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Recent research shows that matching between contemporaneous revenues and expenses has declined over the past 40 years. We argue that this decline in matching reduces the contracting usefulness of earnings and affects managerial effort allocation and performance measure choice. Based on a theoretical model, we predict that firms with poor matching benefit from contracting on sales revenue instead of earnings. Using hand-collected CEO performance measure data from S&P 500 firms, we document a significant increase in the use of sales revenue coupled with a significant decline in the use of bottom line income as a performance measure over time. We confirm the model prediction that firms are more likely to explicitly employ sales revenue as a performance measure when matching is poor. We further show that this negative association between matching and the use of sales revenue performance persists after controlling for the use of other earnings measures and equity compensation. This study contributes to the literature by examining the effect of revenue-expense matching on compensation design and documenting the increasing trend of revenue-based compensation in recent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article we examine whether firms structure their convertible bond transactions to manage diluted earnings per share (EPS). We find that the likelihood of firms issuing contingent convertible bonds (COCOs), which are often excluded from diluted EPS calculations under Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 128, is significantly associated with the reduction that would occur in diluted EPS if the bonds were traditionally structured. We also document that firms' use of EPS-based compensation contracts significantly affects the likelihood of COCO issuance and find weak evidence that reputation costs, measured using earnings restatement data, play a role in the structuring decision. These results are robust to controlling for alternative motivations for issuing COCOs, including tax and dilution arguments. In addition, an examination of announcement returns reveals that investors view the net benefits and costs of COCOs as offsetting one another. Our results contribute to the literature on earnings management, diluted EPS, financial reporting costs, and financial innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is relatively little evidence on the specific accruals used to manage earnings. This paper examines this issue by considering the use of specific accruals in three earnings-management contexts: equity offerings, management buyouts, and firms avoiding earnings decreases. We argue that the costs of managing earnings through different income statement items vary and that the benefits of earnings management through each of these items depend on the context. We thus make differential predictions regarding which specific accrual will be used to manage earnings in each of the three contexts we consider. To measure earnings management for specific accruals, we develop performance-matched measures to capture the unexpected component of accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable, accrued liabilities, depreciation expense, and special items. Consistent with our predictions, we find that firms issuing equity appear to prefer managing earnings upward by accelerating revenue recognition. Specifically, we find that accounts receivable for these firms are unexpectedly high. Conversely, for the management buyout context, we predict and find unexpected accounts receivable to be negative. For firms trying to avoid reporting an earnings decrease, we expect firms to be less concerned with earnings persistence and therefore more likely to use more transitory, and less costly, items to achieve their goal. We find that special items are significantly more positive for this group. This paper provides a further step toward understanding how the incentives behind earnings management affect the method used to achieve earnings goals, and it illustrates the usefulness of examining individual accruals in specific contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Manuscript type Empirical Research question/issue We empirically examine the antecedents of shareholder activism related to increasing the gender diversity of corporate boards of directors and whether such activism is an effective mechanism for achieving this goal. Because campaigns for increased gender diversity may be driven by either economic efficiency or social legitimacy concerns, we condition our analysis on activists' motivations for achieving their objectives. Research findings/insights Based on a sample of US S&P 1500 firms over 1997-2011, we find that female board representation and board independence are negatively associated with the likelihood of being targeted by a shareholder proposal related to gender diversity. We further document that financially motivated activists are more likely to target firms with extremely low female board representation than are socially motivated activists. Targeted firms significantly increase their female board representation in the two-year period following proposal initiation, relative to that of a matched sample of non-targeted firms, with no significant differences observed across activist motivations. Theoretical/academic implications Our findings provide empirical support for the effectiveness of shareholder activism in shaping corporate governance. Our work also suggests that shareholder activists' underlying motivations are an important conditioning variable in governance research, with both agency theory and institutional theory providing insight into differing motivations. Practitioner/policy implications Our findings suggest that shareholder proposals are an effective mechanism for increasing board diversity, irrespective of activist motivations. However, we note that mean female board representation for both targeted and non-targeted firms remains far below the level of representation sought by various activist groups. For policy-makers, this suggests that legislative action may be necessary to achieve these corporate board diversity goals in the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the role of target firms' accounting quality in the merger and acquisition process. We predict that target firm accounting quality will be positively associated with (1) the likelihood that the deal will be structured as a negotiation rather than as an auction, (2) the speed with which the deal reaches final resolution, and (3) the likelihood that the proposed deal is ultimately completed. Our empirical evidence is consistent with these predictions. These results complement and extend existing findings on target firm accounting quality and provide new evidence that financial accounting quality relates positively to the efficient allocation of the economy's capital resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether US firms' M&A decisions influence the likelihood of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts and whether clawback adoption improves subsequent M&A decisions. Because prior research finds that poor M&A decisions are associated with future earnings restatements, we predict that clawback adoption is more likely after these transactions. We further conjecture that M&A decisions will improve after clawback adoption, as its