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Since the late 2000s, New Zealand has largely followed an asymmetrical hedging strategy in its foreign policy: growing its trade relationship with China while concurrently remaining firmly within the US-led security architecture. However, as the room for hedging in the Indo-Pacific has shrunk, especially after Wellington adopted an Indo-Pacific outlook in 2019, New Zealand has taken steps to lessen its trade reliance on China while further committing itself within the Anglosphere. Since the election of the Sixth National Government of New Zealand in late 2023, Wellington appears to be tentatively switching from a strategy of hedging to something closer to a more conventional balancing strategy, evident in its efforts to participate in AUKUS. While the current situation can still be characterized as an asymmetrical hedge given the ongoing importance of China, if the room for hedging continues to shrink, it is likely that New Zealand will completely abandon its hedge in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of whether New Zealand should participate in AUKUS or not has emerged as a significant debate in popular political discourses in 2024. Thus far, clear pro-AUKUS and anti-AUKUS camps have developed. The pro-AUKUS camp emphasises the growing threat of China in the Indo-Pacific and New Zealand's lacking technological capabilities that have it exposed if a conflict emerges. The anti-AUKUS camp emphasises New Zealand's embedded independent foreign policy and staunch anti-nuclear stance which makes participating in AUKUS an ethically untenable option. However, neither side has considered the deeper, ontological questions on the table and how this affects New Zealand's main foreign policy concern: the Pacific. New Zealand's recent engagement with the Pacific and its experimentation with a Māori foreign policy led it to being a champion of the Blue Pacific narrative, an ontologically distinct approach that challenges the geopolitically-focussed Indo-Pacific concept. Yet, in the wake of New Zealand's flirtation with AUKUS, the Blue Pacific has been largely ignored in debates. Ultimately, the debate about AUKUS misses the big picture as it, so far, limits the focus on the true existential threat to New Zealand and the Pacific which is not China's rise but rather climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Typically, China has tried to use positive aspects of its history, such as its previous grandeur and its philosophical and cultural heritage, to guide its diplomatic strategic narratives – a kind of historical statecraft. However, this has largely failed to inspire international audiences. Analysis of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' regular press conferences over a twenty-year period reveals there is an observable seeping of more negative aspects of history into China's diplomatic language during Xi Jinping's second term. Negative history appears in China's strategic narratives to highlight changes in the international order by reframing understandings of China and the nature of other major powers. Negative history of this type might afford Xi significant domestic legitimacy, as well as some international supporters, for its assertive articulations; at the same time, however, it reduces China's ability to win over international audiences and positively disseminate its vision of international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Friendship is an important aspect of a state's ability to succeed in great power politics, especially with regards to international order reshaping or building. Through engaging with the extant literature on friendship in International Relations, it is posited that while friendships tend to arise along strategic or normative dimensions, the most important (and enduring) friendships are bilateral relationships which are also culturally and historically aligned—what this article terms a bona fide international friendship. With China's rise continuing apace, the importance for it to have friends, especially powerful ones, is self-evident. This article examines the concept of friendship in the scope of China's foreign policymaking, identifying an increased effort to cultivate friendships. However, this article argues that as it currently stands, China does not appear to have any significant bona fide friends. Russia may yet emerge as a serious contender as a bona fide friend for China, but substantial issues may arise in that friendship in the coming decades. Thus, for China, and other aspiring international powers, building bona fide international friendships with prominent international powers is a critical task ahead because international orders underpinned by bona fide friendships will likely be more resilient than those orders that are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, Aotearoa New Zealand's Foreign Minister, Nanaia Mahuta, sketched out a kaupapa Māori (collective Māori vision) foreign policy for New Zealand based on four tikanga Māori (Māori customary practices and behaviours): manaakitanga (hospitality), whanaungatanga (connectedness), mahi tahi and kotahitanga (unity through collaboration), and kaitiakitanga (guardianship and the protection of intergenerational wellbeing). This article makes a novel contribution to the global International Relations body of literature by questioning to what extent New Zealand's 'Māori foreign policy' has been applied to its relationship with China. Through assessing the communications of Mahuta and other officials, it is found that New Zealand is utilizing a kaupapa Māori framework towards China: 'the taniwha and the dragon'. It is argued that New Zealand is attempting to consolidate the maturity of the Sino-New Zealand relationship, as well as differentiate itself from the other Anglosphere countries that have recently pushed back on China. In doing so, not only is New Zealand something of an outlier, it is demonstrating how eschewing a western-centric understanding of foreign policy for a more relational view based on indigenous knowledge and perspectives (in this case, from te ao Māori : the Māori worldview) can be applied at a time of increasing great power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A correction is presented to the article "The Psychology of Athletic Tapering in Sport: A Scoping Review" published in February 18, 2023 issue.

