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Why do people moralize harmless behaviors? Although people rely on cooperative principles in making their moral judgments, I argue that self-interest likely plays a role even in these judgments. I suggest potential lines of research that might examine the role of self-interest in puritanical morality.

Religion makes unique claims (e.g., the existence of supernatural agents) not found in other belief systems, but is religion itself psychologically special? Furthermore, religion is related to many domains of psychological interest, such as morality, health and well-being, self-control, meaning, and death anxiety. Does religion act on these domains via special mechanisms that are unlike secular mechanisms? These could include mechanisms such as beliefs in supernatural agents, providing ultimate meaning, and providing literal immortality. We apply a critical eye to these questions of specialness and conclude that although it is clear that religion is psychologically important, there is not yet strong evidence that it is psychologically special, with the possible exception of its effects on health. We highlight what would be required of future research aimed at convincingly demonstrating that religion is indeed psychologically special, including careful definitions of religion and careful attention to experimental design and causal inference.

Why has fiction been so successful over time? We make the case that fiction may have properties that enhance both individual and group-level fitness by (a) allowing risk-free simulation of important scenarios, (b) effectively transmitting solutions to common problems, and (c) enhancing group cohesion through shared consumption of fictive worlds.

Sex differences in religiosity are cross-culturally common and robust, yet it is unclear why sex differences in some cultures are larger than in others. Although women are more religious than men in most countries, religions frequently provide asymmetrical benefits to men at the expense of women. Two global analyses (51 countries and 74 countries) found that country-level gender equality was consistently and negatively associated with religiousness (i.e. religious attendance, reported importance of God and frequency of prayer) for men, more than for women, leading to a larger sex difference in religiousness in more gender-equal countries. Results were especially robust for religious attendance, and hold accounting for country-level wealth, as well as individuals' religious affiliation, the moralization of sexuality, age and education level. We interpret results through a rational choice lens, which assumes that people are more drawn to religion when it is consistent with their reproductive goals.

The COVID-19 pandemic allowed for a naturalistic, longitudinal investigation of the relationship between faith and science mindsets and concern about COVID-19. Our goal was to examine two possible directional relationships: (Model 1) COVID-19 concern ➔ disease avoidance and self-protection motivations ➔ science and faith mindsets versus (Model 2) science and faith mindsets ➔ COVID-19 concern. We surveyed 858 Mechanical Turk workers in three waves of a study conducted in March, April, and June 2020. We found that science mindsets increased whereas faith mindsets decreased (regardless of religious type) during the early months of the pandemic. Further, bivariate correlations and autoregressive cross-lagged analyses indicated that science mindset was positive predictor of COVID-19 concern, in support of Model 2. Faith mindset was not associated with COVID-19 concern. However, faith mindset was a negative predictor of science mindset. We discuss the need for more research regarding the influence of science and faith mindsets as well as the societal consequences of the pandemic., (© 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Many religions emphasize the importance of sexual morality. This article argues mating strategies are central to understanding religion. I highlight the reproductive-religiosity model, which suggests that religious behavior is partly motivated by preferences for restricted mating strategies. I then discuss how religion can lead to reproductive benefits. Specifically, religions can make parenting a relatively safer strategy by increasing paternal certainty, which drives men toward parental investment, and alloparenting, which reduces offspring mortality rates. Next, I discuss the social implications of reproductive-religiosity, including mate selection and trust. Finally, I discuss the potential role of mating strategies in the evolution and cultural evolution of religion and discuss future directions for developing an approach to religion rooted in mating interests., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Although casual sex is increasingly socially acceptable, negative stereotypes toward women who pursue casual sex remain pervasive. For example, a common trope in television, film, and other media is that women who engage in casual sex have low self-esteem. Despite robust work on prejudice against women who engage in casual sex, little empirical work has focused on the lay theories individuals hold about them. Across six experiments with U.S. adults ( N = 1,469), we found that both men and women stereotype women (but not men) who engage in casual sex as having low self-esteem. This stereotype is held explicitly and semi-implicitly; is not driven by individual differences in religiosity, conservatism, or sexism; and is mediated by inferences that women who have casual sex are unsatisfied with their mating strategy-yet the stereotype persists when women are explicitly described as choosing to have casual sex. Finally, the stereotype appears to be unfounded; across experiments, the same participants' sexual behavior was not significantly correlated with their self-esteem.

Religious people are more trusted than nonreligious people. Although most theorists attribute these perceptions to the beliefs of religious targets, religious individuals also differ in behavioral ways that might cue trust. We examined whether perceivers might trust religious targets more because they heuristically associate religion with slow life-history strategies. In three experiments, we found that religious targets are viewed as slow life-history strategists and that these findings are not the result of a universally positive halo effect; that the effect of target religion on trust is significantly mediated by the target's life-history traits (i.e., perceived reproductive strategy); and that when perceivers have direct information about a target's reproductive strategy, their ratings of trust are driven primarily by his or her reproductive strategy, rather than religion. These effects operate over and above targets' belief in moralizing gods and offer a novel theoretical perspective on religion and trust.