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Testing is increasingly recognized as an important tool in learning. One form of testing often used in lectures, particularly recorded lectures, is interpolated testing wherein tests are interspersed throughout the lecture. Like testing in general, interpolated testing appears to benefit performance on content tests among other outcome variables (e.g., mind wandering). While beneficial, adding testing also increases instructional time. In the present investigation, we examine one strategy to mitigate the costs of this increase in instructional time in the context of recorded lectures. Specifically, we examine the interaction between increasing the playback speed of a recorded lecture and adding interpolated tests. Results demonstrate that the conjoint effects of these two interventions are largely additive. That is, the benefit of testing was as robust in a normal speed lecture and a lecture that was sped up 1.5×. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Measuring effort has long been a challenge and this seems particularly true in the case of subjective effort. Koriat et al. compared two types of effort frames, what they call data-driven effort, the amount of effort perceived to be required by a task, and goal-driven effort, the amount of effort one chooses to invest in a task. This study investigates whether self-reports of data- and goal-driven effort are differentially associated with test performance, metacognition, and affect in a complex learning task. Results demonstrate that data- and goal-driven effort have qualitatively different relations with many of these variables. For example, partial correlations revealed data-driven effort was negatively associated with prospective and retrospective performance estimates, but the opposite pattern emerged for goal-driven effort. These results demonstrate that how subjective measures of effort are framed (and interpreted by the respondent) can drastically influence how they relate to other variables of interest., Competing Interests: Declaration of conflicting interestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

While memory for semantically related items is improved over unrelated items in many cases, relatedness can also lead to memory costs. Here we examined how the semantic relatedness of words within a display influenced memory for their locations. Participants learned the locations of words inside grid displays; the words in a given display were either from a single category or were from different assorted categories. When a display containing words from a single category was compared to a scrambled display containing words from multiple categories, location memory performance was rendered worse, while word recall performance was significantly improved. Our results suggest that semantically structured spaces can both help and harm memory within the context of a location memory task. We hypothesize that relatedness can improve memory performance by increasing the likelihood that matching candidates will be retrieved, yet might worsen performance that requires distinguishing between similar target representations., (© 2023. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.)

In our lived environments, objects are often semantically organised (e.g., cookware and cutlery are placed close together in the kitchen). Across four experiments, we examined how semantic partitions (that group same-category objects in space) influenced memory for object locations. Participants learned the locations of items in a semantically partitioned display (where each partition contained objects from a single category) as well as a purely visually partitioned display (where each partition contained a scrambled assortment of objects from different categories). Semantic partitions significantly improved location memory accuracy compared to the scrambled display. However, when the correct partition was cued (highlighted) to participants during recall, performance on the semantically partitioned display was similar to the scrambled display. These results suggest that semantic partitions largely benefit memory for location by enhancing the ability to use the given category as a cue for a visually partitioned area (e.g., toys - top left). Our results demonstrate that semantically structured spaces help location memory across partitions, but not items within a partition, providing new insights into the interaction between meaning and memory.

In our lived environments, objects are often semantically organised (e.g., cookware and cutlery are placed close together in the kitchen). Across four experiments, we examined how semantic partitions (that group same-category objects in space) influenced memory for object locations. Participants learned the locations of items in a semantically partitioned display (where each partition contained objects from a single category) as well as a purely visually partitioned display (where each partition contained a scrambled assortment of objects from different categories). Semantic partitions significantly improved location memory accuracy compared to the scrambled display. However, when the correct partition was cued (highlighted) to participants during recall, performance on the semantically partitioned display was similar to the scrambled display. These results suggest that semantic partitions largely benefit memory for location by enhancing the ability to use the given category as a cue for a visually partitioned area (e.g., toys - top left). Our results demonstrate that semantically structured spaces help location memory across partitions, but not items within a partition, providing new insights into the interaction between meaning and memory.

Current accounts of the production effect suggest that production leads to the encoding of additional production-associated features and/or better feature encoding. Thus, if it is the act of production that leads to the storage and/or enhanced encoding of these features, then less of this act should reduce the resulting production effect. In two experiments, we provide a direct test of this idea by manipulating how much of a given item is produced within a single mode of production (typing). Results demonstrate that such partial production can yield a significant production effect that is smaller than the effect that emerges from producing the entire item. These results suggest that how much of an item is produced can moderate the size of the production effect and are considered in the context of recent modelling efforts., (© 2023. The Psychonomic Society, Inc.)

The production effect is the finding that, relative to silent reading, producing information at study (e.g., reading aloud) leads to a benefit in memory. In most studies of this effect, individuals are presented with a set of unique items, and they produce a subset of these items (e.g., they are presented with the to-be-remembered target item TABLE and produce table ) such that the production is both unique and representative of the target. Across two preregistered experiments, we examined the influence of a production that is unique but that does not match the target (e.g., producing fence to the target TABLE, producing car to the target TREE, and so on). This kind of production also yielded a significant effect-the mismatching production effect-although it was smaller than the standard production effect (i.e., when productions are both unique and representative of their targets) and was detectable only when targets with standard productions were included in the same study phase (i.e., when the type of production was manipulated within participant). We suggest that target-production matching is an important precursor to the production effect and that the kind of production that brings about a benefit depends on the other productions that are present.

