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This article explores how Frances Lamont and Elizabeth Morison’s An Adventure (1913) disrupts temporal and spatial dichotomies through its supposed representations of time travel. An Adventure presents time as a shifting force that aligns with Bergsonian notions of temporality – specifically the concepts of objective and subjective time as defined in Henri Bergson’s Creative Evolution (1911) and “Time and Free Will” (1913). This article also considers how Freudian notions of “condensation” further outline the subjective rendering of time in An Adventure’s surreal journeys back in time to the French Revolution and how the narrative’s subjective presentation of time aligns with Ford Madox Ford’s later theories of literary impressionism, particularly his idea that modernist narratives are composed of “various unordered pictures”. This article ultimately argues that Lamont and Morison’s book benefited from the temporally minded scientific and social climate of the time and used the theoretical groundwork of thinkers like Henri Bergson, Ford Madox Ford and Sigmund Freud as starting points from which they could tell their tale as truth. Specifically, their formal construction of the text as scientific research seeks to consciously obscure the differentiation between fact and fable, effectively positing their nonlinear time slip as truth. If that truth is humored, Lamont and Morison are proposing a more radical conception of time than Bergson – a nonlinear conception of time – a proposition that sits in tension with their use of scientific diction and discourse.

Çalışmamızın konusu ve amacı düşünce dünyasında çalışmalarıyla önemli bir yere sahip olan İbrahim Kalın’ın modernite eleştirilerini ortaya koymak ve bu eleştirileri Bergson’un felsefesiyle yorumlayarak yeniden değerlendirmek ayrıca Kalın ve Bergson’un birbirini tamamlayan benzer düşünceler ortaya koydukları göstermektir. Her iki düşünürün de çalışmalarında modern insanın akıl temelinde yarı tanrısal özne rolüne karşı, modern aklın ötesindeki gerçekliği ve aklı yapan öncesi ve sonu olmayan bir varlığı temel almaları çalışmamıza konu olmalarını sağlamıştır. Kalın’ın hayatın anlamının, ilerlemecilik anlayışı doğrultusunda her şeyin akıl temelinde belirlenmesine karşı bir modernite eleştirisi olarak Tanrı inancını koymasının nedenleri, Bergson’da modern düşüncenin ötesinde bir varoluşu ifade eden sezgi, süre, oluş, şuur ve tekâmül gibi kavramlar üzerinden yorumlanarak, Kalın’ın eleştirilerine farklı bir perspektiften anlamsal olarak katkı sağlanacaktır. Bu bağlamda Kalın’ın merkezinde modern insanın Tanrı’dan bağımsız bir şekilde aklını kullanmaya kalkması ve kendisini dünyanın geri kalanına karşı üstün gören bir varlık olarak düşünmesinin olduğu modernite eleştirilerinin, Bergson’un felsefesi üzerinden yeniden okunması mevcut literatürü zenginleştirmesi açısından önemlidir.

This article analyzes the artwork of two seemingly distant contemporary artists – Toomas Altnurme and Cao Jun – elucidating their creative processes through the theoretical frameworks of Martin Heidegger, Sigmund Freud, and Henri Bergson. In Section 1, I offer reasons for a side-by-side examination of Altnurme’s and Jun’s art. In my discussion of Altnurme’s art in Section 2, I argue that his process exemplifies Heidegger’s view that artists must abnegate themselves in order for their creations to come into being. In Section 3, I elucidate Jun’s painting in its power to decenter the usual, object-oriented, circumspection of the mind. I ground my analyses in Freud’s concept of dream logic. Freud’s work on dreams allows me to approach Jun’s creative process as a work of translation whereby the artist translates the preconscious elements into images that we – the audience – then see on canvas. In Section 4, where I offer a comparative examination of both artists, I rely on Bergson’s articulation of the importance of intuition in order to show that both Altnurme and Jun create artworks that disclose to us the non-objective dimension of life wherein action or process and possibility take precedence over objectively existing things.

Henri Bergson w pracy Materia i pamięć (1896) odróżnił dwa rodzaje pamięci: mózgową i czystą. Pamięć mózgowa należy do ciała i służy reagowaniu na bodźce, w związku z czym preferuje takie wspomnienia, które są najbardziej przydatne życiowo. Pamięć czysta rejestruje wszystko, co się zdarzyło, również wspomnienia bezużyteczne w prawdziwym życiu. Pierwszy rodzaj sytuuje nas po stronie ciała, a więc biologii. Hołubienie wspomnień bezużytecznych jest wyróżnikiem człowieczeństwa i warunkiem duchowości. Te konstatacje Bergsona, spopularyzowane w teorii Gilles’a Deleuze’a, okazują się niezwykle aktualne przy charakteryzowaniu filmowych przedstawień pamięci protetycznej, w których filmowi protagoniści mają wszczepione implanty pamięci lub też ich pamięć ulega eksternalizacji. Twierdzenia Bergsona o tym, że pamięć jest wyróżnikiem człowieczeństwa, że zachodzi związek między pamięcią a ciałem, a wreszcie, że istnieje podział na wspomnienia praktyczne i niepraktyczne, zachowują tu swoją ważność.

When we feel that all beings are interconnected – how can we reconstruct this in philosophical terms, avoiding ideology and scientific-evolutionary or religious big pictures? This text looks at Bergsons notion of intuition and Rentschs notion of negativity and the transcendental conditions of life in order to describe a secular mysticism. Love is a core aspect of this mysticism since love protects singularity (Rentsch), sees potentials of development (Scheler) and can connect us with the world (Bergson).

