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Do life-course transitions in adulthood shape political orientations? One framework suggests that life events expose people to new information, allowing actors to assess their political beliefs and preferences in response to these social experiences. An alternative framework suggests that the link between one’s life-course position and personal politics may be ambiguous, and early experiences should be more informative for political orientations. In this article, I use four household surveys across three countries and 40 items on political beliefs and preferences to test whether lifecourse transitions change one’s political orientations. In doing this, I employ difference-in-differences models to identify the effects of six life transitions across family and work domains on a wide variety of propositional survey items. I find that life-course transitions have no substantive influence on political orientations, and the general findings are not sensitive to differences in political interest or the age at which individuals experience these life events.

Seung Yeon Lee,1,2 Ji Hye Ham,3 Hyun-Kyung Park,4 Deok Hyun Jang,5 Won Mo Jang6,7 1Department of Administration, Seoul National University Hospital, Seoul, South Korea; 2Office of External Affairs, Seoul Metropolitan Government-Seoul National University Boramae Medical Centre, Seoul, South Korea; 3Seoul Public Health Research Institute, Seoul Medical Center, Seoul, South Korea; 4Health Insurance Research Institute, National Health Insurance Service, Wonju, South Korea; 5Research Analytics & Communications, Gallup Korea, Seoul, South Korea; 6Department of Public Health and Community Medicine, Seoul Metropolitan Government-Seoul National University Boramae Medical Centre, Seoul, South Korea; 7Department of Health Policy and Management, Seoul National University College of Medicine, Seoul, South KoreaCorrespondence: Won Mo Jang, Department of Public Health and Community Medicine, Seoul Metropolitan Government – Seoul National University Boramae Medical Center, Seoul, 07061, South Korea, Tel +82-2-870-2165, Email thomasj@snu.ac.krPurpose: After the declaration by the World Health Organization signaling the conclusion of the COVID-19 pandemic, most countries lifted mandatory mask-wearing regulations. This study aimed to investigate factors such as risk perception and political ideology associated with continued adherence to mask-wearing among specific populations, particularly when it is no longer deemed necessary.Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional study including a sample of 1001 respondents stratified by sex, age (≥ 18 years), and region from January 31 to February 2, 2023, after the mandatory mask regulation was lifted in South Korea. Multivariate logistic regression models were applied to estimate the relationships between risk perceptions, political ideology, and mask-wearing maintenance, adjusting for factors such as sex, age, occupation, and trust in the government.Results: Our results indicated significant associations between age, self-reported household economic status, political ideology, affective risk perception, and perceived effectiveness of the government’s COVID-related measures with indoor mask-wearing. Specifically, liberals were more likely to keep mask-wearing indoors than conservatives (adjusted odds ratio [aOR]: 2.19; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.33– 3.59); and those who perceived a greater affective risk of COVID-19 (aOR: 2.47; 95% CI: 1.96– 3.10), along with those who perceived the government’s countermeasures as inadequate, were more inclined to maintain the habit of wearing masks indoors (aOR: 1.90; 95% CI: 1.19– 3.03).Conclusion: Our study highlighted the multifaceted factors influencing mask-wearing behavior in the post-COVID-19 era. Even after adjusting for various confounding factors, such as age, sex, and trust in the government, an association remained between affective risk perception, political ideology, and mask-wearing behavior. However, further research for psychological mechanisms is needed to foster a culture of preventive behaviors proportional to the risk of infection.Keywords: risk perception, mask-wearing behaviors, political ideology

Although much research has been devoted to how political interest is related to different political outcomes, little is known about its influence on attitudes toward immigration. In line with deliberative theory, political interest should facilitate greater exposure to various perspectives via political discussions and other forms of political engagement that, in turn, should contribute to more positive attitude toward those with differing views or backgrounds. Using data from the European Social Survey, including 39 countries across 10 survey rounds 2002–2021, this study shows that political interest is positively related to immigrant acceptance. However, there is moderation effect of conservative values. Being politically interested is associated with a higher probability of holding pro-immigrant attitudes among weak conservatives, while there is no significant association among strong conservatives. This finding can be explained by the motivated cognition theory, which states that individuals tend to seek out and pay more attention to information that supports their strong pre-existing ideologies. For individuals with ideologies that predispose them to adopt very negative attitudes toward immigration (strong conservatives), being politically interested might entail a greater exposure and attention to ideology-congruent perspectives and, as a result, confirmation of initial predispositions.

In a world grappling with technological advancements, the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in governance is becoming increasingly realistic. While some may find this possibility incredibly alluring, others may see it as dystopian. Society must account for these varied opinions when implementing new technologies or regulating and limiting them. This study (N = 703) explored Leftists’ (liberals) and Rightists’ (conservatives) support for using AI in governance decision-making amidst an unprecedented political crisis that washed through Israel shortly after the proclamation of the government’s intentions to initiate reform. Results indicate that Leftists are more favorable toward AI in governance. While legitimacy is tied to support for using AI in governance among both, Rightists’ acceptance is also tied to perceived norms, whereas Leftists’ approval is linked to perceived utility, political efficacy, and warmth. Understanding these ideological differences is crucial, both theoretically and for practical policy formulation regarding AI’s integration into governance.

As a pharmaceutical intervention, vaccines remain a major public health strategy for mitigating the effects of COVID-19. Yet, vaccine intake has been affected by various cognitive and cultural factors. We examine how a selected set of factors (i.e., knowledge, concern, media, peer influence, and demographics) shaped COVID-19 vaccination intention in the early phase of the pandemic (Fall 2020). Using a survey conducted in three US states (Idaho, Texas, and Vermont) just prior to the rollout of the first vaccines against COVID-19, we find that COVID-19 concern was the primary driver of vaccination intention. Concern was shaped mainly by two factors: political ideology and media sources. Yet, ideology and media were much more important in affecting concern for those who leaned politically conservative, as opposed to those who leaned liberal or remained moderate. The results from our structural equation models affirm that the information politically conservative respondents were receiving reinforced the effects of their ideology, leading to a greater reduction in their concern. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for future pandemic preparedness.