It has been argued that the experience of ease (i.e., the ability to quickly generate an initial response) during processing influences one's likelihood of engaging reflectively when reasoning. This is a key facet of Metacognitive Reasoning Theory (MRT) and numerous studies have found support for this claim by showing that answers that come to mind quickly, are associated with higher feelings of rightness (FORs), and less reflective processing. However, the possibility remains that the critical determinant of FORs may be the speed of executing a response and not generating a response, given the nature of the evidence for this claim. Across two experiments, we manipulated the duration of the response execution to identify whether participants' FOR judgements are at least partially based on factors occurring after the initial mental generation of an answer. We found no evidence that FORs nor reflection are influenced by a manipulation of response execution. Broadly, the present investigation provides evidence that the relation between speed of response and FORs is likely due to the speed with which an answer is generated internally, and not the response execution phase. These findings are consistent with Metacognitive Reasoning Theory and provide further support for the suggestion that answer fluency is the critical variable in determining FORs. All data, scripts, and materials can be found at https://osf.io/f48az/., Competing Interests: Declaration of conflicting interestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Previous work demonstrates that individuals often recall less information if, at study, there is expectation that an external memory store will be available at test. One explanation for this effect is that when individuals can expect access to an external memory store, they forgo intentional, controlled efforts at encoding. The present work offers a novel test of this account by examining study effort, indexed by study time and self-reported strategy use, as a function of instructed external store availability. In two preregistered experiments, participants studied lists of to-be-remembered items for a free recall test and were either instructed that they could use their study list to support them at test or that they could not. Critically, participants controlled their own study time, and no participant had their study list at test, regardless of instruction. Consistent with the effort at encoding account, external store availability influenced both study time and strategy use, and there was evidence that these effects mediated the influence of external store availability on recall performance. Interestingly, much of the memory cost remained when controlling for study effort, thus, suggesting that the cost is potentially multiply determined., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Cognitive effort is a central construct in our lives, yet our understanding of the processes underlying our judgments of effort are limited. Recent work has suggested that our judgments of effort are sensitive to the context in which they are made (i.e., the judgment context). Using a cognitive task and stimulus set that has produced a reliable dissociation between judgments of effort and cognitive demand (as measured by performance and other indirect measures of demand), we examined whether evaluation context might be able to eliminate this dissociation (i.e., bring judgments of effort more in line with measures of cognitive demand). To address this question, we conducted four experiments manipulating a number of aspects of the judgment context including, principally, a manipulation of joint versus separate evaluation; whether the judgment was prospective, or retrospective; and whether prospective judgments were made with or without having experienced the cognitive task. Additionally, we collected objective demand measures and examined participants' self-reported reasons for their judgments of effort across the joint and separate evaluation contexts. Results demonstrated that evaluation context has a marked effect on judgments of effort; however, no judgment context appeared to yield a pattern more similar to what is found using measures of cognitive demand. Moreover, the reasons individuals cited for their judgments varied across evaluation contexts. Implications of the present work for our understanding of judgments of effort are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

We often rely on external devices to store to-be-remembered information in our everyday lives (e.g., writing grocery lists, setting reminders), yet there is limited research about how certain information (i.e., valuable information) may be differentially encoded when we rely on our internal memory versus an external store. Across three preregistered experiments, we examined the effect of relying on an external store on the recall of high-value and low-value information. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we presented participants with words associated with point values and examined mean recall performance during two critical trials in which the external store was not available: (1) a trial in which participants were told that they would have access to an external memory store at test (told-external-store) and (2) a trial in which participants were told that they would not have access to their external store at test (told-no-external-store). In Experiment 2, we explored participants' metacognitive predictions of performance on the recall test. Critically, across all of the experiments, we found that the value effect (i.e., better recall for valuable information) was significantly reduced when individuals were told that they could rely on an external store. The same pattern was present in participant's metacognitive judgements. Together, these results suggest that when relying on external stores, individuals forgo (to some extent, at least) selective encoding by value and that individuals might be aware of this change in strategy., (© 2022. The Psychonomic Society, Inc.)

Humans routinely organise or reconfigure the environment as part of their everyday activities, such as placing a set of keys in a designated location to reduce the need to remember its location. This type of spatial organisation is widely thought to reduce both the physical and cognitive demands of a task to allow individuals to perform tasks more easily. Although spatial organisation can be a useful strategy when searching for items in the environment, individuals do not always choose to utilise these organisational strategies when carrying out everyday tasks. Across three experiments, we examined individuals' preference for spatial organisation in the context of a real-world search task, and the degree to which individuals engaged in time- and effort-based cost-benefit analysis to inform whether to choose between an organisation-based or non-organisation-based search strategy. We found that individuals' strategy preferences could be explained by the perceived task time associated with each strategy, but not perceived task effort. However, even statistically controlling for relative perceived task time or reported effort, participants showed a strong systematic preference against organisation prior to engaging in the task, and, post-task, a strong preference towards organisation. Implications for understanding individuals' use of spatial organisation are discussed.