In in the second half of the 1940s, Jan Patočka emphasized the essentially negative character of human existence. He thus found himself in the neighborhood of Sartre’s existentialism, Heidegger’s philosophy of being, and Hegel’s dialectic, and at the same time in opposition to schools of thought which either completely reject the substantive use of “the nothing,” such as Carnap’s positivism, or relativize it, like Bergson. It is the latter polemic, Patočka’s with Bergson, which is discussed in this article. The concept of negativity in Patočka basically refers to the idea that human existence is defined by a capacity to adopt a distance toward what is pre-given, be it the reality of the physical world or the established habits and rules of a particular society. Negativity qua distance has in Patočka an absolute character. It is this claim that he defends in his critique of Bergson. The article attempts to reconstruct Patočka’s position. I claim that the wager on absolute negativity does not make Patočka a nihilist, but a philosopher of a negative holism, and, in a sense, even a moralist. Above a reconstruction of Patočka’s stance, I spell out some reservations focused especially on the systematic meaning of Patočka’s recourse to negativity. I suggest that negation is an indispensable part of a more complex existential structure Patočka is aiming at. The terms he uses for this structure include “thirst for the absolute,” “thirst for reality,” “restlessness of the heart” and “desire.” To translate these allusions onto a general plan, it is useful to talk about the capacity to establish differences that matter. As general as it seems, this turn of phrase can grasp both Patočka’s emphasis on negativity, and his emphasis on the absolute, the latter – nevertheless – not residing in a distance from being, but in differences established, maintained and abandoned by ourselves within being.

RESUMO Este artigo aborda o fiar como devir nas obras de Judith Scott (1943-2005), artista trissômica, iletrada e inábil para a linguagem verbal. O intento é examinar a índole intuitiva e a temporalidade - a formatividade prioriza o processo ao produto. A temporalidade será abordada a partir da filosofia bergsoniana. Frequentemente, expressões ínsitas são sufocadas pelo conhecimento teórico, por “ideias muito possuídas”, em termos pontyanos. Deduzir aleatoriedade é um equívoco, orientado pela generalidade. Considerando o ineditismo da pesquisa sobre a estadunidense no Brasil, esta reflexão contribui com a diversidade de perspectivas sobre processos de saber artístico e com a consolidação da fortuna crítica, além de proporcionar uma discussão sobre a possibilidade de pensar a arte a partir de uma perspectiva fenomenológica.

Climate change is facing a crisis of representation. Visual culture has a temporal bias towards spectacular violence, instantaneous and explosive, leaving no means with which to document slow-moving disasters in the image-driven world. With its focus directed at disasters of epic proportions, climate change photography would seem to offer compelling imagery that delivers on the conventions that the media require. However, the story of climate change is one of “slow violence”, which is neither spectacular nor immediate but incremental and attritional. The repercussions of climate change’s violence are relatively invisible; postponed for decades they are thought to lie beyond our contemporary life spans and cannot be captured by the camera’s lens. To redress conventional representations of climate change, photography needs to gain an understanding of temporality that can represent the “slow”, not just the “spectacular”. This essay turns to Bergsonian time to read photographs that picture climate change. Henri Bergson’s distinction between two modes of time—mathematical time and pure time—is used to analyse contemporary photographs of the Rhône Glacier in Switzerland. The essay takes the trope of the melting glacier in climate change photography as its visual cue, and moves through three different photographic projects: Corinne Vionnet’s Souvenir d’un glacier (2015–19), Simon Norfolk’s Shroud (2018) and Noémie Goudal’s Cyclope, Glacier du Rhône (2016). In doing so it addresses the issue of temporality, or rather temporalities, through which both photography and climate change can be better understood.

Jewish humour with a rich repertoire of forms is an integral part of Jewish culture. The article summarises the typical features of Jewish humour and presents an outline of its history from its beginning at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, through the times of immigrants to Palestine, from the first Aliyah (1882–1903), until the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, to the humour of modern Israel. The humour of Anna Fein – one of the important representatives of Russian-Israeli literature – is situated at the intersection of traditional Jewish humour, Israeli humour, and the mentality of a repatriate (the writer left Russia for Israel during the so-called Great Aliyah), creating an interesting Russian-Israeli version of Jewish humour. Fein’s humour fits in with the exemplary tone of archetypal Jewish humour. At the same time, referring not to the emotions, but to the recipient’s intellect, together with the assumption that humour must have pragmatic values, understood as the implementation of a utilitarian function, it brings the recipient closer to the postulates of Henri Bergson’s theory of laughter.

Este artigo tem como objetivo investigar a relação entre autismo e memória, tomando como referência as teses do filósofo francês Henri Bergson, em interlocução com o paradigma cognitivista e o campo das neurociências. A partir da perspectiva bergsoniana, defendemos haver no autismo uma dissociação precoce entre memória e ação corporal, levando à dificuldade em usar as experiências passadas para iluminar a situação atual. A memória autista, sem a bússola pragmática, vaga sem função precisa, resultando ora na incapacidade do sujeito em se localizar nos contextos e em sua própria história, ora em prodígios mnêmicos pouco úteis para a autonomia e a vida social. O autismo pode, portanto, ser entendido como transtorno da memória pragmática ou perturbação da atenção à vida, afetando a capacidade dos indivíduos de responder criativamente aos obstáculos do cotidiano.

The study analyzes the philosophical and religious dimensions of the novel Život bez konca (A Life without End, 1956) by the Slovak writer František Švantner (1912–1950). It argues that they are derived from Taoism (as an original source also of its later European adaptations). The study compares Švantner’s imagination with Taoism and further analyzes its intertextuality with A. Schopenhauer, H. Bergson and F. Nietzsche. These philosophical projections are recognized in philosophical metaphors that are the key supporting elements of the cognitive architecture of the novel and support the Taoist perspective. One of the novel’s Taoist principles are invocations of examples of earthly life, which Švantner executes by realistically representing life on the river Hron in early 20th century. In this way his writing paradoxically conforms with the ideological prescriptions of (socialist) realism, even though his inspiration was not marxism, but irrationalist philosophy. This philosophical conflict complicated aesthetic and stylistic assessments of the novel. Their contradictions can be explained by a philosophical (especially the novel’s Taoist dimension) rather than a literary interpretation.