Taper is a common training strategy used to reduce fatigue and enhance athletic performance. However, currently, no review has summarised what psychological research has been conducted examining taper, what this research shows and what future research needs to be undertaken to extend the field. Consequently, a scoping review was conducted with three aims: (a) to determine the characteristics of psychological research examining taper, (b) to summarise psychological research collected during taper with adult athletes and coaches, and (c) to identify gaps in psychological research examining taper. Forty-eight articles were identified following an exhaustive search strategy and charted following scoping review guidelines. Results showed most research was quantitative, used a longitudinal design, was conducted in swimming, triathlon, cycling or across multiple sports, and used a university-, regional- or national-level male athlete sample. Eight themes were developed to summarise the research: Mood, Perception of Effort, Perceived Fatigue and Wellness, Recovery-Stress, Taper as a Stressor, Stress Tolerance, Psychological Preparation and Cognitive Functioning. Additionally, four research recommendations were identified: (a) conducting exploratory research that examines the impact taper has on athletes' and coaches' competition preparation and stress experience, (b) asking more advanced psychological questions and conducting multi-disciplinary research, (c) including a more diverse participant sample in studies and (d) examining the impact of psychological interventions during taper. Overall, this scoping review has highlighted the limited research examining the psychology of taper and the need for focused research that asks more complex questions across diverse populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this research is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the EU's public diplomacy – towards both domestic and external audiences – during times of crisis. The EU's public diplomacy is examined across six major crises: the Eurozone crisis (2008), the Ukrainian crisis (2014), the migrant crisis (2015), the Brexit referendum (2016), the new transatlantic relationship (2017) and the COVID-19 pandemic (2019). The goal of examining these crises in conjunction is to derive policy-relevant insights. Design/methodology/approach: This article adopts a problem-driven approach – the problem being how successful is the EU at public diplomacy during times of crisis – that draws theoretical and empirical insights from Communication Studies, International Relations and EU studies via a "strategic narratives" framework. It situates the EU as a unique public diplomacy actor, one which is becoming more prominent due to the mediatisation of diplomacy, especially driven by the advent of cyberspace. Findings: The article finds that the EU has been experiencing a cycle of crises that have affected the political, economic, symbolic and social foundations of the common project. The EU has had some notable success – such as restoring confidence at the height of the Eurozone crisis – and some notable challenges – such as effectively combatting disinformation. Regardless, the EU has the potential to better manage these and future crises by engaging in an effective public diplomacy strategy that tells a shared European story that informs and inspires people, both domestically and externally. Originality/value: The article offers an original examination of the EU's public diplomacy response to six different crises. It looks at different types of crises and utilises concepts from different social science perspectives. It offers novel strategic and policy recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The usefulness of 'realism' in explaining Russia's decision to invade Ukraine has become a keenly contested debate not only in International Relations but in wider public intellectual discourse since the onset of the war in February 2022. At the centre of this debate is the punditry of John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent offensive realist who is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Chicago. This article argues that although Mearsheimer is indeed a realist, his offensive realism is but one of many different realist theories that can forward an explanation of the Ukraine War. Beyond the apparent hegemony of structural realism (the branch of realism to which Mearsheimer's offensive realism belongs), it is argued that classical and neoclassical realist frameworks can provide more nuanced and, ultimately, convincing arguments as to why Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to invade Ukraine. This