The study aimed to examine the correlation between neoliberal beliefs and socio-political attitudes in Japan. A comprehensive four-factor scale was customized to assess neoliberal beliefs, making it suitable for Japanese society by creating items that evaluated the four factors and renaming them to align with the Japanese context. This study assesses the following four factors: ‘aversion to reducing inequality,’ ‘endorsement of meritocracy,’ ‘competition,’ and ‘government non-interference.’ Moreover, we incorporated items to gauge ‘personal responsibility,’ which are deemed a fundamental constituent of neoliberalism in Japan but is not directly included in the abovementioned scale. The association between these five sub-components of neoliberal beliefs and socio-political attitudes in Japan, including demographic and psychological variables, attitudes toward policy issues, and political party support, was scrutinized. Our findings consistently demonstrate that neoliberal beliefs are correlated with conservative psychological tendencies.

We hypothesized that because politically conservative ideology legitimizes the status quo—including heteronormative institutions and arrangements—it should be negatively associated with in-group identification, opposition to homophobia, and support for LGBTQ+ rights among sexual minorities. These hypotheses, which were derived from system justification theory, were assessed in large US samples of sexual minority respondents. In Study 1 (N = 4,530) and Study 2 (N = 1,107), we observed that more conservative sexual minorities expressed weaker sexual identification, and, relatedly, less support for same-sex marriage and adoption and other rights and privileges, as well as less participation in collective action in favor of LGBTQ+ rights. In Study 3 (N = 446), heterosexist system justification was associated with decreased sexual identification and support for LGBTQ+ rights. In all studies, identity and ideology accounted for unique variance in support for vs. opposition to LGBTQ+ rights. Implications for the politics of sexual identity and collective action among disadvantaged groups are discussed.

The Human Ecosystem is defined “as a coherent system of biophysical and social factors capable of adaptation and sustainability over time” (Machlis et al., 1997). This social-ecological model consists of two portions: Critical Resources (Biophysical Resources, Socioeconomic Resources, and Cultural Resources) and Social Systems (Social Institutions, Social Order, and Cyles). In the Human Ecosystem, ‘Beliefs’ is a variable of Cultural Resources, which is one of three Critical Resources. As a representative of ‘Beliefs’ in Taiwan’s human ecosystem, the political ideology of Taiwan independence is selected as a case study. The quantitative study uses the content analysis method with literature studies on Taiwan’s politics, especially, on the issues of Taiwan independence are the main sources of data. The Human Ecosystem Model is adopted as the main analysis tool to take a new exploration of how the political ideology of Taiwan Independence integrates, manifests, and functions in Taiwan’s human ecosystem. The study suggests that land, population, and political subsystems are the main variables that integrate the political ideology of Taiwan independence. Also, the study proposes that there is a visible relationship between beliefs and identity. Consequently, Taiwan’s social institutions such as government, education, security, and defence are forced to interact according to the rise of the political ideology of Taiwan independence. Besides, indigenous peoples’ governance focuses on solidifying the territorial and cultural background, which significantly strengthens the political ideology. The initial findings suggest that indigenous peoples’ territories, cultural resources, and ideological security are key variables to solidify the political ideology of Taiwan independence.

Few food groups are subject to the same depth and scope of critique as meat. Yet little is known about how the Canadian public feels about meat production and consumption. In other jurisdictions, meat has been a politically polarizing topic; thus, we focus our analysis on political differences (and similarities) in orientations toward meat. In this paper, we draw on survey data collected on a quota sample of Canadians (n=2328) in order to address the following questions: to what extent do Canadians across the political spectrum agree that meat is a problem? Where is there overlap, and where is there disagreement? We find that, despite small but statistically significant differences across political ideology in Canadians’ meat-related attitudes, preferences, and practices, there is widespread agreement that meat is delicious, that it poses risks to health, and that many livestock production practices violate animal welfare ethics. The majority of Canadians would prefer to source meat that is locally-produced and raised on a small farm. These patterns illustrate high levels of discomfort with large-scale animal agriculture. This study fills an important gap in Canadian food studies by interrogating public perceptions of meat and identifying areas of political convergence and divergence on meat-related attitudes, preferences, and practices.

The relevance. The article is devoted to the analysis of new strategies of ideology in working with collective ideas about the past in metamodern societies. The issues related to the transformation of the structure and content of ideology, the change of the main object of its influence and new tools in the management of collective consciousness and the unconscious are touched upon. The main hypothesis of the article is the assumption that metamodern societies are characterized not by de-ideologization, but rather by a crisis of ideology, expressed in distrust and suspicion of the authorities, rejection of previous meta-narratives, which formed the foundation of ideologies and ensured the legitimacy of power in previous periods. The main purpose of this article is to show that the main object of the impact of new ideologies in metamodern societies is not a person as a free person, but collective memory. In the first third of the XXI century, a new political ontology is being built, in which history occupies a central place. The thesis of the article is the assertion that new hybrid forms of ideology work not with historical consciousness, but with the contents of collective memory. Ideology is traditionally characterized by rewriting the past, but in the era of metamodern, its work manifests itself in a purposeful and conscious sacralization of collective memory, which unfold simultaneously with desacralization of collective ideas about the past. These processes have their own characteristic features depending on the political regimes. The main processes of sacralization of historical memory in authoritarian/totalitarian and democratic societies are considered. It is shown that the purpose of sacralization as an ideological tool in authoritarian/totalitarian societies is to legitimize power, maintain collective identity and increase the patriotic sentiments of the masses. Methods: system approach, hermeneutics, phenomenological method. Conclusions. Metamodern societies are not de-ideologized. The ideological complex as a set of intellectual stra-tegies retains its functionality, but passes into new forms of existence. The shadowy, latent ideology becomes the dominant form. Its main institutions are historical politics and the politics of memory. Shadow ideology builds its work with collective ideas as hidden, unobvious, requiring decoding and reconstruction. However, it manages to effectively form specific behavioral attitudes and patterns among the masses in a limited period of time. Through a set of practices for working with collective memory, latent ideology canonizes a certain tradition, fixing it in the form of a canon of sacred texts, memorial culture of memorable places and dates, ritual actions and rituals. The historical past becomes a material for ideology, opening up wide opportunities for manipulation of collective ideas, motivation and assessments of social groups.

