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Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, we suggest that personalized LLMs trained on information written by or otherwise pertaining to an individual could serve as artificial moral advisors (AMAs) that account for the dynamic nature of personal morality. These LLM-based AMAs would harness users’ past and present data to infer and make explicit their sometimes-shifting values and preferences, thereby fostering self-knowledge. Further, these systems may also assist in processes of self-creation, by helping users reflect on the kind of person they want to be and the actions and goals necessary for so becoming. The feasibility of LLMs providing such personalized moral insights remains uncertain pending further technical development. Nevertheless, we argue that this approach addresses limitations in existing AMA proposals reliant on either predetermined values or introspective self-knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 'Must We Mean What We Say?', Stanley Cavell defends the method of ordinary language philosophy while arguing that the special status of philosophical claims about language arises from the fact that these statements are expressions of self-knowledge. Recently, Nat Hansen (2017) has explored Cavell's position in relation to empirical research on linguistic usage. This paper challenges Hansen's reading of Cavell, and presents an alternative interpretation that withstands some of Hansen's objections. For Cavell, claims about 'what we say' are claims about observable matters of fact, but nevertheless they are not, and cannot ever be, observation-based claims. The point of observing ordinary usage is to remind the philosopher of what is contained within the practical mastery that she already possesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a new kind of approach to conspiracy theories – a procedural approach. This approach promises to establish that belief in conspiracy theories is rationally criticisable in general. Unlike most philosophical approaches, a procedural approach does not purport to condemn conspiracy theorists directly on the basis of features of their theories. Instead, it focuses on the patterns of thought involved in forming and sustaining belief in such theories. Yet, unlike psychological approaches, a procedural approach provides a rational critique of conspiracist thought patterns. In particular, it criticises these thought patterns for failing to conform to procedures prescribed by reason. The specific procedural approach that I develop takes its cue from the Kantian notion that reason must be used self-critically. I tentatively suggest that conspiracy theorists fail to engage in the relevant sort of self-critique in at least three ways: they do not critically examine their own motivations, they avoid looking at matters from the point of view of others, and they fail to reflect on the limits of human knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital mental health interventions (DMHIs) have surged in popularity over the last few years. However, adherence to self-guided interventions remains a major hurdle to overcome. The current study utilized a phased implementation design, incorporating diverse samples and contexts to delve into the engagement challenges faced by a recently launched online mental health platform in Brazil with self-evaluation forms. Employing an iterative mixedmethods approach, including focus groups, online surveys, and think-aloud protocols, the research aims to evaluate user satisfaction, identify barriers to adherence, and explore potential hybrid solutions. Engagement in the platform was evaluated by descriptive statistics of the number of instruments completed, and qualitative interviews that were interpreted thematically. In the fully selfguided mode, 2,145 individuals registered, but a substantial majority (88.9%) engaged with the platform for only 1 day, and merely 3.3% completed all activities. In another sample of 50 participants were given a choice between online-only or a hybrid experience with face-to-face meetings. 40% of individuals from the hybrid group completed all activities, compared to 8% in the online-only format. Time constraints emerged as a significant barrier to engagement, with suggested improvements including app development, periodic reminders, and meetings with healthcare professionals. While the study identified weaknesses in the number and length of instruments, personalized results stood out as a major strength. Overall, the findings indicate high satisfaction with the mental health platform but underscore the need for improvements, emphasizing the promise of personalized mental health information and acknowledging persistent barriers in a digital-only setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Colombiana de Educación is the property of Universidad Pedaggica Nacional and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper aims to defend the standard view of what it dubs 'Self-understanding' — i.e. (very roughly) our knowledge of why we behave as we do — from the threat posed to it by Neo-Ryleanism. While the standard, entrenched view regards self-understanding as special in kind and status, the Neo-Rylean agrees with Gilbert Ryle that our method of understanding ourselves is much the same as our method of understanding others, involving self-interpretation on the basis of the available evidence. Neo-Ryleanism has been gaining ground in recent decades, fuelled by a wide range of empirical results which allegedly demonstrate that subjects confabulate items of self-understanding. The paper rejects this attack on the received view. After critically examining one extant response to the Neo-Rylean, which gratuitously accuses her of equivocation, the paper proceeds to offer its own response, casting doubt over the suggestion that the experimental results actually demonstrate widespread confabulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

