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Due to the dynamic nature of human conflict, non-traditional terror tactics have evolved to undermine the socioeconomic stability of targeted societies. Considering the landscape in which terrorists operate, emphasis on more subversive methods of biological terror have become prominent in recent decades. Agroterrorism, or the use of plant pathogens to infect a nation’s cultivated crops, is an emerging topic due to its threat to global food security and economic stability. Although emergency preparedness objectives have been enacted at national, state, and even local levels, preemptive measures can no longer remain the sole responsibility of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The agricultural and scientific communities are responsible for collaboration to improve security and pioneer new methods of disease resistance in susceptible crops. Plant immunology is an expanding field which explores the molecular defense mechanisms innately present within the plant kingdom and provides insight concerning novel methods of boosting the immunity of susceptible crops to existing and emerging pathogenic agents. This thesis serves to define the threat of agroterrorism from a national security and scientific perspective, identify notable plant pathogens, provide a brief survey of plant immunology, and discuss topics which can aid scientists, policymakers, and growers in efforts to secure the global food supply from those who would cause harm.

Due to the dynamic nature of human conflict, non-traditional terror tactics have evolved to undermine the socioeconomic stability of targeted societies. Considering the landscape in which terrorists operate, emphasis on more subversive methods of biological terror have become prominent in recent decades. Agroterrorism, or the use of plant pathogens to infect a nation’s cultivated crops, is an emerging topic due to its threat to global food security and economic stability. Although emergency preparedness objectives have been enacted at national, state, and even local levels, preemptive measures can no longer remain the sole responsibility of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The agricultural and scientific communities are responsible for collaboration to improve security and pioneer new methods of disease resistance in susceptible crops. Plant immunology is an expanding field which explores the molecular defense mechanisms innately present within the plant kingdom and provides insight concerning novel methods of boosting the immunity of susceptible crops to existing and emerging pathogenic agents. This thesis serves to define the threat of agroterrorism from a national security and scientific perspective, identify notable plant pathogens, provide a brief survey of plant immunology, and discuss topics which can aid scientists, policymakers, and growers in efforts to secure the global food supply from those who would cause harm.

Since the beginning of the biological warfare cattle and crops have been considered as a strategic objective. With the evolution of the threat to terrorist employment, agroterrorism emerged as a concept derived from bioterrorism, with vulnerable state declaring themsel ves in front of it. Agroterrorism poses fewer challenges in order to reach the operational capacity of dissemination, and its use may remain unnoticed until the effects are devastating. Similarly, agroterrorism poses lower ethical dilemmas than bioterrorism as the consequences are basically economic, considering that the single threat of employment will have direct effects on society as a whole. Of all the biological agents that affect animals and plants, it may be the Foot and Mouth virus that can be considered the agro-terrorist agent par excellence because of its characteristics and effects. The existence of countries bordering on the European Union where the virus is active makes the programs of collaboration, surveillance and control extreme. The existence of disease outbreaks in the North of Africa means that Spain has established control measures to prevent the entry of the virus into our territory., Desde los inicios de la guerra biológica, el ganado y las cosechas se han considerado como un objetivo estratégico. Con la evolución de la amenaza hacia el empleo terrorista surgió el agroterrorismo como concepto derivado del bioterrorismo, declarándose los Estados vulnerables frente a él. El agroterrorismo plantea menores retos para alcanzar la capacidad operacional de diseminación, pudiendo pasar desapercibido su uso hasta que los efectos sean devastadores. De igual forma, el agroterrorismo plantea menores dilemas éticos que el bioterrorismo al ser las consecuencias fundamentalmente económica s, considerándose que la sola amenaza de empleo tendrá efectos directos sobre la sociedad en su conjunto. De todos los agentes biológicos que afectan a animales y plantas quizá sea el virus de la fiebre aftosa el que pueda considerarse como el agente agrot errorista por excelencia debido a sus características y efectos que provoca. La existencia de países limítrofes a la Unión Europea donde el virus está activo hace que se extremen los programas de colaboración, vigilancia y control.

