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A fundamental feature for understanding the diffusion of innovations through a social group is the manner in which we are influenced by our own social interactions. It is usually assumed that only direct interactions, those that form our social network, determine the dynamics of adopting innovations. Here, we test this assumption by experimentally and theoretically studying the role of direct and indirect influences in the adoption of innovations. We perform experiments specifically designed to capture the influence that an individual receives from their direct social ties as well as from those socially close to them, as a function of the separation they have in their social network. The results of 21 experimental sessions with more than 590 participants show that the rate of adoption of an innovation is significantly influenced not only by our nearest neighbors but also by the second and third levels of influences an adopter has. Using a mathematical model that accounts for both direct and indirect interactions in a network, we fit the experimental results and determine the way in which influences decay with social distance. The results indicate that the strength of peer pressure on an adopter coming from its second and third circles of influence is approximately two-third and one-third, respectively, relative to their closest neighbors. Our results strongly suggest that the adoption of an innovation is a complex process in which an individual feels significant pressure not only from their direct ties but also by those socially close to them., (© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of National Academy of Sciences.)

Networks of social interactions are the substrate upon which civilizations are built. Often, we create new bonds with people that we like or feel that our relationships are damaged through the intervention of third parties. Despite their importance and the huge impact that these processes have in our lives, quantitative scientific understanding of them is still in its infancy, mainly due to the difficulty of collecting large datasets of social networks including individual attributes. In this work, we present a thorough study of real social networks of 13 schools, with more than 3,000 students and 60,000 declared positive and negative relationships, including tests for personal traits of all the students. We introduce a metric-the "triadic influence"-that measures the influence of nearest neighbors in the relationships of their contacts. We use neural networks to predict the sign of the relationships in these social networks, extracting the probability that two students are friends or enemies depending on their personal attributes or the triadic influence. We alternatively use a high-dimensional embedding of the network structure to also predict the relationships. Remarkably, using the triadic influence (a simple one-dimensional metric) achieves the best accuracy, and adding the personal traits of the students does not improve the results, suggesting that the triadic influence acts as a proxy for the social compatibility of students. We postulate that the probabilities extracted from the neural networks-functions of the triadic influence and the personalities of the students-control the evolution of real social networks, opening an avenue for the quantitative study of these systems.

Congestible goods describe situations in which a group of people share or use a public good that becomes congested or overexploited when demand is low. We study experimentally a congestible goods problem of relevance for parking design, namely how people choose between a convenient parking lot with few spots and a less convenient one with unlimited space. We find that the Nash equilibrium predicts reasonably well the competition for the convenient parking when it has few spots, but not when it has more availability. We then show that the Rosenthal equilibrium, a bounded-rational approach, is a better description of the experimental results accounting for the randomness in the decision process. We introduce a dynamical model that shows how Rosenthal equilibria can be approached in a few rounds of the game. Our results give insights on how to deal with parking problems such as the design of parking lots in central locations in cities and open the way to better understand similar congestible goods problems in other contexts.

When some 'entities' are related by the 'features' they share they are amenable to a bipartite network representation. Plant-pollinator ecological communities, co-authorship of scientific papers, customers and purchases, or answers in a poll, are but a few examples. Analyzing clustering of such entities in the network is a useful tool with applications in many fields, like internet technology, recommender systems, or detection of diseases. The algorithms most widely applied to find clusters in bipartite networks are variants of modularity optimization. Here, we provide a hierarchical clustering algorithm based on a dissimilarity between entities that quantifies the probability that the features shared by two entities are due to mere chance. The algorithm performance is O(n^{2}) when applied to a set of n entities, and its outcome is a dendrogram exhibiting the connections of those entities. Through the introduction of a 'susceptibility' measure we can provide an 'optimal' choice for the clustering as well as quantify its quality. The dendrogram reveals further useful structural information though-like the existence of subclusters within clusters or of nodes that do not fit in any cluster. We illustrate the algorithm by applying it first to a set of synthetic networks, and then to a selection of examples. We also illustrate how to transform our algorithm into a valid alternative for one-mode networks as well, and show that it performs at least as well as the standard, modularity-based algorithms-with a higher numerical performance. We provide an implementation of the algorithm in python freely accessible from GitHub.