Despite his impeccable academic pedigree, a protégé of Josiah Royce and a friend and student of William James, John Elof Boodin is nearly forgotten today among American philosophers; hence, an essential aspect of his thought lost to history is his contribution to process theology. The leading features of process thought demonstrate Boodin’s connections to this unique theology and show it to have been established early on, as early as 1900 and 1904. This places Boodin’s writing on process philosophy/theology well before Alfred North Whitehead, the putative pioneer in modern process metaphysics, by more than twenty years, and co-extensive with Henri Bergson, who influenced Whitehead. Nevertheless, when Boodin is discussed today, it is usually as an early pragmatist rather than as a process philosopher. The central claim of this essay argues that Boodin is best understood as a pragmatically influenced process theist, one of the first in a modern context. This historiographical revision will permit a better portrayal of process thought by revealing a more nuanced and pluralistic theological landscape beyond the standard Bergsonian/Whiteheadian/Hartshornian triumvirate.

This article reexamines Rabbi Abraham Isaac HaCohen Kook’s (1865–1935) approach to Zionism, by proposing a reading of Kook’s Zionism through the lens of the Lebensphilosophie (The Philosophy of Life) of the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941). I show that we can clarify Kook’s view of freedom, the self and creativity and its essential connection to Zionism, therefore, proposing a new understanding of the meaning that Jewish nationalism assumes in Kook’s thought, thanks to the application of the model of freedom and creativity developed by Bergson to Kook’s writings. Especially for Kook, I show that Jewish nationalism is seen as a means for the Jewish People to return to their true self and through this connection attain true freedom. Only when a nation realizes its freedom by a return to its own original self, it can be creative. This is how I explain the connection that Kook draws between a return to the Land of Israel and the ability of Israel as a people to finally be able to be creative. Finally, I argue that this understanding of nationalism adds a new layer to the essential place that the territory assumes in Kook’s thought. A State of Israel outside its original land can attain the goal of autonomous self-governance but lacks the ability to inspire the reconnection of the nation to its own original self. The Jewish People as a collective cannot connect to their authentic self away from the Land of Israel, consequently, the Land of Israel is the only place in which they can be truly free.

This article analyzes the conceptions of anticipation and invention in the philosophies of Henri Bergson and Gilbert Simondon. In doing so, I analyze the questions how futures are anticipated and what role technologies play in the anticipation and invention of the future. Technologies are increasingly used to predict, prescribe and control behavior. These technologies are based upon the ontological belief that reality is computable and predictable. With Bergson and Simondon, I aim to show that this ontology does not take the temporal structure and the anticipatory faculty of living beings into account. Anticipation is an essential activity of a living being in its milieu. In order to survive, living beings structure their milieu to make their future actions reliable. Images are central to this process. They are constantly evoked by and with practices. They are transformed and used to anticipate and imagine the future. Yet, these images are affectively charged and can be an expression of what Bergson calls “myth-making function” (fonction fabulatrice). While Bergson describes this function as a positive force, one can ask whether this force turns against itself in face of our contemporary climate crisis, digital technologies and the crisis of open democracies. An alternative is to understand and to construct technical objects as essentially open in analogy to the living being. This implies a conception of the human not as a fixed conception, but as an “open adventure” (Simondon 2016: 121)that constantly re-invents itself in relation with nature and technology.

This study examines Louis Cazamian’s considerations on the nature of humour, which were influenced by Bergson’s theory of the comic as a contrast between life and automatism and Bergson’s idea of humour as a specific type of comic linguistic transposition. In this context, the paper draws attention to the critical function of humour in Cazamian’s understanding based on his embracing of Bergson’s conception of laughter as a critique of the automation of life. However, Cazamian’s speculating diverges from Bergson’s thoughts on humour and leads to the creation of an elaborated theory. Cazamian states that humour has an artistic status and attributes characteristics to it that Bergson attributes to works of art. In contrast to Bergson, who emphasises the distinction between art and the comic, Cazamian deems humour’s critical aspect to accord with its artistic status. While humour is attributed artistic status because it suggests the multifaceted or elusive character of reality, humour’s comic character entails ridiculing the inability or unwillingness to respect that reality has a comic character.

El siguiente trabajo tiene por objetivo exponer y problematizar la relación entre las nociones de temporalidad, imagen y libertad en el pensamiento del filósofo francés Henri Bergson, a la luz de la crítica desarrollada por Jean-Paul Sartre. Para ello, en primer lugar, se expone, de modo sintético, dos conceptos que dan forma al pensamiento bergsoniano, a saber, duración e intuición. Con esto, se pone de manifiesto el problema que suscita la definición de imagen entregada por Bergson, debido a que entra en conflicto con la noción de duración. Es por esto que, en segundo lugar, se revisa la crítica desarrollada por Jean-Paul Sartre a las definiciones entregadas por Bergson, advirtiendo que el problema surgido de las definiciones de duración e imagen implican un empirismo y determinismo que supeditan la imagen a la percepción, lo que conduce a una contradicción relativa a la espontaneidad de la conciencia, que en Sartre se muestra como conciencia intrínsecamente libre.

The primary goal of this article is point out certain close parallels between some ideas of the radical feminist theorist Mary Daly and those of the French philosopher Henri Bergson. These similarities are particularly striking regarding distinctions made by both authors between two fundamentally contrasting types of cognitive faculty, of time and temporal experience, and of self and emotion. Daly departs from Bergson inasmuch as she employs these distinctions in her own way. She does not—like Bergson—employ them to depict the result of a natural process of consciousness or life, and the dangers for human freedom and thought of not properly respecting these differences. Rather, she locates these differences within a more liberatory, ethical perspective to ground a sharp, inimical contrast between feminist creative movement on the one hand, and static, fixing, and “fixating” patriarchy, with its “technocratic” pretensions, on the other. My hope is that highlighting the similarities between Daly and Bergson will open new paths of appreciation and critique of Daly’s work.

Is Architecture Today Still an Art? Theoretical Considerations and Ethical Consequences Architecture has been proposing, for many decades now, more and more spectacular buildings. This could lead to believe that architecture has reached the top of its art. But this question requires first to define art in general, and also the authentic art of architecture. For this purpose, we will use a Bergsonian methodology in order to unveil in an unprecedented way the two different natures of art. The first nature, "ephemeral art", will be analyzed as an artistic performance, which is powered by the creative gesture. The second nature, "persistent art", relies on durable productions. Using a multidisciplinary approach, we will create links between the two natures of art and German musicology: "pathogenic" and "logogenic" architectural productions will be presented to validate if architecture respects its own profound nature. We will finally analyze the modern paradigm of occidental "occulocentric" way of creating with its lack of hermeneutic substance and, thus, its important ethical consequences.

