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Implementing green innovation in megaprojects is an effective way to reduce energy consumption, environmental pollution and eliminate environmental externalities. In order to consider the interactive effects of multiple stakeholders, we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, the public, and construction enterprises. And investigated the effects of the initial strategy and various parameter adjustments on the players' choices through simulation. In comparison to previous research, we discover that government penalties and subsidies and the degree of public participation all affect the motivation of construction enterprises to execute green innovation. Government behavior and public participation are also interacting, government incentives can encourage public participation on the one hand, while public participation can inhibit negative government regulatory behavior, and environmental contamination by construction enterprises, effectively promoting green innovation in megaprojects on the other. Finally, we attempt to provide solutions for incentivizing green innovation in megaprojects from a synergistic perspective.

Government fiscal support is an important way to improve social welfare and enhance the protection of people’s livelihood. This paper uses the entropy weight TOPSIS method, fixed effect model, two-stage least squares regression, moderating effect model, and mediating effect model to comparatively analyze the level of high-quality development of the region and explore the impact and mechanism of livelihood expenditures on the high-quality development of the region. The findings show that increasing government expenditures on people’s livelihoods can effectively improve regional high-quality development, but the degree of marginal improvement varies with different periods and locations. People’s livelihood expenditure could promote sustainable regional development by increasing the consumption level of residents. Urbanization could strengthen the positive effect of livelihood expenditure on regional high-quality development. This study enriches the theoretical research on institutional economics and explores the effect and role of government behavior in the process of high-quality development from the perspective of livelihood expenditure.

The high-tech industry belongs to the core strategic national development category and is essential in promoting social future economic growth and scientific and technological progress. This paper constructs a theoretical framework for high-tech industry land misallocation based on the four-level institutional analysis method. The study selects Zhejiang Province of China as the research area. It uses the literature research method and multiple regression analysis methods to analyze the root causes and influence mechanism of land misallocation for the high-tech industry. The research shows that the land-use support policies for the high-tech industry can effectively alleviate the misallocation of land factors. In contrast, the government’s improper financial support measures and tax incentives increase the degree of land misallocation in the high-tech industry. The higher the R&D expenditure-to-income ratio and profitability, the lesser the land misallocation in the high-tech industry. Government behavior and enterprise behavior impact land misallocation in the high-tech industry, but government behavior has a major impact. Therefore, the government, enterprises, and the market should adopt an integrated strategy to reduce excessive government intervention in land resource allocation, allowing the market to play a decisive role in resource allocation, and stimulate the vitality of enterprise R&D and innovation. This study helps to reveal the deep motivation of land misallocation for high-tech industry and provides practical guidance for optimizing the high-tech industrial land allocation and promoting high-quality industrial development.

Environmental protection is a basic public service that the government must guarantee and is closely related to public health. An important driver of environmental pollution in China is the local government’s pursuit of a rapid economic development while ignoring environmental protection under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system. On the basis of the principal–agent theory between the central and local governments, this study analyzes the environmental deterioration caused by the distortion of local government behavior under fiscal decentralization. In addition, using China’s prefecture-level city data from 2014 to 2018, this study empirically estimates the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution. SO2 emissions and PM2.5 concentrations are used to measure the degree of environmental pollution. Results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization exacerbates environmental pollution and that the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution differs in regions with varying levels of economic development and cultural penetration. Moreover, fiscal decentralization does not significantly impact environmental pollution in eastern China and in those areas influenced by Confucian culture yet aggravates the environmental pollution in central and western China and in those areas that are not affected by Confucian culture. These results offer important policy implications. Clearly dividing the power and financial power between the central and local governments, establishing an environmental governance system compatible with economic incentives, and building an environmental public finance system can alleviate the impact of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution.

In this paper, the government behavior of leasing different land use rights in Beijing, China, is analyzed using data analysis based on the multinomial logit model. The factors that lead the government to lease different land use rights are considered from the aspects of the land features, geographical location of the land, district economic development, government finance and political tenure of the district head, etc. Considering the factors as the variables, the multinomial logit model is presented to analyze the factors that affect the district government behavior on leasing different land use rights. The data of the variables are obtained in Beijing at the district level from 2004 to 2015. From the results, we can see that the area and price of the land, gross domestic product, foreign direct investment, distance of the land from airport, distance of the land from city center, distance of the land from the nearest industrial park, government fiscal deficit and tenure of the district head all influence the district government behavior on leasing land. Finally, the policy implications are proposed. The results and implications can be referenced by other metropolises in China and other developing countries with public ownership of land.

Abstract Researchers of the Chinese bureaucracy generally believe that policy promotion depends on the power of the party committees because they have absolute authority in China. This intuitive argument, however, lacks support from rigorous empirical research and theoretical analyses. Through close observation of the Bureau of Justice, this paper analyzes how differentiated authority affects organizational interaction and triggers the corresponding government behavior. The paper finds that while the functional bureaus could use professional authority to carry out policies, they nevertheless choose to rely on the administrative authority of the government and the political authority of the party committee. We illustrate the process, mechanism, and consequences of attention competition. The process reflects that the party committee has real authority, while the government has formal authority and the functional bureaus have only symbolic authority. This differentiated authority has three consequences: (1) the “Matthew effect” of the authority structure, (2) functional bureaus competing fiercely for the party committees’ attention at the expense of accomplishing routine work, and (3) rule of the leader’s personal preference instead of the rule of law in governance.

This article presents an analysis of the different theoretical models for the relationship between elections and economics, as well as econometric tests applied to GDP and employment trends in Latin American democracies from 1979 to 1998. Considering that a government's possibilities for pushing its policy objectives forward depends on its agenda power, the article analyzes the majority versus minority nature of governments, seeking to define the political conditions that favor a level of macroeconomic evolution in keeping with the objective of maintaining power. On the one hand, the results of empirical tests show a post-electoral deterioration of target indicators, as predicted by theoretical models. On the other hand, greater economic dynamism in election years is observed more frequently in governments with a majority in the legislature, a characteristic of the political system generally associated with greater macroeconomic policy efficiency, but also a condition favoring electoral manipulation of policy.