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The paper analyses the rights of members of closed companies originating from common law - drag along and tag along rights. Since they represent effective instrument of prevention of second agency problem of corporate governance, relating to the conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholder, as well as for resolving conflicts between members that may occur in case of the sale of a company's share, these rights were introduced in civil law countries as well. In recent years, drag along and tag along rights have become more significant in domestic practice, since they are often contracted between members of domestic companies. For this reason, it is important to understand the purpose of these rights and the interests that are protected by them. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explain the concept and purpose of drag along and tag along rights.

ABSTRACT This study aimed to understand which characteristics and listing rules relate with non-migration to the New Market (Novo Mercado) segment in companies that already obey the “one share, one vote” principle. The study sought to understand which governance characteristics, as well as the one share, one vote principle, represent challenges to listing in the New Market. Given the benefits of adhesion to the New Market shown in the literature and the existence of companies in the traditional segment that already meet one of the challenges to migration, namely the use of shares with only voting rights, the relevance of the study lies in showing which other governance characteristics may represent challenges to migration. The study indicates to regulators and markets which governance characteristics may represent challenges to adhesion to higher segments. This understanding may influence strategies for promoting better practices aimed at overcoming resistances to these governance rules. For the literature, the results show characteristics that warrant additional studies as they represent adoption challenges for companies. We chose the companies from the traditional segment that already have only common shares and with propensity score matching we chose comparable companies from the New Market. We observed variables related to the other New Market rules, ownership structure, pyramid structures, shareholder agreements, and the score in a comprehensive corporate governance index. The analyses involved descriptive statistics, differences of means and proportions tests, and logit models. The results show that the free float and minimum tag along rules have a strong relationship with the non-listing in the New Market of companies that already fulfill the one share, one vote rule. In addition, ownership concentration and corporate governance quality are also related to non-listing in the New Market.