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This paper aims to discuss the current criteria for municipal priorities in municipal healthcare services in Norway in light of major theories from political philosophy on social justice, such as John Rawlsʼs theory of justice and utilitarianism. Our first goal is to show that perspectives from political philosophy could prove useful for increasing our understanding of the current priority-setting criteria in municipal healthcare services. Decision-makers in municipalities often have to exercise discretion in their decisions. We argue that the current criteria of health benefit, resource use and severity can introduce some indeterminacy in certain situations where municipalities have to make priorities. This is important, as municipalities are experiencing an increase in demand coupled with a decrease in capacity due to an ageing population, leading to a stronger need for prioritization between services. Our last goal is to provide a heuristic based on Rawlsʼs Original Position that may help to narrow indeterminacy in choice situations. We have included a case of municipal decision-making that focuses on municipal priority-setting in home care services, including assisted living facilities, nursing homes and preventative measures.

The view of happiness that I propose in this article and derive on the basis of Aristotle’s and Henri Bergson’s ideas recommends that we must first understand life as an activity – not as a sum of accumulated experiences and things; nor a set of projects; nor fateful or haphazard events that befall us, but as a formative activity in which we play a key role. Ἐνέργεια or de l’action are at the core of life and it is by getting a hold of this creative core that we stand to live happily (Aristotle) or joyously (Bergson). For both thinkers, the possibility of happiness and joy comes to the fore, to no small extent, as a certain orientation in our thinking, i.e., as φρόνησις and θεωρία, for Aristotle, and as philosophy for Bergson. Our thoughts inform our choices and actions as well as our view of the world, grounding our sense of meaning, purpose, and value of action. It is by reckoning with the ever-unfolding act of life and with our own actions in it (actions which can be vicious, senseless, and unexamined or creative and constitutive of a life well-lived) that we also take hold of the possibility of happiness and joy.

Background: Jeremy Bentham introduced Utilitarianism which is one of the normative ethical theories that imposes procedures that maximize happiness and well-being for all intended individuals. Utilitarianism has been applied to the crisis of global poverty, the ethics of raising animals for food, and social welfare economics. Materials and Methods (2023): In the current paper, we study the concept of Utilitarianism in the Triage system in disasters as an example of a nursing healthcare system. Results: Utilitarianism is a practical framework for the Triage system. Because it represents an important style of thought in modern life. Conclusions: Utilitarianism could be applied in some situations such as pandemics and crises. However, it has some limitations related to the ignorance of the principles of human rights and social justice.

The present study examined the impact of aging on ethical decision-making in simulated critical driving scenarios. 204 participants from North America, grouped into two age groups (18–30 years and 65 years and above), were asked to decide whether their simulated automated vehicle should stay in or change from the current lane in scenarios mimicking the Trolley Problem. Each participant viewed a video clip rendered by the driving simulator at Old Dominion University and pressed the space-bar if they decided to intervene in the control of the simulated automated vehicle in an online experiment. Bayesian hierarchical models were used to analyze participants’ responses, response time, and acceptability of utilitarian ethical decision-making. The results showed significant pedestrian placement, age, and time-to-collision (TTC) effects on participants’ ethical decisions. When pedestrians were in the right lane, participants were more likely to switch lanes, indicating a utilitarian approach prioritizing pedestrian safety. Younger participants were more likely to switch lanes in general compared to older participants. The results imply that older drivers can maintain their ability to respond to ethically fraught scenarios with their tendency to switch lanes more frequently than younger counterparts, even when the tasks interacting with an automated driving system. The current findings may inform the development of decision algorithms for intelligent and connected vehicles by considering potential ethical dilemmas faced by human drivers across different age groups.

ABSTRACT Contemporary theories on animal ethics, particularly utilitarian and deontological accounts, can provide clear answers to questions of how animals should be considered ethically when humans and animals have different interests at stake. However, both accounts are unable to provide solutions in cases where both parties have a similar basic interest at stake; for example in direct, unavoidable conflicts for the same food, land or resources, seen when elephants destroy crops, baboons raid farms etc. By exploring Singer’s utilitarian view and Regan’s deontological accounts in detail, I will demonstrate that these approaches cannot solve conflicts of this kind since both parties are weighted equally. This will serve to highlight the importance of reconceptualising animal ethics in terms of an ethically relevant quality that can be held in degrees, and that an individual can have more or less of.

The measures of obligatory vaccination against COVID-19 disease in Greece, have failed to cater to people, who for serious medical reasons, were prohibited by their private doctors to be vaccinated. This fact, however, leads to their unwilling social seclusion, since they cannot obtain the vaccination certificate that ensures access to all social activities. They are, therefore, faced with the dilemma of consenting to vaccination, disregarding possible health or even fatal consequences, or social exclusion and isolation. This research study aims to discuss this ethical conflict, between what is considered ethical for society in contrast to restriction of personal will and health. It wishes to rediscover the very essence of the commitment to protecting human rights-health and social well-being. This dilemma will be viewed and examined under the scope of core ethical values and principles met in Hippocrates’ oath and the fundamental ethical theory of Utilitarianism. The study will try, drawing from these ethical theories and definitions, to test these questions and conclude on what the indicative ethical choice is. The study wishes to propose suggestions of measures that can be taken to ensure equal operations for all citizens, based on medical ethics and self-disposition principles. It will also propose actions that should be put in the equation, sensitive groups. We feel that a balanced ethical approach that does not accentuate disparities within and among different groups, could ensure health equality, better social resilience, and commitment to effective prospective preparedness.

In this paper, we explore a new perspective on digital humanism, emphasizing the centrality of multi-stakeholder dialogues and a bottom-up approach to surfacing stakeholder values. This approach starkly contrasts with existing frameworks, such as the Vienna Manifesto's top-down digital humanism, which hinges on pre-established first principles. Our approach provides a more flexible, inclusive framework that captures a broader spectrum of ethical considerations, particularly those pertinent to the digital realm. We apply our model to two case studies, comparing the insights generated with those derived from a utilitarian perspective and the Vienna Manifesto's approach. The findings underscore the enhanced effectiveness of our approach in revealing additional, often overlooked stakeholder values, not typically encapsulated by traditional top-down methodologies. Furthermore, this paper positions our digital humanism approach as a powerful tool for framing ethics-by-design, by promoting a narrative that empowers and centralizes stakeholders. As a result, it paves the way for more nuanced, comprehensive ethical considerations in the design and implementation of digital technologies, thereby enriching the existing literature on digital ethics and setting a promising agenda for future research.

The essay contains a radical critique of the total act utilitarianism. The consistent implementation principle of aggregate utility maximization suggests that the best world what we can create (with a given amount of resource R) would be a world with countless rat brains in vats converted into solid pleasure centers.

Despite the lower levels of psychopathy in women than in men, the scientific interest in studying psychopathy in female participants is increasing. Nevertheless, the number of studies investigating psychopathy in women and associated phenomena remains low. The influence of psychopathy in women inmates on experimental tasks of emotional recognition and moral judgment was evaluated, aiming to contribute to this field of research. Utilitarian moral judgment was predicted by psychopathy, specifically by primary and secondary psychopathy, while primary psychopathy predicted a worse performance on the emotional recognition task. There was no significant influence of general intellectual abilities on either task. Contrarily to what was expected, emotional recognition did not prove to be a significant mediator of the relationship between psychopathy and utilitarian moral judgment. These results emphasize that the tendency to utilitarian moral judgment and worse recognition of facial expressions of emotion are associated to higher psychopathy scores in female inmates (especially primary psychopathy), but more studies are necessary to address the role of the emotional component in the process of moral judgment.

The article examines the features of the comic objectification of the aesthetic concept of UGLINESS from the perspective of axiological linguistics. The author applies an algorithm of axiological analysis, which includes the following stages: evaluating the audience’s reaction to relevant comic statements; identifying the ridiculed characteristics of the analyzed concept; analyzing remarks aimed at evaluating these characteristics; studying the linguistic features of concept actualization. As practical material, over 70 stand-up comedy shows and 700 episodes of various sitcoms were used. It is proposed to divide physical flaws into two groups: acquired and congenital. The main ridiculed acquired physical flaws of a person include excess weight, poor memory, and missing / deforming body parts / organs. Common ridiculed congenital physical flaws include non-standard shapes and sizes of human organs, short or tall stature, and speech defects. The main linguistic means of actualizing the concept of UGLINESS include direct designation, euphemisms, comparison, and hyperbole. It has been established that in English-language stand-up comedies and sitcoms, the gender characteristics of the comic object are primarily subjected to ridicule when actualizing the concept of UGLINESS.