Partindo das reflexões a respeito do fenômeno religioso em Henri Bergson, compreendendo-o como uma entonação mística do filosofar, o presente artigo procura confirmar na obra Morte e Vida Severina, a expressão de uma experiência mística orante do autor, João Cabral de Melo Neto, diante do drama dos retirantes do Nordeste Brasileiro.

The article presents a brief overview of the musicological reflections of the composer Olivier Messiaen on the philosophical category of time as interpreted by the French writer and philosopher Henri Bergson. The conceptual relationship between the interpretations of the category of time by the philosopher and the composer is based on the translations of the relevant fragments from „Treatise on the Rhythm, Colour and Ornithology” of Olivier Messiaen.

In this paper, I evaluate the work of two contemporary cosmologists, Julian Barbour and Lee Smolin, through the lens of Henri Bergson’s metaphysics of time. Barbour and Smolin center their cosmological systems on their respective philosophical conceptions of time: for Barbour, time is a human illusion that must be eradicated from cosmology; for Smolin, time must be considered a reality of the universe, a force of change that underlies our everyday observations and which not even the laws of physics can escape. Both systems, however, run into dead ends. Barbour cannot escape dealing with observed movement and change and ultimately restricts them to the human brain, where these phenomena are left unexplained; Smolin posits the need for a meta-law that would account for why temporal phenomena unfold as they do, but fails to provide such a law. As I will show, Bergson’s original take on the problem of time has a lot to offer to both sides of the debate. On Barbour’s side, it provides compelling arguments against the latter’s eradication of time, which, if accepted, would invalidate the philosophical assumptions behind his cosmology; on Smolin’s side, Bergson sidetracks the “meta-law” problem and offers a deeper understanding of time than the one presented by Smolin, putting forth a consistent philosophical theory of time which, as I will show, is missing from the latter’s work. Ultimately, my aim is to illustrate, through Bergson’s work, how, without the aid of philosophy, cosmology is likely to keep running into such dead ends.

Introduction. The research aim is to point to an interesting typological parallel between the notions of second, or passive, contemplation in late Byzantine philosopher Theodore Metochites (1270 –1332) and Henri Bergson’s Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). Methods. The methodological basis of the work is the medieval and modern (Hegel’s) notion of the unity of the philosophical process in the world. Traditional methods of cultural studies and the Geistesgeschichte (also known as ‘intellectual history’) are applied as well. At the same time we single out and confirm the basic opposition in the Byzantine culture between secular philosophy and Hesychasm, on the one hand, and certain convergences between Metochites’ and Bergson’s notions of a passive contemplation. Our sources are not confined with Metochites’ and Bergson’s texts, but include Theodore Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, and, on the Byzantine side, Sophianos’ Letter to Macarius, Metropolitan of Philadelpheia (ca. 1350) as well. Analysis. In the 50th chapter of his 10th Logos On Education Metochites strongly criticized those who flew from the sensible reality, taking no active part in the mundane affairs, without reaching contemplation of the first principles of the Universe. They make just a stupid resignation from activity and get nothing instead, whereas the true contemplation always strives to see these principles. It is not a Hesychast prayer but scientific and philosophic analysis and rumination on the structure of the Universe. It is remarkable that, six centuries and a quarter later, the same strictures against such a kind of resignation reappeared again in the course of Bergson’s polemics against those who could not make a choice between the two types of society, i.e., the closed one and the open one, staying halfway in between. We come to the conclusion that it would be advisable to look for further parallels between Late Byzantine and contemporary philosophy. Results. There are certain typological parallels between the notion of contemplation in Metochites and Bergson, which should make us move further and look for ulterior resemblances between secular philosophy and anthropology of Byzantium and of the contemporary world. In the Appendix we publish the first to fifth chapters of On education in Russian translation performed by us.

W artykule autorka analizuje koncepcję czasu francuskiego filozofa Gastona Bachelarda na podstawie trzech jego dzieł: Intuicja chwili (1932), Dialektyka trwania (1936) oraz Chwila poetycka i chwila metafizyczna (1939), pokazując jej konsekwencje w późniejszych pracach. Bachelard za negatywny punkt odniesienia przyjmuje myśl Henriego Bergsona. Niezgoda na jej fundamentalne założenia pozwala mu wykrystalizować własną teorię – pojęcia trwania i intuicji mają istotne znaczenie w dyskusji dotyczącej natury czasu i sposobów jego poznawania. Bachelard uznaje ontologiczny prymat chwili i pokazuje konsekwencje na poziomie doświadczenia człowieka w codzienności i twórczości myślowej. Teoria czasu stanowi podstawę jego epistemologii historycznej oraz koncepcji poezji. Oparte na dyskontynuacyjnym czasie, akcentują one wartość twórczej nowości i wolności.

The conception of pure poetry acquires a fundamental role in the discourse of French poets towards the end of the 19th century, as an expression of the Rousseauian return to language within the framework of a tension between utility and abstraction characteristic of modernity. This study focuses on the position of Stéphane Mallarmé as a key piece of these discussions that are the center of the modern theory of poetry and clarify some of the disputes of the avant-garde of the 20th century. For this, in the context of French Symbolism and Wagnerism, the Mallarmean concept of “pure notion” is analyzed in the light of the search for an authenticity of language able to recover a naked experience, linking its attempt not only to idealism, but to an experience like the one that will claim the vitalist philosophies almost at the same time.

The paper looks at the idea of grounding human freedom in selfhood, with particular attention to the strategies of “denaturalizing” time, resulting in its separation into different modalities. The perspective of practical philosophy, interested in accounting for and making legitimate the spontaneous first person assumption of being a free agent, is enriched with some historical references to different ontological and anthropological attempts at inscribing verticality or transcendence into the human self in order to secure to this self what is called here inalienable freedom. The paper focuses on some elements of Henri Bergson’s thought and tries to reinterpret them in terms of an example of a modern, anti-reductionist “immunization” of the triad of freedom – self – humanity. It also emphasizes the emancipatory potential and the novelty of Bergson’s conception of the human self.