God the Father was considered so completely inexpressible and unembodied that his visual appearance in early modern masterpieces has long challenged the theological accuracy of such works. A recent discovery complicates that issue. Albrecht Dürer's 1500 Self-portrait as Christ is incorrectly considered an isolated example of divine self-representation. It was, in fact, as shown here, part of a long tradition throughout Europe between at least the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. The praxis, potentially sacrilegious, raises questions about the truth of art at its highest level. To address this conundrum, this article analyzes works by three eminent, but very different, artists: Michelangelo, Raphael, and Dürer. Two current methodologies—visual exegesis and the poetics of making—support the argument. The analysis reveals that there is a fundamental unity to their work, which has not been recognized on account of three popular misconceptions about the nature of art, divinity, and the mind. This article concludes that depictions of God the Father and Christ by these artists are neither heretical nor false because, as the evidence shows, all three were part of a continuous spiritual tradition embedded within their craft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discovery of "Self", the essence of “Self’ and the relationship between man and "Self" have a special place in the philosophy of illumination. The main issue in this article is how Suhrawardi discovers "self" and what is his mechanism in self-analysis? In order to reach Suhrawardi's answer, we have distinguished between two types of ontological and epistemological encounters with "self". In the ontological confrontation, man achieves the existential truth through self-analysis and makes this existential matter the basis of his entire metaphysical system, as we see in Ibn Sina's philosophical system. But from Suhrawardi's point of view, the human encounter in the discovery of "self" is epistemological. In the epistemological encounter with "self", the first finding of man is something that constantly appears to him, and according to the identity of appearance and perception, man's discovered is consciousness, and as a result, "self" is consciousness. Consciousness that is the basis of the philosopher's entire knowledge system. Considering these kinds of encounter, in this article we have distinguished between three stages of self-analysis, i.e. illuminated self-awareness, illuminated self-knowledge and illuminated selfimprovement. In the stage of self-awareness, a reality beyond the material body is discovered in three ways. In the stage of self-knowledge, by distancing from the Peripatetics philosophers and relying on the phenomenological approach, we reach the fact that this non-material thing constantly appears to man, such a thing is pure light. In the stage of self-development, by establishing a dialectic between man and "self", the conclusion is reached that alienation is a contradictory thing. Therefore, suhrawardi’s illuminated selfanalysis establishes a foundation for illumination epistemology both in its own philosophy and in the philosophies after it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The aim of this study was to compare the effectiveness of positive therapy and dialectical behavior therapy on the self-knowledge of vulnerable teenagers under the welfare of Tehran. Materials and Methods: 60 samples were selected by using the available sampling method and by screening, and they were assigned equally and randomly in the intervention groups of positive psychology and dialectical behavior therapy and the control group. The score obtained from Kettle's SelfKnowledge Questionnaire (1998) was included in the initial screening as a pre-test. Then, the intervention of positive psychology and dialectical behavior therapy was presented to the experimental group for 10 sessions of 90 minutes each, and the control group did not receive any intervention. Then all three groups were measured in the post-test. Also, after one month, a follow-up period was conducted by implementing a self-awareness questionnaire. Results: Data analysis with mixed variance analysis showed that positive treatment and dialectical behavior therapy were effective on the selfawareness of vulnerable teenagers under the welfare of Tehran city (P<0.001). Also, the effect of positive treatment was greater than dialectical behavior therapy in improving self-knowledge (P<0.001). The results were maintained in the follow-up phase. Conclusion: The results of this research reveal the need to pay special attention to the issues of vulnerable teenagers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines Nietzsche's inversion of Terence's formula "I am the closest to myself" into "Everyone is furthest from himself [Jeder ist sich selbst der Fernste]" (GM, Preface 1). In a contextual reading, I am going to ask how Nietzsche relates this formula to the difficulty of acquiring self-knowledge, as emphasized at the beginning of On theGenealogy of Morality. First, I argue that Nietzsche does not prohibit