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In writing the U.S. Constitution the framers anticipated that the use of American military force should require an extraordinary consensus between Congress and the President. The era of the Vietnam War led many to believe that Congress had become the junior partner to presidents who exercised an increasing degree of constitutional independence in use of force issues. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973 attempted to address that constitutional imbalance. Our analysis of the constitutional debates surrounding the adoption of the WPR reveals that members of Congress were unable to agree upon a coherent 'institutional' vision for Congress; even those who supported the measure were unsure of its meaning. When Congress took up measures related to the commitment of American forces in Kosovo, the same constitutional divisions that existed 25 years previously re-emerged and Congress was unable to perform as a full constitutional partner--not because of presidential bullying, but because it lacked its own institutional view of its constitutional responsibilities.

This paper examines whether constitutional interpretations of the proper roles of the executive and the legislative branches influence Congress members' voting decisions on use of force votes. Specifically, the authors examine the hypothesis that some members are presidentialists--those whose constitutional interpretations favor the executive--and others are congressionalists--those whose constitutional interpretations defend congressional prerogatives. We examined members of Congress who served continuously in either the US House of Representatives or the US Senate from 1990-1999. We identified possible congressionalists and presidentialists using all roll call votes of resolutions to authorize the use of force, and examined floor speeches in the Congressional Record to see how these members explained their votes. We conclude some members of Congress do take constitutional interpretations into account when casting these votes, and justify their actions based upon their reading of the Constitution. Thus, they shape congressional debate and voting outcomes.

Recent war powers debates have seen the emergence of two opposing viewpoints. Those who advocate close adherence to the Constitution and who assume congressional predominance in matters of war have squared off against those who point to modern political realities that require presidential independence and power. This article argues that the resulting interpretive dichotomy is both false and unnecessary. The Constitution created a vigorous executive in the conduct of foreign affairs, checked and balanced by an equally powerful Congress. This is borne out by analysis of the language of the Constitution, by an examination of its intent, and by judicial doctrine. An additional method of interpretation, structural argument, integrates text, intent, and doctrine and provides a theoretically sound and politically feasible framework for the exercise of the war power by the political branches., The past few years have given constitutional students and scholars the chance to stake out positions on a number of high-profile and controversial topics. From the impeachment of the president [...]

Twenty-five years ago, students of the American presidency were confronted with the idea that the chief executive had overstepped the reasonable limits of power and was in danger of becoming [...]