Este artigo pretende trazer ao público algumas considerações sobre educação e vontade presentes na filosofia de Henri Bergson, sobretudo em seus cursos, conferências e discursos publicados postumamente. Em seu cerne, vigora a ideia de que a vontade corresponde ao aspecto movente da nossa consciência pelo qual aprendemos e pensamos. Nesta via, as dificuldades de aprendizagem implicam a presença de obstáculos frente à vontade, sobre os quais o ato pedagógico deve operar um esforço de remoção para que o movimento do aprender e do pensar possa ser restabelecido. Por fim, depreende-se daí uma pedagogia do movente, cuja tarefa visa desimpedir a livre corrente do pensamento e o impulso da aprendizagem em direção ao desconhecido, ao novo, ao porvir.

Este artigo pretende trazer ao público algumas considerações sobre educação e vontade presentes na filosofia de Henri Bergson, sobretudo em seus cursos, conferências e discursos publicados postumamente. Em seu cerne, vigora a ideia de que a vontade corresponde ao aspecto movente da nossa consciência pelo qual aprendemos e pensamos. Nesta via, as dificuldades de aprendizagem implicam a presença de obstáculos frente à vontade, sobre os quais o ato pedagógico deve operar um esforço de remoção para que o movimento do aprender e do pensar possa ser restabelecido. Por fim, depreende-se daí uma pedagogia do movente, cuja tarefa visa desimpedir a livre corrente do pensamento e o impulso da aprendizagem em direção ao desconhecido, ao novo, ao porvir.

Times of crisis push human beings, a clannish creature, to retreat into closed societies. Anthropologically, this can be explained with concepts such as pseudospeciation, group narcissism, or parochial altruism. Politically, the preference for closed societies results in our modern world in nationalism or imperialism. Henri Bergson’s distinction between static and dynamic religion shows which type of religion promotes such tendencies of closure and which type can facilitate the path toward open society. Bergson rejected nationalism and imperialism and opted for an open patriotism with its special relation to dynamic religion. Dynamic religion relativizes political institutions such as the state and results today in an option for civil society as the proper space where religions can and must contribute to its ethical development. It aligns more easily with a counter-state nationhood than with a state-framed nationalism. Whereas Bergson saw in Christianity the culmination of dynamic religion, a closer look shows that it can be found in all post-Axial religions. Martin Buber, Mohandas Gandhi, Leo Tolstoy, Abul Kalam Azad, and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan exemplify this claim. After World War II, Catholic thinkers such as Jacques Maritain or Robert Schuman by partly following Bergson chose patriotism over nationalism and helped to create the European Union. Today, however, a growing nationalism in Europe forces religious communities to strengthen dynamic religion in their own traditions to contribute to a social culture that helps to overcome nationalist closures. The final part provides a positive example by referring to the fraternal Catholic modernity as it culminates today in Pope Francis’ call for fraternity and his polyhedric model of globalization that connects local identity with universal concerns.

Presente em toda a obra de Samuel Beckett, o cômico torna-se mais radical a cada etapa de sua narrativa. Partindo dos procedimentos paródicos nos textos dos anos 30, o cômico corrói as estruturas do gênero nos romances dos anos 50 e avança, por fim, sobre a própria linguagem por volta dos anos 70. Este artigo estabelece uma relação entre a teoria do riso de Henri Bergson e o romance Molloy (1951). A partir desta análise, podemos perceber como as ideias de Bergson sobre a rigidez (de corpo, de caráter, de linguagem) ajudam a explicar os efeitos metanarrativos do cômico desta segunda fase. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

The dossier explores movement in four different meanings and their implications. This introductory article lays out these topics and places the contributions to the dossier in relation to them. It starts with movement in the most obvious sense – the cinematic. I examine how a few modernist figurative paintings display the primary features of the cinematic without resorting (only) to representing movement. The second meaning of movement comes from the act of perception. According to Henri Bergson, perception is a selection by the perceiving subject and that subject’s memories. The third meaning of movement is affective. This is related to the synaesthetic nature of seeing, and the importance of especially tactility and hearing in it. The last meaning is the result of this: the potential to move us to action in the political domain.El presente dossier explora el movimiento y sus implicaciones en cuatro significados diferentes. Este artículo introductorio sienta las bases de estos temas y pone en contexto las contribuciones del dossier. Comienza con el análisis del movimiento en su sentido más obvio, el cinemático. Examino cómo algunas pinturas figurativas modernistas muestran las características primarias de la cinemática sin recurrir –únicamente– a la representación del movimiento. El segundo significado del movimiento procede del arte de la percepción. Según Henri Bergson, la percepción es una selección producida por el sujeto perceptor y sus recuerdos. El tercer significado del movimiento es afectivo. Está relacionado con la naturaleza sinestésica del ver y, especialmente, con la importancia del sentido del tacto y del oído implícitos en ella. El último significado es el resultado de esto: el potencial de conducirnos hacia la acción en el terreno político.

The influence of process metaphysics on the development of abstraction between 1800 and the second half of the 20th century can best be exemplified with the case of the American Expressionist painter and theoretician Robert Motherwell (1915–1991). Taking as its starting point Motherwell's exposure to the History of Idea of Romanticism, Arthur O. Lovejoy's yearlong seminar at Harvard (1937–38), the artist's affinity with fluid forms through motion brushstrokes in Romanticist painting is analyzed as a preformative stage of his own transitory creations. This is done by structural comparison between Motherwell's written reflections and Romanticist art theory. Motherwell's specific perception through Bergson's and Whitehead's lens of immanence and multiplicity, I argue, resonates Lovejoy's principle of “Romantic Evolutionism,” in its turn from being to becoming, derived from the philosophies of the Spiritualist Maine de Biran and the Idealist–Empiricist George Berkeley.