self-knowledge, but instead invites us to think about it differently; and second, I will show that the formula according to which "everyone is furthest from himself" can also be understood as an injunction to keep the self always at a distance. I will link these two aspects by arguing that Nietzsche replaces self-knowledge in the classical sense by an interpretation of the self, and that this interpretation must never be thought of as an undertaking that seeks to reify their self. Nietzsche urges us to make ourselves into creative projects, even this will entail fiction and illusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that $\neg p$ ¬ p and yet is sincere in asserting that $p$ p. I argue that the agent qualifies as sincere in asserting the contrary of what they in the most basic sense believe in virtue of asserting what they are committed to believing. It is only by recognizing such commitments and distinguishing them from the more basic beliefs whose rational regulation is automatic that the tension between the self-deceived agent's actions and assertions can be explained in a core subset of cases of self-deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Meat consumption has a host of serious negative consequences for nonhuman animals, underprivileged humans, and the natural environment. Several interventions have been developed to encourage meat reduction but to relatively limited effect. There is also a range of established predictors of meat consumption, but much less is known about the factors that predict intentions to reduce meat consumption. The goal of this study was to determine the roles of personality and self‐knowledge in meat reduction intentions. Method: In this set of three preregistered studies, we tested brief interventions to encourage meat reduction intentions and examined personality predictors of intentions to reduce meat consumption. Results: We found no evidence that brief interventions with or without a self‐knowledge component had a meaningful effect on changing meat reduction intentions. However, we found robust evidence for relatively small associations between intending to eat less meat and high Openness to Experience, high Emotionality, and perceiving meat reduction as moral behaviors. Conclusion: Individual differences may be a more influential predictor of meat reduction intentions than brief interventions. Implications for promoting meat reduction are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as object”. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are only de facto IEM, not strictly speaking IEM, while Gareth Evans disputed it. In the past two decades research on memory has produced very significant results, which have changed the philosophical landscape. As part of it, several new arguments have been made for and against the IEM of personal memories. The paper aims to defend the Shoemaker line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we look at installation art through the lens provided by the notion of "affective artifact" (Piredda 2019). We argue that affective character is central to some works of installation art and that some of those works can expand our knowledge of our affective lives, while others can contribute to the construction of our identities. Sections (2), (3), and (4) set the stage for our discussion of affective installation artworks by, respectively, situating it within the debate on affective artifacts, looking at some general issues concerning the affective character of artworks, and sketching out a view of the ontology of installation art. In section (5), we discuss the affective character of six works of installation art. In section (6), we show how those artworks can reveal aspects of who we are. Section (7) concludes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, to revitalize the discussion on semantic externalism's implications on the issue of content self-knowledge, I will argue that semantic externalism generates in fact two related but distinct skeptical puzzles concerning the presumption of truth attached to our mental self-ascriptions. The first is to explain how I can correctly ascribe mental states to myself, and the second is to explain how others can ascribe thoughts to me by taking my expressions of such self-ascriptions at face value. In my view, although the first has been sufficiently addressed in the literature, the second has been more or less neglected. Furthermore, as I will argue, theorists must respond to both of the questions to fully show the compatibility of our ordinary conception of self-knowledge and semantic externalism. As a case study, I will introduce Dorit Bar-On's neo-expressivism as an account of self-knowledge that provides a promising answer to the first question and argue that it is still incomplete in that it does not address the second skeptical puzzle. To shed light on the nature of the puzzle in question further, I will also explore its possible solutions in the neo-expressivist framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Encuentros is the property of Universidad Autonoma del Caribe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In classical Arabic philosophy, the topic of consciousness is commonly associated with Avicenna's 'Flying Man' thought experiment. But Avicenna's explorations of the nature of consciousness are not confined to the Flying Man, and he is by no means the only classical Islamic thinker to deem consciousness an important feature of our experience. Consciousness also plays a important role in the epistemology and moral