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Substantial R &D efforts are currently directed towards the development of combined heat and power (CHP) systems that automatically and seamlessly connect to the power grid. In this paper we develop a real options model to assess the impact that the operational flexibility characterizing such systems will have on the optimal timing and capacity associated with investments in CHP plants. We take the viewpoint of a manufacturer operating in an energy-intensive industry who contemplates investing in CHP. We discuss and compare investments in two types of CHP systems: a standard one that is operationally rigid and a technologically advanced one that is operationally flexible. The interaction between temporal and operational flexibility under uncertainty and irreversibility is central to our analysis. We show that operational flexibility guarantees earlier investment but has an ambiguous effect in terms of capacity. In particular, when operational flexibility is very valuable the potential investor is opting for investing in a plant with larger productive capacity. The potential investor chooses a smaller CHP unit if otherwise. A numerical exercise calibrated using data from the Italian pulp and paper and electricity industries complements our theoretical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider an n-player non-cooperative game where the payoff function of each player follows a multivariate distribution. This formulation is adopted to model a zonal electricity market in which generators operate by running conventional and renewable-based plants. The players in the market compete as in a Cournot model. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by defining the payoff function of each player using a chance constraint. A full empirical analysis has been conducted on the Italian electricity market to test the impact of renewable generators in the light of decarbonization of the market and the impact of the volatility of the cost of conventional plants, mainly related to the volatility of gas prices. We finally test the robustness of the chance constraint formulation with an out of sample analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider an n-player non-cooperative game where the payoff function of each player follows a multivariate distribution. This formulation is adopted to model a zonal electricity market in which generators operate by running conventional and renewable-based plants. The players in the market compete as in a Cournot model. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by defining the payoff function of each player using a chance constraint. A full empirical analysis has been conducted on the Italian electricity market to test the impact of renewable generators in the light of decarbonization of the market and the impact of the volatility of the cost of conventional plants, mainly related to the volatility of gas prices. We finally test the robustness of the chance constraint formulation with an out of sample analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The online version of the original article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05273-xCorrection to: Annals of Operations Researchhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05273-xThis correction is published as the text published under Statements and Declaration section was mismatched due to proofing error.Original article has been corrected.Publisher's NoteSpringer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.By Dimitrios Zormpas and Giorgia OggioniReported by Author; Author [Extracted from the article]

The deregulation of electricity markets in Europe has deeply changed the organization of this sector. Vertically integrated generating companies have been unbundled to create competition and to increase the competitiveness of electricity markets. Directive 96/92/EC was issued by the European Commission to liberalize electricity markets and to pave the way for the creation of the Internal Electricity Market. In particular, this Directive aimed at promoting the competition in the activities of electricity generation and wholesale through the creation of a 'marketplace' and the maximization of transparency and efficiency. Competition in European day-ahead electricity markets has been established through auction markets where electricity producers and consumers offer/bid prices and volumes. This paper suggests a dynamic equilibrium model for a system of auction markets linked by transmission lines and subject to energy balance and transmission constraints, such as those characterizing restructured electricity markets. This model is treated as a system of variational inequalities with arbitrary monotone mappings. An inexact splitting type method is proposed to find its solution. Numerical experiments are conducted on the Italian day-ahead electricity market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Complementarity problems are recognized to be a general computational method for solving economic equilibrium models. There exist various problems describing the energy markets that rely on the complementarity models since they allow to analyze the interactions among different market players. Complementarity models generalize linear and non-linear problems because the Karush- Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions are one particular instance of a complementarity problem. Moreover, the class of complementarity models is appropriate for modeling spatial price equilibrium, perfect and imperfect completion models, such as Cournot-Nash games, and other many models where both primal and dual variables can be constrained together. The first part of this paper provides a motivation and a description of complementarity models. In the second part, we investigate a capacity expansion problem applied to the restructured Italian electricity market that is currently subject to the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS). In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-ETS aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from human activities provoking climate changes. This scheme is now subdivided into three phases and it is based on a cap and trade system that defines the maximum amount of CO2 that can be emitted in each compliance period. Our analysis shows that investments in renewables are mainly conditioned to incentive policies. The solution of the developed model is found by exploiting the mixed complementarity theoretical framework. The model is implemented in GAMS using the PATH solver. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Market Coupling' is currently seen as the most advanced market design in the restructuring of the European electricity market. Market Coupling, by construction, introduces what is generally referred to as an incomplete market: it leaves several constraints out of the market and hence avoids pricing them. This may or may not have important consequences in practice depending on the case on hand. Quasi-Variational Inequality problems and the associated Generalized Nash Equilibrium can be used for representing incomplete markets. Recent papers propose methods for finding a set of solutions of Quasi-Variational Inequality problems. We apply one of these methods to a subproblem of market coupling namely the coordination of counter-trading. This problem is an illustration of a more general question encountered, for instance, in hierarchical planning in production management. We first discuss the economic interpretation of the Quasi-Variational Inequality problem. We then apply the algorithmic approach to a set of stylized case studies in order to illustrate the impact of different organizations of counter-trading. The paper emphasizes the structuring of the problem. A companion paper considers the full problem of Market Coupling and counter-trading and presents a more extensive numerical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-border trade remains a contentious issue in the restructuring of the European electricity market. This paper analyzes the cross-border trade problem through a set of models that represent different degrees of coordination both between the energy and the transmission markets and among national Transmission System Operators (TSOs). We first present a nodal price-like organization of the system, where Power Exchanges (PXs) and Transmission System Operators are integrated to operate the energy and transmission markets. This system is not implemented in Europe but its success elsewhere makes it the natural reference for the study. We then move to a more realistic representation of the European electricity market based on the so-called market coupling design where energy and transmission are operated separately by PXs and TSOs. We consider different degrees of coordination of the national TSOs' activities to assess the range of inefficiencies that the lack of integration can lead to. The paper supposes price taking agents and hence leaves aside the incentive to game the system induced by zonal systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The inception of the emission trading scheme in Europe has contributed to power price increases. Energy intensive industries have reacted by arguing that this may affect their competitiveness and will induce them to leave Europe. Taking up a proposal of these industrial sectors, we explore the possible application of special contracts, where electricity is sold at average generation cost to mitigate the impact of CO2 cost on power prices. The model supposes fixed generation capacities. We first consider a reference model representing a perfectly competitive market where all consumers (industries and the rest of the market) are price-takers and buy electricity at short-run marginal cost. We then change the market design by assuming that energy intensive industries pay power either at a regional or at a zonal average cost price. The analysis is conducted with simulation models applied to the Central Western European power market. The models are implemented in GAMSIPATH. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]