opinion–policy linkage than the one frequently presented in the academic literature and public debate. We find that the capacity of groups to affect whether policy is congruent with the majority of the public is restricted to situations where the public supports a change in the status quo. In these cases, policy is less likely to end up reflecting public opinion if the majority of interest groups do not support the public position. In cases where the public is supportive of the policy status quo, the position of interest groups does not affect the likelihood that policy will eventually reflect the preferred position of the public. Our findings expand existing knowledge of organised interests in the study of policy representation and have important implications for understanding democratic governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest groups are important intermediary organisations that function as a transmission belt between societal interests and political decision-makers. However, while some interest groups survive over decades, others only last a few years. This article argues that the survival of interest groups depends on their ability to mobilise resources which is crucially affected by interest group type and the public salience of an interest group's policy domain. The theoretical expectations are tested based on a novel dataset mapping the survival of 1699 interest groups registered at the German Bundestag between 1974 and 2012. Using event history analysis, it is shown that interest group type and public salience indeed affect whether interest groups survive. Sectional groups last significantly longer than cause groups, and interest group survival increases with the public salience of their policy area. The results have major implications for our understanding of interest groups and political representation in contemporary democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does joining a governing coalition as a junior partner influence a party's subsequent electoral success? We argue that joining a multiparty cabinet as a junior partner considerably hurts a party's future electoral prospects as junior partners cannot enact much of what they promised before the election and since they cannot sufficiently differentiate themselves from their larger coalition partner. To test our theoretical expectations comparatively and over time, we have compiled a comprehensive data set on the electoral performance of 307 political parties running in 219 elections in twenty-eight European countries from 1972 to 2017. To shed light on the underlying causal mechanisms, we additionally provide empirical evidence from an illustrative case study showing that the inability to deliver on election promises and a large degree of misperception among voters are important drivers of junior coalition parties' electoral losses. Our findings provide important insights into the relationship between coalition governments and electoral competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent evidence suggests that vaccination hesitancy is too high in many countries to sustainably contain COVID-19. Using a factorial survey experiment administered to 20,500 online respondents in Germany, we assess the effectiveness of three strategies to increase vaccine uptake, namely, providing freedoms, financial remuneration, and vaccination at local doctors. Our results suggest that all three strategies can increase vaccination uptake on the order of two to three percentage points (PP) overall and five PP among the undecided. The combined effects could be as high as 13 PP for this group. The returns from different strategies vary across age groups, however, with older cohorts more responsive to local access and younger cohorts most responsive to enhanced freedoms for vaccinated citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often argued that electoral vulnerability is critical to constituency responsiveness. We investigate this possibility using different measures of vulnerability, but argue that in the United States the Republican Party may be less responsive than the Democratic Party due to its core constituency and view of representation. We test our hypotheses relying on an innovative research design that exploits referenda in U.S. states to compare legislator voting behavior with voter preferences on exactly the same policy proposal, allowing us to overcome the measurement problems of much previous research. Based on a newly compiled data set of more than 3,000 voting decisions for 818 legislators on 27 referenda, we find high levels of congruence, but that congruence with the median voter is higher for legislators who are running for reelection. We also find that Democrats are more responsive after a close election but that Republicans are not sensitive to electoral margins. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do political parties respond to interest group mobilization? While party responsiveness to voters has received widespread attention, little is known about how interest groups affect parties' policy agendas. I argue that political parties respond to interest groups as lobbyists offer valuable information, campaign contributions, electoral support and personal rewards, but that party responsiveness is conditioned by voter preferences. Based on a novel longitudinal analysis studying the responsiveness of German parties to interest groups across eleven issue areas and seven elections from 1987 until 2009, it is shown that parties adjust their policy agendas in response to interest group mobilization and that interest groups are more successful in shaping party policy when their priorities coincide with those of the electorate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Right-wing populist and far right parties are on the rise across Europe. While established parties are suffering dramatic electoral losses, right-wing parties are celebrating one electoral victory after another. To address their radical right challengers, many established parties have adopted a so-called 'accommodative strategy' by taking a more immigration-skeptical policy position. However, it is unclear whether such a strategy yields the expected benefits or whether such a position shift in