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ABSTRACTFocusing on Laos’s engagement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this article examines the role and limits of host-county agency toward foreign-backed infrastructure connectivity cooperation. Based on fieldwork observations, semi-structured interviews, and scholarly literature, this paper finds that Laos’s agency toward the BRI has been mixed and uneven, with both active and passive elements. That is, while Laos actively initiated cooperation with China on the Vientiane-Boten railway and other projects, during the negotiation and implementation phases it was at times passive and acquiescent. While the Lao government has attempted to shape the processes, it is unclear how successful these attempts have been. Although the Lao authorities have pursued pragmatic planning in order to benefit more fully from ventures with China, it is too early to determine actual progress. We argue that such patterns of agency result from internal and external dynamics. Internally, while Lao elites’ performance legitimation has been the main driver motivating the small state’s embrace of the BRI, its capacity to gather feedback, act responsively, and correct its course of cooperation has been limited by its one-party political system and near absence of societal agency. Externally, a lack of alternative infrastructure partner has further constrained Laos’s developmental options. Looking ahead, external partners have an important role to play.