A double ambiguity has been charged against Rawls’s difference principle (DP). Is it Maximin, Leximin, or something else? Usually, following A. Sen, scholars identify DP with the so-called Leximin. One argues here that one has to distinguish 1° the Leximin, 2° the Maximin (as rule of justice formally analogous to the maximin rule of decision), represented by the figure in L of the perfectly substitutable goods, and 3° the genuine DP. When the augmentation of inequality benefits the worse off, only Pareto-strong improvements are permitted. Leximin would also permit Pareto-weak improvements too (after the first maximum D), where only the richest improves: from (2, 3) to (2, 5), say. This is forbidden by DP. With two classes, unlike Maximin, DP has no curve of indifference and is always decisive, as Leximin is. For undecisive Rules of Justice, which admit indifferent curves, I propose to add a lexically secondary rule, to break ties. That move is able to clarify the links and the differences between on the one hand Maximin alone, with its typical indifference curves in L, and on the other hand, the DP properly understood and the Leximin, which both have no indifferent curves. With two classes of persons (best off/worse off), DP appears more egalitarian than Leximin, because it's secondary rule is MinIn (Minimization of Inequality). But the intuition behind the distinction is that it cannot possible “fair” that only the best off improves in a productive social cooperation.

The purpose of the study is to interpret the idea of “restoring time”, common to the texts of the Russian writer Vladimir Nabokov and the French intuitionist philosopher Henri Bergson. The concept of “restoration of time” in Vladimir Nabokov’s texts, viewing it through the lens of Henri Bergson’s philosophy is explored. According to Nabokov “time is essentially memory in the process of its unfolding”. Moreover, that memory itself is a dynamic and never-changing process. Therefore, the conventional notion that restoring the past is simply about retrieving previous “moments” does not hold true in Nabokov’s approach. As a result of studying the phenomenon, it is concluded that in Nabokov’s system the restoration of time (the past) should become the restoration of the very movement of our memories, constantly “flowing” to the present. The reconstruction of time (the past) should focus on capturing the very movement of our memories, which continuously flow from the past to the present. Bergson referred to this movement as the basis of “pure memory” phenomenon, understood as the constant pressure of memories on the present and as the essence of “duration”: genuine inner time, that cannot be divided into moments, but rather is an uninterrupted ever-growing stream of our impressions. Thus, the Bergson’s philosophy effectively addresses numerous Nabokovian issues, both peripheral and central.

Indonesia, which is a democratic country, is not necessarily free from the practice of ownership of a handful of groups that influence the course of the National constitution. Oligarchy begins with the fact that extreme material inequality produces extreme political inequality. Although in a democracy, position and access to the political process are interpreted as equal, the enormous wealth in the hands of a small minority creates a significant excess of power in the political sphere for that group. The practice of oligarchic politics in Indonesia has been prominent and widespread since the New Order era. Oligarchy has undermined the philosophical meaning of democracy, which is political power or government run by the people, and for the people. Freedom in the political field certainly does not mean legalizing all means but remains in the corridor as contained in Pancasila as the basic ideology of the Indonesian nation. The good and bad of the law must be measured by the good and bad consequences produced by the application of the law, meaning that legal provisions can be considered good and provide benefits if the consequences resulting from their application are good, maximum happiness, and reduced suffering.

Purpose: This research aims to elucidate the benefits commercial entities strive to accrue by implementing sustainability practices, using a conceptual analysis framework to probe into the anticipated benefits underpinning sustainability adoption. Methodology: The study employs a comprehensive literature review to define and establish a framework for utilitarianism and sustainability, focusing on their relationship and implications within the business context. Results: The research findings indicate that sustainability practices can considerably augment the utilitarian objectives of businesses. Energy efficiency initiatives, for instance, can enhance profitability by curtailing energy costs and simultaneously alleviating environmental impacts. Social responsibility endeavours can amplify brand value, solidifying customer loyalty. Elevated employee satisfaction and engagement can foster heightened productivity and competitiveness. Theoretical contribution: This study contributes to the existing body of literature by critically examining the definitions of critical terms and interrogating the ontological validity of the assumed linkage between sustainability initiatives and the anticipated benefits. It also offers a framework illustrating how businesses might integrate the principles of sustainability and utilitarianism, setting a foundation for further exploration of this theme. Practical implications: The research provides valuable insights for businesses seeking to harmonize their activities with environmental, social, and economic impacts in the pursuit of sustainability, while simultaneously aiming to maximize benefits. It underscores the importance of maintaining a delicate equilibrium between sustainability and utilitarianism, as the incorporation of sustainability principles can assist businesses in achieving their profit and benefit creation objectives, thereby fortifying their prospects for enduring success.

The present study examines the features of the comedic objectification of the concept of USELESSNESS in contemporary English-language comedic discourse. This concept is considered for the first time as the main utilitarian antivalue in comedic discourse, using an axiological approach. The analysis includes recordings and scripts of over 70 stand-up comedy performances, more than 500 episodes of various sitcoms, and 60 episodes of different humorous shows. It is determined that within comedic discourse, the concept of USELESSNESS is a socially-oriented antivalue concept. It is noted that the main satirized socio-cultural characteristics are professional traits. It is established that the manifestation of uselessness in English-language comedic discourse is evaluated negatively either by the author of the work or by its positive characters. The main ridiculed characteristics of the antivalue concept of USELESSNESS include failure to perform necessary actions (inability to perform simple / basic actions and low quality of performed actions) and performance of unnecessary actions (actions that bring no benefit; accompanying actions that cause harm). It is determined that police officers, politicians, doctors, military personnel, lawyers, and teachers are most frequently ridiculed. The main linguistic means for expressing the concept of USELESSNESS include hyperbole, paradox, and antithesis.

The article aims at revising Durkheim’s pejorative assessment of utilitarianhedonistic impulses as the reasons for the differentiation of labor in the consumerism perspective. The author considers Durkheim’s criticism of economism and utilitarianism through his theory of social solidarity as having moral rather than utilitarian foundations and shows the transformation of Durkheim’s concept of solidarism and the idea of division of labor based on it in social practices of the contemporary consumer society. Thus, the concentration of morality in the rules (according to Durkheim) that regulate social behavior proves that the rules and morality of the consumer society are determined by consumerist values and make every individual play the consumer role. The inconsistency of solidarism under consumerism is expressed in the fact that, despite the high degree of social integration which demands that as an organic part of the social we have to ‘sacrifice’ ourselves to this whole, in the consumer society, there is a reverse trend - the dominance of consumer values, attitudes and stereotypes which determine models of social behavior based on selfishness. In the second part of the article, the author considers utilitarian-hedonistic needs multiplied by consumerism as one of the key reasons for the progress and differentiation of labor. Hedonistic intentions manifested in consumer practices should be considered not as mental or psychological (according to Durkheim) but as social facts. The author argues that Durkheim’s concept of social solidarity, which seeks to overcome economism and utilitarianism in the interpretation of the progress of labor, may be of scientific interest as an alternative (moral) approach. However, it ignores the potential of the permanent desire for pleasure in the social-cultural environment of consumerism; therefore, in the consumer society with appropriate morality, this approach loses to the utilitarianeconomic interpretation of the progress of labor. One of Durkheim’s main arguments in the critique of the hedonistic and eudemonistic causality of the progress of labor is that if the differentiation of labor aimed at increasing happiness and pleasure, then this progress would have reached its limits long ago, but the contemporary consumer society proves the opposite.

The essay examines the inconsistence problem of the existence a perfect God and evil in the world. It contains criticism of the traditional view that the concept of God as a morally perfect entity is paradoxical. Essay is demonstrated that such views are based on an extreme form of utilitarianism. It is argued that the idea of God and evil coexisting in the world is not inconsistent if we accept the deontological view in ethics that the general obligation to eliminate suffering wherever it occurs cannot be one’s moral duty. It is proved that the idea of the coexistence of God and evil in the world does not contain a contradiction if we accept the deontological point of view in ethics that the obligation to eliminate suffering wherever it occurs cannot be anyone’s moral duty.