turn hurts a party electorally. In this article, we find that mainstream left parties benefit from 'going tough on immigration' whereas it neither helps nor hurts mainstream right parties electorally. We arrive at this conclusion through an analysis of 16,811 vote choices in 15 elections in six countries from 1998 until 2013. Our findings have important implications for understanding what explains the rise of far right parties and the changing nature of electoral competition across Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can one explain the significant vote losses of mainstream parties across Europe in recent years? In this article, it is argued that mainstream party convergence is an important determinant of the recent political and electoral volatility in European party systems. More specifically, it is hypothesised that as mainstream parties converge on the left‐right scale, voters will switch from supporting a mainstream party to a non‐mainstream party in the next election as they look for an alternative that better represents their ideological views. To test these theoretical expectations, data is combined from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the Manifestos Project for nearly 15,000 vote choices of individual voters in 30 elections in 16 West and East European countries from 2001 until 2013. The findings have important implications for understanding the recent rise of non‐mainstream parties, the changing nature of party systems and the increasing complexity of cabinet formation across Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do coalition parties settle some policy issues in great detail, whereas other issues are hardly mentioned in coalition agreements? Coalition agreements are important policy platforms that determine policy making during the legislative term. However, we know remarkably little about their content. We shed light on why issue attention in coalition agreements varies so extensively. We argue that intra-cabinet conflict positively affects issue attention as parties have stronger incentives to negotiate a detailed policy agenda that constrains their coalition partners. However, we expect that this effect is conditioned by preference tangentiality and the salience of an issue among coalition partners. Our theoretical expectations are tested drawing on a new data set based on a comprehensive content analysis of 224 agreements negotiated by 181 parties between 1945 and 2015 in 24 West and East European countries. We find support for our hypotheses and conclude that parties draft agreements to limit "ministerial drift." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Voters are increasingly concerned that special interests control the policy process. Yet, the literature on representation is more optimistic: elected officials face strong incentives to listen to voters—not just lobby groups—and this makes for more responsive policies. Building on recent work, we argue a more nuanced point: different types of groups have different effects on responsiveness. We show empirically that lobbying from "cause" groups—representing diffuse interests like climate change—strengthens responsiveness, while lobbying from "sectional" groups—representing industry and professional associations—has no observable effect. Our project uses a novel data set of Canadian lobbying registrations spanning fifteen policy areas from 1990 to 2009. Using a dynamic panel model, we test how interest group lobbying moderates the effect of voter issue attention on government spending. Our findings contribute to contemporary debates over the influence of organized groups, suggesting some interest groups may improve representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does the number of interest groups vary across economic sectors? Interest groups are an important channel through which companies can transmit their policy preferences to decision-makers. However, empirical research shows that the number of interest groups varies considerably across sectors. We argue that the size and the wealth of the potential constituency as well as government activity positively affect interest group density. We test our theoretical expectations based on an unprecedented longitudinal analysis of interest groups that registered at the German Bundestag from 1978 until 2013 and show that the number of firms, the wealth of an economic sector, and government activity positively influence interest group density. However, we also find that the relationship between interest groups and legislative activity is reciprocal as legislative activity positively impacts the number of interest groups in an economic sector, but at the same time interest group density also positively affects legislative activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the role of interest groups in the transmission of issues between the public and government policy? While government responsiveness to voters has received widespread scholarly attention, little is known about the role of interest groups in the transmission of public opinion to government. It is argued here that interest groups importantly influence government responsiveness to public opinion, but that the effect varies by type of interest group: while cause groups increase the responsiveness of governments to their electorate, sectional groups decrease government responsiveness. Drawing on a new and unique dataset, this article examines the relationship between public opinion, interest groups and government expenditure across 13 policy areas in Germany from 1986 until 2012 and shows that interest groups indeed have a differential effect on the responsiveness of governments. The article’s findings have important implications for understanding political representation and the largely overlooked relationship between public opinion, interest groups and government policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When are minority cabinets effective? We study the extent to which minority cabinets demonstrate legislative reliability, that is, introduce to parliament the bills they have announced in their legislative agendas. We test hypotheses drawn from two theories of minority government effectiveness: the positional agenda power theory