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Background: Infectious diseases such as COVID-19 and HIV/AIDS are behaviorally challenging for persons, vaccine and drug companies, and donors., Methods: In 3 linked games in which a disease may or may not be contracted, N persons choose risky or safe behavior (game 1). Two vaccine companies (game 2) and 2 drug companies (game 3) choose whether to develop vaccines and drugs. Each person chooses whether to buy 1 vaccine (if no disease contraction) or 1 drug (if disease contraction). A donor subsidizes vaccine and drug developments and purchases. Nature probabilistically chooses disease contraction, recovery versus death with and without each drug, and whether vaccines and drugs are developed successfully. COVID-19 data are used for parameter estimation., Results: Each person chooses risky behavior if its utility outweighs safe behavior, accounting for nature's probability of disease contraction which depends on how many are vaccinated. Each person buys a vaccine or drug if the companies produce them and if their utilities (accounting for side effects and virus mutation) outweigh the costs, which may be subsidized by a sponsor., Discussion: Drug purchases depend on nature's recovery probability exceeding the probability in the absence of a drug. Each company develops and produces a vaccine or drug if nature's probability of successful development is high, if sufficiently many persons buy the vaccine or drug at a sales price that sufficiently exceeds the production price, and if the donor sponsors., Conclusion: Accounting for all players' interlinked decisions allowing 14 outcomes, which is challenging without a game theoretic analysis, the donor maximizes all persons' expected utilities at the societal level to adjust how persons' purchases and the companies' development and production are subsidized., Highlights: A game theoretic approach can help explain the production decisions of vaccine and drug companies, and the decisions of persons and a donor, impacted by Nature.In 3 linked games, N persons choose risky behavior if its utility outweighs safe behavior.Vaccine and drug companies develop vaccines and drugs sponsored by a donor if profitable, allowing 14 outcomes.

Background: The article develops an eight-period game between N persons and a pharmaceutical company. The choices of a donor and Nature are parametric., Methods: Persons choose between safe and risky behavior, and whether or not to buy drugs. The pharmaceutical company chooses whether or not to develop drugs. The donor chooses parametrically whether to subsidize drug purchases and drug developments. Nature chooses disease contraction, recovery, death, and virus mutation. The game is solved with backward induction., Results: The conditions are specified for each of seven outcomes ranging from safe behavior to risky behavior and buying no or one or both drugs. The seven outcomes distribute themselves across three outcomes for the pharmaceutical company, which are to develop no drugs, develop one drug, and develop two drugs if the virus mutates. For these three outcomes the donor's expected utility is specified., Conclusion: HIV/AIDS data is used to present a procedure for parameter estimation. The players' strategic choices are exemplified. The article shows how strategic interaction between persons and a pharmaceutical company, with parametric choices of a donor and Nature, impact whether persons choose risky or safe behavior, whether a pharmaceutical company develops no drugs or one drug, or two drugs if a virus mutates, and the impact of subsidies by a donor., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

Gross national income (GNI) per capita is widely regarded as a key determinant of health outcomes. Major donors heavily rely on GNI per capita to allocate development assistance for health (DAH). This article questions this paradigm by analysing the determinants of health outcomes using cross-sectional data from 99 countries in 2012. We use disability-adjusted life years (Group I) per capita as our main indicator for health outcomes. We consider four primary variables: GNI per capita, institutional capacity, individual poverty and the epidemiological surroundings. Our empirical strategy has two innovations. First, we construct a health poverty line of 10.89 international-$ per day, which measures the minimum level of income an individual needs to have access to basic healthcare. Second, we take the contagious nature of communicable diseases into account, by estimating the extent to which the population health in neighbouring countries (the epidemiological surroundings) affects health outcomes. We apply a spatial two-stage least-squares model to mitigate the risks of reverse causality. Our model captures 92% of the variation in health outcomes. We emphasize four findings. First, GNI per capita is not a significant predictor of health outcomes once other factors are controlled for. Second, the poverty gap below the 10.89 health poverty line is a good measure of universal access to healthcare, as it explains 19% of deviation in health outcomes. Third, the epidemiological surroundings in which countries are embedded capture as much as 47% of deviation in health outcomes. Finally, institutional capacity explains 10% of deviation in health outcomes. Our empirical findings suggest that allocation frameworks for DAH should not only take into account national income, which remains an important indicator of countries' financial capacity, but also individual poverty, governance and epidemiological surroundings to increase impact on health outcomes., (The Author(s) 2017. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.)

A four-period game is developed between a policy maker, the international community, and the population. This research supplements, through implementing strategic interaction, earlier research analyzing "one player at a time". The first two players distribute funds between preventing and treating diseases. The population reacts by degree of risky behavior which may cause no disease, disease contraction, recovery, sickness/death. More funds to prevention implies less disease contraction but higher death rate given disease contraction. The cost effectiveness of treatment relative to prevention, country specific conditions, and how the international community converts funds compared with the policy maker in a country, are illustrated. We determine which factors impact funding, e.g. large probabilities of disease contraction, and death given contraction, and if the recovery utility and utility of remaining sick or dying are far below the no disease utility. We also delineate how the policy maker and international community may free ride on each other's contributions. The model is tested against empirical data for 43 African countries. The results show consistency between the theoretical model and empirical estimates. The paper argues for the need to create commitment mechanisms to ensure that free riding by both countries and the international community is avoided.

