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The role of international financial institutions is recognized in the modern world and even today the global world depends on the finances of financial organizations, because they play a major role in the accumulation, availability and distribution of finance, and some international financial organizations help publicly And has become an essential aid component at the modern stage, especially during the Kovid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. International financial organizations are often cited as the world's most powerful agents of economic reform (Halliday and Carruthers, 2007:1135-1202). The role of international financial organizations is also special for Georgia, it can be said for developing countries in general, of course developed countries are not excluded, but access to finance and technical assistance is often needed by poor, transition or developing economies. The role of international financial organizations increased especially after the Second World War, in fact, in 1944, and the Bretton Woods Conference is considered the birthplace of international financial organizations, as there were no such financial organizations before, however, the formation of such organizations Financial condition. We will not discuss the origins of organizations in this topic, but it should be noted that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, established under the Bretton Woods Conference, are still major players in the process of globalization and economic rapprochement with various international or regional financial organizations. At the same time, the International Monetary Fund is constantly introducing new standards in the face of modern challenges and adapting in the face of crises and challenges, assisting in implementation and conducting monetary policy, of course, taking into account the specifics of the country. It should also be noted that the opinion of scientists and experts often does not coincide with the policies of international financial organizations, even the International Monetary Fund in some cases, because local factors are ignored, which will be discussed in the main text, according to some examples. As for the World Bank Group, it mainly accredits countries with various types of loans and often plays an important role in stimulating the economy of a particular country - by financing infrastructure, energy and investment projects. It should be noted that intercity and urban infrastructure in Georgia is mainly financed by international financial organizations, including the construction of highways, municipal infrastructure, drainage systems, sidewalks and municipal transport development (For example, KFW-funded projects are important for the city of Batumi). The Asian Development Bank mainly finances the construction of the Central Highway, etc. Of course, such list is much broader and a matter of separate research, but we understand that it would be difficult for the state to finance such projects only with its own funds, and the already protracted projects would be further extended. Although international financial institutions play an important role in stimulating the economy, criticism often comes from the IMF's monopolistic and linear monetary policy, for example, the crisis of Asia in the 1990s and South Korea, when the IMF imposed its rule on South Korea. The policy developed by the experts, which should have been mainly focused on fighting inflation, which in fact deepened the crisis and led South Korea to default, which affected the entire financial market and particularly harmed private farms - small and medium-sized enterprises. The role of international financial organizations is special for Georgia as well, because the IMF and other international financial organizations play an important role in stimulating the Georgian economy, as most of the loans are directed to infrastructure and budget support loans. The volume of GDP and the level of employment of the population, however, the results of the funded projects will be more effective for the state and the population in the future. Debt management and services remain a challenge when financing international organizations, as the existence of public debt has historically been problematic, and the IMF has repeatedly called on states to maintain adequate levels of debt. However, it should be noted that the IMF at the present stage pursues a policy of relatively open governance and takes into account the characteristics of states in their monetary policy, because in the light of the crises of recent years, the Fund was not open to such governance. t should be said about the practice of Georgia, Georgia does not have a bad practice in terms of debt management, however, the debt volume as of 2021 is within 52% of GDP At the same time, it remains a challenge for Georgia to effectively implement projects financed by international financial organizations on time, because it is difficult to talk about the effectiveness of projects delayed over time. At the same time, it is important for Georgia to receive more loans from such organizations to finance more infrastructure and necessary economic projects.

This paper examines the origins of the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA), a template to facilitate the measurement of a country’s debt sustainability that was introduced in 2002 and further developed in 2003. The template provides a pre-set format for governing the way debt sustainability analyses will be conducted by IMF staff economists. This paper examines how economic knowledge is embedded in the policy template and shows how expertise is shaped to resolve the IMF’s legitimation problems. This paper draws out the role of the public as an indispensable aspect of this process. Previous practice was publicly derided for being unsound and the introduction of the template attempted to make practices comparable across countries. This paper shows that the actual theoretical underpinnings of debt sustainability analysis were less important than how the “public” perceived them. Within the Fund, this “public” was perceived through reference to “the market,” governments as well as an undefined external scrutineer. The paper uses archival material from the Executive Board to show that a significant source of authority that the IMF used to enhance its legitimacy in the public domain arises from the perception of soundness in policy design, in turn relying on a perception of underlying theoretical rigour.