Relying on external memory aids is a common memory strategy that has long allowed us to "remember" vast amounts of information more reliably than with our internal memory alone. However, recent work has provided evidence consistent with the idea that offloading memory demands encourages a reduced engagement in intentional or top-down memory strategies/efforts, leading to lower memory performance in general. Evidence for this view comes from results demonstrating a reduced primacy effect but intact recency and isolation effects when individuals could offload memory demands (but had to unexpectedly rely on their internal memory at test). In the present investigation, we attempt a replication of these critical results, given some inconsistencies in the findings between studies. In addition, we extend the examination of offloading's impact on memory via examining individual differences in reliance on the external store (when available) and different strategies for the use of that store. Results of the replication are generally consistent with previous research. An individual differences analysis yielded results consistent with the notion that increased reliance on an external store can compromise internal/biological memory in the absence of that store. Finally, a verbal model of offloading memory demands within a framework of effort and study time allocation is presented. Together, the results both reinforce extant research and extend it in new directions., (© 2021. The Psychonomic Society, Inc.)

Offloading memory to external stores (e.g., a saved file) allows us to evade the limitations of our internal memory. One cost of this strategy is that the external memory store used may be accessible to others and, thus, may be manipulated. Here we examine how reducing the perceived reliability of an external memory store and manipulating one's expectation for future access to such a store can influence participants' susceptibility to its manipulation (i.e., endorsing manipulated information as authentic). Across three pre-registered experiments, participants were able to store to-be-remembered information in an external store. On a critical trial, we surreptitiously manipulated the information in that store. Results demonstrated that an explicit notification of a previous manipulation of that store and the warning that the store will be inaccessible in the future can decrease susceptibility to manipulation of that store. Results are discussed in the context of the metacognitive monitoring and control of memory reports in situations that involve the distribution of memory demands across both internal and external spaces.

When we can offload to-be-remembered information to an external store, our ability to recall that information from internal memory can be diminished. However, previous research has suggested that associative memory processes may remain intact in the face of offloading behaviour. In the present investigation, we examine how the opportunity to offload memory demands affects the learning of categorised word lists. Across six experiments, participants studied and wrote down word lists that were either strongly associated with a semantic theme (categorised) or word lists that consisted of the same set of words but shuffled across the categorised lists (shuffled). When participants expected to have access to their written lists during the recall test (i.e., a condition that would encourage offloading) but were not given access to it, we found the typical recall advantage for categorised lists. This effect was found to be the same size or larger compared to a condition where participants did not expect to have access to their written lists during the recall test (i.e., a condition that would not allow offloading). We propose that gist memory supported by semantic associations is not substantially reduced in offloading.

Research into both receptivity to falling for bullshit and the propensity to produce it have recently emerged as active, independent areas of inquiry into the spread of misleading information. However, it remains unclear whether those who frequently produce bullshit are inoculated from its influence. For example, both bullshit receptivity and bullshitting frequency are negatively related to cognitive ability and aspects of analytic thinking style, suggesting that those who frequently engage in bullshitting may be more likely to fall for bullshit. However, separate research suggests that individuals who frequently engage in deception are better at detecting it, thus leading to the possibility that frequent bullshitters may be less likely to fall for bullshit. Here, we present three studies (N = 826) attempting to distinguish between these competing hypotheses, finding that frequency of persuasive bullshitting (i.e., bullshitting intended to impress or persuade others) positively predicts susceptibility to various types of misleading information and that this association is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style., (© 2021 The British Psychological Society.)

We propose a novel phenomenon, attention contagion, defined as the spread of attentive (or inattentive) states among members of a group. We examined attention contagion in a learning environment in which pairs of undergraduate students watched a lecture video. Each pair consisted of a participant and a confederate trained to exhibit attentive behaviors (e.g., leaning forward) or inattentive behaviors (e.g., slouching). In Experiment 1, confederates sat in front of participants and could be seen. Relative to participants who watched the lecture with an inattentive confederate, participants with an attentive confederate: (a) self-reported higher levels of attentiveness, (b) behaved more attentively (e.g., took more notes), and (c) had better memory for lecture content. In Experiment 2, confederates sat behind participants. Despite confederates not being visible, participants were still aware of whether confederates were acting attentively or inattentively, and participants were still susceptible to attention contagion. Our findings suggest that distraction is one factor that contributes to the spread of inattentiveness (Experiment 1), but this phenomenon apparently can still occur in the absence of distraction (Experiment 2). We propose an account of how (in)attentiveness spreads across students and discuss practical implications regarding how learning is affected in the classroom. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Cognitive effort is a central construct in our lives, yet our understanding of the processes underlying our perception of effort is limited. Performance is typically used as one way to assess effort in cognitive tasks (e.g., tasks that take longer are generally thought to be more effortful); however, Dunn and Risko reported a recent case where such "objective" measures of effort were dissociated from judgements of effort (i.e., subjective effort). This dissociation occurred when participants either made their judgements of effort after the task (i.e., reading stimuli composed of rotated words) or without ever performing the task. This leaves open the possibility that if participants made their judgements of effort more proximal to the actual experience of performing the task (e.g., right after a given trial) that these judgements might better correspond to putatively "objective" measures of effort. To address this question, we conducted two experiments replicating Dunn and Risko with additional probes for post-trial judgements of effort (i.e., a judgement of effort made right after each trial). Results provided some support for the notion that judgements of effort more closely follow reading times when made post-trial as opposed to post-task. Implications of the present work for our understanding of judgements of effort are discussed.

