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Currently, there is a large deviation between official road freight data and real road freight performance at a subnational level in China. In order to deal with this deviation, the new concept of local freight tonnage and ton-kilometers is presented in this paper based on the territoriality principle, where either the origin or the destination of goods transported is local. Also, the statistic procedures and estimation models of the local freight tonnage and ton-kilometers are proposed based on five accessible basic datasets. Finally, an empirical study in Sichuan province of China is conducted. The statistical results show that there is a large amount of local freight transported by local non-commercial trucks and non-local trucks, which is ignored in the existing road freight statistics. Especially, the higher the level of local economic development, the greater the deviation between the official road freight data and the real road freight performance at a subnational level., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist., (Copyright: © 2023 Huang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.)

With the implementation of the double carbon plan, this paper considers the delivery fees of two risk averse logistics companies under carbon cap and trade mechanism. We establish logistics company Stackelberg (MS) model and retailer Stackelberg (RS) model under mean variance (MV) framework, respectively. We obtain the optimal delivery fees and retail prices. We find out that the higher degree of risk aversion can lead to a lower delivery fee. We also show that a higher carbon trading price or a higher cross price sensitivity will increase delivery fees. Moreover, we indicate that the performances of logistics companies under MS scenario are higher than that RS scenario. In addition, we suggest that under the carbon cap and trade rules, in order to obtain higher profits, logistics companies should use fuel vehicle for transportation under certain conditions, and use electric vehicle in other cases., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist., (Copyright: © 2023 Huang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.)

With the growth of people's environmental awareness and the encouragement of government policies, the use of electric vehicles in logistics distribution is gradually increasing. In order to solve the dual demand of customers' simultaneous pick-up and delivery in the "last kilometer logistics", an electric vehicle routing problem with simultaneous pick-up and delivery and time window (EVRPSPDTW) is considered from the perspective of multi-objective distribution in this paper. Firstly, a decision-making model based on distribution cost and power consumption function is established. In this model, distribution cost includes transportation cost, vehicle use cost, penalty cost of not arriving on time and charging cost. Power consumption function is the energy loss caused by air resistance, tire rolling friction and transmission system. Secondly, a multi-objective genetic algorithm (NSGA-II) optimization solution with fast nondominated ranking and elite strategy is designed, and in view of the shortcomings of traditional NSGA-II, it is proposed to complete population initialization through greedy algorithm and random rules, introduce adaptive cross-mutation strategy in the chromosome crossing and mutation stage, and design three different neighborhood operators in mutation operation based on variant fitness function. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of traffic congestion coefficient further proves the effectiveness of the proposed model and the improved algorithm., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist., (Copyright: © 2023 Cai et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.)

With the rising environmental concerns among consumers all over the world, sustainability has received considerable attention, and numerous enterprises are adopting various practices such as investing in energy-saving to improve sustainability in supply chains. However, many previous researches always assume that decision makers are perfectly rational and neglect the behavioral concerns of decision makers. This paper considers a two-stage sustainable supply chain with behavioral concerns in order to develop more realistic models, and mainly focuses on the energy-saving and pricing decisions in the decentralized system, as well as how to improve energy-saving level and profits. We develop decentralized decision-making models under two types of behavioral concerns: fairness concern and risk aversion, and derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader. The effect of the behavioral concerns on the optimal decisions and corresponding profits is discussed in detail. Theoretical analysis verified by numerical experiments shows that the fairness behavior always causes a negative effect on the manufacturer, total supply chain, and energy conservation, while it could benefit the retailer in profits. The risk aversion behavior always benefits the manufacturer, total supply chain, and energy conservation, whereas it could make the retailer suffer. Note that both the optimal energy-saving level and corresponding profit of the total supply chain under two types of behavioral concerns are lower than that in the centralized system, thereby we propose a revenue-cost-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain, under which both the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve a win-win outcome and the energy-saving level can be improved. In addition, some managerial implications through our analytical and numerical results are summarized in this paper., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.