T.S. Eliot was a prominent poet-critic of the modernist period whose theories have still as much penetrating influence on contemporary thinking as his poetry. Eliot cannot be confined to a single period such as modernism when his affinity with various opposing schools of thinking is considered. The same is true for Gilles Deleuze who, as a unique and idiosyncratic philosopher resists any categorization. We identify postmodern tendencies in the modernism of Eliot in the same way as we identify modernist sensibilities in the poststructuralism of Deleuze. A comparison between Eliot’s views of time, memory and perception and those of Deleuze may bring to light some resemblances. One major element behind these resemblances is their indebtedness to Henri Bergson in the formation of their thought. Eliot’s concepts such as “objective correlative,” “dissociation of sensibility,” and “impersonal voice” echo the Deleuzean concept of art as the producer of “affects and percepts.” Gilles Deleuze is known for his analyses of modernist literature and Eliot, somehow, was not among his focus points. This paper will be a revisiting of T.S. Eliot’s ideas on art and time with Deleuze in mind, to illustrate the common points of the two figures.

La concepción de una poesía pura adquiere un lugar fundamental en el discurso de los poetas franceses hacia finales del siglo XIX, como expresión de un retorno rousseauniano al lenguaje en el marco de una tensión entre utilidad y abstracción propia de la modernidad. Este estudio se centra en la posición de Stéphane Mallarmé como pieza clave de estas discusiones que se hallan en el centro de la teoría moderna de la poesía y esclarecen algunas de las querellas de las vanguardias del siglo XX. Para ello, en el contexto del Simbolismo y el Wagnerismo francés, se analiza el concepto mallarmeano de “noción pura” a la luz de la búsqueda de una autenticidad del lenguaje capaz de recobrar una experiencia desnuda, vinculando su tentativa no ya al idealismo, sino a una experiencia como la que reclamarán, casi en la misma época, las filosofías vitalistas.

La concepción de una poesía pura adquiere un lugar fundamental en el discurso de los poetas franceses hacia finales del siglo XIX, como expresión de un retorno rousseauniano al lenguaje en el marco de una tensión entre utilidad y abstracción propia de la modernidad. Este estudio se centra en la posición de Stéphane Mallarmé como pieza clave de estas discusiones que se hallan en el centro de la teoría moderna de la poesía y esclarecen algunas de las querellas de las vanguardias del siglo XX. Para ello, en el contexto del Simbolismo y el Wagnerismo francés, se analiza el concepto mallarmeano de “noción pura” a la luz de la búsqueda de una autenticidad del lenguaje capaz de recobrar una experiencia desnuda, vinculando su tentativa no ya al idealismo, sino a una experiencia como la que reclamarán, casi en la misma época, las filosofías vitalistas.

La concepción de una poesía pura adquiere un lugar fundamental en el discurso de los poetas franceses hacia finales del siglo XIX, como expresión de un retorno rousseauniano al lenguaje en el marco de una tensión entre utilidad y abstracción propia de la modernidad. Este estudio se centra en la posición de Stéphane Mallarmé como pieza clave de estas discusiones que se hallan en el centro de la teoría moderna de la poesía y esclarecen algunas de las querellas de las vanguardias del siglo XX. Para ello, en el contexto del Simbolismo y el Wagnerismo francés, se analiza el concepto mallarmeano de “noción pura” a la luz de la búsqueda de una autenticidad del lenguaje capaz de recobrar una experiencia desnuda, vinculando su tentativa no ya al idealismo, sino a una experiencia como la que reclamarán, casi en la misma época, las filosofías vitalistas.

La concepción de una poesía pura adquiere un lugar fundamental en el discurso de los poetas franceses hacia finales del siglo XIX, como expresión de un retorno rousseauniano al lenguaje en el marco de una tensión entre utilidad y abstracción propia de la modernidad. Este estudio se centra en la posición de Stéphane Mallarmé como pieza clave de estas discusiones que se hallan en el centro de la teoría moderna de la poesía y esclarecen algunas de las querellas de las vanguardias del siglo XX. Para ello, en el contexto del Simbolismo y el Wagnerismo francés, se analiza el concepto mallarmeano de “noción pura” a la luz de la búsqueda de una autenticidad del lenguaje capaz de recobrar una experiencia desnuda, vinculando su tentativa no ya al idealismo, sino a una experiencia como la que reclamarán, casi en la misma época, las filosofías vitalistas.

La concepción de una poesía pura adquiere un lugar fundamental en el discurso de los poetas franceses hacia finales del siglo XIX, como expresión de un retorno rousseauniano al lenguaje en el marco de una tensión entre utilidad y abstracción propia de la modernidad. Este estudio se centra en la posición de Stéphane Mallarmé como pieza clave de estas discusiones que se hallan en el centro de la teoría moderna de la poesía y esclarecen algunas de las querellas de las vanguardias del siglo XX. Para ello, en el contexto del Simbolismo y el Wagnerismo francés, se analiza el concepto mallarmeano de “noción pura” a la luz de la búsqueda de una autenticidad del lenguaje capaz de recobrar una experiencia desnuda, vinculando su tentativa no ya al idealismo, sino a una experiencia como la que reclamarán, casi en la misma época, las filosofías vitalistas.

This paper analyzes Tancrède de Visan’s early views on Symbolism as they appear in his foreword to the poetry collection Paysages introspectifs (1904). We put a special emphasis on some Bergsonian key notions, such as intuition or élan vital, and the way Visan uses them in order to distinguish the Parnass’ methods from those used by the Symbolists.