Despite optimism about the end of AIDS, the HIV response requires sustained financing into the future. Given flat-lining international aid, countries' willingness and ability to shoulder this responsibility will be central to access to HIV care. This paper examines the potential to expand public HIV financing, and the extent to which governments have been utilising these options. We develop and compare a normative and empirical approach. First, with data from the 14 most HIV-affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa, we estimate the potential increase in public HIV financing from economic growth, increased general revenue generation, greater health and HIV prioritisation, as well as from more unconventional and innovative sources, including borrowing, health-earmarked resources, efficiency gains, and complementary non-HIV investments. We then adopt a novel empirical approach to explore which options are most likely to translate into tangible public financing, based on cross-sectional econometric analyses of 92 low and middle-income country governments' most recent HIV expenditure between 2008 and 2012. If all fiscal sources were simultaneously leveraged in the next five years, public HIV spending in these 14 countries could increase from US$3.04 to US$10.84 billion per year. This could cover resource requirements in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Swaziland, but not even half the requirements in the remaining countries. Our empirical results suggest that, in reality, even less fiscal space could be created (a reduction by over half) and only from more conventional sources. International financing may also crowd in public financing. Most HIV-affected lower-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa will not be able to generate sufficient public resources for HIV in the medium-term, even if they take very bold measures. Considerable international financing will be required for years to come. HIV funders will need to engage with broader health and development financing to improve government revenue-raising and efficiencies., (Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Background: In 2015 around 15 million people living with HIV were receiving antiretroviral treatment (ART) in sub-Saharan Africa. Sustained provision of ART, though both prudent and necessary, creates substantial long-term fiscal obligations for countries affected by HIV/AIDS. As donor assistance for health remains constrained, novel financing mechanisms are needed to augment funding domestic sources. We explore how Innovative Financing has been used to co-finance domestic HIV/AIDS responses. Based on analysis of non-health sectors, we identify innovative financing instruments that could be used in the HIV response., Methods: We undertook a systematic review to identify innovative financing instruments used for (1) domestic HIV/AIDS financing in sub-Saharan Africa (2) international health financing and (3) financing in non-health sectors. We analyzed peer-reviewed and grey literature published between 2002 and 2014. We examined the nature and volume of funds mobilized with innovative financing, then in consultation with leading experts, identified instruments that held potential for financing the HIV response., Results: Our analysis revealed three innovative financing instruments in use: Zimbabwe's AIDS Trust Fund (a tax/levy-based instrument), Botswana's National HIV/AIDS Prevention Support (BNAPS) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Buy-Down (a debt conversion instrument), and Côte d'Ivoire's Debt2Health Debt Swap Agreement (a debt conversion instrument). Zimbabwe's AIDS Trust Fund generated US$ 52.7 million between 2008 and 2011, Botswana's IBRD Buy-Down generated US$ 20 million, and Côte d'Ivoire's Debt2Health Debt Swap Agreement generated US$ 27 million, at least half of which was to be invested in HIV/AIDS programs. Four additional categories of innovative financing instruments met our criteria for future use: (1) remittances and diaspora bonds (2) social and development impact bonds (3) sovereign wealth funds (4) risk and credit guarantees., Conclusion: A limited number of innovative financing instruments contributed a very modest share of funding toward domestic HIV/AIDS programs. Several innovative financing instruments successfully applied in other sectors could be used to augment domestic financing toward HIV/AIDS programmes.

Prompted by the 20th anniversary of the 1993 World Development Report, a Lancet Commission revisited the case for investment in health and developed a new investment framework to achieve dramatic health gains by 2035. The Commission's report has four key messages, each accompanied by opportunities for action by national governments of low-income and middle-income countries and by the international community. First, there is an enormous economic payoff from investing in health. The impressive returns make a strong case for both increased domestic financing of health and for allocating a higher proportion of official development assistance to development of health. Second, modeling by the Commission found that a "grand convergence" in health is achievable by 2035-that is, a reduction in infectious, maternal, and child mortality down to universally low levels. Convergence would require aggressive scale up of existing and new health tools, and it could mostly be financed from the expected economic growth of low- and middle-income countries. The international community can best support convergence by funding the development and delivery of new health technologies and by curbing antibiotic resistance. Third, fiscal policies -such as taxation of tobacco and alcohol- are a powerful and underused lever that governments can use to curb non-communicable diseases and injuries while also raising revenue for health. International action on NCDs and injuries should focus on providing technical assistance on fiscal policies, regional cooperation on tobacco, and funding policy and implementation research on scaling-up of interventions to tackle these conditions. Fourth, progressive universalism, a pathway to universal health coverage (UHC) that includes the poor from the outset, is an efficient way to achieve health and financial risk protection. For national governments, progressive universalism would yield high health gains per dollar spent and poor people would gain the most in terms of health and financial protection. The international community can best support countries to implement progressive UHC by financing policy and implementation research, such as on the mechanics of designing and implementing evolution of the benefits package as the resource envelope for public finance grows.