which emphasizes the central location of the minority cabinet in the policy space and the ideological proximity theory which stresses the importance of the ideological closeness of opposition parties to the government. In an analysis of over 1600 bills announced by Danish and Swedish minority cabinets in 19 legislative agendas published between 1998 and 2012, we find more support, overall, for the ideological proximity than for the positional agenda power model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines to what extent different formal conceptualizations of ideological conflict can help to explain the capacity for and speed of policy change in the European Union (EU). We compare the core and the winset, two competing concepts based on the spatial theory of voting. The empirical analysis shows that the latter concept bears a strong and systematic influence on decision making in the EU. The smaller the winset containing the outcomes that a majority of actors in the Council of the EU prefers over the status quo, the longer a decision-making process lasts and the smaller the potential for policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does governing in coalitions affect coalition parties' responsiveness to voters? In this article, we seek to understand the relationship between political parties' participation in multiparty governments and their responsiveness to voters. We argue that the extent to which coalition parties respond to policy priorities of voters is influenced by the divisiveness of policy issues within the cabinet and the ministerial responsibility for policies. To test our hypotheses, we combine data on the issue attention of 55 coalition parties from the Comparative Manifestos Project with data on government composition and data on the policy priorities of voters from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and various election studies in 45 elections across 16 European countries from 1972 to 2011. While we find that intra-cabinet divisiveness decreases coalition parties' responsiveness, we find no effect for portfolio responsibility. Our findings shed light on the relationship between party competition and coalition governments and its implications for political representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective While selective issue emphasis is a widely recognized strategy of party competition, we have little knowledge about how coalition parties interact with each other when deciding which policy issues to emphasize. Therefore we ask: Who leads and who follows the issue agenda in coalition governments? Methods. We create an issue attention data set using quantitative text analysis from over 40,000 press releases. We use this data set and time series cross-section regression analysis to study the dynamics of coalition parties' issue attention. Results. We find that junior coalition parties are more responsive to their senior partners than senior partners to their junior partners. Hence, while coalition partners generally follow each other, senior partners enjoy a stronger leadership role in the cabinet. Conclusion. Coalition parties indeed coordinate their issue priorities as they respond to each other's issue agenda. However, due the asymmetric power distribution in coalition cabinets, it is not a negotiation process on equal footing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does governing in coalitions affect how coalition parties' policy positions are perceived by voters? In this article, the authors seek to understand the relationship between parties' participation in coalition governments and their perception by voters. Policy positions are an important instrument through which parties compete for the support of voters. However, it is unclear to what extent voters can correctly perceive the positions of parties when they govern together with other coalition partners. It is argued here that because of the blurred lines of responsibility in multiparty cabinets, it is difficult for voters to correctly perceive the positions of coalition parties. What is more, it is expected that the internal functioning of coalition cabinets affects the extent to which coalition parties struggle to get their message out to voters. It is hypothesized in the article that intra-cabinet conflict is negatively related to misperception. To test their theoretical expectations, the authors combine data on the left-right policy positions of political parties from the Comparative Manifestos Project with data on how these positions are perceived by voters gathered from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems from 1996 to 2011. The findings shed light on the relationship between party competition and coalition governments, and its implications for political representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do parties listen to their voters? This article addresses this important question by moving beyond position congruence to explore whether parties respond to voters' issue priorities. It argues that political parties respond to voters in their election manifestos, but that their responsiveness varies across different party types: namely, that large parties are more responsive to voters' policy priorities, while government parties listen less to voters' issue demands. The study also posits that niche parties are not generally more responsive to voter demands, but that they are more responsive to the concerns of their supporters in their owned issue areas. To test these theoretical expectations, the study combines data from the Comparative Manifestos Project with data on voters' policy priorities from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and various national election studies across eighteen European democracies in sixty-three elections from 1972-2011. Our findings have important implications for understanding political representation and democratic linkage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do political parties arrive at their policy positions? We conceptualize position formation in federalist countries as an intra-party bargaining process in which subnational parties compete with each other in an attempt to get their own positions into their national party manifesto. Drawing on theories