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The article focuses on several works by those who wish to strike a pose as being at the forefront of thinking about theory, culture and society end with a gesture, more or less rhetorical, that consists in one way or another in calling for the new whether in philosophy, or politics, or in some sense that exceeds these old terms altogether.

This article attempts an organological and pharmacological re-interpretation of the later Heidegger's understanding of modern technology as a provocative mode of revealing of beings, in particular of its central notions of Gestell [enframing] Gefahr [danger], Kehre [turning] and Ereignis [event]. Although these notions in principle allow us to think what is at stake currently in the Anthropocene as the age of total automation, generalized toxicity of the technical milieu and post-truth (i.e., as the Entropocene) calling for a radical bifurcation, they need to be reframed and re-imagined in terms of the process of exosomatization issuing from humanity's original and necessary default of origin and situated within the perspective of entropy and negentropy, both unthought by Heidegger. Only thus will it become possible to really think and take care of what Heidegger called the danger of technology and its turning into the event as the destiny of enframing. This also requires a rethinking of Aristotle's theory of four causes as it is invoked by Heidegger in his analysis of technology, in particular the efficient and final causes, in terms of what Deleuze called quasi-causality, here understood as the need and the obligation for mortals to make their (de-)fault come true, i.e., to make it truly happen or make it advene in truth, out of the experience of the danger as the ordeal of the necessary default. Thus becoming the anti-anthropic cause of anthropic toxicity, humans would restore final causality as quasi-causality and inaugurate, as neganthropos, the bifurcation into the Neganthropocene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article endeavours to rethink wealth and the meaning of work (understood not only as ponos, but also as ergon), in the context of the Anthropocene. It is argued that only through redefining work it is possible to safely overcome the limitations of this age. As the article proves, the Anthropocene is in fact the Entropocene: an age in which the biosphere is confronted with a sudden and mass increase of entropy in each dimension of life on Earth. In order to resolve this threat, the transformation of knowledge and skills is essential. These qualities are, arguably, capable of producing negentropy, that is, the way through which human beings produce artificial organs that enhance the world in its technological (and not biological) dimension. Therefore, negentropy is discussed as an adequate alternative to the economic models that fail to respond to the dynamics of the Anthropocene/Entropocene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today's question concerning technology involves asking about both the post-pandemic world and the post-data-economy world, in a situation where resentments and scapegoats are easily generated. We can no longer avoid integrating this question with that of entropy, but also with the specific question of anthropic entropy, and the way this has accompanied the rise of computation: it thus demands a new approach to theoretical computer science. While digital and network technologies initially seemed to offer new hopes for the reorganization of work (exemplified by the free software movement), the subsequent rise of smartphones and social networks seems to have turned these hopes into lost illusions: network effects and algorithmic platforms are hegemonic, and the changes brought by neoliberalism are being progressively intensified. Unless something utterly improbable happens, this dystopian tendency seems destined to continue. Could the pandemic bring the necessary break? Before asking this question, we should reflect on the meaning of the probable, the improbable and the unforeseen. Capitalism can be described as an epistēmē, whose operator is information, but also as an anti-epistēmē, because it installs generalized proletarianization. In other words, knowledge is destroyed and diversity systemically eliminated, and a new theoretical computer science must learn how to take the need for diversity functionally into account. Yuk Hui raises these questions through the notion of technodiversity, as a way of challenging the hegemony of a universal calculability prescribing arrangements between the technical system and the social and biological systems. Today, the computer is a cellular element in a global megamachine, and, from Hui's perspective, it imposes this cosmotechnical question firstly because China cannot be reduced to the West. Already in the twentieth century, the culture industries tended to reduce reason to rationalization, raising the question of whether modernity is the generalization of the universal or its elimination. What lies behind this question is Leroi-Gourhan's notion of universal technical tendencies. For Leroi-Gourhan, this question involves three kinds of milieus – interior, exterior and technical – and these are mutually diffracting, which means: there is never a milieu, but only milieus. We must further distinguish the production of technical organs (exosomatic exorganogenesis) from the production of those specifically concerned with memory (exomnesic exorganogenesis). The conditions of the expression of universal technical tendencies vary according to advances in exomemorization. Tendencies play out in an irreducible way with counter-tendencies, forming open dynamic systems. Today, platforms tend to eliminate this play, and this is why today's state of fact inherently calls for the question of diversity. The challenge is to introduce new conditions for variability, reconstituting noodiversity. The exosomatic technical milieu is in excess over the interior milieu, connecting interior milieus together by traversing the common exterior milieu. Today, this traversal of the technical saturates the exterior milieu. Exomnesic exorganogenesis involves a meeting of three layers – the physiological, the nervous and the logical – where the second and third of these are what must be woven in new ways by a new theoretical computer science opening up new forms of différance between the understanding and reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

