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Adversity-exposed youth tend to score lower on cognitive tests. However, the hidden talents approach proposes some abilities are enhanced by adversity, especially under ecologically relevant conditions. Two versions of an attention-shifting and working memory updating task--one abstract, one ecological--were administered to 618 youth (M[subscript age] = 13.62, SD[subscript age] = 0.81; 48.22% female; 64.56% White). Measures of environmental unpredictability, violence, and poverty were collected to test adversity × task version interactions. There were no interactions for attention shifting. For working memory updating, youth exposed to violence and poverty scored lower than their peers with abstract stimuli but almost just as well with ecological stimuli. These results are striking compared to contemporary developmental science, which often reports lowered performance among adversity-exposed youth.

Although growing up in stressful conditions can undermine mental abilities, people in harsh environments may develop intact, or even "enhanced," social and cognitive abilities for solving problems in high-adversity contexts (i.e. 'hidden talents'). We examine whether childhood and current exposure to violence are associated with memory (number of learning rounds needed to memorize relations between items) and reasoning performance (accuracy in deducing a novel relation) on transitive inference tasks involving both violence-relevant and violence-neutral social information (social dominance vs. chronological age). We hypothesized that individuals who had more exposure to violence would perform better than individuals with less exposure on the social dominance task. We tested this hypothesis in a preregistered study in 100 Dutch college students and 99 Dutch community participants. We found that more exposure to violence was associated with lower overall memory performance, but not with reasoning performance. However, the main effects of current (but not childhood) exposure to violence on memory were qualified by significant interaction effects. More current exposure to neighborhood violence was associated with worse memory for age relations, but not with memory for dominance relations. By contrast, more current personal involvement in violence was associated with "better" memory for dominance relations, but not with memory for age relations. These results suggest incomplete transfer of learning and memory abilities across contents. This pattern of results, which supports a combination of deficits and 'hidden talents,' is striking in relation to the broader developmental literature, which has nearly exclusively reported deficits in people from harsh conditions. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/e4ePmSzZsuc.

I argue that emotion research needs formal (mathematical) theory to address two central questions. How does evolution shape mechanisms of emotion development across generations, depending on environmental conditions? How do these mechanisms generate emotions, based on lifetime experience and current context? Formal modeling enables researchers to state ideas clearly and precisely, deduce predictions, and evaluate the fit between theory and data.

Bjorklund synthesizes promising research directions in developmental psychology using an evolutionary framework. In general terms, we agree with Bjorklund: Evolutionary theory has the potential to serve as a metatheory for developmental psychology. However, as currently used in psychology, evolutionary theory is far from reaching this potential. In evolutionary biology, formal mathematical models are the norm. In developmental psychology, verbal models are the norm. In order to reach its potential, evolutionary developmental psychology needs to embrace formal modeling.

Children vary in the extent to which their development is shaped by particular experiences (e.g. maltreatment, social support). This variation raises a question: Is there no single level of plasticity that maximizes biological fitness? One influential hypothesis states that when different levels of plasticity are optimal in different environmental states and the environment fluctuates unpredictably, natural selection may favor parents producing offspring with varying levels of plasticity. The current article presents a mathematical model assessing the logic of this hypothesis--specifically, it examines what conditions are required for natural selection to favor parents to bet-hedge by varying their offspring's plasticity. Consistent with existing theory from biology, results show that between-individual variation in plasticity cannot evolve when the environment only varies across space. If, however, the environment varies across time, selection can favor differential plasticity, provided fitness effects are large (i.e. variation in individuals' plasticity is correlated with substantial variation in fitness). Our model also generates a novel restriction: Differential plasticity only evolves when the cost of being mismatched to the environment exceeds the benefits of being well matched. Based on mechanistic considerations, we argue that bet-hedging by varying offspring plasticity, if it were to evolve, would be more likely instantiated via epigenetic mechanisms (e.g. pre- or postnatal developmental programming) than genetic ones (e.g. mating with genetically diverse partners). Our model suggests novel avenues for testing the bet-hedging hypothesis of differential plasticity, including empirical predictions and relevant measures. We also discuss several ways in which future work might extend our model.

