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Cyprus has been divided since 1974 and the many summit negotiations have not brought any success. This paper shows that in the civil society, are growing initiatives, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish, in favour of a rapprochement between the communities. These are already ancient efforts that have been increasing since the beginning of the 2000’s. The obstacles are numerous, drawn up by both sides nationalists, a one-sided and prejudiced history teaching, the influence of the Greek and Turkish governments, family memories, etc. Yet, even if their effect on politics is thin, each of these initiatives, often supported by international or European institutions, NGOs, foreign universities, trade unionists, journalists, feminists and Cypriot historians, leaves some seeds that help to make slowly evolve mentalities.

This paper examines the transformation of the Cypriot conflict through its relocation in the London diaspora. It juxtaposes the newly recomposed and intangible border in the diaspora to the physical one in Cyprus, showing how the two connect and interact. It recalls the historical transformations of the London Cypriot diaspora to explain the appearance of the border between Greek and Turkish Cypriots after the 1974 war and division of Cyprus. It deconstructs the idea of a massive Greek Cypriot refugee influx to the UK and shows how Cypriot refugees who were forced to make a temporary stay permanent, with no prospect of return, transformed and reinvented the diaspora and its power relations. It explores those transformations through the analysis of the political transnational engagements of three Cypriots in the diaspora. This work then shows how this recomposed and intangible border connects with, interacts with and impacts the physical border in Cyprus.

This chapter reviews the impact of Europeanization on the Cyprus conflict. Since 1974, the UN has developed increasingly detailed proposals for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. But throughout the decades of failed negotiations the main parties have essentially stuck to their negotiating positions. In the 1990s, with Cyprus' application for EU membership, the EU became a key external determinant of the evolution of the conflict. Indeed, because of Cyprus' accession process and Turkey's own aspirations to join the Union, the parties to the conflict equate Europeanization with EU-ization. EU-ization in Cyprus has two dimensions: the impact of the EU as a framework on conflict resolution efforts, and the impact of the accession process on the parties in conflict. The latter dimension of Europeanization has had both intended and unintended effects, which in turn are likely to impinge on future developments in the eastern Mediterranean.

With its GDP per capita being high enough and already approaching Western Europe on averages, the Republic of Cyprus appears to be one of the best candidates for European Union (EU) membership and its negotiators are making rapid progress in accession negotiations with Brussels. Yet, the continuing stand-off between the island's Greek- and Cypriot communities raises questions as to the exact status under which Cyprus will soon accede to the EU. The article addresses this problem and outlines what seems most likely to happen with the signing of the accession agreement. Given that the issue might crucially affect the way the European order of the near future will be shaped, the article also discusses the implications Cyprus' accession could possibly have on EU-Turkey relations and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

This article argues that, despite the optimistic expectations of the international community, the accession process of the Republic of Cyprus with the European Union (EU) has so far only contributed to further 'securitization' and 'perpetuation' of the conflict. It is argued that the dangers of EU membership of a divided Cyprus would far outweigh the expected benefits. As a consequence, the paper contends that if the EU wants to make a constructive contribution to the resolution of the Cyprus dispute, it should adopt a new approach-one that foresees the active support of the European countries to the EU membership of a loosely-centralized federal Cyprus. Compared to the traditional sovereign sensitive approaches, the author argues that neither the confederal approach of the Turkish Cypriots nor the tightly-centralized federal approach of the Greek Cypriots could find a niche within the post-modern and post-Westphalian environment of the European Union. Given that the EU is the only institution that could affect the incentive-matrixes of the interested parties in the conflict, the author concludes that a change of mind is required by the EU for a breakthrough to come about.

Since the application of the government of the Republic of Cyprus was accepted by the European Union (EU) and accession negotiations began in March 1998, controversy has surrounded the extent to which the accession process could help or hinder a solution to the longstanding division on the island. The main purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which EU accession and the 'power of attraction' can act as a catalyst for a solution to the Cyprus issue. The main argument is that despite much negative comment surrounding the accession process, portraying it as 'a catalyst for catastrophe' rather than solution, there are many positives to Cyprus' accession which, in the long-term, will be beneficial to all parties involved in the 'Cyprus dispute'-the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. Moreover, it is argued that the EU, in the form of enlargement and eventual membership for Cyprus and Turkey, can provide the necessary incentives and framework (economic, political, security) for a solution to the Cyprus issue.