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Various polls suggest that Donald Trump has enjoyed the support of a sizable minority of the Latinx electorate despite his racially offensive rhetoric and support for some of the most restrictive immigration policies in recent memory. Building on Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory, we contend that some Latinxs harbor negative stereotypes about immigrants, blame them for the status devaluation of the Latinx community, and cognitively distinguish themselves from Latinx immigrants. Rather than viewing anti-immigrant policies, rhetoric, and politicians as a direct status threat, those exhibiting this "Latinx Immigrant Resentment (LIR)" may regard them as a means to enhance the status and interests of "prototypical" Latinxs by signaling their distinction from "atypical" Latinxs. To evaluate this theory, we use the 2020 American National Election Study (ANES) and 2016 Collaborative MultiRacial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) as a proof-of-concept to first confirm that negative immigrant stereotypes and cognitive intragroup distinctions are associated with increased support for Donald Trump and restrictive immigration policies. We then introduce a more refined measure of LIR by fielding online surveys of US Latinxs administered through Lucid in 2020–2021 (N = 1,164) and 2021/22 (N = 1,017). We demonstrate the validity of this measure and its predictive power for attitudes toward Donald Trump, Ron DeSantis, and restrictive immigration policies after accounting for a range of rival explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do involuntary interactions with authoritarian institutions shape political engagement? The policy feedback literature suggests that interactions with authoritarian policies undercut political participation. However, research in racial and ethnic politics offers reason to believe that these experiences may increase citizens' engagement. Drawing on group attachment and discrimination research, we argue that mobilization is contingent on individuals' political psychological state. Relative to their counterparts, individuals with a politicized group identity will display higher odds of political engagement when exposed to authoritarian institutions. To evaluate our theory, we draw on the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Study to examine the experiences of Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans. For all subgroups and different types of institutions, we find that, for those with a politicized group identity, institutional contact is associated with higher odds of participation. Our research modifies the classic policy feedback framework, which neglects group-based narratives in the calculus of collective action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent do national partisan cues exert influence over local voting behavior? Despite being an "immigrant welcoming city," in November, 2019, Tucson, Arizona, voters rejected Prop. 205—the Tucson Families Free and Together Initiative. We leverage theories of elite partisan cues to explain why voters in a progressive city voted against such an initiative. In contrast to Democratic support for sanctuary cities at the national level, we argue that mixed cues from local Democratic elites contributed significantly to a surprising rejection of the initiative. Using aggregate-level data and a framing experiment, we find that the local political environment split Democratic votes (50% favored, 50% opposed) while keeping Republican voters—who received consistent elite cues of opposition—uniformly against the proposition. This study illustrates how local partisan elite cues can shape ballot initiative voting outcomes, even to the point of overriding negative partisanship and national co-partisan consensus on the same issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On January 27, 2017, President Trump signed executive order 13769, which denied citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries entry into the United States. Opposition to what was termed the "Muslim ban" quickly amassed, producing sudden shifts to the information environment and to individual-level preferences. The present study examines whether within-subject shifts against the ban lasted over an extended period of time. Evidence from a three-wave panel study indicates that individual-level opinions, once they shifted against the ban, remained fairly stable one year later. Analysis of a large corpus of cable broadcast transcripts and newspaper articles further demonstrates that coverage of the ban from February 2017 to January 2018 did not dissipate, remained largely critical, and lacked any significant counter-narratives to potentially alter citizens' preferences once again. Our study underscores the potential of capturing the dynamics of rapid attitudinal shifts with timely panel data, and of assessing the durability of such changes over time. It also highlights how mass movements and political communication may alter and stabilize citizens' policy preferences, even those that target stigmatized groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social Identity Theory suggests that individuals are motivated to support/oppose policies and politicians that benefit/harm members of their ingroup as a means of protecting their social status. Since the Republican Party's rhetoric against immigrants in recent decades has often been viewed as an assault upon those of Latinx descent, it is not surprising that strong majorities oppose restrictionist immigration policies and support the Democratic Party. However, the existing literature has overlooked why a sizeable minority of Latinx voters express support for restrictionist immigration policies and the politicians who espouse them. Our analysis of Latinx voters with the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) demonstrates that the degree to which individuals prioritize their US American identity over their Latinx identity has a significant influence over support for conservative immigration policies and GOP candidates. This relationship