These lectures outline the project of a general organology, which is to say an account of life when it is no longer just biological but technical, or when it involves not just organic matter but organized inorganic matter. This organology is also shown to require a modified Simondonian account of the shift from vital individuation to a three-stranded process of psychic, collective and technical individuation. Furthermore, such an approach involves extending the Derridean reading of Socrates's discussion of writing as a pharmakon, so that it becomes a more general account of the pharmacological character of retention and protention. By going back to Leroi-Gourhan, we can recognize that this also means pursuing the history of retentional modifications unfolding in the course of the history of what, with Lotka, can also be called exosomatization. It is thus a question of how exteriorization can, today, in an epoch when it becomes digital, and in an epoch that produces vast amounts of entropy at the thermodynamic, biological and noetic levels, still possibly produce new forms of interiorization, that is, new forms of thought, care and desire, amounting to so many chances to struggle against the planetary-scale pharmacological crisis with which we are currently afflicted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to be conceived as a kind of programmatic afterword for the present issue. It first describes the key concepts that orient the Real Smart Cities project, with a special focus on intelligence as a noetic process, and on the relation between territory, urban and non-urban territorialisation and knowledge. Then, after an economic and socio-political analysis of the Anthropocene in the light of what the author defines as anthropy and neganthropy, the paper describes the blueprints of a new interdisciplinary and international project based on the concepts enucleated above (de-proletarianisation, exosomatisation, noodiversity, among others). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Aby Warburg's enterprise as an anamnesis, as a question of memory in exosomatisation in relation to the pharmakon. Here the pharmakon is considered as a 'support' in relation to questions of 'care' and as a therapeutics, prescribing the way by which such a pharmakon can become or remain curative, rather than toxic. The discussion looks at how the pharmakon makes possible the transmission of the condition of knowledge, that is: as a preindividual milieu that contains, retains and re-activates traumatypes, providing opportunities for bifurcations in the future. Warburg's employment of photographic montage is considered as an exploration of pharmacological possibilities inherent to tertiary retentions and providing the condition for revenance. Such revenance is proposed as the return of the serpent in absentia: as a new form of tertiary retention that today appears as digital tertiary retention. At stake is the libido's economisation, interactivity and algorithmic governmentality all of which effect the faculties for dreaming, imagination and knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are no longer in the time of reform, we are in the time of “disruption”: the extreme stage of rationalization, which thus forms a threshold, that is, a limit beyond which is the unknown. This era of the world requires a new conceptuality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the question under what conditions it is still possible to think in today's era of the Anthropocene, in which the human has become the key factor in the evolution of the biosphere, considering the fact, structurally neglected by philosophy, that thinking is thoroughly conditioned by a technical milieu of retentional dispositives. The Anthropocene results from modern technology's domination of the earth through industrialization that is currently unfolding as a process of generalized, digital automation, which tends to eliminate reflection and to block any genuine questioning of its own development, producing a state of generalized entropy at all levels—ecological, psychic, social, economic, and, in particular, the noetic or thinking. The radical undermining of the very possibility of thinking and questioning, thought by Martin Heidegger in terms of Enframing, should be understood as a pharmacological situation that calls for a therapeutic reversal of the toxicity of current digital technologies into a remedial instrument for realizing a negentropic turn beyond the Anthropocene and toward the Neganthropocene. This requires that thinking starts to understand itself as caring, i.e., as a taking care of itself by taking care of the technical pharmaka that thoroughly constitute and condition it and that can render human life as noetic life both deeply unlivable and profoundly worthwhile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A lecture on the Quarrel of the Amateurs, delivered by French philosopher Bernard Stiegler and translated by Robert Hughes in Duke University, is presented. He focused on the conflict opposing philosophers like Denis Diderot on the faculty of judging amateur art works. Stiegler examined the ambiguous criticism that decomposed into an interesting form of cultivated philistinism.

A lecture on Kant, Art, and Time, delivered by French philosopher Bernard Stiegler and translated by Stephen Barker and Arne De Boever in Duke University, is presented. He focused on knowledges that were transmitted by modern digital machines to mark the end of mass media. Stiegler believed the technical, transitional object became monstrous and pathetic in a new age of care that traversed the field of contemporary art.

A lecture on Proletarianization of Sensibility, delivered by French philosopher Bernard Stiegler and translated by Arne De Boever in Duke University, is presented. He focused on the development of technologies with mechanical reproducibility that led to regression of the psychomotive knowledges of art amateurs transformed into cultural consumers. Stiegler called the psychopower of marketing and the culture industries as digital machines of sensibility and reconstitution of libidinal energy.