presence reduces executives' willingness to manipulate post-acquisition earnings. Consistent with our expectations, we find that (1) firms with more negative M&A announcement returns are more likely to adopt clawbacks; (2) firms that acquire targets with relatively poor accounting quality are more likely to adopt clawbacks; (3) clawbacks improve investor perception of M&A quality; and (4) executives are more responsive to the market when completing M&A deals if their compensation contracts include clawbacks. These results suggest that boards take a pro-active approach and consider factors that may lead to restatements when adopting clawbacks. Our results have implications for US policymakers, as the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires mandatory adoption of clawbacks. Our results also suggest that non-US firms can reduce managerial incentives to manipulate post-takeover earnings by using clawbacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt-equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms' speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms' debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers' aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We empirically examine the effects of intensified scrutiny over non-GAAP reporting on the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions. We find that, on average, exclusions are of higher quality (i.e., more transitory) following intervention by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) into non-GAAP reporting. We further find that firms that stopped releasing non-GAAP earnings numbers after the SEC intervention had lower quality exclusions in the pre-intervention period. These results are consistent with the SEC's objectives of improving the quality of non-GAAP earnings figures. However, when we decompose total exclusions into special items and other exclusions, we find evidence that the quality of special items has decreased in the post-intervention period, which suggests that managers adapted to the new disclosure environment by shifting more recurring expenses into special items. This suggests that there may be unintended consequences arising from the heightened scrutiny over non-GAAP reporting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the economic consequences of changes in the financial reporting requirements for contingent convertible securities (COCOs). Using a sample of 199 COCO issuers from 2000 to 2004, we find that issuers are more likely to restructure or redeem existing COCOs to obtain more favorable accounting treatment when the financial reporting impact on diluted earnings per share (EPS) is greater and when EPS is used as a performance metric in CEO bonus contracts. These results provide new evidence that managers are willing to incur costs to retain perceived financial reporting and compensation benefits. We also present evidence of significantly negative stock returns around event dates associated with the financial reporting changes, consistent with investor anticipation of the agency costs associated with the rule change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present descriptive evidence on the quality of firms' disclosures related to contingently convertible securities (COCOs). We document evidence of inconsistent and inadequate disclosure of the information necessary to undo the financial reporting effects associated with COCOs prior to 2004, when only the general disclosure requirements on capital structure provided in SFAS 129 were in effect. Disclosure quality improved after the introduction of FASB Staff Position 129-a, which specifically required firms to disclose the terms of COCOs that would enable users to understand the conversion features of COCOs and their potential impact on earnings per share (EPS). However, we find evidence that managerial incentives significantly affect disclosure quality in both disclosure regimes. Our results underscore the difficulty that standard setters face in developing general disclosure guidelines that foster adequate disclosure and suggest that additional specific disclosure guidance may be necessary as new financial instruments and transactions evolve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines accounting and nonaccounting factors behind accounting losses over a 50-year period. Using multivariate time-series analysis, we report evidence that the annual percentage of losses for U.S. firms is significantly related to accounting conservatism, Compustat coverage of small firms, real firm performance as measured by cash flows from operations, and business cycle factors. We further find that nonaccounting factors tend to play the dominant role in explaining accounting losses over our sample period. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of macroeconomic productivity, as well as to varying model specifications. Our findings contribute to the literature on accounting losses and accounting conservatism and have implications for the use of accounting loss information in numerous settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides evidence on the characteristics of firms that include "pro forma" earnings information in their press releases, whether the usefulness of pro forma earnings to investors varies systematically with these characteristics, and whether the investor response to pro forma earnings is consistent with market efficiency or mispricing. Using a sample of 249 press releases from 1997-99, we find that firms with low GAAP earnings informativeness are more likely to disclose pro forma earnings than other firms. We also find that strategic considerations, measured using the direction of GAAP earnings surprises, are an important determinant of pro forma reporting. In addition, our examination of the relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings shows that investors find pro forma earnings to be more useful when GAAP earnings informativeness is low or when strategic considerations are absent. Tests of the predictive ability of pro forma earnings for future profitability and returns are mixed, and we therefore cannot conclusively determine whether the investor reaction to pro forma earnings at the time of the press release is consistent with market efficiency or mispricing. The paper contributes to the growing literature on pro forma earnings and more generally to the literature on voluntary and strategic disclosure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses a study which examined whether opportunistic earnings management impairs the value relevance of accounting information as reflected in stock prices. Prior work on value relevance has demonstrated that both income statement and balance sheet information play a role in determining equity values. The analysis was conducted in a setting in which opportunistic earnings management is both expected to occur and where the incentives to manage earnings are relatively transparent to investors. The results are sensitive, however, to firms' disclosure activity prior to the equity offering. The study extends the literature on the value relevance of accounting information. The paper also extends the literature on discretionary accruals by demonstrating that discretionary accruals are ignored by investors when managers are opportunistically motivated. The study also complements findings in the earnings response coefficient literature.