about inter-party bargaining over ministerial portfolios, we hypothesize that the bargaining success of subnational parties depends on their parliamentary strength. We evaluate our hypotheses based on a comprehensive dataset on policy positions of national and subnational parties in Germany from 1990 until 2009. Our results show that German subnational parties that are powerful in the second parliamentary chamber (Bundesrat) are particularly successful in shaping the manifesto of their national party. The findings have important implications for our understanding of intra-party politics and position formation within political parties in Germany more specifically and federalist countries more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do political parties prioritise some policy issues over others? While the issue ownership theory suggests that parties emphasise policy issues on which they have an advantage in order to increase the salience of these issues among voters, the riding the wave theory argues instead that parties respond to voters by highlighting policy issues that are salient in the minds of citizens. This study sheds new light on the selective issue emphasis of political parties by analysing issue attention throughout the entire electoral cycle. On the basis of a quantitative text analysis of more than 40,000 press releases published by German parties from 2000 until 2010, this article provides empirical support for the riding the wave theory. It shows that political parties take their cues from voters by responding to the issue priorities of their electorate. The results have important implications for political representation and the role that parties play in democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Citizens delegate the representation of their political preferences to members of Parliament (MPs), who are supposed to represent their interests in the legislature. However, MPs are exposed to a variety of interest groups seeking to influence their voting behavior. We argue that interest groups influence how MPs cast their vote in Parliament, but that this effect varies across groups. While lobbying by sectional groups provides incentives for MPs to defect from their constituents, we expect that cause groups in fact strengthen the link between MPs and their voters. We test our argument based on an innovative study of 118 Swiss public referenda, which allows for directly comparing voter preferences with legislative voting of 448 MPs on these issues. Drawing on a multilevel regression analysis, this study shows that interest groups considerably affect the link between MPs and their voters. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of political representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quantitative text analysis constitutes a promising new method that allows for measuring the policy positions and the lobbying success of interest groups by analyzing their submissions to legislative consultations (Klüver, 2009). The use of quantitative text analysis allowed me to present a novel and unique research design which was the largest in scope at the time and resulted in important new insights regarding the determinants of lobbying success (Klüver, 2009, 2011, 2013). In their recent article, Bunea and Ibenskas (2015) however question the usefulness of quantitative text analysis for studying interest groups and discuss several issues which in their view constitute important disadvantages of the technique. In this article I carefully discuss each of their arguments and show that none of their objections actually prevents scholars from successfully using quantitative text analysis to study interest groups in the European Union and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since political scientists were introduced to the concept of ‘the scope and bias of the pressure system’ by Schattschneider more than half a century ago, we have grappled with the lack of a standard against which to assess bias. Still, scholars have continued to address Schattschneider's provocative claim. This means that they must have in their minds at least implicit images of the unknown state of an unbiased interest system. We uncover these implicit images in this analysis both for their own intrinsic interest and perhaps as a foundation for more progressive research on biases in interest representation. Ten scholars who have done considerable work on the politics of interest representation were asked to provide a brief description of what he or she would see as an unbiased interest system. After presenting each, we summarize the themes that emerged and discuss possible avenues for empirical research on bias. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Framing plays an important role in lobbying, as interest groups strategically highlight some aspects of policy proposals while ignoring others to shape policy debates in their favour. However, due to methodological difficulties, we have remarkably little systematic data about the framing strategies of interest groups. This article therefore proposes a new technique for measuring interest group framing that is based on a quantitative text analysis of interest group position papers and official policy documents. We test this novel methodological approach on the basis of two case studies in the areas of environmental and transport policy in the European Union. We are able to identify the frames employed by all interest groups mobilised in a debate and assess their effectiveness by studying to what extent decision-makers move closer to their policy positions over the course of the policy debate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

What explains when Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) defect from their EP party group? While previous research has focused on the policy distance between an MEP’s national party and her party group, it has been overlooked that not all issues are equally important to national parties. As parties prioritize certain issues over others, we argue that it is both the distance and the salience of the issue for the MEP’s national party that explains defection. To test our theoretical claim, we explore more than 400,000 vote decisions across 1,948 different roll-call votes in four issue areas – agriculture, environment, social policy and external trade – from 1979 until 1999. To measure policy salience and distance, we combine roll-call analysis with data from the Euromanifestos Project. Our findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of party competition and the role that national parties play in the European Parliament. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

