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In 2011, Britain and France introduced affirmative action policies aiming at improving board gender mix in listed companies. While the reforms were similar in terms of target and timing, Britain opted for a 'soft law' (comply or explain) approach, while France enacted a mandatory quota. Using difference-in-differences analyses, we examine the differential impact of these two reforms on board composition and on women empowerment within boards. We first show that the quota has been associated with a more rapid adjustment of the gender mix without significant disruptive effects on board composition. However, we report that the quota has induced a more limited access of women to monitoring committees within boards, relative to soft law. As these committees are the most influential, this evidence shows that the quota came at a cost when considering within-board women's influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors study compensation packages in family-owned and nonfamily-owned firms. Using French matched employer-employee data, they first show that family firms pay on average lower wages. Part of this wage gap is attributable to low-wage workers sorting into family firms and high-wage workers sorting into nonfamily firms; however, they also find evidence that company wage policies differ according to ownership status, so that the same worker is paid differently under family and nonfamily firm ownership. In addition, family firms are characterized by lower job insecurity, as measured by lower dismissal rates. Family firms also appear to rely less on dismissals, and more on hiring reductions, than do nonfamily firms when they downsize. The authors show that compensating wage differentials account for a substantial part of the inverse relationship between the family/nonfamily gaps in wages and job security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Résumé: Dans cette étude comparative sur la France et la Grande‐Bretagne, les auteurs analysent les liens entre relations professionnelles et ajustements (des effectifs et des salaires) face à la crise de 2007–2008, en s'appuyant sur deux enquêtes au niveau des établissements, fortement comparables, l'une britannique (WERS), l'autre française (REPONSE), collectées en 2010–2012. Malgré des contextes différents (composition du tissu productif, temporalité et impact de la crise), les liens entre relations sociales et stratégies d'ajustement semblent proches (la présence syndicale ne suffisant pas à empêcher les ajustements). La différenciation des systèmes de relations professionnelles ne permet donc pas d'expliquer les divergences de modes d'ajustement constatées au niveau macroéconomique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this comparative study, the authors analyse the relationships between industrial relations and workforce or wage adjustments in response to the 2007-08 crisis, using two highly comparable establishment-level surveys conducted in Great Britain (WERS) and France (REPONSE) in 2010-12. Notwithstanding contextual differences in the countries' productive systems and the timing and impact of the crisis, the relationships between industrial relations and adjustment strategies appear to have been similar (trade union presence not preventing adjustments). Differences in industrial relations are therefore not found to provide an explanation for the different modes of adjustment observed at the macroeconomic level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The board‐level gender quota enacted in France has induced the massive arrival in corporate boards of a new population—namely, women with no prior board experience. We examine the positions and the compensation of these "rookie female directors." We show that, conditional on their individual characteristics and firm effects, rookie female directors have had a limited access to the key positions within boards and have suffered from a significant compensation gap. We interpret this evidence of positional segregation as resulting from gender stereotypes that have persisted in the process of rookie female directors' integration within boards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the relationship between board independence and firm operating performance in French listed companies. We take advantage of an original database, with a time-series dimension that can be used to mitigate heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity issues. In addition, this database can be disaggregated at the individual (director) level. This design enables us to introduce firm fixed effects and individual fixed effects in firm performance equations, thereby controlling for heterogeneity at the firm and individual levels. Our main result is to document a significant negative relationship between independence and accounting performance. This result suggests that, in the French context, the costs of independence (i.e. the informational gap supported by independent directors compared to insiders and affiliated directors) outweigh the benefits of independence (i.e. the reduction in agency costs). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Information disclosure requirements significantly increased in French listed companies in the early 2000s, converging toward the U.S./U.K. stock market standards. We investigate the consequences of this process regarding worker information: does more information for shareholders mean more information for workers? Our empirical analysis takes advantage of a French establishment survey that generates linked "employer--employee" data at two points in time, 1998 and 2004. Our results show that worker information has improved in listed companies as an externality of the financialization process. We find, however, that this extra information is only partially correlated with greater employee satisfaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use data from the Relations Professionnelles et Négociations d'Entreprise survey of 2004 and the Workplace Employment Relations Survey of 2004 to analyse how far approaches to human resource management differ according to whether an establishment is part of a company with a stock exchange listing. In both countries we find that listing is positively associated with teamworking and performance-related pay, while in France, but not in Britain, it is also linked to worker autonomy and training. Our findings are inconsistent with the claim that shareholder pressure operates as a constraint on the adoption of high-performance workplace practices. The pattern is similar in the two countries, but with a slightly stronger tendency for listing to be associated with high-performance workplace practices in France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shareholder primacy is increasingly considered to be the most effective way to foster managerial (corporate) accountability. Contrary to this now standard argument, we consider that shareholder primacy, rather than gatekeeper failure, is directly responsible for the multiplication of accounting irregularities and the dramatic increase in executive compensations. To defend this thesis, we propose a new reading of Berle and Means (1932), Galbraith (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), stressing the logical failure of a control of the business firm provided for by stock markets: the implementation of shareholder primacy implies a partial disconnection between access to internal knowledge and empowerment. In turn, this disconnection favours deceptive behaviours on the part of corporate insiders. Empirical evidence mostly based on Enron-era financial scandals illustrates our argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the basic principles of the continental European style of corporate governance, and its evolution in the context of the globalization of financial markets. By stressing the role of worker involvement, shareholder value, as an (economic) theory of the firm, as a practice and as an ideology, is critically assessed. Also, the thesis of national models’ convergence is rejected, in favour of an approach rooted in ‘institutional complementarities’. To sustain and illustrate our main conclusions, recent developments in France and Germany are studied. Finally, the current building up of a regulatory framework in the European Union — characterized by a model of corporate governance based on workplace democracy — is analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]