The recent popularity of figures such as Pierre Poilievre and events such as the Ottawa “Freedom Convoy” demonstrate the rise of right-wing populism among young Canadian voters. Through a mixed-methods approach with thematic analysis, this study attempted to determine the most significant factors contributing to right-wing populist support in this demographic. The survey of 56 self-identified conservative Canadian university students and Reddit users aged 18–35 found that right-wing populist support was predicated on three factors: economic uncertainty, with unsustainably high cost of living and mismanaged fiscal policies; distrust in government, with negative perceptions of institutions, including the media; and cultural conflict, with backlash against “woke” ideas and “non-traditional” values. The themes point to disillusionment with Canada’s current economic, political, and social environment, and a desire for the alternative messaging often found in right-wing populism. The findings contain significant implications regarding current and upcoming Canadian voter behaviour and the effects of populist worldviews.

This article aims to reconstruct Robert Lehmann-Nitsche's political ideology and links with the German-speaking community, in the light of a series of considerations on German anthropology and the contextualisation of the actions of German scholars between the end of the twentieth century and the first decades of the twentieth century. To this end, I will rely on the analysis and cross-referencing of a number of written sources, which contribute both to the elucidation of Lehmann-Nitsche's case and to a fuller understanding of early twentieth-century anthropological practices. Among these sources, the most important is "German Investigations of the Domain of Americanism", published by Lehmann-Nitsche in 1933 as part of a special edition of the journal Zeitschrift für Politik, entitled Ibero-America and Germany. A collective work on friendly relations, disarmament and equal rights. It is argued that Lehmann-Nitsche's characterisation as a Nazi and/or National Socialist Party collaborator is not supported by documentary evidence and that current interpretations so far inadequately equate "Nazi ideology" with orthodoxy, monarchist-anti-republican fervour and anti-Semitism.

What is the relation between morality and politics? If morality is a collection of cooperative rules, and politics is conflict over which cooperative projects to pursue, then they should be correlated. We examined the relation between moral values and political orientation in samples of participants from the USA (N = 518), Denmark (N = 552), the Netherlands (N = 353), and an international online population (N = 1,337). Political conservatism was consistently related to deference values. We also found some support for the hypotheses that political orientation has distinct relations with family values and group values, and has distinct relations with fairness values and reciprocity values. However, for most hypotheses the results showed no support, largely due to poor model fit or measurement error associated with the political scales. The results suggest that improved measurement of political preferences will help understand the relation between morality and politics.

Big Five personality traits have been consistently shown to be important predictors of political differences. Other work found that political differences are related to geographical differences in personality. The present study extended existing work by examining the numbers and features of distinct personality profiles within different political regions of the United States using latent profile analysis (LPA). Across two large datasets (total N > 6,000), we found that while all regions shared similar numbers (3–5 profiles per region) and some overlapping patterns of personality profiles (e.g., well-adapted individuals), different political regions also showed unique personality profile patterns (e.g., “Worrisome Liberals”, “Rigid & Antisocial”). Overall, these results provide initial evidence suggesting that different personality profiles may exist among different political regions of the US, and offer insights on the interplay between personality, political ideology, and geographical differences.

IntroductionPolitically left-leaning individuals are more likely to get vaccinated against COVID-19, although little is known about the mechanisms underlying the ideological differences in vaccination intentions. Understanding the extent to which trust in the healthcare system, in complementary and alternative medicine, and the perceived threat from the disease contribute to these disparities is crucial, as it could inform targeted interventions to address vaccine hesitancy across the political spectrum.MethodsThe present cross-sectional study conducted among adults living in Slovenia (n = 858) examined the mediating role of trust in the healthcare system, trust in complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), and the perceived threat from the virus on COVID-19 vaccination intention.ResultsWe found that leftist ideology and trust in the healthcare system positively predicted vaccination intention, whereas CAM negatively predicted this intention. In addition, left-leaning individuals expressed greater trust in the healthcare system and lower trust in CAM, resulting in higher levels of COVID-19 vaccination intention. The serial mediation model confirmed that trust in CAM was a negative predictor, while trust in the healthcare system positively predicted perceived threat.DiscussionWhen dealing with vaccine hesitancy among right-oriented individuals, strategies should focus on enhancing trust in the healthcare system and critically evaluating the reliance on CAM.

A prevailing lay understanding of retraction in the scientific literature is to correct for misconduct and honest errors. Nonetheless, though historically rare, retractions to limit the spread of results deemed socially harmful (i.e., information hazards), have gained increasing traction and become increasingly common. This study sought primarily to determine the extent to which information hazard-based retraction is supported in the scientific community and as a secondary goal whether individual difference variables moderate receptivity. We tasked a diverse sample of researchers across various disciplines who use social media to evaluate scenarios in which a paper was retracted for misconduct, honest errors, and information hazards. Overall, support for retraction on the basis of information hazards was low, suggesting that researchers overwhelmingly support academic freedom as a concept. Nonetheless, left-leaning ideologies predicted slightly greater defensibility of the practice among individuals early in their careers. We provide training suggestions to mitigate reactance toward controversial scientific findings.

Over the past decade, ‘anti-gender discourse’ has been institutionalised by the governing right-wing party in Hungary to a wide effect, from the removal of accreditation from a gender studies MA program to the Parliament's refusal to ratify the Istanbul Convention. The anti-egalitarian backlash echoes those emergent in other countries where right-wing populism has gained ground — such as Poland, Turkey, India, the United States, and Brazil. The present study examined the role of two opposite orientations, cosmopolitanism as an egalitarian worldview and social dominance orientation as the preference for hierarchies and inequality among groups and people in general, in mediating the relationship between political orientation and sexism among a representative Hungarian sample (N = 1000). The path analysis revealed that left-wing political orientation was associated with higher levels of cosmopolitan orientation, while right-wing political orientation was associated with higher levels of SDO. Higher levels of cosmopolitan orientation were associated with a more positive attitude toward feminists and lower levels of modern sexism and gender-based zero-sum thinking, while higher levels of SDO were associated with the opposite. Furthermore, cosmopolitan orientation mediated the relationship between political orientation and modern sexism and attitudes toward feminists, while SDO mediated the relationship between political orientation and modern sexism and gender-based zero-sum thinking. Our study emphasizes the important role of cosmopolitan orientation in opposing SDO and promoting a more egalitarian worldview.