When do coalitions do what they promise? Previous research has focused on the extent to which parties implement electoral pledges. In this article, we examine how coalition cabinets fulfil post-electoral legislative agendas. Many coalitions announce programmes identifying bills that they plan to introduce to parliament in the months ahead. Even though coalition parties publicly signal commitment to all such proposals, there is variation in the extent to which cabinets meet their own deadlines. We argue that pledge fulfilment is driven by differences in the divisiveness and salience of legislative initiatives. We test our theoretical expectations based on an empirical analysis of over 500 legislative pledges made by the Polish cabinet between 2008 and 2011. Our results confirm that pledges dealing with less divisive and more salient issues are likely to be fulfilled with less delay than those dealing with more divisive and less important issues. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Do interest groups adjust their activity in response to public opinion? While previous studies have primarily focused on the link between voters, political parties and governments, interest groups have largely been ignored. This article therefore examines how public opinion affects interest group activity. It is argued that interest group activity is a bottom–up process in which interest groups respond to the issue priorities of citizens. Bringing together panel data on citizen concerns with longitudinal data on interest group issue attention, this article examines the issue linkage between citizens and interest groups in Germany from 1984 until 2010 in two different policy domains. Based on a time-series cross-section analysis, it is shown that issue attention of citizens precedes the registration of interest groups in the Bundestag indicating that interest groups play an important role in issue evolution and political representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does voter polarisation affect party responsiveness? Previous research has shown that political parties emphasise political issues that are important to their voters. However, it is posited in this article that political parties are not equally responsive to citizen demands across all issue areas. The hypothesis is that party responsiveness varies considerably with the preference configuration of the electorate. More specifically, it is argued that party responsiveness increases with the polarisation of issues among voters. To test these theoretical expectations, party responsiveness is analysed across nine West European countries from 1982 until 2013. Data on voter attention and voter preferences with regard to specific policy issues from a variety of national election studies is combined with Comparative Manifestos Project data on parties' emphasis of these issues in their election manifestos. The findings have major implications for understanding party competition and political representation in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We outline a conceptual framework that identifies and characterizes the contextual nature of interest group politics in the European Union (EU) to better understand variation in interest group mobilization, lobbying strategies and interest group influence. We focus on two sets of contextual factors that affect EU interest group lobbying. First, we argue that interest group activities are shaped by several policy-related factors, namely the complexity, the policy type, the status quo, the salience and the degree of conflict characterizing legislative proposals and the associated issues. Second, we posit that lobbying in the EU is affected by institutional factors that vary within the EU political system, such as the institutional fragmentation within the European Commission and the European Parliament and across different national political systems depending on the patterns of interest intermediation or the vertical and horizontal distribution of powers. Finally, we theorize about the interrelationship between contextual features and interest group properties and summarize the findings of the collection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Framing plays an important role in public policy. Interest groups strategically highlight some aspects of a policy proposal while ignoring others in order to gain an advantage in the policy debate. However, we know remarkably little about how interest groups choose their frames. This contribution therefore studies the determinants of frame choice during the policy formulation stage in the European Union. We argue that frame choice is a complex process which is simultaneously affected by interest groups as well as contextual characteristics. With regard to interest group characteristics, we expect that frame choice varies systematically across actor type. With regard to contextual characteristics, we hypothesize that the frames that interest groups employ are specifically tailored towards the DGs in charge of drafting the proposal. Our theoretical expectations are tested based on a new and innovative dataset on frame choice of more than 3,000 interest groups in 44 policy debates. