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We study the existence of measure-valued solutions for a class of degenerate elliptic equations with measure data. The notion of solution is natural, since it is obtained by a regularization procedure which also relies on a standard approximation of the datum μ. We provide partial uniqueness results and qualitative properties of the constructed solutions concerning, in particular, the structure of their diffuse part with respect to the harmonic-capacity.

Abstract Realistic models of traffic flow are nonlinear and involve nonlocal effects in balance laws. Flow characteristics of different types of vehicles, such as cars and trucks, need to be described differently. Two alternatives are used here, $$L^p$$ L p -valued Lebesgue measurable density functions and signed Radon measures. The resulting solution spaces are metric spaces that do not have a linear structure, so the usual convenient methods of functional analysis are no longer applicable. Instead ideas from mutational analysis will be used, in particular the method of Euler compactness will be applied to establish the well-posedness of the nonlocal balance laws. This involves the concatenation of solutions of piecewise linear systems on successive time subintervals obtained by freezing the nonlinear nonlocal coefficients to their values at the start of each subinterval. Various compactness criteria lead to a convergent subsequence. Careful estimates of the linear systems are needed to implement this program.

In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly, in which any firm does not know the marginal costs of production of the other player, as a Bayesian game. In our game, the marginal costs depend on two infinite continuous sets of states of the world. We shall study, before the general case, an intermediate case in which only one player, the second one, shows infinitely many types. Then, we shall generalize to the case in which both players show infinitely many types depending on the marginal costs, where the marginal costs are given by the nature and each actual marginal cost is known only by the respective player. We find, in both cases, the general Nash equilibrium.