The present article purports to explore the significance of the Japanese case within the context of contemporary populism studies. By appraising the state of political discourse about populism both in select Japanese media and in theoretical and empirical work by political scientists in Japan and in the West concerned with the subject matter, the author seeks to summarize the state of the respective research by arguing that there are three possible ways of providing for a conceptual re-evaluation of the notion of ‘Japanese populism’, while underscoring that there are both similarities and divergences in terms of empirical manifestations of the aforesaid populism, which is duly presented through three case studies of recently most prominent Japanese politicians conceived of as ‘populists’– Jun’ichiro Koizumi, Yuriko Koike, and Toru Hashimoto.

The article deals with the development of conservatism in modern Russian society. The current socio-political situation indicates that Russian society refuses to accept liberal Western values, giving preference to values of a conservative nature. There is an obvious demand for conservative projects to consider the values of social justice, the greater social orientation of the state, the rules and orders that are significant for people and have been with them for decades. The Russian elites are still poorly aware of the possibilities of reflecting such a request and remain within the framework of their usual ideological and conceptual approaches. The article outlines the main problem areas of Russian conservatism, which include the lack of a conservative view on the economy, a certain degree of closeness of conservatism to society, and an upset balance between renewal and preservation. Modern Russia needs to develop a new traditionalist-conservative doctrine as a possible methodology for the development of the entire Russian society, a new, broader, Russian conservatism. It is necessary to develop own “language”, taking into account civilizational, cultural and socio-historical features.

Background It has been argued that human ancestors evolved greater sensitivity to certain traits that signal dominance in poten-tial leaders. From this perspective, modern voters still favor certain physical characteristics during political elections. Indeed, previous studies have shown that voters prefer dominant candidates, especially when primed with wartime scenarios, and with conservative voters being more likely to choose a dominant leader. Because facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) was found to be positively associated with perceived dominance, we sought to investigate the effect of fWHR on leader preference by taking into an account voting context and voters’ political ideology. Participants and procedure A total of 148 participants took part in two online experiments in which we manipulated standardized facial images to represent faces with low and high fWHR. Furthermore, we assessed participants’ political ideology and asked them to rate the extent to which faces with low and high fWHR looked like leaders during wartime and peacetime scenarios. Results Preference for leaders with high fWHR was positively related to participants’ political ideology, but only in a wartime scenario, suggesting that the more conservative participants were, the higher was their preference for leaders with high fWHR. This is consistent with the notion that preferences for dominant-looking leaders vary as a function of the contextual (voting context) and individual differences (political ideology). Conclusions The present findings provide new evidence for the contribution of fWHR in leader preference and significantly adds to the results of previous research demonstrating the roles of voters’ political ideology and politicians’ physical char-acteristics in perceiving leadership abilities.

This project examines the intersection of political constructs and epistemic motivations as they relate to belief in misinformation. How we value the origins of knowledge – through feelings and intuition or evidence and data – has important implications for our susceptibility to misinformation. This project explores how these epistemic motivations correlate with political ideology, party identification, and favorability towards President Trump, and how epistemic and political constructs predict belief in misinformation about COVID and the 2020 election. Results from a US national survey from Nov-Dec 2020 illustrate that Republicans, conservatives, and those favorable towards President Trump held greater misperceptions about COVID and the 2020 election. Additionally, epistemic motivations were associated with political preferences; Republicans and conservatives were more likely to reject evidence, and Trump supporters more likely to value feelings and intuition. Mediation analyses support the proposition that Trump favorability, Republicanism, and conservatism may help account for the relationships between epistemic motivations and misperceptions. Results are discussed in terms of the messaging strategies of right-wing populist movements, and the implications for democracy and public health.

Evidence suggests that politically right-leaning individuals are more likely to be closed-minded. Whether this association is inherent or subject to change has been the subject of debate, yet has not been formally tested. Through a meta-analysis, we find evidence of a changing association between conservatism and facets of closed-mindedness in the U.S. and international context using 341 unique samples, over 200,000 participants, and 920 estimates over 71 years. In the U.S., data ranging from 1948 to 2019 revealed a linear decline in the association between social conservatism (SC) and closed-mindedness, though economic conservatism (EC) did not vary in its association with closed-mindedness over time. Internationally across 18 countries, excluding the U.S., we observed a curvilinear decline in the association between SC and closed-mindedness over that same time, but no change in ECs association. We also tested variation over time for attitudinal measures of conservatism ranging between 1987 to 2018. In the U.S., we observed a linear increase in the association between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and closed-mindedness, with a similar linear increase in the association between social dominance orientation (SDO) and closed-mindedness. Internationally, there was a curvilinear increase in the association between RWA and closed-mindedness, but no change in the association with SDO. We discuss the changes to the political landscape that might explain our findings.

This study aimed to investigate the association between political ideology and awareness of HPV and HPV vaccine among US adults. Study data were derived from Health Information National Trends Survey 5 Cycle 4, a 2020 cross-sectional survey of US adults. Multivariable logistic regressions were conducted to examine the association between political ideology with HPV and HPV vaccine awareness. A total of 3418 adults participated in the study, with the majority being non-Hispanic White individuals and women. The results showed that 66.1% and 62.3% of the participants were aware of HPV and HPV vaccine, respectively. A total of 36.9%, 29.7% and 33.4% of the population reported moderate, liberal and conservative political ideologies respectively. Awareness levels were highest among liberals, with 77.1% and 72.7% reporting awareness of HPV and HPV vaccine respectively. Multivariable logistic regression analysis revealed that liberal participants were more likely to be aware of HPV (aOR, 1.94; 95% CI, 1.25–3.00), and HPV vaccines (aOR, 1.94; 95% CI, 1.37–2.74) compared to moderates. Also, liberals had higher odds of HPV (aOR, 2.41; 95% CI, 1.65–3.51), and HPV vaccine awareness (aOR, 1.91; 95% CI, 1.29–2.83) compared to conservatives. However, there was no significant difference in awareness between moderates and conservatives. Study findings point to an association between individuals’ political ideology and HPV awareness. Further research is needed to understand the intricacies on how political ideology impacts HPV awareness. Overall, results highlight the need to incorporate individuals’ political ideologies in interventions geared toward increasing the awareness and uptake of HPV vaccination.