The study deals with the content and transformations of Jeremy Bentham’s theory of sanctions and its role in the development of the contemporary understanding of how moral regulation works. In An Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, Bentham defines sanction as a type of pleasure and pain that gives the binding force to some law or rule and mentions four sanctions: physical, political, popular, or moral, and religious. The popular, or moral, sanction rests on such a motive as ‘the love of reputation’. Unlike the motive of ‘good-will’, ‘the love of reputation’ has some drawbacks that lessen its general efficiency and its contribution to the fulfillment of the principle of utility. Though the development of civilization makes them less dangerous. In the Deontology, two more sanctions were added: sympathetic (the pain generated by the contemplation of the pain suffered by a fellow creature) and retributive (the pain caused to a perpetrator by retaliatory actions of his/her immediate victim). The renewed typology of sanctions is discussed by Bentham in the context of the activity of a moralist, or a deontologist. There are two main interpretations of moral sanctions in the contemporary ethics: ‘the moral sanction as a public condemnation of a perpetrator’ and ‘the moral sanction as a self-condemnation of a perpetrator (his/her feeling of guilt, pricks of conscience)’. Bentham was a major figure in the development of the first interpretation. However, his extended typology contributed to the development of the second. Bentham’s sympathetic sanction in the case of ‘pains of sympathy’ that experienced by a perpetrator and caused him/her by pains of his/her victims is not identical to a guilt-feeling but can work without a public condemnation.

A just or fair distribution of environmental bads and goods is important for solving environmental social dilemmas and is a core idea of environmental justice politics and research. Environmental justice is mostly associated with egalitarianism as the sole justice principle for all people. In contrast, we argue that it is important to uncover and consider heterogeneity in justice concerns to achieve socially accepted solutions to environmental social dilemmas. With noise pollution as an example, we explore citizens’ preferences for justice principles regarding the allocation of politically initiated environmental benefits. In our survey in four European cities, respondents were asked to choose between different outcomes of a program to reduce road traffic noise in line with the following four notions of distributive justice: equal shares, equal outcomes, the greatest benefit for the least advantaged (Rawls), and the greatest benefit for the greatest number (Bentham). We found that most respondents chose Rawls’ principle, a preference that was stable over time but weaker when explicitly introducing the veil of ignorance. The preference for Rawls notwithstanding, we observed substantial heterogeneity in justice preferences. Multinomial logit analyses of survey and geo-referenced data on noise exposure showed that respondents with a higher socio-economic status and lower exposure to traffic noise were more likely to choose Rawls’ principle. Taken together, our study confirms the prominence of Rawls’ principle, demonstrates empirically the heterogeneity of justice preferences, and calls for more direct measurements of such preferences in research on environmental social dilemmas, environmental justice, and beyond.

Xiyou Chen,1,2,* Zhihui Wu,1,2,* Bin Zhan,3 Daoqun Ding,1,2 Xiangyi Zhang1,4 1Department of Psychology, School of Education Science, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China; 2Center for Mind and Brain Science, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China; 3State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, CAS Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, People’s Republic of China; 4Cognition and Human Behavior Key Laboratory of Hunan Province, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China*These authors contributed equally to this workCorrespondence: Daoqun Ding; Xiangyi Zhang, Department of Psychology, School of Education Science, Hunan Normal University, 36 Lushan Road, Changsha, Hunan, 410081, People’s Republic of China, Email psychding@hunnu.edu.cn; xiangyizhang@hunnu.edu.cnPurpose: Although several studies have investigated the association between alexithymia and moral decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas, the evidence remains mixed. The current work investigated this association and how alexithymia affects moral choice in such dilemmas.Methods: The current research used a multinomial model (ie, CNI model) to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms in responses to moral dilemmas.Results: Higher levels of alexithymia were associated with a greater preference for utilitarian judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (Study 1). Furthermore, individuals with high alexithymia showed significantly weaker sensitivity to moral norms than did those with low alexithymia, whereas there were no significant differences in sensitivity to consequences or a general preference for inaction versus action (Study 2).Conclusion: The findings suggest that alexithymia affects moral choice in sacrificial dilemmas by blunting emotional reactions to causing harm, rather than through increased deliberative cost–benefit reasoning or general preference for inaction.Keywords: alexithymia, moral decision-making, deontology, utilitarianism, CNI model

The article explores the idea of people coming together in order to effectively make changes in their communities, countries, and world. The research problem focuses on the issue of how to unify people to more succinctly solve problems together and facilitate change from the individual’s perspective to the universal. The proposed efforts are based on the utilitarian philosophy and refer to John Stuart Mill’s works. Following a theoretical discussion, the article offers three proposals for providing adequate clothing to individuals in need across the levels of analysis.

Sisi Wang,1– 3 Jinghui Song1– 3 1Department of Dermatology, Henan Provincial People’s Hospital, Zhengzhou, Henan, 450003, People’s Republic of China; 2Zhengzhou University People’s Hospital, Zhengzhou, Henan, 450003, People’s Republic of China; 3Henan University People’s Hospital, Zhengzhou, Henan, 450003, People’s Republic of ChinaCorrespondence: Sisi Wang, Department of Dermatology, Henan Provincial People’s Hospital, No. 7 of WeiWu Road, Jinshui District, Zhengzhou, Henan, 450003, People’s Republic of China, Tel +86 0371 6589 7690, Fax +86 0371 65964376, Email wang_ssi@yeah.netBackground: Recently, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) remain a sensitive issue within generally healthy environments. Different countries have developed various principle-based approaches to tackle the ethical issues surrounding STDs. Due to lacking any relevant laws or code of conducts to deal with the ethical issue, it has become a notable ethical problem in China.Objective: Ethical principles involve a sensitive clinical problem, this paper intends to reflect upon and discuss how nurses as moral agents deal with ethical dilemmas within Chinese culture and provided some orientations for further study.Methods: This paper briefly presented the nurses’ ethical dilemma related to the issue of confidentiality and disclosure of STD patients’ information via a case scenario. Based on Chinese cultural tradition, we focused on how to solve this situation as a clinical nurse with ethical principles and philosophical theories. The process of discussion provided eight steps by the Corey et al model to solve the ethical dilemma.Conclusion: The ability to deal with ethical dilemmas is a necessary quality for nurses. On the one hand, nurses should respect patients’ autonomy and contribute positively to the relationship between confidentiality and the nurse-patient therapeutic relationship. On the other hand, nurses should combine with the current situation and make a targeted decision where necessary. Of course, professional code supported by related policies is necessary.Keywords: ethics, sexually transmitted diseases, Chinese culture, utilitarianism, deontology

Lammers and Stapel reported that high power increases deontological (rule-based) moral thinking, and low power increases utilitarian (outcome-based) moral thinking. However, the dilemmas were mild and did not involve harm to life. Here, we examined whether the presence or absence of harm to life affects the moral decisions of powerholders. To help establish the replicability and validity of the effects of power on moral judgments in the absence of harm to life, we first performed an exact replication of a study conducted by Lammers and Stapel, and this experiment was followed up by a similar study in an organizational context in China (Studies 1 and 2). Studies 3 and 4 investigated whether power and the presence/absence of harm to life interacted with preferences for deontological versus utilitarian moral judgments. Power consistently triggered deontological thinking. However, power differences in moral reasoning only emerged when there was no harm to life. Harm prompted deontological responses among control and powerless individuals, which nullified differences across the power conditions. The findings demarcate the generalizability of the association between power and a moral thinking style.

The meaning of justice can be defined according to a juridical, human, theological, ethical, biomedical, or social perspective. It should guarantee the protection of life and health, personal, civil, political, economic, and religious rights, as well as non-discrimination, inclusion, protection, and access to care. In this review, we deal with three theoretical concepts that define justice in all its aspects. (1) The utilitarian theory, which justifies moral statements on the basis of the evaluation of the consequences that an action produces, elaborating a pragmatic model of medical science. (2) The libertarian theory, which considers freedom as the highest political aim, thus absolutizing the rights of the individual; here, the principle of self-determination, with respect to which the principle of permission/consent is the fundamental presupposition, plays a central role in the definition of the person. (3) The iusnaturalist theory, in which man’s moral freedom is identified with the ability to act by choosing what the intellect indicates to him as good; the natural moral law that drives every conscience to do good is therefore realized in respect for the person in the fullness of his rights. In conclusion, different forms and conceptions of justice correspond to different organizations of society and different ways of addressing ethical issues in the biomedical domain.