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How does ideological congruency affect the speed of legislative decision-making in the European Union? Despite the crucial importance of actor preferences, the effect of partisan alignments and ideological composition of the European institutions has largely been neglected. However, we argue that the ideological congruence between legislative bodies has an important effect on the duration of policy-making. We test our theoretical expectations based on a large new dataset on decision-making speed in the European Union using event history analysis. The findings confirm our theoretical claim indicating that the ideological distance between the European institutions slows down policy-making which has important implications for the problem-solving capacity of political systems more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While Europarties have received increasing attention in recent years, little is known about how they arrive at common policy positions, given their strong internal ideological heterogeneity. In order to explain position formation within Europarties, this article argues that national parties compete with each other in an attempt to upload their own policy positions to their Europarty. The article hypothesizes that their ability to succeed in these attempts depends on their legislative resources. The argument is tested by analysing position formation within the four major Europarties for all European Parliament elections between 1979 and 2004. The empirical results confirm that position choice is skewed towards parties with a large seat share, which has important implications for political representation in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Why does lobbying success in the European Union (EU) vary across interest groups? Even though this question is central to the study of EU policy-making, only few have dealt with it. The small number of existing studies is moreover characterized by a multitude of hypotheses and contradictory findings. This article aims to overcome these shortcomings by presenting a theoretical exchange model that identifies information supply, citizen support and economic power of entire lobbying camps as the major determinants of lobbying success. The hypotheses are empirically evaluated based on a large new dataset. By combining a quantitative text analysis of interest group submissions to Commission consultations with an online survey among interest groups, the theoretical expectations are tested across a large number of policy issues and interest groups while controlling for individual interest group and issue characteristics. The empirical analysis confirms the theoretical expectations indicating that lobbying is a collective enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Does lobbying success in the European Union vary systematically across interest group type? Interest groups lobby the European institutions in order to achieve policy decisions that are in line with their own preferences. While some argue that different types of interest groups are equally able to shape European policy-making, others contend that lobbying success is systematically biased towards some powerful interest groups. The empirical evidence is contradictory as previous studies focused either on a specific interest group type or on a specific policy area so that it is difficult to draw general conclusions. This study therefore presents an extensive empirical analysis of lobbying success across a wide variety of interest groups and policy issues by combining a quantitative text analysis of Commission consultations with an online survey among interest groups. The findings are promising as they indicate that lobbying success does not vary systematically across interest group type. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Information supply is an important instrument through which interest groups can exert influence on political decisions. However, information supply to decision-makers varies extensively across interest groups despite the common objective to influence policy-making. Drawing on resource mobilisation and organisational theory, a new theoretical framework is developed that identifies organisational characteristics, more specifically the resources, the functional differentiation, the professionalisation and the decentralisation of interest groups as determinants of information supply. These theoretical expectations are tested based on a large new dataset. Using multilevel modelling, this article examines information supply to the European Commission across a large number of policy issues and interest groups by combining an analysis of consultation submissions with a survey conducted among interest groups. The findings confirm the theoretical expectations suggesting that interest groups cannot equally exploit their access to decision-makers, but that resource endowment and organisational structures play a crucial role for effective informational lobbying. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Why are some interest groups able to lobby political decisions successfully whereas others are not? This article suggests that the issue context is an important source of variation because it can facilitate or hamper the ability of interest groups to lobby decision-makers successfully. In order to test the effect of issue characteristics, this article draws on a new, unprecedented data set of interest group lobbying in the European Union. Using quantitative text analysis to analyse Commission consultations, this article studies lobbying success across 2696 interest groups and 56 policy issues. The findings indicate that lobbying success indeed varies with the issue context, depending on the relative size of lobbying coalitions and the salience of policy issues, whereas individual group characteristics do not exhibit any systematic effect. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The analysis of interest group influence is crucial in order to explain policy outcomes and to assess the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. However, owing to methodological difficulties in operationalizing influence, only few have studied it. This article therefore proposes a new approach to the measurement of influence, drawing on quantitative text analysis. By comparing interest groups' policy positions with the final policy output, one can draw conclusions about the winners and losers of the decision-making process. In order to examine the applicability of text analysis, a case study is presented comparing hand-coding, WORDSCORES and Wordfish. The results correlate highly and text analysis proves to be a powerful tool to measure interest groups' policy positions, paving the way for the large-scale analysis of interest group influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]