is because both classical and neoclassical realism can incorporate insights from non-realist studies—such as the concepts of civilization and ontological security—and combine them into an overarching power politics framework. Although neither classical nor neoclassical realism is flawless in their explanations, they demonstrate that realism does not just have to be about international power structures but can offer multivariate accounts of why a state, like Russia, decided to act, such as invading Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since at least the last decade, New Zealand has been employing something of an asymmetrical alignment hedge of the US and China, aligning itself with the US strategically and with China economically. Such a strategy remains the perceived optimal foreign policy in Wellington. However, as Sino-American relations continue to deteriorate and the Indo-Pacific super-region becomes more geopolitically tense, the room for hedging is shrinking, making New Zealand's putative strategy potentially untenable. This article assesses the changing geopolitical situation New Zealand finds itself in and assesses other potential strategic options– namely, non-alignment, balance or bandwagon, and zigzagging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The accession of the remaining six Western Balkan states into the EU is shrouded in much uncertainty. Despite Croatia finally traversing the difficult path to eventual membership in 2013, not one of the remaining Western Balkan countries can claim to be on a definite pathway to membership today. An increasingly prevalent argument is that the EU's engagement with its neighbourhoods has faltered because its strategies have been undermined by an inherent stability-democracy dilemma. This article examines the EU's engagement with the Western Balkans and finds that although the EU tried to transcend this dilemma, in reality, a tension between stability and democracy was present with the former generally receiving more attention in policymaking. This led to not only a lack of tangible democratization amongst the Western Balkan states, but further uncertainty about their accession prospects. By 2018, it was clear that the EU's engagement with the Western Balkans needed a rethink, resulting in a new approach: the 'Six Flagship Initiatives'. However, given the apprehensiveness of some member states (especially France) coupled with the presence of outsiders such as Russia and China in the area, the accession prospects of the six non-EU Western Balkan states remains blurred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When confronted by the competing zero‐sum regional strategies of the EU and Russia between 2010 and 2013, Ukraine chose to aggressively pursue a dual‐aligned hedge. This policy choice, in part, helped precipitate a disastrous outcome: the Ukraine crisis. Using the insights of the literature on smaller power hedging and regional security complex theory, it is argued that Viktor Yanukovych misperceived the geopolitical feedback emanating from the Eastern Europe security complex, leading it to pursuing a suboptimal foreign policy. Hedging was still the optimal foreign policy for Ukraine, but arguably a more modest form of hedging was required. It is argued that Ukraine's experience raises important questions about the actorness of smaller powers to pursue hedging strategies in geopolitically‐charged regional security complexes. The mistakes that led to Ukraine's failed hedge of the EU and Russia serve as a cautionary tale to other states that similarly find themselves in regional security complexes (RSCs) that are anarchic, have a bi or multipolar power distribution, and have growing enmity between the great powers there. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article discusses China's religious policy and its setting up of re-education camps in Xinjiang to carry out anti-extremist ideological education. Topics covered include the Uighurs as the target of the assimilation measure into adopting Chinese language, culture, and customs, the cracking down of Christians in China for overt displays of religiosity, and whether terrorism is the reason behind the crackdown as Islamist extremism becomes a legitimate concern for China.

The article offers information on the plural audience and communication strategies. It mentions the aim of publicist international relation as an aim to communicate insights also talks about the pursuit of truth pluralism and highlights the crossing of disciplinary boundaries through special book series that deliberately engage with the overlap of international law, technology, anthropology, and global history.