This article reflects on Karl Marx’s moral thought, and his critical views of (human) rights, Christianity, Kant, and utilitarianism, and what he considers an alternative. The question of whether we should still take his moral approach seriously in today’s context is also briefly addressed towards the end. This is done partly through the lens of American philosopher Vanessa Wills from The George Washington University, United States of America (US). More specifically, Marx’s view of materialism, human nature, morality, and labour are discussed, after which human nature and certain needs are addressed. This is followed by his view of alienation under capitalism, his arguments for communism, and morality as an objective, universal, and historical phenomenon. Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This article implies that we cannot afford to lose our grip (and consensus) on what morality is. By critical discussion and comparison of empirical scientific findings on the emergence and nature of morality across, among others, religious and philosophical traditions, we stand a chance to better understand morality and to cooperate more effectively in tackling and solving global challenges.

IntroductionThis study delves into the ethical dimensions surrounding autonomous vehicles (AVs), with a specific focus on decision-making algorithms. Termed the “Trolley problem,” an ethical quandary arises, necessitating the formulation of moral algorithms grounded in ethical principles. To address this issue, an online survey was conducted with 460 participants in China, comprising 237 females and 223 males, spanning ages 18 to 70.MethodsAdapted from Joshua Greene’s trolley dilemma survey, our study employed Yes/No options to probe participants’ choices and Likert scales to gauge moral acceptance. The primary objective was to assess participants’ inclinations toward four distinct algorithmic strategies—Utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, Egoism, and a Hybrid approach—in scenarios involving AVsResultsOur findings revealed a significant disparity between participants’ preferences in scenarios related to AV design and those focused on purchase decisions. Notably, over half of the respondents expressed reluctance to purchase AVs equipped with an “egoism” algorithm, which prioritizes the car owner’s safety. Intriguingly, the rejection rate for “egoism” was similar to that of “utilitarianism,” which may necessitate self-sacrifice.DiscussionThe hybrid approach, integrating “Utilitarianism” and “Egoism,” garnered the highest endorsement. This highlights the importance of balancing self-sacrifice and harm minimization in AV moral algorithms. The study’s insights are crucial for ethically and practically advancing AV technology in the continually evolving realm of autonomous vehicles.

One of the newest and most influential ethical, political and philosophical theory of the XXI century is “effective altruism”. Its basic ideas firstly appeared in the second half of the XX century in the works of the famous utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer, but the real influence the conception obtained in the second decade of the XXI century. The popularity of the concept is ensured by a combination of a humanistic philosophy, on the one hand, and a concentration on its realistic and effective implementation, on the other. The emergence of the effective altruism is connected with the growing disbalances in the globalizing world. At the turn of the XX and XXI centuries, the quality of people’s lives in the most developed countries reached the highest level in history, while the problems of hunger and child mortality in less developed countries of Africa and Asia remained sharp. Effective altruists wonder how is it possible in the modern world. How, from the point of view of morality, one can explain the existence of easily remedied disasters and injustices on our planet? What needs to be done to solve these problems? One of the main problems identified by representatives of effective altruism is the specificity of moral intuitions inherent both in humankind and in each individual. These intuitions may block the moral intentions toward a person in a distance, while promote them toward people who are close. Effective altruists criticize such situation and try to find a solution. The article observes the main stages of the evolution of the concept of the effective altruism. The philosophical foundations of the concept are explored based on the works of the most famous representative of the movement – Peter Singer. The philosophical critique of effective altruism from both deontological and virtue ethical theories is considered.

P. Singer is called one of the most influential living philosophers in the world, and one of the most controversial. The author of "Animal Liberation", "Practical Ethics", "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" created his own project of preference utilitarianism, in which he placed animals as moral subjects equal to man. In this, he questions Christian anthropocentrism: a human in his system of ethics is intrinsically no better than a chimpanzee or a dog. He recognizes the uniqueness of all species, speaking out against speciesism (discrimination on grounds of species). Singer's ethics is completely independent of religion. Raising issues related to abortion, euthanasia, animal rights, etc., the philosopher inevitably arrived to confrontation with Christian ethics and religious worldview in general. Religion, especially Christianity, plays a significant role in his works, since he considers many of the provisions of Christianity: the special position of humans in the natural world, the attitude to the sanctity of life - to be morally problematic. The article analyzes Peter Singer's critical theses on the Christian religion, including Christian ethics. The second section considers the responses of a number of modern religious thinkers to Singer's criticism of Christianity. In conclusion, the arguments of both sides are analyzed, their strengths and weaknesses are outlined, involving a broader tradition of secular-religious dispute. Conclusions are made about the validity of P. Singer's criticism of religion. Although said criticism is broadly integrated into the works of the philosopher, it is hardly a focus point - rather a tool to solidify Singer's position on practical questions like abortion, euthanasia, animal rights, etc. The negative attitude to religion has roots in Singer's early acquaintance with the Bible and the unhappy past of his family (two of the philosopher's grandparents died in concentration camps). The question of the meaninglessness of suffering largely determines the philosophy and practical ethics of P. Singer. Arguing with theologians, he most often resorts to the classical argument from evil. Singer's criticism of Christian religion is limited, reduced to the problem of the meaninglessness of suffering, the Euthyphron dilemma, criticism of the sanctity of human life, the "dominion" of man over nature. With the exception of a detailed analysis of the bias of Christianity against animals, the criticism is not original.

The review on the monograph by Igor V. Kolosov “History of Legal Consequentialism: Effectiveness of Law” analyzes and evaluates the content of the monograph. The review emphasizes and investigates contribution of the monograph to the modern development of historical and theoretical ideas about effectiveness of legal regulation and law enforcement, as well as the main practical conclusions of the monograph. In the modern period, when confrontation of various kinds of interests is evident, profit and result are the main guidelines in practical activities almost everywhere. Due to this, common legal and human values, including the need to ensure equality and justice, as well as issues of general legal and human values are more relevant and significant than ever. This makes us refer to classical thought, requires adaptation of ideas formed throughout the history of legal thought to modern realities to improve the existing legal order.

Ahlâk felsefesi söz konusu olduğunda akla gelen ilk isimlerden biri Immanuel Kant’tır. Kant’ı ahlak felsefesi için bu kadar önemli kılan husus ise Antik Çağ’dan modern döneme kadar hakimiyetini sürdüren tüm ahlâk öğretilerini reddetmesi ve temelini saf akıldan alan ahlâk yasasının imkânını ortaya koyma çabası olmuştur. Bu bağlamda felsefe tarihi boyunca deneye dayanan tüm ahlâk öğretilerinin karşısına Kant’ın ahlâk felsefesi getirilmiş, Kant’ın ödev ahlâkı çoğunlukla deneyci ahlâk eleştirisi olarak okunmuş ve yorumlanmıştır. Yaygın kanaatin bu yönde oluşmasının en temel sebebi, Kant’ın ahlâk felsefesi ile ilgili yazılarında, temelini deneyden alan tüm ahlâk öğretilerini, ahlâkı kökünden söken ve sarsan ciddi bir tehlike olarak kabul etmesidir. Bu anlamda en açık ifadelere Kant’ın Ahlak Metafiziğinin Temellendirilmesi ve Pratik Aklın Eleştirisi isimli eserlerinde rastlamak mümkündür. Kant Ahlâk Metafiziğinin Temellendirilmesi adlı eserinde temel amacının ahlâk ilkelerinin kaynağını kişiden kişiye, durumdan duruma değişen deneysel ögelerden kurtarıp, evrensel ve mutlak zorunluluk taşıyan ahlâk yasasının imkanını ortaya koymak olduğunu söyler. Pratik Aklın Eleştirisi isimli eserinde ise temelini deneyden alan öğretiler ile ahlâk yasasının kılı kırk yarar biçimde ayrılması gerektiğini belirtir. Bu ifadeler Kant’ın deneyci ahlâkı, dolayısıyla da faydacılığı eleştirdiğini ve ahlâka dair düşüncelerinin faydacı öğretilerden pek çok anlamda farklı olduğunu göstermektedir. Zira faydacılık, ahlâk ilkelerinin temelini deneysel ögeler olarak kabul etmesiyle deneyci ahlâk anlayışları arasında yer almaktadır. Bununla beraber Kant’ın eleştirilerine ve her iki teori arasındaki temel farklılıklara rağmen, özellikle Kant ahlâkında başka insanlara karşı ödevlerimize yapılan vurgu ve başkalarının amaçlarını kendi amaçlarımızmış gibi benimsememizin ahlâkî bir ödev olması gibi bazı noktalar, önde gelen faydacılar tarafından onun ahlâk felsefesinin aslında faydacı olabileceği veya faydacılıkla uzlaştırılabileceği şeklinde anlaşılmıştır. Bu anlayışa göre bir insanın aynı anda hem Kantçı hem de faydacı ahlâk ilkelerini benimsemesi en azından teorik olarak mümkündür. Kantçılık ve faydacılığın uzlaştırılabileceği iddiasının karşısında yaygın bir şekilde kabul edilen görüş ise Kant’ın kesinlikle bir faydacı olamayacağı ve felsefesinin hiçbir şekilde faydacılıkla uzlaştırılamayacağıdır. Biz bu makalede öncelikle Kant’ın temel eserlerinde yer alan deneyci ahlâka yönelik eleştirilerini “ahlâk ilkelerinin kaynağı eleştirisi”, “en yüksek iyi eleştirisi” ve “insanın araçsallaştırılması eleştirisi” şeklinde üç başlık altında ele alacağız. Çalışmamızda elde ettiğimiz bilgilerden hareketle ikincil literatürde yer alan Kant’ın bir faydacı olup olamayacağı tartışmasına, bazı pratik ahlâk problemleri çerçevesinde iki görüşü karşılaştırarak cevap bulmayı amaçlamaktayız.