This essay takes up the encounter between philosophy and literature through a reconsideration of Walter Benjamin’s remarks from “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” about Henri Bergson’s Matière et mémoire as an attempt “[t]owering above” other ventures into Lebensphilosophie to “lay hold of the ‘true’ experience, as opposed to the kind that manifests itself in the standardized, denatured life of the civilized masses”. Despite his initial affirmation of Bergson’s understanding of experience as connected with tradition, Benjamin criticizes the philosopher’s account for sidestepping “the alienating, blinding experience of the age of large-scale industrialism” in reaction to which, as Benjamin insists, Bergson’s philosophy of memory developed. Yet even as Bergson shuts out the historical import of modernization, according to Benjamin, he also spotlights a “complementary” visual experience “in the form of its spontaneous afterimage”. Benjamin subsequently defines Bergson’s philosophy as “an attempt to specify this afterimage and fix it as a permanent record”, an endeavor that inadvertently “furnishes a clue to the experience which presented itself undistorted to Baudelaire’s eyes, in the figure of his reader”. If the literary critic might be viewed here as weighing in on a long-running antagonism between philosophy and literature, then his assessment is resolute: by praising the self-conscious historicity of Baudelaire’s lyric, Benjamin declares that poetry succeeds where Lebensphilosophie fails. Notably, Baudelaire is not the only figure to upstage “ahistorical” Bergson, since Marcel Proust and Sigmund Freud facilitate this victory. To contextualize the second section of “Motifs”, where Benjamin discusses the novelist’s “immanent critique of Bergson” this essay offers a reading of “On the Image of Proust” as a propadeutic to Benjamin’s privileging of “Baudelaire” over “Bergson” in the first section of “Motifs” to broach the destinies of diminished perception before he turns to Freud in the third section. Drawing upon Freud’s thermodynamic model of a selective and protective perceptual-conscious system from Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Benjamin explains how perception calcifies in adapting to industrialism. Notably, however, his “energetics” does not remain bound by closed-system economic premises insofar as he conceives Baudelaire’s correspondances as an antidote to reification and modernization fatigue. The resulting configuration emerges against the backdrop of a lament about the decline of tradition-infused, long-term experience [Erfahrung] that accompanies the rise of isolated experience [Erlebnis]. In tracking Benjamin’s seemingly melancholic emplotment of the literary image between “Proust” and “Baudelaire”, the essay ultimately focuses on how he amplifies its sociohistorical potential to attest to the dehiscence of tradition as a community-sustaining force.

The turn of the 19th/20th centuries saw a number of philosophers of conscious evolution emerging from different cultural backgrounds. This paper argues that this phenomenon, which has sometimes been seen as a philosophical consequence of Darwin’s evolutionary theory in the life sciences, is more importantly related to the enhanced scope of human subjectivity made possible by technology at this time. Yet technology remains the “unthought within the thought” of its times, an ambiguous presence, derided for its alienating effects and praised for its enhancement of human capacities and comforts. A later generation of thinkers, belonging to the post World War II era renews the thought of conscious evolution, now in engagement with new technologies of a planet spanning scope. This essay considers the ideas of these two generations of thinkers, focusing on Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950) from the earlier generation and Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) from the more recent era, questioning the consequences of contemporary technology in their thoughts, goals and practices. In developing the historical continuity of ideas, it tracks the question of technology from the earlier to the later generation, highlighting the understanding of both its promise and its ills and engaging with it the possibilities of conscious evolution.

Este artículo versa sobre el problema de la técnica en Henri Bergson, particularmente en su libro Las dos fuentes de la moral y de la religión, de 1932. En una primera sección del artículo ofrezco una perspectiva histórica del problema de la técnica en la obra del Bergson maduro, desde su génesis hasta su desarrollo, y de ahí a su posterior culminación, en 1932. En la segunda sección propongo una interpretación del problema como tal. Esta primera sección histórica contiene tres pasos evolutivos. Parte del las consideraciones del autor sobre la inteligencia y sus relaciones con la técnica o capacidad de invención en La evolución creadora, de 1907. Aquí se da cuenta de una noción optimista de la técnica. En un segundo episodio, muestro la subsiguiente visión de Bergson de la técnica como amenaza para la humanidad que se puede encontrar en sus discursos anti-alemanes durante la Primera Guerra Mundial (1914-1918). A continuación, esta investigación pondera el contexto de 1932, año de publicación del ensayó en cuestión. En ese libro, la técnica no sólo va ligada a la amenaza de una guerra técnica sino también a la amenaza de una decadencia espiritual. La segunda sección tiene un propósito doctrinal, exclusivamente en relación a Las dos fuentes. La tesis es que si, como dice el mismo título, la moral y la religión tienen dos fuentes en Bergson, una biológica y otra espiritual, también la técnica tiene dos fuentes. La técnica es una suerte de tercera vía en un ensayo en el que se contrapone biología y espíritu. Las dos fuentes de la técnica dejan de lado la biología. Son, según mi interpretación, la inteligencia y el espíritu. En primer lugar, sostengo que aunque en el ensayo hay una visión negativa de la inteligencia, se puede encontrar otra positiva, según la cual la inteligencia es una de las dos fuentes del espíritu de invención y de la técnica. Además, en segundo lugar, muestro que la segunda fuente de la técnica es el espíritu o alma abierta. La técnica es potencialmente un agente de progreso, como el cristianismo o la democracia. Por último, en este artículo considero la peculiar filosofía del progreso en Bergson y su relación con nuestro problema.

W swym artykule Masłoń argumentuje przeciwko takim interpretacjom Generała (1926) Bustera Keatona, które przedstawiają ten film jako krytykę mechanizacji, a co za tym idzie – dehumanizacji ludzkiego życia w nowoczesnym świecie. Wychodząc od definicji Bergsona, dla którego esencją komedii jest „mechaniczność powlekająca życie”, i uwzględniając romantyczną proweniencję tej definicji (idee organicznego dzieła sztuki, sentymentalnej wewnętrzności itp.), autor stara się pokazać, że wbrew tej tradycji to właśnie „bezduszne” ciało jest przedstawione w filmie jako interesujące oraz że owo ciało, a nie spontaniczna duchowość, jest źródłem autonomii głównego bohatera i jego poetyckiego uroku. Co więcej, jeśli wziąć pod uwagę formę filmu, tylko „mechanicznie” skonstruowany slapstickowy wątek – oparty na pogoni, ukazujący stawanie się Johnny’ego maszyną – można uznać za samowystarczalny, choć zostaje on „zanieczyszczony” przez narzucone mu, rzekomo organiczne, sentymentalne i heroiczne konwencje. W ten sposób (zarówno w treści, jak i formie) film ten nie tylko odnosi się do uroszczeń spontaniczności i sentymentalnej organiczności, lecz także może być uznany za ocenę tej strony walczącej w wojnie secesyjnej, której tożsamość odwołuje się do tego rodzaju wartości.