Abstract The first introductory manual of the IMF framework for Sovereign Debt Restructurings (SDRs) is introduced in this article. SDR processes, in which billions of dollars are negotiated, constitute key elements for the healthy recovery of an over-indebted economy. However, there are no academic works that analyze in depth the way in which the Fund organizes them. Based on official documents, this paper aims to bridge this gap by explaining how the components that shape the IMF SDR framework are articulated. To this end, the article analyzes: 1) the framework substantial and procedural rules in order to show it as an abstract normative structure as well as an action procedure applicable to specific cases; 2) the framework evolution, synthetically presenting the discussions that gave rise to its main components and justified its principal changes; 3) the framework latest updates, which modified sensitive areas of the Fund’s surveillance and financing functions. This analytical perspective closes a logical circle that shows the IMF SDR framework in a historical and integral manner and also gives an idealistic insider view to what the Fund is and how it operates.

Agenda 2030 has set up a global partnership revitalized which has facilitating involvement intensive worldwide in support of the implementation of all objectives and targets, bringing together governments, civil society, private sector, United Nations system and other stakeholders and mobilizing all available resources.

This paper has as main objective highlighting the principles underlying the Agenda 2030 of the rationale and motivations of the United Nations to implement it globally, especially bringing to the attention of the international community a new way that this can work in for a global commitment to a different future for people and planet - one that brings humanity on the path of development.

Europe faces challenges reminiscent of Latin American financial crises, namely unsustainable sovereign spreads, banking system distress, sudden stops in capital flows and growth rate collapse. The failure of recent liquidity support to normalize the situation suggests the need to refocus the policy debate on fundamentals: structural reform for growth and, where needed, restructuring to resolve banking crises and the debt overhang. Latin America’s experience yields relevant policy lessons for Europe on all these fronts, tempered only by the slight exception that sharp real devaluation, which was key to spearheading recovery in Latin America, is unfeasible in the eurozone. Struggling eurozone countries are caught between a rock and a hard place, as the currency union imposes strict policy constraints while the reintroduction of national currencies under conditions of crisis would be catastrophic. Nevertheless, contemporary Europe stands a better chance of recovery because, in contrast with the Latin America experience, the European Union possesses greater avenues for international cooperation. With respect to financial support, a resourceful European Central Bank able to avoid chaotic adjustment by brute force is a decisive advantage of Europe relative to Latin America, which only had access to the weaker and less reliable IMF. Arguably, the limited nature of external support strongly contributed to the depth of Latin America’s great collapses. European cooperation can explore and exhaust alternatives to a euro exit to the benefit of all union members and, if dissolution becomes unavoidable, ensure amicable support to ease the transition. The path to success remains uncharted, however, and implementation of the necessary regional mechanisms will require innovation and political will. If the available means of cooperation are not used effectively, crisis countries in Europe may fare worse than those in Latin America.

At the turn of the millennium, social protection became a new priority for both states of the global South and international development policy more generally. As, in the past, social protection policies were considered unsuitable for development countries, the elevation of social protection to the level of a preferred instrument of development marks a fundamental paradigm shift. This shift began in the late 1990s, driven by disenchantment with the results of economic adjustment programmes, the 1997 Asian economic crisis, and a heightened awareness of the negative effects of global poverty. Social protection thus became a preferred instrument of the Millennium Development Goals, while the World Bank promoted social protection as a key component of international poverty reduction strategies (social risk management). The Department for International Development (DfID) in the United Kingdom, along with other organisations, promoted a development model centred on the rights of the poor. Successful social protection programmes developed in the Global South – such as Brazilian and South African social pension schemes and conditional cash transfers (CCT) established in Mexico and Brazil – were adopted as model programmes at the global level. The purpose of this article is to analyse the emergence of social protection in development policies. From this perspective, it examines the various types of programmes promoted by the international community, with a specific focus on CCT. It concludes with an assessment of the relative appropriateness of social protection policies for developing countries.

O objetivo deste artigo é compreender as razões da maior autonomia burocrática do Banco Mundial em relação ao Fundo Monetário Internacional. Acreditamos que as razões desta diferença residem na burocracia com expertise mais diversificada do Banco Mundial em contraste com a burocracia de expertise mais rígida do FMI. Uma burocracia mais diversificada aumenta as possibilidades de formação de coalizões com ONGs em torno de policies de interesses comuns. Essas coalizões aumentam os custos de intervenção dos Estados para alterar ou barrar as policies defendidas pelo corpo burocrático. Assim, quanto maior a diversidade de expertise da burocracia internacional, maior será a possibilidade de formação de coalizões com ONGs em torno de policies de seu interesse e, consequentemente, maior será sua autonomia burocrática. Do ponto de vista teórico, utilizamos a teoria agente-principal para discutir burocracias internacionais. Usamos o método comparativo com base em instrumentos qualitativos de análise e estatística descritiva.The main goal of this article is to understand why the World Bank has reached more bureaucratic autonomy than the International Monetary Fund regardless the fact that both have similar institutional structures. We believe that the reason for such difference is a more diverse expertise of the World Bank compared to the IMF. We claim that a more diverse bureaucracy increases the likelihood of coalition formation with NGOs. Such coalitions aim to support policies that are important for both the bureaucracy and the NGO's. Consequently, they increase the costs for both State intervention and State control over the organization. The higher costs of intervention and control allow bureaucrats to act more freely according to their interests. Hence, our hypothesis is the following: the more diverse the bureaucratic expertise, the more likely is the formation of coalitions between bureaucracy and NGOs, and the greater the costs for State control and intervention. Higher intervention and control costs, in turn, increase bureaucratic autonomy. We use mainly qualitative research methods with some descriptive statistics.