Despite its relatively brief history, cryptocurrency has already had a profound impact on the economy, with some predicting that it will eventually replace traditional fiat currencies. Historically, it had dark associations with illegal activities in the early days, although perceptions and associations likely have, in recent years, changed for the better. Thus, understanding how people perceive the morality of cryptocurrency currently forms the motivation of the current research. We, in particular, examine associations dependent on political ideology. Across both a large-scale analysis of Twitter posts (N = 959,393) and controlled survey research (N = 487), we find that cryptocurrency is currently best understood as being more strongly linked to conservative vs. liberal moral foundations. Cryptocurrency-related posts were more likely to express conservative moral foundations (Authority, Purity, and Loyalty) rather than liberal moral foundations (Fairness and Care), and individual endorsement of these conservative moral foundations was associated with increased interest in crypto investment.

IntroductionAlthough ethnocentrism is one of the fundamental concepts in the social sciences, its study has been impeded by a diversity of conceptualizations and measures. In recent years, a growing number of political scientists and psychologists have undertaken in-depth research into ethnocentrism. In addition, researchers have recently proposed a comprehensive reconceptualization of ethnocentrism and developed a new Ethnocentrism scale. There is strong evidence for this scale's reliability and validity in indexing ethnocentrism, but like most measures in psychology and political science, this scale is based on classical test theory. Item response theory (IRT) is a powerful psychometric technique that can provide a much more sophisticated test of test performance and is currently under-utilized in research.MethodsWe performed IRT to assess the psychometric properties of the Ethnocentrism scale on a sample of 4,187 participants.ResultsThe scale's items had strong psychometric properties to capture the ethnocentrism latent construct, particularly in the below average to above average range. Men required marginally lower levels of ethnocentrism to endorse less socially acceptable items than women (items relating to superiority, purity, or exploitativeness). When compared to liberals, conservatives responded more readily to nearly all ethnocentrism items. Given this variation, the IRT approach highlighted that future measurements must adjust for differential item functioning, albeit more for political orientation than gender identity.DiscussionThe findings detail how IRT can enhance measurement in political science and demonstrate the implications for how gender and political ideology may affect the differential performance of items.

We investigated the impact of egalitarianism on consumers' inclination to support fair-trade products and examined whether this effect was observed among individuals with different political affiliations. In four experiments featuring a fictional chocolate brand presented in either a social-justice (fair trade) or quality-focused (control) manner, we examined the product purchase intentions of both left- and right-leaning consumers in the United States and Malaysia (Studies 1a, N = 200; 1b, N = 269; & 2, N = 410). Results revealed that participants expressed a greater willingness to support the product when it was framed as contributing to a social justice cause, but this effect was limited to left- and right-leaning consumers who strongly endorsed egalitarian principles. Study 3 (N = 354) employed a mediated-moderation approach and confirmed that an elevated sensitivity to injustice was the underlying mechanism driving increased intentions to support the product among egalitarians exposed to social justice framing. These results demonstrate that right-leaning consumers can be influenced by social justice framing when their commitment to equity is strong.

The article describes the concept of political socialization of Soviet schoolchildren based on children's public diplomacy in 1982–1986. The authors concentrated on the international visits made by Samantha Smith and Yekaterina Lychyova. The research did not involve other factors of political socialization, e.g., weekly political information, fundraising events for the starving children of Africa and Nicaragua, foreign pen-palls, etc. These international visits provided valuable practical experience of interaction between Soviet and foreign children. Children's diplomacy is a relatively new phenomenon for Russian historiography, and the authors attempted to define its theoretical and symbolic meaning. The ideology-affected political socialization transformed children's everyday life, depriving it of the freedom of choice and opportunities. The analysis of children's diplomacy with its potential opportunities and shortcomings made it possible to determine the bottlenecks of political socialization. It revealed the tension between the public and private dimensions of international politics and actualized the factor of transnational activity in the development of bilateral Soviet-American relations. The research relied on the personal experience of those children, their memories, memoirs of their contemporaries, media publications, etc. The project of children's diplomacy failed because it deviated from its original scenario. Every time the process was out of direct control of political elites, children’s psychology and behavior interfered with the plan.

The increase in divorce rates over the past decades challenges the traditional image of the two-parent family, as new family forms are increasingly more common. Yet, the traditional view of the family has remained central to political socialization research. Therefore, we propose and empirically test a theoretical framework regarding the consequences of parental separation for processes of political socialization. While the impact of parental divorce has been studied extensively by sociologists, the political implications of this impactful life event have remained largely uncovered. We identify two mechanisms that we expect to predict more leftist political orientations in children of separated parents compared to those from intact families: experiences of economic deprivation and single-mother socialization. Multi-level analyses using the European Values Study (2008) and two-generational analyses with the Swiss Household Panel (1999–2020) support our expectations, indicating that in case of parental separation offspring tends to hold more leftist political orientations, controlling for selection into parental separation and the intergenerational transmission of political ideology. We find empirical support for mechanisms of economic deprivation and single-mother socialization across our analyses. The implications of our findings are that in the family political socialization process, offspring's political orientations are not only influenced by their parents' ideology, but also by formative experiences that result from the family structure.

Considering current world politics, investigating people’s tendency to believe in the greatness of their nation contingent on external validation seems ever so relevant. Thus, we examined the relationship between the direction and extremity of political orientation and national narcissism (NN) on European quota-representative samples (N = 15,882). Although the relationships between ideological extremity and NN were established, they were much weaker than the positive relationship between political orientation and NN. Testing for model invariance across Western and Eastern European samples suggested differences in the predictive strength of political orientation on NN, with a weaker association in Eastern Europe. Further analyses, including a quadratic examination of political ideology’s relation to NN, supported the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis, highlighting the stronger presence of NN among right-leaning individuals. This pattern persisted despite varying European socio-cultural backgrounds, suggesting a transcultural aspect of NN within the political right spectrum. Our research underscores the importance of considering socio-political context when assessing the interplay between political ideology and NN, setting a starting point for further, more nuanced research.