This paper examines whether Cold War-style anxiety and paranoia have emerged in the West-Russia relationship since the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2013. Although the idea that a New Cold War is emerging is repudiated, the possibility that anxiety and paranoia are developing in Eastern Europe is deemed worthy of examination. Using Bronfenbrenner’s ‘mirror image’ theory from the Cold War, the contemporary West-Russia relationship is evaluated through examining the foreign policy discourses of both sides. The evaluation demonstrates that anxiety and paranoia are evident in the relationship which, as during the Cold War, reduces the opportunity for compromise (over Ukraine and Syria) and potentially moves the relationship towards greater competition and conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A cross‐sectional survey of 188 ambulant patients with chronic liver disease was performed to determine the prevalence of restless legs syndrome (RLS) using a validated patient completed questionnaire. Patient responses were verified by standardised telephone interview. RLS was identified in 64 (34%) patients. Significantly, more patients with cirrhosis had RLS than patients without RLS (43.9 vs 23.3%, P = 0.003, respectively). Cirrhotic patients with a history of hepatic encephalopathy were also more likely to have RLS than patients without hepatic encephalopathy (odds ratio = 4.33, 95% confidence interval = 1.40–13.37, P = 0.011). Patients with chronic liver disease may be at risk for RLS; early detection and treatment may improve patient outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article breaks from the dominant liberal-idealist literature and examines the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy decisions from a realist perspective. Through employing a novel, EU-focussed neoclassical realist framework, the EU’s offer of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) to Ukraine is argued as being a result of the mediating influence of its normative power role identity, the (mis)perceptions held by its foreign policy decision-makers and the institutional constraints inherent to its foreign policy decision-making process, which filtered systemic pressures (emanating from the European geopolitical setting) into the final foreign policy decision. Thereafter, this article assesses the EU’s responses to the Ukraine crisis, offering policy reflections and recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the competitiveness of the European Union (EU) and Russia's regime preferences in their foreign policies towards Ukraine in the scope of the on-going Ukraine crisis. It is argued that the underpinning geopolitical environment Ukraine currently resides in, wedged between two much larger powers (the EU and Russia), renders it a vulnerable target state for regime promotion from both sides. Indeed, since the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine, both the EU and Russia have had discernible regime promotion strategies in their foreign policies. The EU's regime promotion has focussed on facilitating democracy in Ukraine, along with more material interests (trade and strategic aims) while Russia has reacted with increasingly zero-sum policies which pursue its preference for having a loyal and Russian-facing regime in Ukraine. Ultimately, the increasing competitiveness of the EU and Russia has been a key factor in the onset of the Ukraine crisis, which offers important insight into the relationship between large powers and the smaller third states which lie in their overlapping spheres of influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Host genetic factors influence treatment responses to antiviral therapy in chronic hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection. We retrospectively investigated associations between host genetic markers and treatment-induced virologic responses to dual therapy with interferon-α and ribavirin in chronically infected HCV genotype 1 (g1)- and genotype 3 (g3)-infected individuals. A total of 171 patients (89 HCV g1 and 82 HCV g3 infected) were investigated for genetic markers influencing treatment-induced sustained virologic response (SVR). Overall, SVR was observed for 46/89 (52%) HCV g1- and 57/82 (70%) HCV g3-infected patients. Of the 4 interleukin 28B ( IL28B) single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), rs12979860 was the host genetic marker most significantly associated with failure to achieve an SVR in HCV g1-infected individuals [ P=3.83×10−4; odds ratio (OR)=5.61; confidence interval (CI)=2.07-15.18] and gave a positive predictive value for treatment failure of 81.3% for minor homozygotes (TT). Using additive ( P=3.54×10−4) and dominant models ( P=3.83×10−4), a dosage effect of the T allele was observed, with the dominance term not significant for this SNP. Logistic regression showed an association between HLA-C1/C1 and rapid virologic response in HCV g1 infections with an OR relative to the heterozygote of 10.0 (95% CI: 1.6-62.5, P=0.014). HLA-C2 homozygosity was a significant predictor of nonresponse to treatment in HCV g1-infected individuals ( P=0.023). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses challenging political situation facing Ukraine in the future, when it needs to balance its relationship with both the Russian government and the European Union. Topics discussed include the state of Ukraine while balancing between EU and Russia in its first two decades of independence, the future of the country with EU and Russia entering into an element of competition and the two parties' interest in Ukraine's energy sector.