Recent psychological research has identified important individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit, which has greatly enhanced our understanding of the processes behind susceptibility to pseudo-profound or otherwise misleading information. However, the bulk of this research attention has focused on cognitive and dispositional factors related to bullshit (the product), while largely overlooking the influences behind bullshitting (the act). Here, we present results from four studies focusing on the construction and validation of a new, reliable scale measuring the frequency with which individuals engage in two types of bullshitting (persuasive and evasive) in everyday situations. Overall, bullshitting frequency was negatively associated with sincerity, honesty, cognitive ability, open-minded cognition, and self-regard. Additionally, the Bullshitting Frequency Scale was found to reliably measure constructs that are (1) distinct from lying and (2) significantly related to performance on overclaiming and social decision tasks. These results represent an important step forward by demonstrating the utility of the Bullshitting Frequency Scale as well as highlighting certain individual differences that may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in everyday bullshitting., (© 2020 British Psychological Society.)

Offloading to-be-remembered information is a ubiquitous memory strategy, yet in relying on external memory stores, our ability to recall from internal memory is often diminished. In the present investigation, we examine how offloading impacts true and false recall. Across three experiments, participants studied and wrote down word lists that were each strongly associated with an unstudied critical word. Recall in the Offloading condition (i.e., when they were told that they would have access to their written lists during recall) was contrasted with a No-Offloading condition (i.e., when they were told that they would not have access to their written lists during recall). We found that offloading decreased true recall of presented words while increasing false recall for unpresented critical words. Results are discussed in terms of offloading's differential effects on the formation of gist and verbatim traces during encoding., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

An important aspect of embodied approaches to cognition is the idea that human cognition does not occur simply in the brain, but is influenced by a complex bi-directional interplay between the brain, body, and external environment. Though embodied cognition is often studied in a controlled laboratory setting, by its very nature it can arise spontaneously in everyday life (e.g., gesturing). A recent paper by Chisholm et al. suggested that leaning while playing a video game may be another instance of a natural spontaneous expression of embodied cognition that can be studied to gain insight into a person's ongoing covert cognition. Consistent with this proposal, Chisholm et al. found that, like gestures, leaning increases when cognitive demand is increased. However, in Chisholm et al., immersion also increased with cognitive demand. We argue that their test to exclude it as a contributing factor-by holding cognitive demand constant while manipulating immersion-was limited. Despite their test, it remains possible and plausible that cognitive demand has an effect on leaning only when immersion increases. To address this issue, the present study systematically varied demand and immersion. We replicate Chisholm et al.'s finding that leaning increases with cognitive load. We also show that the effect of load is not influenced by a robust and reliable change in immersion. Collectively our results provide new and converging evidence that spontaneous overt embodiment of an individual's intention is modulated by cognitive demand, and emphasises the utility of using natural behaviours to understand the embodiment of cognition.

The effect of cognitive load on social attention was examined across three experiments in a live pedestrian passing scenario (Experiments 1 and 2) and with the same scenario presented as a video (Experiment 3). In all three experiments, the load was manipulated using an auditory 2-back task. While the participant was wearing a mobile eye-tracker, the participant's fixation behavior toward a confederate was recorded and analyzed based on temporal proximity from the confederate (near or far) and the specific regions of the confederate being observed (i.e., head or body). In Experiment 1 we demonstrated an effect of cognitive load such that there was a lower proportion of fixations and time spent fixating toward the confederate in the load condition. A similar pattern of results was found in Experiment 2 when a within-subject design was used. In Experiment 3, which employed a less authentic social situation (i.e., video), a similar effect of cognitive load was observed. Collectively, these results suggest attentional resources play a central role in social attentional behaviors in both authentic (real-world) and less authentic (video recorded) situations.

People often behave differently when they know they are being watched. Here, we report the first investigation of whether such social presence effects also include brain monitoring technology, and also their impacts on the measured neural activity. We demonstrate that merely informing participants that fMRI has the potential to observe (thought-related) brain activity is sufficient to trigger changes in functional connectivity within and between relevant brain networks that have been previously associated selectively with executive and attentional control as well as self-relevant processing, social cognition, and theory of mind. These results demonstrate that an implied social presence, mediated here by recording brain activity with fMRI, can alter brain functional connectivity. These data provide a new manipulation of social attention, as well as shining light on a methodological hazard for researchers using equipment to monitor brain activity.