Since the beginning of the biological warfare cattle and crops have been considered as a strategic objective. With the evolution of the threat to terrorist employment, agroterrorism emerged as a concept derived from bioterrorism, with vulnerable state declaring themsel ves in front of it. Agroterrorism poses fewer challenges in order to reach the operational capacity of dissemination, and its use may remain unnoticed until the effects are devastating. Similarly, agroterrorism poses lower ethical dilemmas than bioterrorism as the consequences are basically economic, considering that the single threat of employment will have direct effects on society as a whole. Of all the biological agents that affect animals and plants, it may be the Foot and Mouth virus that can be considered the agro-terrorist agent par excellence because of its characteristics and effects. The existence of countries bordering on the European Union where the virus is active makes the programs of collaboration, surveillance and control extreme. The existence of disease outbreaks in the North of Africa means that Spain has established control measures to prevent the entry of the virus into our territory., Desde los inicios de la guerra biológica, el ganado y las cosechas se han considerado como un objetivo estratégico. Con la evolución de la amenaza hacia el empleo terrorista surgió el agroterrorismo como concepto derivado del bioterrorismo, declarándose los Estados vulnerables frente a él. El agroterrorismo plantea menores retos para alcanzar la capacidad operacional de diseminación, pudiendo pasar desapercibido su uso hasta que los efectos sean devastadores. De igual forma, el agroterrorismo plantea menores dilemas éticos que el bioterrorismo al ser las consecuencias fundamentalmente económica s, considerándose que la sola amenaza de empleo tendrá efectos directos sobre la sociedad en su conjunto. De todos los agentes biológicos que afectan a animales y plantas quizá sea el virus de la fiebre aftosa el que pueda considerarse como el agente agrot errorista por excelencia debido a sus características y efectos que provoca. La existencia de países limítrofes a la Unión Europea donde el virus está activo hace que se extremen los programas de colaboración, vigilancia y control.

Bioweapons deliberately spread to humans and animals is one of the most complex and intersectoral CBRNE threats. It requires multi-sectoral collaboration between law enforcement, public and animal health and in severe cases civil-military collaboration. By building a collaborative management culture between these sectors, through joint education, training and exercise activities, better methods and tools will be obtained in order to reach interoperability and an integrated preparedness approach. Lessons learned and experiences from previous projects, courses, workshops, and simulation exercises require a rationale knowledge transfer. Horison scanning is one example of a method that can be recommended to educate strategic analysts jointly from various sectors and the “Decision Theater” is a dynamic and flexible tool that is useful to train decision makers to examine complex bio-agro defense and biosecurity problems.

The debate about whether sub-state actors have an interest in conducting a WMD attack using chemical or biological weapons is embedded within escalation theory, which holds that in order to maintain credibility terrorist groups must demonstrate a continued ability to conduct operations and inflict significant numbers of casualties on their enemy, maintaining a consistent, if not escalating, level of violence. This thesis uses E. coli in produce and foot and mouth disease in livestock case studies to evaluate U.S. Systems' ability to contain such an agroterror attack and to estimate likely results of such attacks. The analysis shows that neither a FMD attack on livestock nor an E. coli attack on produce is likely to cause sufficient casualties, economic disruption, and/or fear and panic to constitute escalation from recent conventional attacks for an established international terrorist organization, and therefore agroterror attacks are not likely to be particularly attractive for such organizations., http://archive.org/details/agriculturalterr109453171, US Air Force (USAF) author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The current operational environment presents military forces with enemies that use unconventional warfare to achieve their goals. Although the US government has dedicated significant resources to address threats of bioterrorism, the adaptive nature of our adversaries necessitates additional emphasis on bioterrorism awareness among military health professionals. This article provides an overview of 3 categories of entomological terrorism and examples from each category with a risk assessment., Published in Armed Forces Pest Management Bulletin (AFPMB), v30 p11-21, April-June 2010.

The United States agricultural industry generates more than $1 trillion in annual economic activity and provides an abundant food supply for the United States and other countries. Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States government has recognized the vulnerability of the agriculture industry and the potential for the deliberate introduction of animal and plant diseases or agroterrorism. An agroterrorist attack could have enormous economic consequences, disrupt the entire system of critical infrastructure and affect all Americans. The federal and state governments must establish a comprehensive foreign animal disease strategy that is equal to the risk posed by agroterrorism and/or natural outbreaks. Critical elements of this strategy must reconcile conflicting worldviews and existing tensions between the federal and state government to synchronize all remediation efforts while increasing the nation's preparedness. Finally, the national strategy must address the population of first responders by recognizing the unique authorities, restrictions, and capabilities they possess. The Department of Defense (DoD) has the opportunity to mitigate the risk of agroterrorism to the nation because it possesses the inherent dimension, organization and equipment to rapidly deploy, and conduct operations in austere and geographically distributed areas of operation., The original document contains color images.