One influential framework for examining human moral cognition has been a dual process model, in which utilitarian judgment (e.g., infliction of harm for the greater good) is associated with cognitive control processes, while non-utilitarian judgment (e.g., avoiding such harms) is associated with emotional, automatic processes. Another framework of moral cognition, the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, posits that utilitarian choices may reflect either instrumental harm, i.e., inflicting harm on an individual for the greater good; or impartial beneficence, i.e., impartially and altruistically acting for the benefit of the overall welfare. We evaluated preregistered hypotheses (https://osf.io/m425d) derived from these models of moral cognition in a sample of 275 neurologically healthy older adults. Our results suggest that both the dual process and two-dimensional models provided insights regarding utilitarian reasoning, including three cardinal domains of conflict between utilitarianism and common-sense morality: agent-centered permissions, special obligations, and personal rights. One prediction of the dual process-based model was supported by our findings, with higher emotionality associated with decreased endorsement of utilitarian judgments (b = - 0.12, p

The Enlightened Movement in Spain is widely known for its modernizing effort and its economic and social reform projects in Spain in the 18th and 19th centuries. In line with the European Enlightenment, the ideals of classical liberalism and utilitarianism began to spread hand in hand with the enlightened intellectuals as a paradigm towards the well-being of the people. The anthropocentric turn of the Enlightenment brought with it not only the struggle for the rights of man and the consequent evolution of European absolute monarchies towards enlightened despotism, but also the evolution of the very perception of wealth, well-being and happiness of the society. Thanks to the works of Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus or Jeremy Bentham, the roots of the Happiness Economics can be traced back to the 18th century through the association they made between the economic development of society and the level of happiness. This paper analyzes the project of the Royal Sevillian Economic Society of Friends of the Country for the salted meat trade with the province of Buenos Aires as a case study of the connection between economic development, well-being and happiness in the Spanish Enlightenment through the study of the transcripts of sessions collected in the Libro de Actas No. 1 (1775-1780) and the copies of letters collected in the Book of Correspondence of the Society, as well such as the loose papers available in the Municipal Archive of Seville.

How should we think of the preferences of citizens? Whereas self-optimal policy is relatively straightforward to produce, socially optimal policy often requires a more detailed examination. In this paper, we identify an issue that has received far too little attention in welfarist modelling of public policy, which we name the “hidden assumptions” problem. Hidden assumptions can be deceptive because they are not expressed explicitly and the social planner (e.g. a policy maker, a regulator, a legislator) may not give them the critical attention they need. We argue that ethical expertise has a direct role to play in public discourse because it is hard to adopt a position on major issues like public health policy or healthcare prioritisation without making contentious assumptions about population ethics. We then postulate that ethicists are best situated to critically evaluate these hidden assumptions, and can therefore play a vital role in public policy debates.

Despite evidence often showing differences between groups with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and neurotypical controls in moral judgment, the precise nature of these differences has been difficult to establish. At least two reasons for this are (1) that ASD (and its associated characteristics) is difficult to define and (2) that morality, and the inclinations that undergird it, are hard to measure empirically. These challenges have made conclusive associations between ASD and particular patterns of moral judgment hard to come by. Thus, in the current study, participants levels of a traits associated with ASD were assessed by their responses to a questionnaire (i.e., the Iowa Screener) before they made moral judgments across a set of 20 moral dilemmas that independently assess utilitarian and deontological processing. Interestingly, results indicated that increased levels of autistic traits were associated with fewer moral judgments corresponding to either moral theory; that is, higher levels of autistic traits were associated with atypical patterns of moral judgment. In addition, and consistent with some prior methods (e.g., Gaeth et al., 2016), participant scores on the Iowa Screener, as well as their self-identification, were used to categorize participants between two groups (i.e., ASD and Typical) for exploratory purposes. Taken together, this research better informs the relationship between ASD and its associated traits with moral judgment and can inform certain discrepant findings in the field. Implications and ideas for future research are discussed, such as whether traits associated with ASD might relate to alternative moral inclinations, beyond deontology and utilitarianism.

This study aimed to investigate whether consumers’ personal involvement with the COVID-19 pandemic led to hedonic or utilitarian buying motives, and how these buying motives might encourage impulse or planned buying behaviour. Furthermore, it examined whether these influences differed between a developed country (Germany) and a developing country (South Africa). The methodology involved a quantitative, descriptive, cross sectional survey, using a questionnaire based on the literature and sent by e-mail to a quota sample from an online-accessed consumer panel. Useable responses of 548 each from the two countries were analysed, showing that respondents with high levels of involvement with COVID-19 also show high levels of hedonic motivation, whereas utilitarian motivation appeared less important and not linked to a greater involvement with COVID-19. The study also found that a high hedonic motivation is associated with more impulsive shopping, whereas utilitarian motivation is not. The implication is that those with a utilitarian motivation tend towards planned shopping. Finally, the findings show that there appear to be no significant differences between the buying behaviour of consumers in a developing country and a developed country. This study contributed new knowledge about consumer shopping behaviour by examining the interaction of the hedonic/utilitarian construct and the impulsive shopping construct as components of consumer behaviour, research that has not been done before, and especially not in a developing country nor relative to the COVID-19 pandemic.

During the coronavirus pandemic, communities have faced shortages of important healthcare resources such as COVID-19 vaccines, medical staff, ICU beds and ventilators. Public health officials in the U.S. have had to make decisions about two major issues: which infected patients should be treated first (triage), and which people who are at risk of infection should be inoculated first (vaccine distribution). Following Beauchamp and Childress’s principlism, adopted guidelines have tended to value both whole lives (survival to discharge) and life-years (survival for years past discharge). This process of collective moral reasoning has revealed our common commitment to both Kantian and utilitarian principles. For Kant, respecting people’s rights entails that we ought to value whole lives equally. Therefore we ought to allocate resources so as to maximise the number of patients who survive to discharge. By contrast, the principle of utility has us maximise life-years so that people can satisfy more of their considered preferences. Although people are treated impartially in the utilitarian calculus, it does not recognise their equal worth. Subjecting Kantian ethics and utilitarianism to the process of reflective equilibrium lends support to the idea that we need a pluralistic approach that would accommodate our moral intuitions regarding both the equal value of whole lives and the additive value of life-years.

A standard argument for ethical vegetarianism contends that factory farming – the source of nearly all animal products – is morally wrong due to its extreme cruelty, and that it is wrong to buy products produced in an extremely immoral manner. This article defends this argument against objections based on appeal to libertarian political philosophy, the supposed benefit to animals of being raised for food, and nonhuman animals’ supposed lack of rights.