psychology of Avicenna's intellectual rivals, the theologians (mutakallumūn), who represent important sources for Avicenna's own theorizing about consciousness. And while Avicenna's philosophical successor and critic, Averroes, seems to banish consciousness from the core of his cognitive psychology, in doing so he seems to anticipate contemporary efforts to expand the scope of consciousness through the notion of the 'extended' mind. This paper examines the varieties of consciousness recognized by Avicenna and several other classical Islamic thinkers with a view to understanding the extent to which their accounts can be mapped on to some of the concepts of consciousness delineated by contemporary philosophers of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mathematical beliefs and metacognitive knowledge play significant roles in solving mathematical problems; thus, this study aims to investigate the influence of middle school students' beliefs on their metacognitive knowledge when solving geometry problems. This study utilizes both quantitative and qualitative research methods. A linear regression test was used to determine the effect of middle school students' beliefs on their metacognitive knowledge. The results of the quantitative research analysis were followed up with a qualitative research approach to describe the metacognitive knowledge of students who have high and low confidence in solving geometric problems. This research involved 352 middle school students in the Tarakan area. Based on the results of linear regression, it is known that the beliefs of middle school students have a positive effect on their metacognitive knowledge when solving geometric problems. In addition, it was found that students with different beliefs could solve a given geometry problem, but the approach to solving it varied among subjects. Middle school students have diverse beliefs, but these variations do not affect their capacity to apply their metacognitive knowledge at every stage of solving mathematical problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces the special issue 'The point of view of shared agency', a collection of papers that develops, and critically assesses, a striking development in recent philosophy of mind, epistemology, and developmental psychology, that is, the fundamental reappraisal of the time-honoured distinction between a 'first-person' and a 'third-person perspective' on our mental lives. In recent years, the nature of the 'second-person standpoint' has become a major focus of work across a range of disciplines. More recently, the idea of 'first-person plural knowledge', has received some attention, for example in considering knowledge of what 'we are doing' when we are doing things together. This collection explores collective agency, self-knowledge, and knowledge of other minds, from this plural and relational point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Anscombe a solitary activity is intentional if the agent has self-knowledge of what she is doing. Analogously one might think that to partake in shared intentional activities is for the agents involved to have plural or collective self-knowledge of what they are doing together. I call this 'the Plural Practical Knowledge Thesis' (PPK). While some authors have advanced related theses about the nature of the knowledge involved in shared practical activities (see Laurence, B. [2011]. "An Anscombian Approach to Collective Action." In Essays on Anscombe's Intention, edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland. Cambridge: Harvard UP; Schmid, H.-B. [2016]. "On Knowing What We Are Doing Together." In The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, edited by Michael S. Brady, and Miranda Fricker. Oxford: Oxford UP; Rödl, S. [2015]. "Joint Action and Recursive Consciousness of Consciousness." Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 14: 769–779. doi:; Rödl, S. [2018a]. "Joint Action and Pure Self-Consciousness." Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1): 124–136; Rödl, S. [2018b]. Self-Consciousness and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard UP) this alternative remains relatively underexplored in the current literature. The paper offers an account of plural practical knowledge based on the idea that shared activities of the relevant sort share a normative structure given by practical, means-end structures and proposes a paradigmatic methodology that generalizes this account to understand what different cases of collective intentional action have in common. It then discusses the differences between the proposed approach and those due to Schmid 2016. "On Knowing What We Are Doing Together." In The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, edited by Michael S. Brady, and Miranda Fricker. Oxford: Oxford UP and Laurence 2011. "An Anscombian Approach to Collective Action." In Essays on Anscombe's Intention, edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland. Cambridge: Harvard UPand the reasons why it should be preferred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Perspectives on Culture / Perspektywy Kultury is the property of Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores William Ockham's account of memory with a view to understanding its implications for his account of the nature and persistence of human beings. I show that Ockham holds a view according to which memory (i) is a type of self-knowledge and (ii) entails the existence of an enduring psychological subject. This is significant when taken in conjunction with his