Developing countries were hit hard by the financial and economic crisis, although the impact was somewhat delayed. Every country had different challenges to master. The closer the developing countries are interconnected with the world economy, the crasser the effects. And the incipient recovery that is becoming noticeable is, for the time being, restricted to only a few countries and regions.The crisis was transmitted primarily by trade and financial flows forcing millions back into poverty. Attainment of the Millennium Development Goals is seriously jeopardised in many countries. Many developing countries did not and do not have the resources to stimulate the economy and protect their socially disadvantaged populations to the same extent as the industrialised countries. However, many countries have made considerable efforts to mitigate the effects. Developing countries have also increased their cooperation with one another and are urgently demanding a greater voice in global economic affairs.The industrialised countries are for the most part more concerned with their own problems. Their readiness to provide more extensive aid is limited. They are under pressure from the international institutions to relax their previous dominance in favour of the increasingly strong emerging countries. A shift in power and influence that was already noticeable before the financial crisis is deepening.

This paper investigated the impact of IMF structural adjustment policies (SAPs) on the Philippine economic performance. The study utilized critical analysis approach to evaluate secondary data from government statistics, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), World Bank, IMF and articles from online refereed journals. Analyses were focused on IMF prescribed SAP loan conditionalities pertaining to liberalization, export-oriented economic efficiency, privatization of estate owned assets, reducing government expenditures, and streamlining the bureaucracy. Findings revealed that trade liberalization implemented through stripping off restrictions of more than 900 items and reduction in nominal tariff protection fell short from the onset of global recession. Apparently, aggregate exports contracted instead of expanding while imports disproportionately increased when importers took advantage of the liberalized regime. This resulted to severe erosion of the Philippine industries which were left unable to compete in the open market. Government revenues, generated from the SAP driven privatization policy were redirected for debt servicing rather than being invested on productive programs and projects for economic development. This privatization policy even created local monopolies in the country’s capital market. Reduction in government expenditures through tightening of government budget, cuts in government subsidies and freezing the filling up of government vacant positions, failed to significantly impact on poverty alleviations and underpinned the much needed resources for basic health, education and social services delivery programs. In conclusion, the adherence by the Philippines to IMF loan conditionalities did not significantly benefit the country as manifested by the country’s sluggish economic development. The Philippines should never go back to the IMF loan portfolio, it should find other resources to propel growth and development away from IMF borrowing. Prudently however, it may continue to avail the Fund’s technical assistance program on monetary and international banking expertise without incurring external debt obligations from the Fund.

Romania has ended a high growth cycle. The world economic crisis is worsening with every passing day and Romania increasingly feels the effects of this economic downturn. The sector of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is the most dynamic in the Romanian economy, but it will also be one of the first to be hit by the global financial crisis the ripples of which have reached Romania as well. SMEs are now considered the most sensitive sector and worst affected by the economic climate. The economic crisis has prompted the member states of the European Union, too, to adopt packages of measures to counteract the effect of the crisis. Here below I will exemplify with the cases of Romania, the Italian Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary.

Resumen El discurso de la gobernanza fomenta la producción de modalidades regulativas de alcance global a partir de lógicas diferentes a la del mercado y a la del Estado. Los promotores de los modelos de Cláusulas de Acción Colectiva (CACs) de 2014 señalaron que la matriz política que los diseñó se construyó en buena medida sobre la base de la experiencia de la reforma contractual precedente (2001-2003); ahora bien, también advirtieron de su carácter innovador. Este artículo compara las matrices políticas de las que emergieron las CACs 2003 y 2014 mostrando quiénes participaron en ellas y cómo se articularon. El análisis muestra empíricamente que en ambos procesos se involucraron prácticamente los mismos agentes, aunque a partir de una dinámica de cooperación diferente: los rasgos típicos-ideales de la gobernanza se visualizan más en la segunda que en la primera experiencia. Sin embargo y a contramano de lo que postulan sus promotores, se argumenta que se trata en los dos casos de formas de gobernanza imperfecta que excluyen estratégicamente de los procesos de producción de estas normativas globales a aquellos agentes con potencialidad para disputar el poder a las elites que dominan el mercado de deuda soberana desde la década de los años 1970/1980.