The resilience model to disinformation (Humprecht et al., 2020, 2021) suggests that countries will differ in exposure and reactions to disinformation due to their distinct media, economic, and political environments. In this model, higher media trust and the use of public service broadcasters are expected to build resilience to disinformation, while social media use and political polarization undermine resilience. To further test and develop the resilience model, we draw on a four-country (the US, Canada, the UK, and France) survey conducted in February 2021. We focus on three individual-level indicators of a lack of resilience: awareness of, exposure to, and sharing of misinformation. We find that social media use is associated with higher levels of all three measures, which is consistent with the resilience model. Social media use decreases resilience to misinformation. Contrary to the expectations of the resilience model, trust in national news media does not build resilience. Finally, we consider the use of public broadcasting media (BBC, France Télévisions, and CBC). The use of these sources does not build resilience in the short term. Moving forward, we suggest that awareness of, exposure to, and reactions to misinformation are best understood in terms of social media use and left–right ideology. Furthermore, instead of focusing on the US as the exceptional case of low resilience, we should consider the UK as the exceptional case of high resilience to misinformation. Finally, we identify potential avenues to further develop frameworks to understand and measure resilience to misinformation.

As for the mitigation of the negative consequences of the coronavirus pandemic and the related crisis, governments should inter alia facilitate the willingness to vaccinate. However, related discussions became politicised, especially in countries with an extremely high level of partisan polarisation in opinions and media discourses, like in Hungary, which is the selected case of our study. As previous research about the United States shows, general trust in science is also influenced by the ideological alignment of individuals – people with conservative identification are more likely to question scientific results and recommendations, considering global warming, or the characteristics of the pandemic and the effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines. In our study we examine two main questions: first, whether the ideological orientation and partisan alignment of Hungarian citizens influence their general trust in science, and second, whether the same factors influence their opinion on scientists’ ability to develop effective vaccines against the coronavirus. Furthermore, we also investigate whether media consumption habits might influence these interrelations. According to the results of the representative online survey, the more conservative someone in Hungary identifies, the more likely they will be sceptical in terms of both questions. However, support of government or opposition parties does not determine whether they believe in the ability of scientists to develop effective vaccines, and it is influenced by their media consumption habits. We showed that (1) opposition supporters are much more different along their preferred media source than government supporters, (2) television watchers are of the same opinion independent of their party preference and (3) social media consumers are generally more likely to reject scientific results. The phenomenon that supporters of the conservative government and of the alliance of opposition parties are different in terms of their media consumption is a surprising finding in the polarised Hungarian context. We provide two main explanations for this. First, it is most probably the consequence of the government’s intensive campaign that encouraged vaccination. Second, the government used the issue of vaccination as a source of legitimacy regarding the effectiveness of their crisis management.

The analysis of the prime political ideologies that affect human behaviours and how these make people interact with their habitat is most necessary for policy making. The objective of the present research is to analyse the relationship between an individual’s political ideology and his/her environmental concern and pro-environmental behaviours and attitudes, and how these last two influences on pro-electrical consumption attitudes. To achieve the objective, we based the research on information from two surveys effectuated two years apart. A total of 3,395 household heads were interviewed (84.5% from 2019 and 15.5% from 2021). Four hypotheses were launched and only one validated through our study which proved the relationship between environmental concern and pro-electrical consumption attitudes. However, the study additionally shows a gradual decrease in environmental concern and pro-environmental behaviours and attitudes from centre ideology to the extreme left and right, being the values of the left-wing (extreme left and left-centre) higher than those of the right-wing (extreme right and right-centre). Additionally, a strong influence of environmental concern in pro-environmental behaviours and attitudes was found, meaning that environmental knowledge is necessary to develop greener attitudes and behaviours. These results shed light on citizens environmental policy preferences, making clear the discussion about the effects of political ideology on pro-environmental behaviours and attitudes.

The applicability of system justification theory (SJT) in Japan, where political contexts differ from those in Western countries, was evaluated in this study. SJT explains the psychological mechanisms underlying conservatism. Japan, which has a relatively long history as a democracy among East Asian countries, has a special political context. For instance, (1) it has had almost uninterrupted conservative governance since the end of World War II; and (2) unlike Western countries, opinions on economic issues are not clearly linked to conservative attitudes. A web survey of Japanese voters (n = 1,428) revealed that high general system justification (GSJ) and economic system justification (ESJ) were correlated with conservatism. Further, path analysis results showed that GSJ and ESJ predicted conservative attitudes. Additional analysis suggested that the status-legitimacy hypothesis, in which lower status groups have higher system justification motives, is not supported.

There is a correlation between soccer's popularity and states that traditionally vote Democrat in US elections. This has led to claims that where democrats lead, soccer follows. Yet, this relationship may not be entirely stable, as soccer may stimulate the Democratic party vote through its multicultural elements. Using the 1994 World Cup as a plausibly exogenous shock that positioned US soccer, we investigate whether US states that hosted the tournament increased their Democratic vote in future Presidential elections. A two-way fixed-effects estimator and a dynamic difference-in-difference estimator shows that if a US state was a 1994 World Cup host, it increased its Democratic vote share. However, when examining Major League Soccer franchises, this relationship breaks down but recovers when investigating the women's World Cup in 1999 and 2003. As the swing states of Florida and Georgia are hosting 2026 World Cup matches, the findings may hold key insights for the 2028 Presidential election.

Two experiments tested how environmental policy acceptability of US conservatives and liberals was influenced by manipulating the level (minority vs. majority) and source (in-group vs. outgroup) of normative support for policy. Results from 928 MechanicalTurk users (Study 1: N = 268, Study 2: N = 660) indicated that when evaluating an in-group policy (that participants expect their own political group to support), communicating outgroup support increases acceptability compared with communicating in-group support. The outgroup norm has a positive indirect effect via the inference that the in-group is even more supportive of the policy than the outgroup is. In contrast, when evaluating an outgroup policy, communicating in-group support indirectly yields higher acceptability than communicating outgroup support, via the inference that the outgroup is more supportive than the in-group is. This effect mainly occurred for individuals with strong ideological identification and was independent of level of support (minority vs. majority). Results indicate that bipartisan support for environmental policies can be achieved by strategic communication of normative information about political groups.