account of the afterlife. For, Ockham holds that during the interim state—namely, after bodily death, but prior to bodily resurrection—we retain and recall our embodied experiences. This entails that the subject of our embodied psychological states can survive in a disembodied state and continue to engage in characteristic rational activities—a claim that appears to run against Ockham's own commitment to a hylomorphic conception of human beings (as essentially material). A central aim of this paper is to explore the prospects for reconciling Ockham's account of interim memory with his account of human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Learning to take care of oneself in order to be able to take care of others is key to the future of Social Work practice. This article analyzes how self-care is taught to and learned by Social Work students. We approach it through the experiences and discourses of students and professors from the Social Work degree course at the Rovira i Virgili University (URV), in Tarragona, Spain. The methodology used was mixed. Data was collected during 2019 through 143 Social Work student online questionnaires, two student focus groups, two in-depth interviews with students, and 13 social work faculty online questionnaires. The results highlight the lack of specific training in self-care and the demands of both groups to have better access to this training. Some proposals to introduce content related to self-care programmatically into Social Work university studies are also presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If we can and do have some self‐knowledge, how do we acquire it? By examining the ways in which we acquire self‐knowledge—by introspection—we can try shedding some light onto the nature and the breadth of self‐knowledge, as others have tried to do with other forms of knowledge. My aim is to show that introspection involves multiple (that is, at least two) distinct processes, a view I call "pluralism about introspection". One of the virtues of pluralism is that it explains how we can have such a wide variety of self‐knowledge despite our cognitive limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introspection can be defined as taking time to think deeply both about yourself and the outside world. Through introspection, library managers can obtain a more objective knowledge of their skills and weaknesses to better judge what they can do well, where they can improve, and when they should seek outside expertise. Introspection also leads to improved decision making since the reflective manager examines evidence from all sides, looks for hidden agendas, discovers how the world really works, and thinks before acting. The chief negative is that introspection takes time. The successful introspective manager learns to discover the optimal amount of reflection based upon the complexity and importance of the decision and also understands when to seek closure. The current frenetic pace of life with information overload and never-ending tasks requires the successful manager to find quiet time for the reflection that will increase performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Novel technological devices, applications, and algorithms can provide us with a vast amount of personal information about ourselves. Given that we have ethical and practical reasons to pursue self-knowledge, should we use technology to increase our self-knowledge? And which ethical issues arise from the pursuit of technologically sourced self-knowledge? In this paper, I explore these questions in relation to bioinformation technologies (health and activity trackers, DTC genetic testing, and DTC neurotechnologies) and algorithmic profiling used for recommender systems, targeted advertising, and technologically supported decision-making. First, I distinguish between impersonal, critical, and relational self-knowledge. Relational self-knowledge is a so far neglected dimension of self-knowledge which is introduced in this paper. Next, I investigate the contribution of these technologies to the three types of self-knowledge and uncover the connected ethical concerns. Technology can provide a lot of impersonal self-knowledge, but we should focus on the quality of the information which tends to be particularly insufficient for marginalized groups. In terms of critical self-knowledge, the nature of technologically sourced personal information typically impedes critical engagement. The value of relational self-knowledge speaks in favour of transparency of information technology, notably for algorithms that are involved in decision-making about individuals. Moreover, bioinformation technologies and digital profiling shape the concepts and norms that define us. We should ensure they not only serve commercial interests but our identity and self-knowledge interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The panel discussion presented at the New York Psychoanalytic Society and Institute's 1066th Scientific Meeting held on June 8, 2023, takes up aging and dying of an analyst and their impact on patients and on the nature of analytic process. Participants reflect on conflicts and challenges arising with more analysts and patients living to an advanced age, on the unregulated nature of analysts' retirement, and on multilayered meanings of analysts' ethical commitment to their work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Icelandic Society / Íslenska þjóðfélagið is the property of Icelandic Sociological Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Written