The problem of public good provision is central in economics and touches upon many challenging societal issues, ranging from climate change mitigation to vaccination schemes. However, results which are supposed to be applied to a societal scale have only been obtained with small groups of people, with a maximum group size of 100 being reported in the literature. This work takes this research to a new level by carrying out and analysing experiments on public good games with up to 1000 simultaneous players. The experiments are carried out via an online protocol involving daily decisions for extended periods. Our results show that within those limits, participants' behaviour and collective outcomes in very large groups are qualitatively like those in smaller ones. On the other hand, large groups imply the difficulty of conveying information on others' choices to the participants. We thus consider different information conditions and show that they have a drastic effect on subjects' contributions. We also classify the individual decisions and find that they can be described by a moderate number of types. Our findings allow to extend the conclusions of smaller experiments to larger settings and are therefore a relevant step forward towards the understanding of human behaviour and the organisation of our society.

Understanding whether the size of the interacting group has an effect on cooperative behavior has been a major topic of debate since the seminal works on cooperation in the 1960s. Half a century later, scholars have yet to reach a consensus, with some arguing that cooperation is harder in larger groups, while others that cooperation is easier in larger groups, and yet others that cooperation attains its maximum in intermediate size groups. Here we add to this field of work by reporting a two-treatment empirical study where subjects play a Public Goods Game with a Critical Mass, such that the return for full cooperation increases linearly for early contributions and then stabilizes after a critical mass is reached (the two treatments differ only on the critical mass). We choose this game for two reasons: it has been argued that it approximates real-life social dilemmas; previous work suggests that, in this case, group size might have an inverted-U effect on cooperation, where the pick of cooperation is reached around the critical mass. Our main innovation with respect to previous experiments is that we implement a within-subject design, such that the same subject plays in groups of different size (from 5 to 40 subjects). Groups are formed at random at every round and there is no feedback. This allows us to explore if and how subjects change their choice as a function of the size of the group. We report three main results, which partially contrast what has been suggested by previous work: in our setting (i) the critical mass has no effect on cooperation; (ii) group size has a positive effect on cooperation; (iii) the most chosen option (played by about 50% of the subjects) is All Defection, followed by All Cooperation (about 10% of the subjects), whereas the rest have a slight trend to switch preferentially from defection to cooperation as the group size increases.

The interplay of social structure and cooperative behavior is under much scrutiny lately as behavior in social contexts becomes increasingly relevant for everyday life. Earlier experimental work showed that the existence of a social hierarchy, earned through competition, was detrimental for the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Here, we study the case in which individuals are ranked in a hierarchical structure based on their performance in a collective effort by having them play a Public Goods Game. In the first treatment, participants are ranked according to group earnings while, in the second treatment, their rankings are based on individual earnings. Subsequently, participants play asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma games where higher-ranked players gain more than lower ones. Our experiments show that there are no detrimental effects of the hierarchy formed based on group performance, yet when ranking is assigned individually we observe a decrease in cooperation. Our results show that different levels of cooperation arise from the fact that subjects are interpreting rankings as a reputation which carries information about which subjects were cooperators in the previous phase. Our results demonstrate that noting the manner in which a hierarchy is established is essential for understanding its effects on cooperation.

Recent studies have shown that long non-coding RNAs (lncRNAs) have key functions during breast cancer development. Considering the complexity of IncRNAs regulatory network, the identification of novel and functional lncRNAs associated with breast cancer is thus very important. By using Agilent LncRNA Human Gene Expression Microarray, we identified a number of lncRNAs that were differentially expressed in breast cancer compared to their corresponding adjacent tissues. According to the microarray, the expression of p10247, henceforth named as lncRNA-BCHE (standing for lncRNA high expressed in breast cancer), was found to be uniformly higher in all the five breast cancer tissues tested, and this was further confirmed in 56 breast cancer tissues by real-time RT-PCR. The function of lncRNA-BCHE in breast cancer cells was tested by knockdown and over-expression experiments in vitro. We also analyzed the public cohorts of breast cancer patients on the Kaplan Meier plotter platform. Clinical analysis revealed that the expression of lncRNA-BCHE was significantly correlated with advanced clinical stage and lymph node metastasis. Our data indicate that lncRNA-BCHE regulates the growth, migration and invasion of breast cancer cells. In addition, we found that these functions are mediated, at least in part, by the regulation of integrin subunit beta 1 (ITGB1) levels. The expression of ITGB1 serves as a negative prognostic factor and metastasis risk predictor in breast cancer, irrespective of subtype and therapeutic regimen. In summary, our results suggest that lncRNA-BCHE is an oncogenic lncRNA enhancing the growth and metastatic potential of breast cancer cells, and a potential predictor of breast cancer metastatic progression.

