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In the past years, there has been an intensive discussion on the topic of academic freedom in the university. More precisely, it has been criticized that the university is confronted with a growing intolerance and the request to limit free speech. This contribution takes a case at a German university as point of departure. It shows how the current discussions draw on central figures of the philosophy of Enlightenment. In the first part of the paper, the ideas of free speech following Kant, Mill, and Popper are presented. The second part of the article shows how these positions can also lead to an inversion or instrumentalization of Enlightenment thought. This is illustrated using exemplary statements from the case presented in the beginning of the article. In the third part of the article, the concept of higher education or "Bildung" will be discussed in relation to academic freedom. The guiding principle is an openness toward a pluralistic discourse that is to be framed by societal analysis, civility, and critique.

What does reflection on educational theory and education today actually aim at, if theory and practice can no longer be formulated as a unity? This article describes the German discourse of educational philosophy and outlines its critical view discussing the "limits of understanding subjectivity". In the following parts it is argued that the philosophy of education of the future will encompass an "economy" as well as an "ecology" of pedagogical or educational knowledge. Here, analyses of contemporary educational practices are brought together with the invention and discovery of other or alternative possibilities.

This paper is concerned with the transformation of the field of early education in Germany. It poses the question whether these changes can be generally related to the German concept of "Bildung"--as denoting the children's autonomous activity of engaging themselves and the world. Investigating film material on practices of documentation in early education the paper seeks to clarify the impacts that "Bildung" has for the constitution of children's subjectivity. Does "Bildung" bring about a regime of individualization that obfuscates modes of sociality and being with? Are there alternative ways to interpret the modes of subjection in observation?

While current literature on examination and testing mostly engages with the objectivity of exams and their procedural logic, this article is concerned with the 'ethical dimension' of examination: Examinations provoke a particular relation to oneself, possibly self-transformation. The praxis of examination entails self-confrontation in the light of the uncertainty regarding that which is expected of the self. Referring to an example taken from the field of early education, four "figures"--positional difference, exposition, identification, and representation--are used in a heuristic manner to elaborate on the ethical dimension in examination. The aim of the paper is to view "examination" from a theoretical point of view focusing on practices, on the one hand, and to analyze the ethical norms and expectations that the self is addressed with in the field of early education, on the other.

In this essay, Christiane Thompson addresses the question of evaluative practices, particularly student evaluation of teaching (SET), and their effects with respect to pedagogical relations in the university setting. In the first part of the essay, Thompson draws on Michel Foucault's analysis of power to show how university teaching has come to be defined according to notions of obligation, accountability, and assurance. The forgetfulness of pedagogical relations that results from the increasing use of SET prompts Thompson to "rethink" the significance of pedagogical relations in the second part of the essay. Referring to the notion of "educational authority" and Foucault's framework of power, Thompson argues that education is about the continuous re-institution of pedagogical relation to the other. In the final section, Thompson reflects upon the professor's "authority" in terms of constituting a "community of inquiry": specifically, the seminar is interpreted as a pedagogical setting that implies a different "being-with" than SET suggests. She concludes by considering what possibilities and limitations the seminar setting offers and how we can discuss this issue (by means of evaluative practice). (Contains 50 footnotes.)

In this paper, I address the question of how a philosophically enriched view of method might inform both educational theory and educational research. The first part of the paper elaborates recent discussions on "philosophical method" in the educational-philosophical discourse. These discussions point toward the importance of analyzing the conceptual or "categorical" frameworks of educational processes. The second part of the paper discusses Martin Heidegger's work "Being and Time" to capture fully the challenges that a philosophical method faces in investigations of subjectivity: The focus lies on Heidegger's strategy to situate his philosophical work as a descriptive undertaking and simultaneously as a categorical outline of human existentiality ("Dasein"). This work serves to reflect a philosophical as well as empirical attitude or conduct in the final part of the paper, which briefly introduces "categorical research" with some examples.

What is the task of educational theory or philosophy if it is not merely conceived as specification of philosophical doctrines in the realm of education? In my view it is the particular task of educational-philosophical theory to "work critically" on the historically developed cultural constructs that shape our (educational) experience. Thus, the activity that educational theorists are to perform is the critical reflection of the "limits of our world" by drawing on philosophical references and theories. In this text I describe this activity drawing from my own research practice with a particular focus on its relation to what is called thinking.

This paper is concerned with the educational-philosophical implications of Michel Foucault's work: It poses the question whether Michel Foucault's remarks surrounding "limit-experience" can be placed in an educational context and provide an alternative view regarding the relationship that we maintain to ourselves. As a first step, the significance of "limit-experience" for Foucault's historicophilosophical investigations, his "critical ontology of the present", is examined. Far from being an external marking point, it can be shown that limit-experience lies at the centre of Foucault's approaches to the history of thought. As a second step, the resistance of Foucault's work against its integration into the educational realm is examined: Coming from Foucault's "limit-experience", it is possible to problematize a specific way we speak about learning and education. As a subsequent step, this resistance is given a constructive turn: The practices of writing and reading (related to limit-experience) could provide a valuable irritation for philosophers of education by exposing them to the challenges of "singularity" in education. It is argued that specifically the writing practice could be helpful for educational studies in order to inquire into the complex relationship of subject, power, and truth within the educational realm. Finally, the possibilities and difficulties of provoking such a writing practice are mentioned.

In the light of the modern idea of a sovereign and self-transparent subject, the paper evaluates the philosophical and ethical relevance of Bildung. As a first step, (the early) Nietzsche's and Adorno's criticism of Bildung is explicated, a criticism based upon the thinkers' critical stance towards the modern epistemological relation of subject and object. However, neither thinker abandons the concept of Bildung. The second part of the paper accordingly reconstructs Nietzsche's and Adorno's adherence to Bildung understood as a different relationship of subject and object within Bildung. In the paper's concluding reflections there is an attempt to assess the systematic educational consequences, and to shed light on the ethical relevance, of a non-transparent subject of Bildung.

Since Dilthey we have become used to thinking of reason as having a cultural and historical setting. If we take this insight seriously, then critical rationality or critical thinking can no longer be conceived of as context-free skills. This paper takes up the line of thought that is elaborated by Christopher Winch in his 'Developing Critical Rationality as a Pedagogical Aim' and seeks to explicate it by drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of language games and on the re-evaluation of thinking by Theodor Ballauff (a German philosopher of education who was influenced by Martin Heidegger). The overcoming of a solipsistic and idealistic conception of thinking raises questions regarding the pedagogical settings and aims, as well as the problems over the limits of critique in education. A comparison of Ballauff's and Winch's positions reinforces the sense of the significance of critique: although the role of critical rationality within education is ambiguous and precarious, the investigation of autonomy (as an educational goal) shows that critique cannot be limited in any straightforward way.