The article is devoted to the transformations of the political ideology of Francoism in modern Spain. The author divides the historical evolution of “Francoism after Franco” into two stages: neo-Francoism (completed) and post-Francoism (incipient). NeoFrancoism is formed during the times of democratic transit (1975–1982), post-Francoism arises as a result of political innovations implemented by the two social-democratic Governments of J.L. Rodriguez Zapatero (2004–2011) and P. Sanchez (from 2018 to the present) and is associated with a negative attitude to “historical memory” (Law of 2007th year) and “democratic memory” (Bill of 2020th year), respectively. Analyzing the internal structure of neo-Francoism, the author decomposes it into three types in accordance with a more general typology of conservatism by A.A. Galkin and P.Yu. Rakhshmir: the right wing (right-wing radical conservatism), centrist neo-Francoism (traditionalism) and the left wing (liberal conservatism). The internal structure of post-Francoism is still being formed, therefore it is revealed in less defined concepts although on the basis of the same classical triad: the right flank (mainstream), the center (“sympathizers”) and the left flank (“fellow travelers”). Comparing the “Francoisms”, the author shows that Francoism under Franco was a closed ideology and had as its main goal the destruction of opponents (expulsion from the country, prison, executions); neo-Francoism was a semi-open ideology and preferred to discuss with opponents (Parliament, media, scientific and journalistic literature). In this context, the fundamental difference between post-Francoism and other Francoisms is its open nature and publicly articulated invitation for all kinds of opponents from across the political and ideological spectrum to mutually beneficial cooperation for the progressive development of the country, thanks to which not only neo-Francoists, but also anti-Francoists (in particular, representatives of the “Communist Party of Spain” who have traditionally been enemies of any Francoism) appear in the logic of its nascent discourse today, which allows the author to add the prefix “post” to it.

Abstract We propose a method to characterize political ideology using network theory. Our analysis is based on the 2015–2016 Chilean constituent process, where self-convened meetings were held throughout the country to discuss which Values, Rights, Duties, and Institutions should be included in the new constitution. Using this unique dataset, co-occurrence networks were constructed by considering the concepts selected in different meetings. The nodes are the concepts, and a link between two nodes represents the association between them. Political ideology is thus analyzed as an emergent network, and we can identify the main ideological communities in Chile and describe their characteristics. Beyond the local results, the proposed methodology enables representing the diversity of a community’s political orientations in a realistic ecological context.

Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one’s group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp.

In this study, we analyze the perception of economic inequality in everyday life in Spain based on political ideology. Using content analysis techniques, we processed 705 open-ended responses from 290 people and used network analysis to examine the relationships between the categories identified. We found that economic inequality is perceived primarily as social comparison and relative deprivation between individuals/groups. However, it is perceived more in terms of social justice when people are situated on the left (vs. the right) of the political spectrum. We discuss the perception of economic inequality as a multidimensional phenomenon situated in everyday life, which influences how we understand and react to social disparities.

The Gender Stereotype Effect in language comprehension refers to the increased processing load that occurs when comprehenders encounter linguistic information that is incongruent with their understanding of gender stereotypes; for example, upon encountering the pronoun he in the sentence The maid answered the phone because he heard it ring. We investigate the Stereotype Effect using appropriateness and correctness ratings and ask whether it is modulated by individual differences in participants' personality and political ideology. Results from this study indicate that the Stereotype Effect can be replicated in an offline paradigm and that the Effect is specific to a discourse character's gender: sentences describing male agents fulfilling stereotypical female roles were rated lower in both appropriateness and correctness than sentences describing female agents fulfilling stereotypical male roles. Further, more open, conscientious, liberal, and empathetic individuals were more sensitive to the character gender-specific effect, rating stereotype incongruent sentences, particularly female role-male pronoun pairings, lower than congruent ones. Overall, these results point to certain individual differences being associated with differences in the strength of stereotype perception, indicating the possibility that these individuals use more top-down language processing, where comprehenders higher on these scales might be able to make more use of extra-linguistic, sociocultural factors in their language comprehension. Additionally, the results indicate a character gender-based difference in sociocultural stereotypes.

From voting fraud to Russian interference, electoral conspiracy theories have circulated on social media since the 2016 United States presidential election with alarming magnitude. Previous conspiracy studies have primarily focused on psychological causes that contribute to the conspiracy mentality, and the discussion on political antecedents of conspiracy endorsement remains lacking. This study selects popular conspiracies reflecting various political ideologies and conducts multiple survey rounds (n = 500) to compare and contrast the effect of partisan affiliations on conspiracy endorsement. Drawing from the extant literature from psychology, communication, and political science and using two-way and three-way interaction models, this study examines three political antecedents—political ideology, knowledge, and participation—and their interactive effects on conspiracy endorsement. The results indicate that individuals with higher levels of political affiliation and knowledge illustrate stronger conspiracy endorsement, and this effect is stronger for conservatives than liberals. Additionally, increased political participation reduces the endorsement of conservative conspiracies and heightens the endorsement of liberal ones among both conservatives and liberals.

This socio-political cross-sectional study describes public trust in Greece and investigates its ideological determinants soon after the national lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Our web-based questionnaire included 22 domains of trust and was completed by 438 participants. Our aim was to explore the relationship between trust domains and belief in conspiracy theories, conservatism, institutional liberalism, and political orientation within the spectrum extreme left-extreme right. We found that the level of public trust regarding the pandemic management was broadly low and that there was considerable dissemination of conspiracy theories in Greek society. Adjusting for demographic characteristics and political attitudes we saw that age was the most influencing demographic determinant of public trust. Belief in conspiracy theories and conservativism were also robustly significant determinants. Our findings feed the research body and the public discussion about the socio-political dimensions of the pandemic under the prism of public health.

In this article, we analyze the relationship between intellectuals and the political factor during the process of the communization of Romania carried out after August 23 1944, through the study of the editorials signed by G. Călinescu, editorial director of the newspaper Națiunea (The Nation). Our research highlights the public discourse used by the „fellow travelers” of that period by highlighting in the public discourse of G. Călinescu the abandonment of „aesthetics” in favor of politics.

Previous research suggests that state anxiety may sway political attitudes. However, previous experimental procedures induced anxiety using political contexts (e.g., social or economic threat). In a pre-registered laboratory experiment, we set out to examine if anxiety that is unrelated to political contexts can influence political attitudes. We induced anxiety with a threat of shock paradigm, void of any political connotation. All participants were instructed that they might receive an electric stimulus during specified threat periods and none during safety periods. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Political attitudes (implicit and explicit) were assessed under safety in one condition and under threat in the other. Psychometric, as well as physiological data (skin conductance, heart rate), confirmed that anxiety was induced successfully. However, this emotional state did not alter political attitudes. In a Bayesian analytical approach, we confirmed the absence of an effect. Our results suggest that state anxiety by itself does not sway political attitudes. Previously observed effects that were attributed to anxiety may be conditional on a political context of threat.