Despite the long history and pervasiveness of cognitive offloading as a memory strategy, the memorial fate of offloaded information is not well understood. Recent work has suggested that offloading information may engage similar mechanisms as instructions to forget (e.g., directed forgetting). In the present investigation, we test this prediction by examining the serial position effect for offloaded information. Previous research has demonstrated that "forget" instructions can eliminate the primacy effect while leaving an intact recency effect. Across two experiments, participants completed a number of free recall trials using an external aid and then a final recall trial without the external aid. We compared a group that was expecting to use the aid for the final trial (offloading) with a group that was not (no-offloading). We found a memory impairment for offloaded items that was characterized by a reduced primacy effect but a typical recency effect, similar to what has been reported in research on intentional/directed forgetting.

The notion that individuals adapt their behaviors in ways that are sensitive to the effortfulness of cognitive processing is pervasive in psychology. In the current set of experiments, we provide a test of a cue-utilization account of how individuals decide which course of action is more or less effortful. In particular, we contrast the influences of time costs and demands on executive control with the influence of an available effort cue. Using a variant of the demand selection task (DST) that specifically focused on making effort-based decisions, we provide evidence that effort-based decisions can be dissociated from both time costs and demands on executive control in a manner predicted by a cue-utilization account., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Why are some actions evaluated as effortful? In the present set of experiments we address this question by examining individuals' perception of effort when faced with a trade-off between two putative cognitive costs: how much time a task takes vs. how error-prone it is. Specifically, we were interested in whether individuals anticipate engaging in a small amount of hard work (i.e., low time requirement, but high error-likelihood) vs. a large amount of easy work (i.e., high time requirement, but low error-likelihood) as being more effortful. In between-subject designs, Experiments 1 through 3 demonstrated that individuals anticipate options that are high in perceived error-likelihood (yet less time consuming) as more effortful than options that are perceived to be more time consuming (yet low in error-likelihood). Further, when asked to evaluate which of the two tasks was (a) more effortful, (b) more error-prone, and (c) more time consuming, effort-based and error-based choices closely tracked one another, but this was not the case for time-based choices. Utilizing a within-subject design, Experiment 4 demonstrated overall similar pattern of judgments as Experiments 1 through 3. However, both judgments of error-likelihood and time demand similarly predicted effort judgments. Results are discussed within the context of extant accounts of cognitive control, with considerations of how error-likelihood and time demands may independently and conjunctively factor into judgments of cognitive effort.

We explored the possibility that increasing participants' motivation to perform well on a focal task can reduce mind wandering. Participants completed a sustained-attention task either with standard instructions (normal motivation), or with instructions informing them that they could be excused from the experiment early if they achieved a certain level of performance (higher motivation). Throughout the task, we assessed rates of mind wandering (both intentional and unintentional types) via thought probes. Results showed that the motivation manipulation led to significant reductions in both intentional and unintentional mind wandering as well as improvements in task performance. Most critically, we found that our simple motivation manipulation led to a dramatic reduction in probe-caught mind-wandering rates (49%) compared to a control condition (67%), which suggests the utility of motivation-based methods to reduce people's propensity to mind-wander.

In many situations, increasing task difficulty decreases thoughts that are unrelated to the task (i.e., mind-wandering). In the context of reading, however, recent research demonstrated that increasing passage reading difficulty actually increases mind-wandering rates (e.g., Feng et al. in Psychon Bull Rev 20:586-592, 2013). The primary goal of this research was to elucidate the mechanism that drives this positive relation. Across Experiments 1-3, we found evidence that the effect of Flesch-Kincaid reading difficulty on mind-wandering is partially driven by hard passages having longer sections of text (i.e., more words per screen) than easy passages when passages are presented one sentence at a time. In Experiment 4, we controlled for reading difficulty, and found that section length was positively associated with mind-wandering rates. We conclude by proposing that individuals may tend to disengage their attention from passages with relatively long sections of text because they appear to be more demanding than passages with shorter sections (even though objective task demands are equivalent).

Based on a recent metacognitive account, cognitive effort is the result of an inferential evaluation made over explicitly available cues. Following from this account, we present here a pre-registered experiment that tested the specific hypothesis that explicit awareness of cues that are aligned with cognitive demand is a prerequisite in avoiding effortful lines of action. We attempted to modulate levels of effort avoidance behavior by introducing an incentive (between-subjects) to monitor two lines of action that, unbeknownst to individuals, varied in the probability of a task switch. Importantly, previous research has demonstrated that the difference in these probabilities is relatively opaque to individuals. We did not find strong evidence for our incentive manipulation having an effect on demand avoidance as indexed by individuals' choices in a block of the task where avoiding effort was instructed. However, we do find that being aware of the task-switching cue appears to increase the likelihood of demand avoidance. We consider these results within the context of the metacognition of cognitive effort., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Recent research has indicated that reducing the difficulty of a task by increasing the predictability of critical stimuli produces increases in intentional mind wandering, but, contrary to theoretical expectations, decreases in unintentional mind wandering. Here, we sought to determine whether reducing task difficulty by reducing working-memory load would yield similar results. Participants completed an easy (Choice Response Time; CRT) task and a relatively difficult (Working Memory; WM) task, and intermittently responded to thought probes asking about intentional and unintentional mind wandering. As in prior studies, we found higher rates of intentional mind wandering during the easy compared to the more difficult task. However, we also found more unintentional mind wandering during the difficult compared to the easy task. We discuss these results in the context of theoretical accounts of mind wandering., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Material re-exposure (e.g., re-reading) is a popular mnemonic strategy, however, its utility has been questioned. We extend research on re-reading to re-watching - an emerging mnemonic technique given the increased use of recorded lectures today (e.g., in online courses). Consistent with findings from recent investigations of re-reading, there were no benefits of massed re-watching on memory for lecture material and re-watching increased rates of mind wandering. We discuss implications for understanding the cognitive consequences of re-exposure-based mnemonics.