The main purpose of this paper is to amplify the current theoretical scenario of "Mental Health and Work" area, according to the Henri Bergson's philosophy and his concepts of perception, cognition, duration, psychic life, time and subjectivity. This theoretical-philosophical article aims to shed new light on the relations between philosophy of mind and present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition, with its complex structure of theories, hypotheses and disciplines. There is in this paper a new approach to understand the contemporary cognitive sciences in a kind of phenomenological investigation initiated by Husserl's phenomenology. The methods employed were the systematic review and adaptation of Bergson's concepts, and its naturalization in the actual context of epistemological and ontological principles of cognitive sciences, to phenomenological analysis of "work-mental health" links. The current contributions of the Husserl's Phenomenology were used to understand the relations between mental health and work. There are also references to philosophy applied in contemporary cognitive sciences based on Bergson's theoretic-philosophical proposal.

This article deals with some of the most important notions that constitutes the form of intuition in Henri Bergson's philosophy, in order to proceed to its reconstruction in such a way that makes clear its determination under the form of love as charity, and its expression in the life-man binomial as an origin of the Divine. Identity amongst the notions of Natura naturante and Natura naturata on one side, and of procession and conversion on the other one, is showed as the core which determines the fundamental structure of the binomial above mentioned.

Welche Erwartungen entstehen, wenn eine musikalische Folge unterbrochen wird, und welche Reaktionen stellen sich ein, wenn eine musikalische Folge in unerwarteter Form fortgesetzt wird? Mit solchen Fragen befasst sich die musikpsychologische Expektanzforschung. Ein Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf melodischen Folgen. Dieser Beitrag will einen Eindruck von den Ergebnissen und methodischen Vorgehensweisen in diesem Forschungszweig geben. Besonders gewichtet wurde dabei die Frage, wie der musikpsychologische Begriff der Expektanz sich zur phänomenologischen Bestimmung des Zeiterlebens verhält, die ihrerseits einen Widerhall in musiktheoretischen Systemen gefunden hat. Die Bündelung verschiedener Betrachtungsweisen führt hier zu kritischen Einschätzungen der musikpsychologischen Expektanzforschung, die sich zu einem recht geschlossenen wissenschaftlichen Bereich entwickelt hat. Eine weiter gefasste Kontextualisierung des für sie zentralen Begriffs der ›Erwartung‹ geht mit der Hoffnung einher, dass aus solcher Kritik Anregungen für die zukünftige Forschung resultieren mögen. Which expectancies are generated when a musical sequence is interrupted, and which reactions appear when a musical sequence progresses in an unexpected way? Research on musical expectancy as carried out in the field of music psychology addresses such questions, with a particular focus on melodic sequences. This essay aims to provide insight into the results and methods of this research. Special attention is devoted to the question of the relationship between musical expectancy and the phenomenology of time experience, since the latter has penetrated music-theoretical systems. The synoptical view on the diverse perspectives results in a critical assessment of research on musical expectancy, as this type of research has developed into a rather closed, hermetic field. The broader contextualization of the key notion of ›expectancy‹ involves the hope that such criticism may offer impulses for future research.

The Nature of Time. A Phenomenological Interpretation of the Dispute between Bergson and Einstein - This paper aims to give a phenomenological interpretation of the dispute about the nature of time and the philosophical interpretation of the theory of relativity which took place between Bergson and Einstein after the publication of Durée et simultanéité (1922), a book in which Bergson had condensed his criticism of Einstein’s conception of time. Bergson’s thesis can be radicalized in a phenomenological sense, suggesting a new connection between the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of temporality which goes beyond a psychological interpretation. The counter-intuitive core of Einstein’s theory of relativity gives rise to a phenomenological problem: even though it is a “rigorous” scientific theory, it challenges the principle of intuition which – according to Husserl – is the only one that ensures a rigorous foundation for the sciences. Bergson was the first to provide a philosophical interpretation of this problem, which can be clarified only by the phenomenological method, which also allows for a new, non-contrastive elucidation of the relationship between philosophy and physics.

O objetivo deste artigo é promover uma leitura materialista de algumas das primeiras obras de Louis Lumière, considerando o caráter transicional destes filmes entre a matéria e o cinema. Recorreremos a dois autores que não costumam embasar estudos sobre os primeiros filmes do cinema: Henri Bergson, autor de Matéria e memória, cujo primeiro capítulo retomaremos explícita ou implicitamente durante todo o percurso, e Gilles Deleuze, do qual tomaremos alguns conceitos oriundos dos livros A imagem-movimento e A imagem-tempo. Acreditamos ter encontrado no estatuto de “imagem-perceptual” a inclinação materialista das imagens de Lumière, nas quais identificamos a extensão do universo material enquanto virtualização da matéria.

The article discusses creativity as an ontological principle as it is presented in scientific-philosophical attitudes of a Nobel Prize winner for chemistry Ilya Prigogine and Werner Heisenberg’s pupil and a former director of the Max Planck Institute for Physics Hans-Peter Dürr. These attitudes are assessed in the light of Heideggerian notions of Being, subiectum, ousia and time and thus they themselves shed light on the potentiality of Heideggerian mode of thinking on the conception of the creative in the postmodern society and science. Bergsonian notion of creativity is also invoked. It is presented as a philosophical basis of the postmodern techno-scientific creativity and is discussed in terms of Heideggerian ecstatic temporality. The juxtaposition of the notions presented by Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger provides the clue to compare and assess the science-based attitudes of Prigogine and Dürr. First published online: 13 Dec 2015

Mina Loy’s writing is in every sense an embodiment of movement; indeed, she isolates “stasis” as a critical obstacle to creative freedom and to the very apprehension of real experience. She articulates her position on movement in close dialogue with her readings of philosopher Henri Bergson, who critiques the tendency of the intellect to consider matter as “provisionally final” rather than in a state of flux, a tendency that is enabled by the encroachment of spatial terms upon conscious experience. This essay examines Loy’s ‘Ladies in an Aviary’, a rarely discussed chapter in her unpublished novel The Child and the Parent, and her ‘Feminist Manifesto’—two texts that encapsulate what I contend is a career-long task of emancipating language from space.