Summary: Background: Scant research, including in the United States, has quantified relationships between the political ideologies of elected representatives and COVID-19 outcomes among their constituents. Methods: We analyzed observational cross-sectional data on COVID-19 mortality rates (age-standardized) and stress on hospital intensive care unit (ICU) capacity for all 435 US Congressional Districts (CDs) in a period of adult vaccine availability (April 2021–March 2022). Political metrics comprised: (1) ideological scores based on each US Representative's and Senator's concurrent overall voting record and their specific COVID-19 votes, and (2) state trifectas (Governor, State House, and State Senate under the same political party control). Analyses controlled for CD social metrics, population density, vaccination rates, the prevalence of diabetes and obesity, and voter political lean. Findings: During the study period, the higher the exposure to conservatism across several political metrics, the higher the COVID-19 age-standardized mortality rates, even after taking into account the CD's social characteristics; similar patterns occurred for stress on hospital ICU capacity for Republican trifectas and US Senator political ideology scores. For example, in models mutually adjusting for CD political and social metrics and vaccination rates, Republican trifecta and conservative voter political lean independently remained significantly associated with an 11%–26% higher COVID-19 mortality rate. Interpretation: Associations between the political ideologies of US federal elected officials and state concentrations of political party power with population health warrant greater consideration in public health analyses and monitoring dashboards. Funding: This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Assessment of critical consciousness among individuals can provide a proxy measure of the readiness of communities, and individual decision-makers within, for social changes that address root causes of ill health. Critical consciousness, as conceived by Paolo Freire, emerges as a consequence of praxis. This iterative, recursive process of reflection and co-created knowledge enables community members to identify salient issues and the actions they want to take to address those issues. Public health and other social science researchers who engage in social- and population-level intervention work need a validated instrument that measures critical consciousness. Our purpose was to develop an instrument that can measure 4 key constructs of critical consciousness (passive adaptation, emotional engagement, cognitive awakening, and intentions to act) in an individual, relative to any salient community issue. We conducted two studies (Initial: June 2018; Retest: October 2019) to develop and validate this instrument. The same sampling strategy was used for both studies, but each study was conducted with a discrete cohort of participants. We used Amazon's Mechanical Turk to recruit and incentivize study participants. Data from the Initial study were used in an iterative process to evaluate construct validity and test our theoretical assumptions. Exploratory factor analyses were used to determine the best model fit that gave the greatest subscale reliability and validity. In the Retest study, confirmatory factor analysis was conducted and construct validity was verified. Our results indicated adequate construct validity as evidenced by good model fit. Additionally, the good fit of the data to the 4-factor structure confirmed our theoretical understanding of critical consciousness.

We investigate whether childhood health status influences adult political ideology and whether health at subsequent life-stages, adolescent personality traits, or adolescent academic aptitude mediate this relationship. Using a national longitudinal cohort sample, we found that better health among children under age 10 was positively related to conservative political ideology among adults over age 64. Children with excellent health compared to very poor health were 16 percentage points more likely to report having a conservative political ideology in adulthood. Children with excellent health compared to very poor health were 13 percentage points less likely to report having a liberal political ideology in adulthood. Adults who had excellent health as children were 30 percentage points more likely to report conservative ideology than liberal ideology. However, the difference in ideological position for adults who had very poor childhood health was negligible. That is, the health and ideology relationship is being driven by those who were healthier early in life, after controlling for family income and material wealth. No evidence was found for mediation by adolescent heath, adult heath, adolescent personality traits, or adolescent academic aptitude. The magnitude of the coefficient for childhood health was substantively and statistically equivalent across race and sex. We discuss the possibility that, instead of being mediated, childhood health may actually be a mediator bridging social, environmental, and policy contexts with political ideology. We also discuss the potential of social policy to influence health, which influences ideology (and voting participation), which eventually circles back to influence social policy. It is important to understand the nexus of political life and population health since disparities in voice and power can exacerbate health disparities.

This study examined the way attitudes towards science in the U.S. mediate the relationship between COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and psychosocial predictors, such as political ideology, religiosity, reactance proneness, dogmatism, perceived communal ostracism, education, and socioeconomic status. We analyzed the structure of people’s attitudes towards science, revealing four distinct factors: epistemic confidence, belief that science and technology are beneficial, trust in science in general, and trust in medical science. With all four factors included as mediators in a saturated path analysis, low levels of trust in medical science and low epistemic confidence fully mediated the relationships between nearly all of the psychosocial predictors and COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. Political conservativism’s negative association with vaccine hesitancy was partially mediated by the same two facets of people’s attitudes towards science. Adding nuance to existing research, we found that trust in science in general was not a significant mediator once all four facets were included in the model. These findings are discussed with a focus on their implications for understanding attitudes towards science and their substantial and complex role in COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy.

Accounts of the character and deeds of Nikola IV Zrinski (1508 – 1566) who became renowned for his heroic guarding of Szigetvár in 1566 and of the work and life of his great-grandson Nikola VII Zrinski (1620 – 1664), a 17th-century baroque poet, had long played central roles in the building of national awareness and political ideology in Hungary. The Slavic inhabitants of the Kingdom of Hungary were familiar with the general who fought against the Ottoman Empire since the 16th century, but in the 19th century, in the context of the idea of Slavic mutuality and Pan-Slavism, this historical figure became more important. In 1866, Andrej Sládkovič (1820 – 1872) wrote a historical epic Gróf Mikuláš Šubić Zrínsky na Sihoti [Count Nikola Šubić Zrinski at Sziget] in which he described Zrinski’s heroic deeds from the perspective of Pan-Slavic identity in detail. He drew on Ján Kollár’s sonnet “My sme dali Uhrům Zríniho” [We gave Zrinski to the Hungarians] included in his Slávy dcera ([The daughter of Sláva] final version published in 1852). The sonnet asserts that the Slavs left Zrinski to the Hungarians, just like they left Ján Hus to the Germans and Nicolaus Copernicus to the Italians and that they also gave up Zrinski’s legacy. Sládkovič, in his epic poem, returned Zrinski of Szigetvár to the Slavic Pantheon, based on the text of Zrinski the poet.