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Increasing research has been devoted to examining collaborations between public and private actors in environmental regulation under neoliberal democracies. However, this public-private interaction in authoritarian regimes remains understudied. This article seeks to address this gap in the literature through an empirical examination of the interaction between environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and procuratorates in China's environmental public interest litigation. We find emerging complementarity: NGOs focus on new issues and target high-profile defendants to increase the socio-legal impact of their civil litigation, whereas procuratorates increasingly engage in administrative litigation against government agencies. This complementarity is shaped by the different legal opportunities for Chinese NGOs and procuratorates, as well as their respective institutional objectives and capacities. Their divergent regulatory preferences have also fostered synergy between these two actors, allowing them to collaborate on legal experimentation and innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although judicial empowerment has become increasingly common worldwide, the expansion of judicial powers in authoritarian countries faces persistent obstacles, such as institutional dependence, lack of political clout, and the repression of civil society. Through empirically examining three cases of environmental legal entrepreneurship under China's new public interest litigation (PIL) system, this study aims to reevaluate the patterns and limits of judicial expansion under authoritarianism. It finds that Chinese judges, prosecutors, and NGOs have been able to leverage the PIL system and their respective institutional advantages to substantially expand judicial oversight on eco‐environmental protection. However, the state has established boundaries for such legal entrepreneurship in terms of subject matter, institutional autonomy, and geographic reach, effectively confining them within political spheres considered unthreatening to the regime. Such quarantined judicial expansion shields relevant actors from authoritarian governments' tendency to suppress legal mobilization and thus may be a more viable form of judicial expansion in nondemocratic settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This study argues that the current Chinese administration has attempted to institutionalize center-local relations by reforming key party-state entities, with the aim of mitigating the centralization-decentralization cycle driven by ad hoc political mobilization. On the fiscal front, these reforms aim to consolidate budget management, merging national and local tax agencies, limiting local government borrowing, and centralizing expenditure planning. On the rule-enforcement front, the reforms try to empower the judiciary and the disciplinary inspection systems by isolating them from local influences. These changes have systematically strengthened the center's fiscal control and enhanced local compliance with national policies and rules. However, it remains to be seen whether the new structure will eventually be weighed down by local resistance, incentive issues, or changes in the center's factional dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The local party-state has always been a major source of extrajudicial influence in China. Drawing on interviews with judges, this article examines the impact of Xi Jinping's ambitious judicial centralization reforms, which are aimed at enhancing judicial autonomy by transferring authority over local court personnel and finances from local to provincial level. It finds that the reforms have achieved limited results. Although many appointment and budgetary powers were formally transferred to the provincial level, the local party-state retains considerable influence in both areas owing to its superior manpower, local knowledge and, in the case of developed regions, financial resources. Moreover, the local party-state maintains significant informal influence over the courts, which require many forms of discretionary assistance from various state organs – ranging from appropriating land for new courthouses to providing police protection for remote tribunals – in order to function. This setback highlights the depth and complexity of the courts' political and economic embeddedness and serves as a reminder of the inherent difficulty of institutionalizing judicial autonomy, however limited, in a large and diverse party-state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past few years, China has made a drastic switch to a more centralized approach to institutional change, thus vastly reducing the decades-old problem of local non-compliance. Using the recent judicial personnel reforms (员额制改革) as a case study, this paper examines the functioning of this new top-down model. Based on field research, the paper finds that the reforms have drastically reduced judge headcounts, placing tremendous burden on those remaining. In addition, they have made it much harder for new recruits to rise to the rank of judge, forcing them to remain as 'judicial assistants' who are not allowed to adjudicate cases independently. These changes have driven many judges to resign and have significantly diminished the appeal of judicial posts to new talent, especially in developed regions where caseloads are heavier and alternative career options more lucrative. Furthermore, such problems have continued to plague the judiciary despite long-standing widespread acknowledgment of them within and outside the judiciary. These developments highlight a critical disadvantage of the new top-down approach: unlike the previous decentralized system, under which powerful local actors could often de facto reject institutional changes they deemed flawed or unsuitable to local circumstances, the new centralized approach provides little effective check against design defects in the center's reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]