Cultural transmission is often viewed as a domain-general process. However, a growing literature suggests that learnability is influenced by content and context. The idea of a learnability landscape is introduced as a way of representing the effects of interacting factors on how easily information is acquired. Extending prior work (Barrett & Broesch, 2012), learnability of danger and other properties is compared for animals, artifacts, and foods in the urban American children (ages 4-5) and in the Shuar children in Ecuador (ages 4-9). There is an advantage for acquiring danger information that is strongest for animals and weakest for artifacts in both populations, with culture-specific variations. The potential of learnability landscapes for assessing biological and cultural influences on cultural transmission is discussed.

Interactions between evolutionary psychologists and developmental systems theorists have been largely antagonistic. This is unfortunate because potential synergies between the two approaches remain unexplored. This article presents a method that may help to bridge the divide, and that has proven fruitful in biology: dynamic optimization. Dynamic optimization integrates developmental systems theorists' focus on dynamics and contingency with the "design stance" of evolutionary psychology. It provides a theoretical framework as well as a set of tools for exploring the properties of developmental systems that natural selection might favor, given particular evolutionary ecologies. We also discuss limitations of the approach. (Contains 12 footnotes and 1 figure.)

Two significant questions in cognitive and developmental science are first, whether objects and events are selected for attention based on their features (featural processing) or the configuration of their features (configural processing), and second, how these modes of processing develop. These questions have been addressed in part with experiments focused on infants' perception of faces, human body shapes, and biological motion of individual agents. Here, we investigate 4- and 10-month-old infants' (N = 192) attention to social motions, specifically to chasing--a ubiquitous, ancient, and fitness-relevant mode of interaction. We constructed computer-generated animations of chasing that had three properties: acceleration, high turning rates, and attraction ("heat-seeking"). In the first experiment we showed chasing side-by-side with a control display of inanimate, billiard-ball-like motions. Infants strongly preferred attending to chasing. In the next three studies, we systematically investigated the effect of each property in turn (acceleration, turning, and attraction) by showing a display of that property side-by-side with the control display. Infants preferentially attended to acceleration, and to attraction, but not to turning. If infants preferred chasing for its configuration, then the sum of the effect sizes of individual properties should be smaller than their combined effects. That is not what we found: instead, on three measures of visual behavior, the summed effects of individual properties equaled (or exceeded) that of chasing. Moreover, although attraction drew little attention and turning no attention at all, acceleration drew (nearly) as much attention as chasing. Our results thus provide evidence that infants preferred chasing because of its features, not its configuration. (Contains 3 figures.)

Four of the articles published in this special section of "Developmental Psychology" build on and refine psychosocial acceleration theory. In this short commentary, we discuss some of the adaptive assumptions of psychosocial acceleration theory that have not received much attention. Psychosocial acceleration theory relies on the behavior of caregivers being a reliable cue of broader ecological conditions and on those ecological conditions being somewhat stable over the individual's lifetime. There is a scope for empirical and theoretical work investigating the range of environments over which these assumptions hold, to understand more deeply why it is that early life family environment exerts such reliable effects on later life-history strategy.

This article discusses 3 ways in which adaptive developmental mechanisms may produce maladaptive outcomes. First, natural selection may favor risky strategies that enhance fitness on average but which have detrimental consequences for a subset of individuals. Second, mismatch may result when organisms experience environmental change during ontogeny, for instance, because they move from one environment to another. Third, organisms may learn about their environment in order to develop an appropriate phenotype; when cues indicate the environmental state probabilistically, as opposed to deterministically, sampling processes may produce mismatch. For each source of maladaptation, we present a selection of the relevant empirical research and illustrate how models from evolutionary biology can be used to make predictions about maladaptation. We also discuss what data can be collected to test these models in humans. Our goal is to show that evolutionary approaches not only yield insights into adaptive outcomes but can also illuminate the conditions leading to maladaptation. This perspective provides additional nuance to the dialectic between the developmental psychopathology model and evolutionary developmental psychology. (Contains 1 figure and 3 footnotes.)