Expectations, exerting influence through social norms, are a very strong candidate to explain how complex societies function. In the Dictator game (DG), people expect generous behavior from others even if they cannot enforce any sharing of the pie. Here we assume that people donate following their expectations, and that they update their expectations after playing a DG by reinforcement learning to construct a model that explains the main experimental results in the DG. Full agreement with the experimental results is reached when some degree of mismatch between expectations and donations is added into the model. These results are robust against the presence of envious agents, but affected if we introduce selfish agents that do not update their expectations. Our results point to social norms being on the basis of the generous behavior observed in the DG and also to the wide applicability of reinforcement learning to explain many strategic interactions.

We study the influence that resource availability has on cooperation in the context of hunter-gatherer societies. This paper proposes a model based on archaeological and ethnographic research on resource stress episodes, which exposes three different cooperative regimes according to the relationship between resource availability in the environment and population size. The most interesting regime represents moderate survival stress in which individuals coordinate in an evolutionary way to increase the probabilities of survival and reduce the risk of failing to meet the minimum needs for survival. Populations self-organise in an indirect reciprocity system in which the norm that emerges is to share the part of the resource that is not strictly necessary for survival, thereby collectively lowering the chances of starving. Our findings shed further light on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies.

In this work, we aim to contribute to the understanding of human prosocial behavior by studying the influence that a particular form of social pressure, "being watched," has on the evolution of cooperative behavior. We study how cooperation emerges in multiplex complex topologies by analyzing a particular bidirectionally coupled dynamics on top of a two-layer multiplex network (duplex). The coupled dynamics appears between the prisoner's dilemma game in a network and a threshold cascade model in the other. The threshold model is intended to abstract the behavior of a network of vigilant nodes that impose the pressure of being observed altering hence the temptation to defect of the dilemma. Cooperation or defection in the game also affects the state of a node of being vigilant. We analyze these processes on different duplex networks structures and assess the influence of the topology, average degree and correlated multiplexity, on the outcome of cooperation. Interestingly, we find that the social pressure of vigilance may impact cooperation positively or negatively, depending on the duplex structure, specifically the degree correlations between layers is determinant. Our results give further quantitative insights in the promotion of cooperation under social pressure.

This article presents an agent-based model designed to explore the development of cooperation in hunter-fisher-gatherer societies that face a dilemma of sharing an unpredictable resource that is randomly distributed in space. The model is a stylised abstraction of the Yamana society, which inhabited the channels and islands of the southernmost part of Tierra del Fuego (Argentina-Chile). According to ethnographic sources, the Yamana developed cooperative behaviour supported by an indirect reciprocity mechanism: whenever someone found an extraordinary confluence of resources, such as a beached whale, they would use smoke signals to announce their find, bringing people together to share food and exchange different types of social capital. The model provides insight on how the spatial concentration of beachings and agents' movements in the space can influence cooperation. We conclude that the emergence of informal and dynamic communities that operate as a vigilance network preserves cooperation and makes defection very costly.

Hemorragic dengue fever is a prevalent infection in many countries around the world. Myocarditis is a severe manifestation of dengue virus infection. With prompt intervention and an early diagnosis, the outcome of this condition can be improve. We report a adult patient with complicated dengue, myocarditis, cardiac and respiratory insufficiency with acute renal injury.

The corrosion behaviour of AZ31 magnesium alloy with different grain sizes immersed in simulated body fluids was compared in chloride solution (8 gl(-1)) and in phosphate-buffer solution (PBS). The influence of immersion time was also analyzed. Electrochemical techniques such as open circuit potential, polarization curves, transient currents and electrochemical impedance spectroscopy, complemented with scanning electron microscopy and energy dispersive spectroscopy, were used. Immediately after the immersion in the corrosive media the corrosion resistance was similar for both grain sizes of the AZ31 alloy and higher in NaCl solutions than in PBS. However, this corrosion behaviour was reversed after longer periods of immersion due to the stabilizing of the corrosion products of MgO by P-containing compounds. These P-compounds contribute to a higher level of protection by hindering the aggressive action of chloride ions. The best corrosion behaviour of the AZ31 alloy was obtained for the finest grain alloy associated with the highest transfer resistance value, after long periods of immersion in PBS., (Copyright (c) 2009 Acta Materialia Inc. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)