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Copyright of Esensia: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin is the property of Esensia: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper discusses the "positivistic" idea of the limits of law in various contexts: the conceptual problem of the "limits of law", the limits of legal interpretation and the limits of theoretical disagreements in jurisprudence. In the latter case, we briefly show how contemporary "reflective" or "critical" positivist theories approach the possibility and limits of disagreements over the "grounds" of law. In what follows, we argue that these theories, which argue for a form of an "institutional" limit for admissible "legal" reasons as built upon theories of basic concepts or normative theories of interpretation, are themselves actually underdetermined by "legal culture" or, so to speak, a "folk theory of law". In the final section, we outline how a folk theory of law constrains both conceptual and interpretive enterprises in jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Retos: Nuevas Perspectivas de Educación Física, Deporte y Recreación is the property of Federacion Espanola de Asociaciones de Docentes de Educacion Fisica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

I consider to what extent, if at all, rights - or to take it wider, law - can contribute or even respond to what is referred to as the 'current crisis' in higher education. To what extent does rights discourse still enable radical political claims that could engage with the complexity of the moment and support a politics of resistance? I recall arguments on the limits of law, in particular the inability of law to be self-reflexive, and also some critical responses to rights as such. Could these critical responses disclose possibilities for a radically different conception of right, of a 'Right' - particularly the Right to the university - that emerges from a place of anxiety, disruption and 'unselfing' rather than preservation? What could be at stake in thinking about a 'Right' to the university against the background of the notion of the Right to the city? The potential relevance of the Right to the city, linked to the notion of 'inhabitance', is that it challenges the modern, technical and functional notion of 'habitat'. Habitat is devoid of any notion of politics, most pertinently political resistance. A contemplation of a Right to the university will have to have at its core the notion of 'inhabitance' that will resonate with Lefebvre's notion of "lived space". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The legal example is used in large part to dress the rule. A naked norm, for common lawyers, is simply an abstraction, an umbrageous nebulosity that needs its particulars, its cases, to have meaning, impact and thought. Using the paradoxical example of nakedness the essay examines the inability of British and European courts candidly to address the undressed. Nakedness is here examined as an instance of undressing the law, of stripping and streaking the norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal positivists often claim that law is a limited normative domain. Understanding the limits of law requires an answer to two related problems. On the one hand, the problem of unregulated cases and, on the other hand, the problem of the alien norms. The first problem refers to the distinction between legal gaps and unregulated cases. Many legal philosophers claim that the identification of legal gaps presupposes an evaluative judgment. Thus, contrary to legal positivism, the determination of the content and limits of law (i.e., the domain of regulated cases) does not only depend on the cognition of certain social facts, but it actually also requires an evaluation of such facts. The second problem refers to the fact that judges often recognize as legally binding norms that are not issued by competent authorities of their systems. Therefore, a positivistic theory would not provide a satisfactory account of law if it failed to explain the legal force of this kind of norms. In this paper I analyze some solutions to such problems that can be found in three well-known positivistic theories (Kelsen, Raz and Bulygin). I show that none of them offers a sound answer to the problem of the unregulated cases and the alien norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kriminologisches Journal is the property of Julius Beltz GmbH & Co. KG Beltz Juventa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Should we conceive of corporations as entities to which moral responsibility can be attributed? This contribution presents what we will call a political account of corporate moral responsibility. We argue that in modern, liberal democratic societies, there is an underlying political need to attribute greater levels of moral responsibility to corporations. Corporate moral responsibility is essential to the maintenance of social coordination that both advances social welfare and protects citizens' moral entitlements. This political account posits a special capacity of self-governance that corporations can intelligibly be said to possess. Corporations can be said to be 'administrators of duty' in that they can voluntarily incorporate moral principles into their decision-making processes about how to conduct business. This account supplements and partly transforms earlier pragmatic accounts of corporate moral responsibility by disentangling responsibility from its conventional linkages with accountability, blame and punishment. It thereby represents a distinctive way to defend corporate moral responsibility and shows how Kantian thinking can be helpful in disentangling the problems surrounding the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]