emerges above and beyond partisanship, ideology, and other key explanatory factors. Such attitudes likely represent an individual social mobility strategy in which members of a social group attempt to "pass" as a member of a higher-status group. Prioritizing a US American identity, supporting the Republican Party, and expressing hostility toward the interests of undocumented immigrants are a means of distinguishing themselves from a social group that has become increasingly associated with negative stereotypes. In contrast, those who are unwilling or unable to make this transition are likely pursuing a collective social mobility strategy (e.g. linked fate) whereby they attempt to enhance their individual status by elevating that of the entire social group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muslim Americans are increasingly integrated into American life, displaying high socioeconomic status, political participation, and adherence to American values. However, they are evaluated more negatively than many other racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and are frequent targets of discrimination. This article examines the mismatch between the integration of Muslims and their poor reception. Drawing on theories of cultural fluency and cognitive dissonance, we argue that cultural integration can exacerbate, rather than mitigate, perceived discrimination because integrated individuals are socialized to expect fair treatment and can recognize and decode even subtle forms of discrimination due to high levels of cultural and language fluency. Using three nationally representative surveys and an opt-in, online study of American Muslims between 2007 and 2017, we find that integrated Muslims are consistently more likely than their counterparts to report individual- and group-level societal and political discrimination. The paradox between adopting the host culture and feeling marginalized poses a challenge to the assumption that integration naturally leads to a sense of belonging among minorities, with important implications for liberal democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Public opinion research suggests that rapid and significant individual-level fluctuations in opinions toward various policies is fairly unexpected absent methodological artifacts. While this may generally be the case, some political actions can and do face tremendous backlash, potentially impacting public evaluations. Leveraging broadcast and newspaper transcripts as well as a unique two-wave panel study we demonstrate that a non-random, rapid shift in opinions occurred shortly after President Donald Trump signed executive order 13769 into law, which barred individuals from seven predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days. The ban set off a fury of protests across U.S. cities and airports, garnering tremendous media attention and discussion. Drawing insights from literature on priming, we claim that an influx of new information portraying the “Muslim Ban” at odds with inclusive elements of American identity prompted some citizens to shift their attitudes. Our study highlights the potential broad political effects of mass movements and protests as it pertains to policies that impact racialized minority groups, and suggests that preferences can shift quickly in response to changing political circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is mosque attendance associated with withdrawal from civic and political life and the endorsement of politically motivated violence (PMV)? We draw from a large multi-ethnic survey in the U.K. to answer this research question. Our analysis is unique in that we compare Muslims to Christians to show that mosques, just like churches, can enhance the civic and political participation of their adherents. Drawing from scholarship on religious institutions, social capital, and social identity, we claim and empirically show that mosque attendance is associated with increased electoral and nonelectoral political participation, higher levels of civic engagement, and the rejection of PMV. Our findings not only advance the current scholarly understanding of the attitudes and behaviours of Muslims in the West, but also have important policy implications in that they help dispel stereotypical and sensationalist accounts of Mosques and their adherents in the post-Brexit U.K. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious institutions and places of worship have played a pivotal role in American Politics. What about the role of the mosque? Does the mosque, as an institution, in any sense play a different role than that of churches or synagogues in political participation? Some scholars have argued that Islam as a religion and a culture is incompatible with liberal, democratic American values; not only is Islam inconsistent with the West, but it poses a direct conflict. This viewpoint has likewise been popularized in American and European media and by some government officials who have labeled Muslims as enemies of freedom and democracy. Through the examination of the Muslim American Public Opinion Survey (MAPOS), which has a large sample size of American Muslim respondents (N = 1410), we argue that the mosque emerges as an important indicator for Muslim social and political integration into American society. We demonstrate that not only are those Muslims who attend the mosque regularly more likely to identify as American Muslims rather than by national origin, they are also more likely to believe mosques encourage Muslims to integrate into U.S. society. Our analysis further exemplifies that mosque attendance and involvement, beyond creating a common identity among American Muslims, leads to more political participation in the U.S. In contrast to prevailing wisdom, we also find that more religiously devout Muslims are significantly more likely to support political participation. Based on our findings, we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent with the mosque and American democracy, and in fact, religiosity fosters support for American democratic values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]