We examined the hypothesis that people can modulate their mind wandering on the basis of their expectations of upcoming challenges in a task. To this end, we developed a novel paradigm in which participants were presented with an analog clock, via a computer monitor, and asked to push a button every time the clock's hand was pointed at 12:00. Importantly, the time at which the clock's hand was pointed at 12:00 was completely predictable and occurred at 20-s intervals. During some of the 20-s intervals, we presented thought probes to index participants' rates of mind wandering. Results indicated that participants decreased their levels of mind wandering as they approached the predictable upcoming target. Critically, these results suggest that people can and do modulate their mind wandering in anticipation of changes in task demands.

Individuals often modify speech characteristics to accommodate their listeners. In the present study, we investigate how speakers modify their speech in a dictation task and what this says about their beliefs with respect to the listener's information processing limitations. To do so, we asked participants to either read a set of numbers aloud, or dictate numbers so that another person could write them down. Our results suggest that speech modification in this task was not related to individual differences in working memory capacity, and could represent speakers' attempt to minimize working memory demands of the listener. This account is similar to minimal memory strategies, whereby individuals often try to minimize memory demands in cognitive tasks.

We present novel evidence that mind-wandering rates during a reading task are influenced by experimental context. In Experiment 1, participants read a series of passages and we measured their frequency of mind-wandering and their subjective evaluations of passage difficulty/interest. Section length was manipulated, such that some passages were presented in short sections and others were presented in long sections. Importantly, participants were randomly assigned to complete either a within-subject version of the experiment (in which they read some short-section passages and some long-section passages) or a between-subjects design (in which they only read either short-section or long-section passages). We found that the within-subject design yielded significant effects of section length on mind-wandering and on subjective passage evaluations, whereas the between-subjects design yielded null effects. This pattern of results was replicated in Experiment 2. These results provide compelling evidence that mind-wandering rates can be influenced by the experimental design. We conclude that mind-wandering is not only driven by the objective demands of the task, but also by subjective evaluations of those task properties, which are influenced by the context in which the task is evaluated (i.e., the "evaluative context")., (Copyright © 2018. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

Researchers have recently demonstrated that mind-wandering episodes can vary on numerous dimensions, and it has been suggested that assessing these dimensions will play an important role in our understanding of mind wandering. One dimension that has received considerable attention in recent work is the intentionality of mind wandering. Although it has been claimed that indexing the intentionality of mind wandering will be necessary if researchers are to obtain a coherent understanding of the wandering mind, one concern is that this dimension might be redundant with another, longstanding, dimension: namely, meta-awareness. Thus, the utility of the argument for assessing intentionality rests upon a demonstration that this dimension is distinct from the meta-awareness dimension. To shed light on this issue, across two studies we compared and contrasted these dimensions to determine whether they are redundant or distinct. In both studies, we found support for the view that these dimensions are distinct.

Our willingness to persist in problem solving is often held up as a critical component in being successful. Allied against this ability, however, are a number of situational factors that undermine our persistence. In the present investigation, the authors examine 1 such factor-knowing that the answers to a problem are easily accessible. Does having answers to a problem available reduce our willingness to persist in solving it ourselves? Across 4 experiments, participants (university students from a large Canadian University) solved multisolution anagrams and were either provided the answers after giving up (and knew they would receive the answers) or not. Results demonstrated that individuals persisted for less time in the former condition. In addition, participants did not seem to be aware of the effect that answers had on their decisions to quit. Implications for our understanding of the role that access to answers has on persistence across a number of domains (e.g., education, Internet) are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)

We hypothesize that cognitively engaged readers dynamically adjust their reading times with respect to text complexity (i.e., reading times should increase for difficult sections and decrease for easier ones) and failure to do so should impair comprehension. This hypothesis is consistent with theories of text comprehension but has surprisingly been untested. We tested this hypothesis by analyzing 4 datasets in which participants (N = 484) read expository texts using a self-paced reading paradigm. Participants self-reported mind wandering in response to pseudorandom thought-probes during reading and completed comprehension assessments after reading. We computed two measures of cognitive coupling by regressing each participant's paragraph-level reading times on two measures of text complexity: Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level and Word Concreteness scores. The two coupling measures yielded convergent findings: coupling was a negative predictor of mind wandering and a positive predictor of both text- and inference-level comprehension. Goodness-of-fit, measured with Akaike information criterion, also improved after adding coupling to the reading-time only models. Furthermore, cognitive coupling mediated the relationship between mind wandering and comprehension, supporting the hypothesis that mind wandering engenders a decoupling of attention from external stimuli. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)