Charles Dickens is often considered a staunch opponent of the doctrine of Utilitarianism upheld by classical authors, a criticism he voiced very strongly in Hard Times, published in 1854. Our article will argue however that when it comes to Utilitarian education, Dickens’s views bear many resemblances to positions upheld by one of the main proponents of utilitarianism at the time, namely John Stuart Mill. We highlight their affinities on the nature of education and the role of feelings, as well as on the quest for happiness associated by the two writers with educational development. We will draw upon our reading of Hard Times, as well as upon the study of Mill’s Autobiography ([1873] 1993) to show how Dickens and Mill develop converging ideas on these questions, considered through the prism of two different literary genres. Through Hard Times and through Mill’s autobiography, the subtle and complex literary construction of an economic, moral and political reflection emerges.

Besides the focus on the various approaches developed until now within animal ethics, perhaps it would be interesting to consider also what ethical theories have ruled out any moral concern for the interests of non-human beings. This article aims to rise some questions about the exclusion of (sentient) animals in the philosophical debates on distributive justice. The introduction briefly provides an overview on the current debate on distributive justice. The author focuses on those theories that adopt welfare as the currency of distribution (so-called “welfare ethics”), underlining how there seem to be a contradiction between the theory of value they rely on and their approach, exclusively focused on humans. The essay analyses the main issues related to the inclusion of animals in welfare ethics, i.e. (a) the alleged incommensurability between human and animal welfare, and (b) the “problematic conclusion”. The paper sketches a hypothesis of research to solve the “inter-species wellbeing comparisons” issue by proposing a model based on species-typical potentialities. Then, it tries to address the problem of demandingness by suggesting a sympathy-based foundation of welfare ethics. The last section singles out the moral issue of laboratory animals as an appropriate field of application for a welfarist approach.

The current acceptance of value orientations by adolescents, changes in acceptance over time, and the connection with changes in social relations are undoubtedly of special interest to researchers, as well as certain segments of society. In this article, the results of the acceptance of the same value orientations at seven points in time, published in the works of different authors starting from 1972 as the first year in which data were available, were compared with the results of their acceptance at the eighth point, i.e., in 2018. The 2018 results were obtained by the author of this article, on a random sample of 832 secondary school students in Belgrade, with the same value orientations as in the previous seven papers: utilitarianism, hedonism, altruism, and activism. The number and type of value orientations are limited by the need to have the same ones throughout the time interval so that comparison is possible. The aim of the paper was: a) to determine the degree of desirability of these value orientations at the time of the research, and b) to determine the desirability changes and possible connection with social changes in the period from 1972 to 2018 (period of 46 years) by comparing the desirability of these value orientations in the same period. The data in previous surveys, before 2018, allowed comparison only in the mean values and calculation of the significance of the differences in them. The results obtained in that way showed the relative stability over time of the hedonic value orientation, a significant increase in the utilitarian value orientation and a significant decrease in the activist and altruistic value orientations. A logical analysis of these changes established their correspondence to the nature and the direction of changes in social relations in that period.

We live in a society that functions with a system of morals that seeks to determine what is right or wrong. Each society is ruled by moral codes that guide people’s action to minimize the risk of sliding into structural dysfunction. To understand the importance of human values within which the society can live and operate in a harmonious state, many great philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and Bentham Jeremy have presented moral theories based on the principles of deontology and utilitarianism, respectively. These two ethical major streams of thought influence ethical decision-making. In utilitarian principles, outcomes justify the means or ways to achieve it and as such the focus is on the consequences of an action, whereas in deontological ethics, obligation to duty is what matters irrespective of the outcome. In medicine, deontology is patient centered, whereas utilitarianism is society centered. Practically, these two moral thoughts seem contradictory but each has its own advantages and disadvantages, which may occasionally intertwine to reach a midpoint level in a critical situation. In a well-resourced setting, the deontology approach to healthcare issues seems more practicable than the utilitarian approach because the duty of care is more focused on the individual and not necessarily on the society. As every rational being thinks of him- or herself as an end, doctors must act in such a way that they treat humanity and their patients always as an end and never simply as a means. The moral worth of a clinician’s action in patients’ management therefore depends exclusively on the moral acceptability of the rule of obligation to duty, that is, “cause no harm” irrespective of the consequences. This article highlights the fundamentals of deontology and utilitarian principles as moral theories in medicine with basic examples.

The stress that the COVID-19 pandemic has placed on health systems internationally has forced difficult decisions concerning the rationing of medical care and has put the bioethical structures that inform those choices under scrutiny. Often, ethical approaches to pandemic circumstances center around utilitarianism, dehumanizing the treatment process and ignoring the plurality of other philosophical doctrines that inform non-Western bioethics, which could be of use in addressing the pandemic. This paper focuses on philosophical Taoism, as developed in the Tao Te Ching and Zhuangzi, in order to suggest an alternative approach to medical care when medical capacity is limited, grounded in the concept of wu-wei, or inaction.