in narrative format and guided by concepts and methods borrowed from intuitive inquiry, a transpersonal and holistic approach to scholarship, the article offers insights into the research process of art teachers who were completing their graduate studies in art education during the pandemic year of 2020–2021. By engaging in an arts-based inquiry that brought them to explore aspects of their inner life, also shedding light on our shared cultural and social conditions, the student-scholars demonstrated the transformative potential of creative investigations as a vehicle for self-knowledge and healing. The article points to the importance of connecting artistic endeavor with transformative learning as both reach beyond cognitive responses to knowledge. Our findings support the vision that self-discovery processes lead to integration and social awareness which informs teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article, teleological thinking in Renaissance anatomy is presented by the example of the Wittenberg anatomist Johannes Jessenius (1566-1621), who performed the first public dissection in Prague in 1600 and published a description of it in Wittenberg in 1601. Jessenius, a graduate of the University of Padua, is also concerned with teleology, which he uses both to justify anatomical practice and to incorporate it into his own interpretation of anatomical acts. In my article, I focus primarily on the dedication and introduction to Jessenius's Prague Anatomy, where teleological thinking is most clearly manifested. I present the teleology in Jessenius in two stages with reference to the passage in the dedication to the Prague Anatomy. In keeping with contemporary practice, Jessenius interprets the Delphic oracle “Know Thyself” as a call to anatomical knowledge of the human body. At the same time the self-knowledge is the knowledge of God in the sense of the connection between cognitio sui and cognitio Dei. The knowledge of the principle of purposefulness thus seems to be the culmination of all anatomical study. In terms of teleology, Jessenius focuses on the points in which the human being differs from other creatures: mind, hand, upright figure. Special attention is paid in my paper to the anatomy of the hand, in which Jessenius follows specifically Andreas Vesalius, who adopts a teleological understanding of the hand from Aristotle and Galen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Pedagogiek is the property of Amsterdam University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Purpose: The transformation of political, social, business and many other organizations into learning organizations is very needed. Such a process should be supported by the theory of learning organizations. This theory, if it is to play more effectively its role, should continue to develop. According to opinion of the author of the present text, improving the conceptual basis of this theory and of its logical structure is one of the desired directions of this development. The purpose of the paper is to contribute to such a development. Design/methodology/approach: This text has character of logical analysis of theoretical concepts and theorems. Findings: The theory of learning organizations is an interdisciplinary theory including elements of such disciplines as epistemology, system theory, cognitive sciences, psychology (of learning), sociology (of organizations), theory of social communication and management sciences. One, common consistent theoretical language is a necessary (though: not sufficient) condition for transforming theory of learning organizations into a more coherent theoretical system. Research limitations/implications: The analyses presented in this text are rather of preliminary character. They should be continued; especially, some formal (mathematical) methods should be applied. Practical implications: Precising, clarifying and systematizing theorems – are important conditions for any social theory to influence effectively politics, governance and management. Social implications: The better function various organizations, the better (sustainable, ecologically safe, socially just, etc.) – all other factors equal – society. Originality/value: The paper undertakes important but little-studied aspects of the theory of learning organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of DoisPontos is the property of Universidade Federal do Parana, Departamento de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Objective: The past two decades have established that people generally have insight into their personalities, but less is known about how and why self‐knowledge might vary between individuals. Using the Realistic Accuracy Model as a framework, we investigate whether some people make better "targets" of self‐perception by behaving more consistently in everyday life, and whether these differences have benefits for psychological adjustment. Method: Using data from the Electronically Activated Recorder (n = 286), we indexed self‐knowledge as the link between self‐reports of personality and actual daily behavior measured over 1 week. We then tested if consistency in daily behavior as well as psychological adjustment predicted stronger self‐knowledge. Results: We found that behaving more consistently in everyday life was associated with more accurate self‐reports, but that psychological adjustment was not. Conclusions: Analogous to interpersonal perception, self‐knowledge of personality might be affected by "target‐side" factors, like the quality of information provided through one's