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The divine command theory holds that morality finds its origin in God or that God is somehow closely connected to morality. Many people across the world hold a related, though different belief that Religious belief is required for proper moral behavior. In this paper, I look at a number of evolutionary and cognitive explanations (supernatural punishment theory, big gods theory, moral dyad, and costly signaling) that purport to explain why people hold beliefs concerning a close connection between God and morality. I assess whether any of these theories provide a reason for epistemic concern.

I discuss whether animism, the worldview that (some) objects, plants and animals are capable of communication, rational reflection and intentional action, is in conflict with contemporary science. I distinguish two conflicts. The first points to conflicting claims regarding the abilities of objects, plants and animals made by scientists and animists (agential vs. non-agential). I argue that the alleged conflict can be diffused by noting that science and animism advance different ways of looking at the world. The second conflict notes discrepancies between how animists treat nature and all therein (with respect and reverence) and how science does (instrumentalized). I argue that this conflict is more difficult, if not impossible, to overcome.

I argue that arguments for the existence of God provide indirect support for the existence of other supernatural beings such as spirits. I defend three arguments: (i) the existence of spirits is more likely if there is a supernatural realm; (ii) an omnibenevolent God makes use of supernatural messengers; (iii) sacred scriptures attest to the existence of spirits. I defend all arguments and defend them against objections.

I argue that deeply ingrained dispositions to do evil do not render moral perfection impossible. I discuss various accounts of moral perfection and the evidence from cognitive (neuro)science that points towards a strong disposition for evil. Afterwards, I discuss three strategies that can allow humans to overcome their evil dispositions. These are: cognitive enhancement, avoiding triggering situations and structural solutions.

In this paper I investigate the epistemic implications of a recent theory of religious cognition that draws on predictive coding. The theory argues that certain experiences are heavily shaped by a subject’s prior (religious) beliefs and thereby makes religious believers prone to detect invisible agents. The theory is an update of older theories of religious cognition but departs from them in crucial ways. I will assess the epistemic implications by reformulating existing arguments based on other (older) theories of religious cognition. Keywords: cognitive science of religion, predictive coding, epistemology of religious belief, reliabilist epistemology, the safety condition for knowledge.