The article discusses art and organological invention in hyper-control societies as analyzed by philosopher Michel Foucault. It mentions that digital technologies constitute an age of hyper-control in societies that have become hyperindustrial. It cites reference to the book "Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work and Think" by Viktor MayerSchönberger and Kenneth Cukier. It highlights benefits of crowdsourcing and use of big data in exploiting hyper-industrial societies by stimulating the production and auto-capturing of personal data.

The control societies analysed by Deleuze are becoming societies of hyper-control, where supercomputing is applied to massive data-sets, with the ultimate goal of controlling behaviour. This control, however, is destroying all forms of knowledge, whether skills, capacities or theories, and undermining all social systems, including the economic foundations of consumerism itself. Although this situation can seem unstoppable, transformations of the technical system always have harmful effects on existing social systems, and thus require the invention of new knowledge and practices. Art has a crucial if not sufficient role to play in creating a new therapeutics for the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the impact of the digital technology and digitization on the transformation of education, the humanities and the production of knowledge. Topics addressed include the role of digital technology as a disruptive process and as an intellectual technology, the rise of consumer capitalism and homogenization of knowledge. The importance of the creation of digital studies is emphasized.

An essay is presented on the development of digital media and real time in the musical field. It offers a history of jazz as a musical culture and highlights American jazz musician Charlie Parker's education, inspiration, and apprenticeship. The author also discusses the technological advancement and innovation in the historical time.

Stiegler argued in Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise (the third volume of Technics and Time) that we must refer to archi-cinema just as Derrida spoke of archi-writing. In this article he proposes that in principle the dream is the primordial form of this archi-cinema. The archi-cinema of consciousness, of which dreams would be the matrix as archi-cinema of the unconscious, is the projection resulting from the play between what Husserl called, on the one hand, primary and secondary retentions, and what Stiegler, on the other hand, calls tertiary retentions, which are the hypomnesic traces (that is, the mnemo-technical traces) of conscious and unconscious life. There is archi-cinema to the extent that for any noetic act - for example, in an act of perception - consciousness projects its object. This projection is a montage, of which tertiary (hypomnesic) retentions form the fabric, as well as constituting both the supports and the cutting room. This indicates that archi-cinema has a history, a history conditioned by the history of tertiary retentions. It also means that there is an organology of dreams. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If performativity means that to say stupid things is to do stupid things, then today stupidity is a very large problem, both within and outside philosophy, stemming, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, from a prostitution of theAufklärung. But understanding stupidity seems almost to require becoming stupid oneself, as evidenced by Derrida's misunderstanding of Deleuze on just this topic, the former failing to grasp that the latter's account is founded on Simondon's theory of individuation, and on the difference between specific individuation and psychic individuation. This failure comes despite the fact thatdifféranceitself must be understood as individuation, and thus what both Deleuze and Derrida help us to think, without quite managing to think it themselves, is that stupidity must be understood in terms of that psychic being who is pharmacologically and technologically capable of being disindividuated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An excerpt from the introduction to the book "Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individuals: Disbelief and Discredit," Vol. 2, by Bernard Stiegler, translated into English by Daniel Ross is presented.

The concept of desire is the key to understanding the relation between economics and psychoanalysis, that is, between social and psychic investment, or between productive and libidinal economies. Today, the system organising the relation between these two economies is less a matter of biopower than of 'psychopower', technologies and industries developed in order to control the behaviour of consumers. But this system interferes with the intergenerational circuits on which desire has hitherto always been based. Consequently, the system is now encountering certain limits, threatening the collapse of the system itself, and requiring a new economic understanding, itself dependent on a new theoretical foundation for understanding desire in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I would like to show that, concerning this era of ubiquitous technology and its teleologics, the stakes concern the constitution of a new milieu of psychic and collective individuation (in Simondon's sense of these terms), which is at least as radically new as the writing of language was in its time; second, I attempt to show that what is at stake relates to the way technology changes the télos, that is, the rule of ends which shape the social organization of collective desire as a system of care and remedies; and, third, I argue that this era requires a new libidinal economy, if we admit that there can be no télos without desire. I will argue that new ubiquitous digital networks operating as new technical associated milieus have fundamental effects for symbolic and psychical associated milieus, and thus for new ways of being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses how technoscience changes the philosophical relationship between contingency and necessity. Philosopher Aristotle stated that action and production cannot be considered science. The author suggests the joining of technology and science for industrial purposes violates ancient philosophical concepts. He suggests technoscience creates different realities.

Interviews Bernard Stiegler, a teacher of philosophy at the Universite de Compiegne, where in 1992 he founded the research unit Connaissances, Organisations et Systemes Techniques (COSTECH). Preoccupation with the questions of technics and time; Attempts to extricate the technical from its traditional determination; Implications in theoretical humanities.