behavior. However, unlike being a good target of interpersonal perception, self‐knowledge does not seem to be related to psychological adjustment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares Augustine's view on the value of learning to classical Chinese philosophy (Laozi, Confucius, Mengzi, Xunzi, Zhu Xi). While Laozi has a quite negative notion of learning as leading humans away from true nature, most Confucians esteem learning highly as the only way to human perfection. Similar to the Confucians, the early Augustine sees knowledge and learning as a way for humans to ascend to divine truth. In his mature works, however, Augustine points out more clearly the dangers of learning: it can make humans proud instead of humble, causing them to rely on their own power instead of confessing their weakness and their need for divine grace. His hesitations on the value of learning bear some similarity to Laozi's view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper explores the widely circulated idea that algorithms will soon be able to know people "better than they know themselves." I address this idea from two perspectives. First I argue for the particular subjective qualities of experience and self-understanding issuing from our engagement with the world and the constitutive role of our reflexive relation to ourselves. These are not "known" by the algorithms. I then address our fundamental opacity to ourselves and the biased, partial, and limited nature of human self-understanding. Our failure to know ourselves is however essential to our subjectivity and therefore, to know a subject in a perfect way that bypasses these limitations is actually not to know them. Taken together, both directions show that while algorithmic knowledge of humans can be vast, and can outperform their own knowledge, it remains foreign to their subjectivity and cannot be said to be better than self-understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of solitude, as elaborated by Petrarch in the treatise De vita solitaria, develops on the antagonistic structure of the concepts otium and negotium. These, in turn, contain notions and intellectual approaches found both in Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, which attribute to loneliness a special dynamism by joining it with several other concepts such as: will, freedom and friendship. Each historical stage has a specific approach to the notions of otium and negotium, and in this sense Petrarch's contribution can be considered significant, even if not entirely new, because he attempts a plenary approach to the idea of solitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article substantiates the autonomy of a philosophical text in relation to a literary text. Max Frisch's novel Stiller is used to illustrate the idea of the dialectical nature of the process of concealing/revealing metaphysical meaning in a work of fiction regarding the problem of self-identification and the construction of one's own "I," which is pivotal in this novel. The philosophical idea of self-identity as the goal of the process of self-knowledge exists only as a projection; it is not feasible in life. On the contrary, the novel Stiller, considered through the prism of basic ideas of philosophy of the twentieth century, allows the reader not only to better understand the inconsistency of the process of self-knowledge, but that it involves a reconfiguration of meanings in a conversation about being, and therefore requires a philosophical revision of the essence of the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hot-cold empathy gaps are a pervasive phenomena wherein one’s predictions about others skew ‘in the direction’ of one’s own current visceral states. For instance, when one predicts how hungry someone else is, one’s prediction will tend to reflect one’s own current hunger state. These gaps also obtain intrapersonally, when one attempts to predict what one oneself would do at a different time. In this paper, we do three things: First, we draw on empirical evidence to argue that so-called hot-cold empathy gaps arise when one projects one’s own current state into a simulation about another. Second, we argue that this process does not typically confer knowledge, even when the predictions it produces happen to be accurate. Third, we suggest that these results can be used to develop a challenge for L.A. Paul’s view that authentic action sometimes requires a certain kind of experience-based knowledge of one’s own values and of how these values relate to relevant outcomes. We then sketch an alternative view of the epistemic grounds of authenticity, one on which authenticity requires a kind of understanding. The relevant form of understanding can be achieved by knowledge from first-personal experience but can also be achieved elsewise, such as through testimony from a close friend about what one values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Philosophers of the theory-of-mind have always grappled with how to describe and image human mental processes, given the impossibility of accessing a perspective outside consciousness from which to analyse it. This article considers the history of models of the mind before exploring in detail Meister Eckhart's conception of psychology, epistemology and ontology. Eckhart's German Sermons and Talks of Instruction are drawn on to tease out his understanding of the mind/brain and the sensible, rational and intellectual faculties. The article looks especially to Eckhart's writings on union with the divine and the apophatic