Photo 29553598 / Aristotle © Eleftherios Damianidis | Dreamstime.com INTRODUCTION Bioethics does not have an explicitly stated and agreed upon means of resolving conflicts between normative theories. As such, bioethics lacks an essential feature – action guidance ― an effective translation from theory to practice. While the normative approaches and historical precedents of bioethics may discourage overtly egregious acts, the bioethical discipline does not offer decisive guidance in situations with multiple competing normative approaches. For example, Utilitarians and Kantians offer diametrically opposed guidance in emblematic cases like the trolley problem in which saving a greater number of people conflicts with the imperative to treat persons as ends-in-themselves rather than a means to an end. The predominant framework in bioethics, principlism, also suffers from a lack of action guidance.[1] The consequences of a ‘toothless’ bioethics impeded by misaligned principles and conflicting normative theories are disastrous – not only in death count but also in moral injury and societal fracture. This paper argues that while there is no ‘one theory to rule them all,’ a virtue-based approach to bioethics can ameliorate the adjudication problem. Bioethics ought to embody moral strength but has often provided indecisive guidance due to its awkward theoretical architecture. In defence of bioethics, many actors control societal level decision making. Thus, the onus does not rest entirely on bioethicists but also leaders in government and healthcare. This paper critiques principlism as internally incongruous, as it is composed of elements from multiple ethical theories. Understanding this, it is seen that the entirety of theoretical bioethics, as composed of conflicting normative approaches, also suffers from this action-guidance problem.[2] l. The Birth of Bioethics Amid Tragedy Bioethics was born out of tragedy. During the Nuremberg Trials of 1946-47, a cohort of French, American, British, and Soviet judges forced the Nazi doctors and architects of the Holocaust to stand trial for their egregious actions and feel the firm hand of justice. In an example of ex post facto law, the global community identified unethical action and indicted Germans for breaking natural law.[3] As a result, the Nuremberg Code arose to prevent crimes against human research subjects. It outlines the parameters of ethical research and is a foundational document of modern bioethics.[4] Early bioethics pronounced immorality and offered decisive guidance, laying the groundwork for an internationally unified theory of negative morality – that which is never permissible. Tuskegee was another foundational tragedy in the history of bioethical discipline. In 1932, the US Public Health Service recruited six hundred African American men from Macon County, Alabama for a study on the effects of untreated syphilis.[5] The researchers failed to obtain informed consent and intentionally withheld information regarding the disease or the nature of the study. The researchers did not offer any men the cure, penicillin, which was discovered midway through the experiment. Many men died during the study. The perpetrators evaded justice until 1972. Tuskegee sparked a new paradigm of bioethics, including the US federal policies, the establishment of ethics review boards, and informed consent as a core tenet of biomedical practice.[6] The National Research Act of 1974 and the Belmont Report of 1978 laid new ground for research ethics and set the tone for the contemporary practice of bioethics. ll. The Rise of Principlism These two cases demonstrate the nature of the early days of bioethics. It largely lacked high-level theory and appealed more to generally agreed upon moral facts and common-sense morality. However, as medicine advanced, increasingly complex biomedical issues created problems that required greater appeals to theory.[7] The “heroic” phase of bioethics saw “theorists aspire to construct symmetrical cathedrals of normative thought.”[8] In the wake of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress helped draft the Belmont Report, a bulwark intended to prevent future atrocities in human research trials. The document aimed to curtail the utilitarianism implicit in medical research and add essential considerations of the subjects themselves, including respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.[9] It also served as the bedrock of the theoretical architecture of principlism. In 1979, Beauchamp and Childress’ published Principles of Biomedical Ethics, which is arguably the most influential text in bioethics scholarship. It attempts to incorporate some main theoretical approaches to ethics in a unified moral theory: autonomy reflects the work of Kant; beneficence aligns with utilitarianism; non-maleficence is reminiscent of Hippocrates; and justice borrows heavily from Rawls.[10] These four principles have become canonical in academic bioethics. However, doubts remain as to their effectiveness in guiding action toward ethical aims given how scholars contend that “ethical expertise cannot be codified in principles.”[11] lll. A Critique of Principlism Clouser & Gert say: At best, ‘principles’ operate primarily as checklists naming issues worth remembering when considering a biomedical moral issue. At worst ‘principles’ obscure and confuse moral reasoning by their failure to be guidelines and by their eclectic and unsystematic use of moral theory.[12] To this point, principlism is no more than a flashlight – a tool to illuminate the ethical landscape. Viewing cases through the lens of moral principles can reveal the salient moral features, but it ultimately provides no guidance for adjudication, hereby referred to as the adjudication problem. Consequently, the doctor’s moral intuition has de facto weight, and the principles are merely a post hoc justification for any given action they choose. Using the four principles to decide the right course of moral action is “tantamount to using two, three, or four conflicting moral theories to decide a case.”[13] Principlism attempts to reap the benefit of multiple ethical theories, each with unambiguous goals. When blended, the result is discordant directives. These conflicting principles “provide no systematic guidance” for real world dilemmas.[14] Other ethical theories have faults too. Kantians leave no room for exceptions for exigency, and utilitarianism ‘crosses the line’ far too often. At least these theories decisively guide action and provide unambiguous justification for doing so. Utilitarianism is quite measurable: “Provide the greatest good for the greatest number” – sure! Done. Kant’s ethical imperative has a clear rule: “Never treat humans as a mere means to an end” – certainly, will do. Principlism merely provides “a check list of considerations” that doctors can cross off one by one before going about their originally intended course of action.[15] Worse, the internally disharmonious nature of principlism allows doctors to justify ethically dubious decisions. An important goal of bioethics is avoiding the following scenario: a doctor faces with a moral dilemma. He can choose Option A or Option B. Let’s say B is morally preferrable on a consensus view. However, his moral intuition guides him toward Option A. Having completed his required course on biomedical ethics in medical school, he recalls a few theories which are relevant to his case. He considers the four principles but autonomy conflicts with beneficence, which does not yield a straightforward, practical directive, so he disregards principlism for the case at hand. Kantian ethics disagrees with his intuition, but utilitarianism may support it. He goes ahead with Option A, claiming utilitarianism supported his actions. He, therefore, provides post hoc justification for Option A, using whichever theory agrees with his judgment. Reliance on intuition when the principles conflict is an intractable problem “unless one is willing to grant privileged epistemological status to the moral judgments (calling them "intuitions") or to the moral principles (calling them "self-evident" or otherwise a priori”).[16] Neither deserves a privileged epistemological status. Moral intuitions can possess prejudice or ignorance, and moral principles can demonstrably conflict, offering no guidance. Realistically, most people “pay little attention to theories when they make moral decisions,” and when they do, post hoc rationalization often follows. When discipline is used as an afterthought, it provides justifications for potentially unethical actions. lV. Virtue Ethics: A Provisional Solution Virtue ethics may provide a workaround. It emphasizes the disposition and character of the moral agent instead of abstract theories, making it a practical choice. As Jacobson writes, “ethical dictates cannot be codified in general rules applicable to particular situations by someone who lacks virtue.”[17] Ethical theories can still highlight moral lapses and dilemmas, but since they do not decisively guide action, bioethics must focus on moral agents’ decision-making abilities. Aristotelian virtue as a provisional solution to the adjudication problem also accounts for the “multiple and heterogeneous” particularities which other theories often neglect.[18] Aristotle said that "phronesis [practical wisdom] deals with the ultimate particular and this is done by perception (aisthesis) rather than science (episteme).”[19] Scientific knowledge in the case of bioethics may appropriately refer to medical facts. Perception refers to the moral intuition of an individual agent as applied to a given scenario. Jonsen goes further, however, interpreting this perception as “the appreciative sight of a constellation of ideas, arguments, and facts about the case, seen as a whole.”[20] Phronesis, or practical wisdom, is the cardinal virtue of Aristotelian virtue ethics. It enables the agent to consider the relevant facts and act in the most prudent, courageous, or tempered manner. This paper proposes that in the face of intractable theoretical disagreements, the only way forward for bioethics is to educate bioethics practitioners and students in this tradition. V. Counterargument So far, this paper has argued that bioethics is relatively toothless and needs to give clear guidance due to theoretical disagreements and the intractable differences between normative approaches. And yet, some may object to the notion that bioethics ought to have these proverbial teeth. In this view, bioethics merely acts as a sounding board for those in executive roles (doctors, lawyers, politicians) to better understand the moral landscape of the problem. To them, bioethics’ failure to decisively guide action is acceptable because it should not. If this is the case, then bioethics need not speak with one voice and should cherish the long-standing, obstinate disagreements between different theoretical camps. But this paper contends the opposite. If bioethics continues to offer conflicting imperatives and fails to demonstrably guide individuals, hospitals, and society toward clear ethical aims and outcomes, it has failed as a discipline. One might argue that virtue theory is not an ideal framework to replace principlism because individuals approach ethical problems in many ways based on features of their character and background. Injecting one’s character into moral decisions can lead to bias. As Carl Elliot writes, “how a moral problem is described will turn on an array of variables: the role and degree of involvement in the case of the person who is describing it, the person’s particular profession or discipline, her religious and cultural inheritance-indeed, with all of the intangibles that have contributed to her character.”[21] Self-awareness may counteract personal biases in moral decision making. Vl. Limitation Virtue ethics is only a provisional solution to the adjudication problem for two reasons. One, not everyone is inherently virtuous, and two, theoretical differences may be resolved. If deontology and consequentialism can be incorporated into a unified theory for bioethics, then virtue ethics may not be necessary. On a certain view, it would be ideal for ethics to be computational – plug in the relevant variables and receive the morally correct answer. Arguably, principlism was an attempt at such a matrix, but it ultimately failed as a unified theory. Rather than waiting for a perfect unified theory, we must count on the genuine virtue of the moral agents who make ethically important decisions from policy to bedside. If practical wisdom is not a characteristic of these agents, then their decisions will not be as ethical as they ought to be, and no theory is the panacea to such a problem. CONCLUSION Bioethics emerged out of unified responses to clear cases of moral depravity, like the Holocaust and Tuskegee, and perhaps bioethics is most appropriate for such cases which are conducive to moral certitude. At minimum, bioethics offers meaningful guidance in cases where the relevant duties align with beneficent consequences. For example, in both the Nuremberg and Tuskegee cases, abrogating fundamental duties to humanity led to grievous consequences. The principles developed in the wake of such problems led to a conflict between autonomy and beneficence, which perhaps mirror the conflict between Kantian deontology and utilitarianism. Bioethics excels when deontology and utilitarianism are aligned, but most of the time, they are not. In such instances, virtue is needed to adjudicate conflicting normative approaches and resolve theoretical tensions with practical wisdom and courage. - [1] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). A Critique of Principlism, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Volume 15, Issue 2, April 1990, Pages 219–236, https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/15.2.219 [2] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). [3] Annas, G. J. (2010). The legacy of the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial to American bioethics and human rights. In Medicine After the Holocaust (pp. 93-105). Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol10/iss1/4 [4] Annas, G. J. (2010). The legacy of the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial to American bioethics and human rights. In Medicine After the Holocaust (pp. 93-105). Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol10/iss1/4 [5] Barrett, L. A. (2019). Tuskegee Syphilis Study of 1932-1973 and the Rise of Bioethics as Shown through Government Documents and Actions. DttP, 47, 11. https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/dttp47&div=36&id=&page= [6] Barrett, L. A. (2019). [7] Annas, G. J. (2010). [8] Annas, G. J. (2010). [9] Adashi, E. Y., Walters, L. B., & Menikoff, J. A. (2018). The Belmont Report at 40: reckoning with time. American Journal of Public Health, 108(10), 1345-1348. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304580 [10] Beauchamp, T. L., & Childress, J. F. (2001). Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Oxford University Press, USA. [11] Jacobson, D. (2005). Seeing by feeling: virtues, skills, and moral perception. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 8(4), 387-409. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-8837-1 [12] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). [13] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). [14] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). [15] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). [16] Daniels, N. (1979). Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics. The Journal of Philosophy, 76(5), 256-282. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025881 [17] Jacobson, D. (2005). [18] Jonsen, A. R. (1991). Of balloons and bicycles—or—the relationship between ethical theory and practical judgment. Hastings Center Report, 21(5), 14-16. https://doi.org/10.2307/3562885 [19] Jonsen, A. R. (1991), p. 15. [20] Jonsen, A. R. (1991), p. 15. [21] Elliott, C. (1992). Where ethics comes from and what to do about it. Hastings Center Report, 22(4), 28-35. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.2307/3563021