Understanding the basic mechanisms underlying attentional function using naturalistic stimuli, tasks, and/or settings is the focus of everyday attention research. Interest in everyday approaches to attention research has increased recently-arguably riding a more general wave of support for such considerations in experimental psychology. This special issue of the Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology attempts to capture the emerging enthusiasm for studying everyday attention by bringing together work from a wide array of attentional domains (e.g., visual attention, dual tasking, search, mind wandering, social attention) that are representative of this general approach. The 14 contributions to the special issue highlight the breadth of topics addressed in this research, the methodological creativity required to carry it out, and the promise of everyday attention for understanding the basic mechanisms underlying attentional function. This introduction will summarise the everyday attention approach as represented in the contributions to the special issue. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)

One recent line of research in the literature on mind wandering has been concerned with examining rates of mind wandering in special populations, such as those characterized by attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, dysphoria, and schizophrenia. To best conceptualize mind wandering in studies examining special populations, it has recently been suggested that researchers distinguish between deliberate and spontaneous subtypes of this experience. Extending this line of research on mind wandering in special populations, in a large non-clinical sample (N = 2636), we examined how rates of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering vary with symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Results indicate that, whereas deliberate mind wandering is not associated with OCD symptomatology, spontaneous mind wandering is, with higher reports of spontaneous mind wandering being associated with higher reports of OCD symptoms. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding both mind wandering and OCD.

Both academic and legal communities have cautioned that laypersons may be unduly persuaded by images of the brain and may fail to interpret them appropriately. While early studies confirmed this concern, a second wave of research was repeatedly unable to find evidence of such a bias. The newest wave of studies paints a more nuanced picture in which, under certain circumstances, a neuroimage bias reemerges. To help make sense of this discordant body of research, we highlight the contextual significance of understanding how laypersons' decision making is or is not impacted by neuroimages, provide an overview of findings from all sides of the neuroimage bias question, and discuss what these findings mean to public use and understanding of neuroimages.

Recent research has suggested that introducing a disfluency in the context of written composition (i.e., typing with one hand) can increase lexical sophistication. In the current study, we provide a strong test between two accounts of this phenomenon, one that attributes it to the delay caused by the disfluency and one that attributes it to the disruption of typical finger-to-letter mappings caused by the disfluency. To test between these accounts, we slowed down participants' typewriting by introducing a small delay between keystrokes while individuals wrote essays. Critically, this manipulation did not disrupt typical finger-to-letter mappings. Consistent with the delay-based account, our results demonstrate that the essays written in this less fluent condition were more lexically diverse and used less frequent words. Implications for the temporal dynamics of lexical selection in complex cognitive tasks are discussed., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Re-reading has been shown to have a minimal benefit on text comprehension, in comparison to reading only once or other types of study techniques (e.g., testing; self-explanation). In two experiments we examined the effect of re-reading on mind wandering. Participants read two texts, during which they responded to intermittent mind wandering probes. One text was read once and the other twice. Consistent with previous findings, there was no effect of re-reading on comprehension even though participants reported feeling more competent when they re-read the text. Critically, participants mind wandered more while re-reading. Furthermore, the effect of re-reading on mind wandering was specific to intentional forms of mind wandering rather than unintentional. The implications of these results for understanding mind wandering and the limited effectiveness of re-reading as a mnemonic are discussed.

While much previous research has suggested that decreased transcription fluency has a detrimental effect on writing, there is recent evidence that decreased fluency can actually benefit cognitive processing. Across a series of experiments, we manipulated transcription fluency of ostensibly skilled typewriters by asking them to type essays in two conditions: both-handed and one-handed typewriting. We used the Coh-Metrix text analyser to investigate the effects of decreased transcription fluency on various aspects of essay writing, such as lexical sophistication, sentence complexity, and cohesion of essays (important indicators of successful writing). We demonstrate that decreased fluency can benefit certain aspects of writing and discuss potential mechanisms underlying disfluency effects in essay writing., (© 2016 The British Psychological Society.)