Since the ‘mega-enlargement’ of the European Union into the erstwhile communist territories of Eastern Central Europe and the Baltics in 2004/2007, the prospect for further EU enlargement(s) has seriously dissipated. Terms such as ‘enlargement fatigue’ and ‘absorption capacity’ have become en vogue in the post-2007 enlargement setting where older EU member states have developed negative attitudes towards future enlargements. However, the accession of Croatia into the EU in 2013 has inevitably raised questions of which states or regions could be next. This paper contends that due to a multitude of issues surrounding Turkey, particularly the political impasse within the EU towards Turkish accession coupled with its sheer size, only the smaller states of the Western Balkans represent viable candidates (Iceland’s accession prospects have stalled significantly due to internal pressures). This paper argues that the limits of EU eastern enlargement are set by both prevailing (subjectively defined) political attitudes founded on various grounds in the leading EU member states and by the rationally defined objective capacity of the EU’s institutions to absorb potential new member states. It is through the latter, and in comparison to the three most recent accession states - Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia – which this paper attempts to assess the objective potential of the remaining Western Balkan states to accede into the EU in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the European Union's (EU's) international action viewed by three external partners including China, Russia and India. It analyses articles in relation to the EU's action in the Arab Spring movements in North Africa and the Middle East and examines the external perceptions of the EU in three emerging Brazil, India and China (BRIC) countries. It argues that the EU's profile continues to be portrayed as inefficient and irrelevant in the news media.

This paper examines the European Union's interaction with civil society organizations in Armenia through the European Neighbourhood Policy as a potential example of normative socialization. Through examining the EU's interaction with domestic NGOs in Armenia, this paper offers an evaluation of the socialization mechanism coupled with a general critique of the EU's democratization policy in relation to civil society promotion. It is argued that while civil society promotion and interaction represents a potentially fruitful avenue for not only democratization but socialization strategies, the EU's utilization of Armenian civil society organizations as a target actor remains too ineffective to generate an environment conducive to the adoption and internalization of EU norms and rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report the results of a Sloan Digital Sky Survey IV eBOSS program to target X-ray sources and mid-infrared-selected Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) active galactic nucleus (AGN) candidates in a 36.8 deg2 region of Stripe 82. About half this survey (15.6 deg2) covers the largest contiguous portion of the Stripe 82 X-ray survey. This program represents the largest spectroscopic survey of AGN candidates selected solely by their WISE colors. We combine this sample with X-ray and WISE AGNs in the field identified via other sources of spectroscopy, producing a catalog of 4847 sources that is 82% complete to r ∼ 22. Based on X-ray luminosities or WISE colors, 4730 of these sources are AGNs, with a median sample redshift of z ∼ 1. About 30% of the AGNs are optically obscured (i.e., lack broad lines in their optical spectra). BPT analysis, however, indicates that 50% of the WISE AGNs at z < 0.5 have emission line ratios consistent with star-forming galaxies, so whether they are buried AGNs or star-forming galaxy contaminants is currently unclear. We find that 61% of X-ray AGNs are not selected as mid-infrared AGNs, with 22% of X-ray AGNs undetected by WISE. Most of these latter AGNs have high X-ray luminosities (Lx > 1044 erg s−1), indicating that mid-infrared selection misses a sizable fraction of the highest luminosity AGNs, as well as lower luminosity sources where AGN-heated dust is not dominating the mid-infrared emission. Conversely, ∼58% of WISE AGNs are undetected by X-rays, though we do not find that they are preferentially redder than the X-ray-detected WISE AGNs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]