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We study whether it is socially desirable to hold a monopolistic firm liable for the harm its potentially judgment-proof consumers inflict on third parties. Consumers' judgment-proofness limits potential product differentiation by pooling different consumer types with uniform liability exposure. The firm's safety choices are distorted in both regimes under consideration: consumer-only liability and residual-manufacturer liability. We find that residual-manufacturer liability dominates consumer-only liability if the monopolistic firm can observe consumers' types, or if consumers' types are not observable but heterogeneity stems only from their asset levels. However, if the monopolistic firm cannot observe consumers' types and heterogeneity stems from their harm levels, it is more difficult to make a case for residual-manufacturer liability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes pretrial bargaining between litigants with reference-dependent preferences. We build on Bebchuk (1984, "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," 15 Rand Journal of Economics 404–15) and, motivated by empirical evidence, assume that the referent is based on expectations. We find that reference dependence on behalf of plaintiffs increases the settlement probability. The fact that preferences are reference-dependent meaningfully influences comparative statics predictions. In our extensions, we discuss the role of fee shifting, the effect of having the referent based on the status quo instead of on expectations, and risk aversion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the traditional law-and-economics production contract model with a fixed price, this paper analyzes the breach and reliance incentives that result from damage measures for breach of contract when buyers have reference-dependent preferences. We show that buyer's reference-dependent preferences can produce results at odds with the traditional portrayal. Importantly, we find that expectation damages are no longer generally superior to reliance damages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how consumers' moral and image concerns influence the equilibrium in a product-accident model in which third parties incur harm. We differentiate results according to whether the product is supplied by a monopolistic firm or competitive ones. Assuming incomplete compensation of third parties, we find that both moral and image concerns of consumers increase product safety in the context of a competitive market, while the monopolist's product safety level varies exclusively with consumers' morality. Comparing market outcomes, we find that the monopolist's product safety levels may induce greater welfare than a competitive industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the workings of liability when harm-inflicting consumers are present biased and both product safety and consumer care influence expected harm. We show that present bias introduces a rationale for shifting some losses onto the manufacturer, in stark contrast with the baseline scenario in which strict consumer liability induces socially optimal product safety and precaution levels. In addition, we establish that strict liability with contributory negligence may induce socially optimal product safety and precaution choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The determinination of material properties is an essential step in the simulation of manufacturing processes. For hot deformation processes, consistently assessed Carreau fluid constitutive model derived in prior works by Schmicker et al. might be used, in which the flow stress is described as a function of the current temperature and the current strain rate. The following paper aims to extend the prior mentioned model by making a distinction, whether the material is being heated or cooled, enhancing the model capabilities to predict deformations within the cooling process. The experimental identifaction of the material parameters is demonstrated for a structural carbon steel with 0.54% carbon content. An approach to derive the flow properties during cooling from the same samples used at heating is presented, which massively reduces the experimental effort in future applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate whether individuals' self-stated privacy behavior is correlated with their reservation price for the disclosure of personal and potentially sensitive information. Our incentivized experiment has a unique setting: Information about choices with real implications could be immediately disclosed to an audience of fellow first semester students. Although we find a positive correlation between respondents' willingness to accept (WTA) disclosure of their private information and their stated privacy behavior for some models, this correlation disappears when we change the specification of the privacy index. Independent of the privacy index chosen we find that the WTA is significantly influenced by individual responses to personal questions, as well as by different decisions to donate actual money, indicating that the willingness to protect private information depends on the delicacy of the information at stake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]