Previous analyses of the standard Stroop effect (which typically uses color words that form part of the response set) have documented effects on mean reaction times in hundreds of experiments in the literature. Less well known is the fact that ex-Gaussian analyses reveal that such effects are seen in (a) the mean of the normal distribution (mu), as well as in (b) the standard deviation of the normal distribution (sigma) and (c) the tail (tau). No ex-Gaussian analysis exists in the literature with respect to the semantically based Stroop effect (which contrasts incongruent color-associated words with, e.g., neutral controls). In the present experiments, we investigated whether the semantically based Stroop effect is also seen in the three ex-Gaussian parameters. Replicating previous reports, color naming was slower when the color was carried by an irrelevant (but incongruent) color-associated word (e.g., sky, tomato) than when the control items consisted of neutral words (e.g., keg, palace) in each of four experiments. An ex-Gaussian analysis revealed that this semantically based Stroop effect was restricted to the arithmetic mean and mu; no semantic Stroop effect was observed in tau. These data are consistent with the views (1) that there is a clear difference in the source of the semantic Stroop effect, as compared to the standard Stroop effect (evidenced by the presence vs. absence of an effect on tau), and (2) that interference associated with response competition on incongruent trials in tau is absent in the semantic Stroop effect.

The frequency with which words appear in print is a powerful predictor of the time to read monosyllabic words aloud, and consequently all models of reading aloud provide an explanation for this effect. The entire class of localist accounts assumes that the effect of word frequency arises because the mental lexicon is organized around frequency of occurrence (the action is inside the lexical boxes). We propose instead that the frequency of occurrence effect is better understood in terms of the hypothesis that the strength of between module connections varies as a function of word frequency. Findings from 3 different lines of investigation (experimental and computational) are difficult to understand in terms of the "within lexicon" account, but are consistent with the strength of between-module connections account. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

In the current set of experiments our goal was to test the hypothesis that individuals avoid courses of action based on a kind of metacognitive evaluation of demand in a Demand Selection Task (DST). Individuals in Experiment 1 completed a DST utilizing visual stimuli known to yield a dissociation between performance and perceived demand. Patterns of demand avoidance followed that of perceived demand. Experiment 2 provided a replication of the aforementioned results, in addition to demonstrating a second dissociation between a peripheral physiological measure of demand (i.e., blink rates) and demand avoidance. Experiment 3 directly tested the assumption that individuals make use of a general metacognitive evaluation of task demand during selections. A DST was utilized in a forced-choice paradigm that required individuals to either select the most effortful, time demanding, or least accurate of 2 choices. Patterns of selections were similar across all rating dimensions, lending credit to this notion. Findings are discussed within a metacognitive framework of demand avoidance and contrasted to current theories. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

If you have ever tilted your head to perceive a rotated image, or programmed a smartphone to remind you of an upcoming appointment, you have engaged in cognitive offloading: the use of physical action to alter the information processing requirements of a task so as to reduce cognitive demand. Despite the ubiquity of this type of behavior, it has only recently become the target of systematic investigation in and of itself. We review research from several domains that focuses on two main questions: (i) what mechanisms trigger cognitive offloading, and (ii) what are the cognitive consequences of this behavior? We offer a novel metacognitive framework that integrates results from diverse domains and suggests avenues for future research., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Highly motivated students often exhibit better academic performance than less motivated students. However, to date, the specific cognitive mechanisms through which motivation increases academic achievement are not well understood. Here we explored the possibility that mind wandering mediates the relation between motivation and academic performance, and additionally, we examined possible mediation by both intentional and unintentional forms of mind wandering. We found that participants reporting higher motivation to learn in a lecture-based setting tended to engage in less mind wandering, and that this decrease in mind wandering was in turn associated with greater retention of the lecture material. Critically, we also found that the influence of motivation on retention was mediated by both intentional and unintentional types of mind wandering. Not only do the present results advance our theoretical understanding of the mechanisms underlying the relation between motivation and academic achievement, they also provide insights into possible methods of intervention that may be useful in improving student retention in educational settings.

The past decade has seen a surge of research examining mind-wandering, but most of this research has not considered the potential importance of distinguishing between intentional and unintentional mind-wandering. However, a recent series of papers have demonstrated that mind-wandering reported in empirical investigations frequently occurs with and without intention, and, more crucially, that intentional and unintentional mind-wandering are dissociable. This emerging literature suggests that, to increase clarity in the literature, there is a need to reconsider the bulk of the mind-wandering literature with an eye toward deconvolving these two different cognitive experiences. In this review we highlight recent trends in investigations of the intentionality of mind-wandering, and we outline a novel theoretical framework regarding the mechanisms underlying intentional and unintentional mind-wandering., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Individuals frequently make use of the body and environment when engaged in a cognitive task. For example, individuals will often spontaneously physically rotate when faced with rotated objects, such as an array of words, to putatively offload the performance costs associated with stimulus rotation. We looked to further examine this idea by independently manipulating the costs associated with both word rotation and array frame rotation. Surprisingly, we found that individuals' patterns of spontaneous physical rotations did not follow patterns of performance costs or benefits associated with being physically rotated, findings difficult to reconcile with existing theories of strategy selection involving external resources. Individuals' subjective ratings of perceived benefits, rather, provided an excellent match to the patterns of physical rotations, suggesting that the critical variable when deciding on-the-fly whether to incorporate an external resource is the participant's metacognitive beliefs regarding expected performance or the effort required for each approach (i.e., internal vs. internal + external). Implications for metacognition's future in theories of cognitive offloading are discussed., (Copyright © 2015 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.)