Abstract The paper represents an empirical study of public attitudes towards moral bioenhancement. Moral bioenhancement implies the improvement of moral dispositions, i.e. an increase in the moral value of the actions or character of a moral agent. The views of bioethicists and scientists on this topic are present in the ongoing debate, but not the view of the public in general. In order to bridge the gap between the philosophical debate and the view of the public, we have examined attitudes towards moral bioenhancement. The participants were people from Serbia older than 15, who voluntarily completed an online questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of a brief introduction to moral bioenhancement, seven general questions, 25 statements about participants’ attitudes towards moral bioenhancement, and five examples of moral dilemmas. The questionnaire also included questions which were used to reveal their preference of either deontology, or utilitarianism. Participants were asked to what degree they agree or disagree with the statements. The results showed that the means used to achieve moral enhancement, the level of education, and preference for deontology or utilitarianism do have an impact on public attitudes. Using exploratory factor analysis, we isolated four factors that appear to drive the respondents' attitudes toward moral bioenhancement, we named: general—closeness, fear of change, security, and voluntariness. Each factor in relationship to other variables offers new insights that can inform policies and give us a deeper understanding of the public attitudes. We argue that looking into different facets of attitudes towards moral bioenhancement improves the debate, and expands it.

The paper discusses the problem of triaging the elderly in the period of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis by analyzing the triage process, caused by lack of resources, in Germany, Holland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. We apply inductive, deductive, and normative bioethical methods, comment on various recommendations for the indication of intensive care during a crisis, and discuss the utilitarianism of benefit maximization. As it follows from the evaluation of the elderly by the frailty parameter, medically inappropriate treatment, as a result of limited resources, is characterized by clinical and bioethical uncertainty. If the main bioethical objective of general bioethics for the COVID-19 pandemic is, in the case of limited resources, based on the non-utilitarian consequentialism paradigm, from the perspective of medical ethics, we face a borderline situation closely related to the topic of dying and death. Such a situation requires social, ethical, and professional reflection. An algorithm for intensive care indication in the situation of crisis and limited resources in the period of the pandemic requires a definition of criteria that identify an acceptable reason for abandoning the treatment in the context of the autonomy of the elderly and by respecting their human dignity and humanity. A global objective of general bioethics in the situation of the pandemic crisis should be based on the paradigm of social justice.

Utilitarianism has been able to respond to many of the objections raised against it by undertaking a major revision of its theory. Basically, this consisted of recognising that its early normative propositions were only viable for agents very different from flesh-and-blood humans. They then deduced that, given human limitations, it was most useful for everyone if moral agents did not behave as utilitarians and habitually followed certain rules. Important recent advances in neurotechnology suggest that some of these human limitations can be overcome. In this article, after presenting some possible neuro-enhancements, we seek to answer the questions, first, of whether they should be accepted by a utilitarian ethic and, second, if accepted, to what extent they would invalidate the revision that allowed them to escape the objections.

For half a century, the problem of justice has been one of the most controversial and debated in Western academic science. For the Anglo-American tradition, the starting point for controversy about distributive justice can be considered 1971, when the philosopher John Rawls published work The Theory of Justice. This book made a revolution, on the one hand, provoking a large-scale discussion on the question of what fair principles should be used in our society, and, on the other hand, finally brought deontological ethics to the leading positions in political philosophy, which replaced the utilitarian approach. Several decades after the publication of Rawls's work, the debate within the framework of the deontological approach to justice reached a kind of dead end, having failed to develop a universal position. Other areas of thought have become the most discussed topics in political philosophy. At the same time, the discussion within the framework of the problem of distributive justice remained extremely relevant, since directly related to the distribution of public goods, which is always one of the main problems of political choice. One of those who suggested a way out of the current impasse was the philosopher Amartya Sen, who proposed an original concept for solving, called “the capability approach”. The purpose of this article is to illustrate how Sen was able to overcome the difficulties faced by Rawls's theory and other new theories of social contract. The author of the article believes that Sen, in fact, returned to a kind of utilitarian ethics, in the controversy with which Rawls developed his deontological version of the theory of justice. The article attempts to substantiate that the capability approach is a kind of synthesis of deontological ethics and utilitarianism. The article examines utilitarian ethics, its criticism from Rawls and the solution that Rawls proposes in the framework of the deontological approach, examines the main differences between new theories of social contract and Sen's the capability approach. The article analyzes Sen's criticism of the theory of Rawls and his followers and Sen's solution to the problem of justice. Particular emphasis is placed on the comparison of deontological and utilitarian views on the problem of justice. At the end of the work, it is concluded that the deontological ethical position on the issue of justice, which has firmly taken the leading positions in the Anglo-American academic community since the 1970s. XX century at the turn of the century could not remain monolithic and faced serious criticism. Utilitarianism, so heavily criticized by Rawls, is back in a new iteration of Sen's the capability approach.

Heumer and I debate animal rights, utilitarianism, libertarianism, morality and philosophy. We agree that suffering is a problem, and diverge, widely, on how to deal with it. I maintain that this author’s reputation as a libertarian, let alone an intellectual leader of this movement, is problematic. Why? That is because libertarianism, properly understood, is a theory of intra-human rights; this philosophy says nothing about right from an extra-human perspective, Heumer to the contrary notwithstanding. That is to say, he is improperly importing into the freedom philosophy considerations extraneous to it.

Objective The current study attempts to adopt more comprehensive and rigorous methods to deconstruct and confirm the association between guilt and moral dilemma judgements, with the expectation of providing new insights for related research. Methods A total of 170 college participants were employed in separate batches for the experiment, including 53 males and 117 females, ranging from 17 to 28 years old (M = 20.88, SD = 2.29). We first induced guilt in the subjects using recalling and writing tasks and then asked the participants to complete the moral dilemma judgement tasks. Results Results of the analysis using traditional methods showed no association between induced guilt and moral dilemma judgements. However, the results of the process dissociation analysis indicated that induced guilt is related to higher deontological inclination. Moreover, the CNI model analysis revealed that induced guilt has a stronger sensitivity to moral norms. Conclusion Induced guilt was associated with a stronger sensitivity to moral norms, which is reflected in less violation and more compliance with moral norms. There was no direct relation between induced guilt and the sensitivity to consequences and a general preference for action in moral decision-making.

Contemporary mainstream economics cannot be seen as disconnected from philosophical concerns. On the contrary, it should be understood as a defence for a specific philosophy, namely, crude quantitative hedonism where money would measure pleasure and pain. Disguised among a great mathematical apparatus involving utility functions, supply, and demand, lies a specific hedonist philosophy that every year is lectured to thousands of economic and business students around the world. This hedonist philosophy is much less sophisticated than that in ancient hedonist philosophers as Epicurus or Lucretius. Furthermore, it does not solve any of the systematic difficulties regularly faced by hedonist philosophy. However, the argument that economics is detached from philosophy works as a rhetorical artifice to protect its dominant underlying philosophy: Philosophical disputes would have to be addressed within the biased mathematical apparatus of quantitative hedonism. Economists and business students must learn to identify the underlying philosophy in mainstream economics and alternative philosophical systems.