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There are well-documented disparities in the number of minority groups' scientists -- such as female and racial minority communities' researchers -- mentioned in scientific outputs. These disparities might be the result of productivity differences (contribution), or they might be due to minority groups' contributions not being acknowledged (attribution). We consider scientists contributing to systematic reviews of healthcare interventions published by Cochrane and leverage a unique attribution of credit guidance to explore whether deserving scientists are properly credited in the reviews' acknowledgements (potential omission bias in the acknowledgements). We document some disparities in the attribution of credit in this setting, providing evidence that the lack of recognition of minority groups' scientists is also noticeable through omission bias in the acknowledgements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The information about R&D activities can shift the competitive landscape and carry a substantial strategic value for firms. However, most of our understanding of R&D disclosures is either for early-stage projects (i.e., patents) or when firms voluntarily share their information. Mandatory disclosures of development projects, such as clinical drug trials, demanded by regulators often put firms in a paradoxical situation - on the one hand, they face regulatory pressures to comply, and on the other hand, they fear informing competitors of internal developments. By integrating the theories of knowledge management and strategic responses to institutional forces, we propose that firms under intense competition would be reluctant to comply and share the results of their clinical trials. However, when they do share their results, they would do so quickly to deter competition. Further, firms would also use rhetoric in their scientific publications linked to the clinical trials to paint a favorable picture to competitors. We test our theoretical model with 7,731 completed clinical trials under a US Act (FDAAA 801) purview between the years 2008-2019 (both inclusive) and find confirming results overall. We discuss the broader implications of our findings on both theory and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does rivalry influence selective reporting in scientific publications? Building on the notion that scientific publications help position a firm's innovation in the marketplace, we study how rivalry influences the selective reporting of key research outcomes in such publications. We define "rivalry" as a subset of competition that captures the subjective relationships between two competitors. Focusing on the context of comparative trials of pharmaceutical drugs and the phenomenon of selective reporting, we propose that the chances of selectively reporting drugs' side effects in scientific articles are higher when the drugs investigated in the trial are rivals than when the investigated drugs are non-rival opponents. We argue that the effect of the relational nature of rivalry on withholding information is strengthened when the scientific publication includes a firm scientist. We also suggest that the effect is weakened when the focal drug outperforms the rival drug in the focal clinical trial and when it pre-empted the rival drug at market entry. Using data on head-to-head clinical trials for antidepressants and expert-driven assessments of selective reporting, our preliminary results provide support for our main hypothesis but only weak support for the moderation effects. Our study is novel in that it is the first study that explores the link between relational rivalry, product-market competition, and content of scientific articles. While scientific publications can be a purposeful tool for competitive positioning and encouraging adoption of innovations, we reveal conditions that are likely to trigger a "dark side" in publication practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]