struggle to conceive or intelligibly communicate, from the human perspective, the transcendent, timeless and unrestricted knowledge which is the Godhead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laurence Sterne develops his complex approach towards solitude throughout his fictional and non-fictional writings. Ranging between A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy, Bramine's Journal, Letters from Yorick to Eliza, and Sterne's sermons, this article explores how Sterne juxtaposes the pleasures of retirement with more painful loneliness, and the opportunities that each opens up for sometimes challenging self-contemplation. Various locations stimulate Sterne's engagement with this relationship in differing ways: simply, the enjoyable solitude of country retreat contrasts with the superficial busyness of city life; but for Sterne the opportunity to attain greater self-knowledge comes through his interactions with others. Alone, he must construct imaginary forms of sociability, especially with his beloved but absent Eliza, whom he brings into a fictive conversation through his writing. In the process, the quixotism of Sterne's sentimental authorial persona leads not to a performance of feeling, but to an embrace of human frailty and hopefulness alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of the present study was to elaborate on an intervention proposal called "Know yourself" based on the development of intrapersonal intelligence and wisdom in university students, in the areas of "Expression and Corporal Communication" (mention of Physical Education) and "Expression, Communication and Creation of motor manifestations" that are relevant for a degree in Primary Education. The sample consisted of a total of 109 participants (M = 22.46; SD = 2.42), 48 men and 58 women. The participants were organized into two groups: n = 59 belonging to the control group and n = 47 to the experimental group. The research process began with the search and review of the existing bibliography, for both general terms and in the university context, in addition to the collection of the sample. Participants were intentionally assigned to the control and experimental groups. A pre-test was performed with the 3D-WS SCALE that evaluates wisdom (affective, reflective, and cognitive dimensions) through a Likert scale, and the results reflected no differences between groups (p > 0.05) for all variables (three dimensions of 3D-WS SCALE and health care), and for this reason, both groups were assessed on a similar level. At a qualitative level, participants were asked about their perception of the intervention and were interviewed through a semi-structured interview at the end of the intervention. Finally, the possible results and benefits of intervention programs are discussed along the same line of study, compared to the present proposal. All the aforementioned steps of the study were conducted with the main purpose of developing interventions with an adequate focus on and a high level of efficiency in the mastery of intra- and interpersonal wisdom crucial for the personal, academic, and social development of university students. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of solitude, as elaborated by Petrarch in the treatise De vita solitaria, develops on the antagonistic structure of the concepts otium and negotium. These, in turn, contain notions and intellectual approaches found both in Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, which attribute to loneliness a special dynamism by joining it with several other concepts such as: will, freedom and friendship. Each historical stage has a specific approach to the notions of otium and negotium, and in this sense Petrarch's contribution can be considered significant, even if not entirely new, because he attempts a plenary approach to the idea of solitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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I discuss how virtual reality can be used to acquire self-knowledge. Lawlor (Philos Phenomenol Res 79(1):47–75, 2009) and Cassam (Vices of the mind: from the intellectual to the political. OUP, Oxford, 2014) develop inferential accounts of self-knowledge in which one can use imagination to acquire self-knowledge. This is done by actively prompting imaginary scenarios and observing one’s reactions to those scenarios. These reactions are then used as the inferential basis for acquiring self-knowledge. I suggest that the imaginary scenarios can be in principle replaced with scenarios in virtual reality in a way that still provides an inferential basis for self-knowledge. Instead of internal prompting in imagination, I call this external prompting in virtual reality. I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of external prompting. On one hand, external prompting avoids some of the common biases that can intervene with internal prompting in imagination. On the other hand, external prompting comes with some challenges of its own. External prompting might be more time-consuming and might be open to a game-like approach of the agent leading to a different sort of distortion that gets in the way of self-knowledge. I suggest that these are practical challenges, but nevertheless, external prompting seems worthwhile for self-knowledge that is otherwise especially difficult to acquire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Philologia is the property of Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia is the property of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)