Agriculture in the United States has a tremendous importance in the economic well being of the country. Agroterrorism is defined as an attack against livestock or crops. Though an agroterrorist incident doesn't make the same statement as an attack against human targets, it would be fairly easy to perform. United States agriculture is particularly susceptible in an intentional terrorist event. Though there are many directives and plans in place to protect the country in case of an agroterrorist event, there are still some areas of concern. Communication and coordination are the primary concerns. In an emergency response in agriculture there are many organizations and governmental agencies responding. In past natural incidents, such as food borne illness, there was much confusion about what roles each group should play. This manuscript will evaluate the steps that have been taken to ensure a more coordinated response in the event of an agricultural incident, and why the "lessons learned" are repeated. In addition, recommendations for reducing repeated errors in coordination are proposed., Program Research Project

FEATURE ARTICLES: An Unconscious Diver With Pulmonary Abnormalities: Problems Associated With Closed Circuit Underwater Breathing Apparatus by Dana E. Adkins, MD; Richard T. Mahon, MD; Steven Bennett, MD. What Every SOF Medic Should Know about Agroterrorism by Kathleen Dunn Farr, MD. A Novel Application of Hydrogel to Improve the Asherman Chest Seal(registered trademark) in a Deployed Environment by Farzad Nowrouzzadeh, MD. Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philipines (JSOTF-P) Joint Medcap Planning by HMC Jody Fletcher; SFC John Dominguez; HM1 Travis Walker; HM1 Patrick Gallaher. Use of Unapproved Products, Off-Label Use and Black-Box Warning... A Variation of Newton's Third Law or the Practical Application of the Rule of Unintended Consequences? Considerations in Military Operational Medicine by Jerome F. Pierson, RPh, PhD., ISSN 1553-9768. The original document contains color images. All DTIC reproductions will be in black and white.

The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against animal disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in research on animal diseases not native to the United States at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) off the coast of New York. With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the PIADC facility was transferred from USDA to DHS, though USDA continues its research program at the facility. DHS has established a foreign animal disease research program in cooperation with USDA at PIADC. DHS has identified the facility as outdated and too limited to continue to be the primary research facility. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has announced plans to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. The DHS plans to select the site in 2008 and open NBAF in 2014. The final construction costs will depend on the site location and may exceed the $451 million projected cost., CRS Report for Congress.

In the event of a major attack on our agriculture--known as agroterrorism--over 30 local, state and federal agencies including the Department of Defense (DoD) will be called upon to respond to the incident. Over the last six years several bioterror and agroterror exercises have shown significant gaps in U.S. capabilities to prevent, prepare, respond and recover from domestic biological and agricultural acts of terrorism. A common theme in the after action reports of these exercises is America's are unpreparedness for the significant psychological, moral and ethical challenges posed by a major attack on our agricultural industry. The U.S. would suffer a breakdown in essential institutions and our civilian biodefense experts and scientists would be overwhelmed possibly to the point of failure. This monograph presents recommendations to enhance the security of the homeland from the consequences of agricultural terrorism.

The potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism, and is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining social stability. The goal of agroterrorism is not to kill cows or plants. These are the means to the end of causing economic damage, social unrest, and loss of confidence in government. While agriculture may not be a terrorist's first choice because it lacks the shock factor of more traditional terrorist targets, many analysts consider it a viable secondary target. Agriculture poses unique vulnerabilities. In the past five years, food defense has received increasing attention in the counterterrorism and bioterrorism communities. Congress has held hearings on agroterrorism and enacted laws and appropriations with agroterrorism-related provisions. The executive branch has responded by implementing the new laws, issuing several presidential directives, and creating liaison and coordination offices. Agriculture now receives about 2.1% of the total non-defense budget authority for homeland security. This report will be updated as events warrant., Updated March 12, 2007. Previous versions dated 22 Jan 2007, 25 Aug 2006 [see ADA456167], 4 Feb 2005 [see ADA444867], and 13 Feb 2004 [see ADA444155]. The original document contains color images.

What follows is the report from the Proteus Futures Academic Workshop: "Analyzing Future Complex National Security Challenges within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environment." This academic workshop was the culmination of a year of exploring and building on the applicability of the Proteus Insights for analyzing future national security issues for tomorrow's volatile, uncertain, ambiguous and complex geo-strategic landscape. The Proteus Management Group USA hosted this workshop from 22 to 24 August 2006 at the Collins Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The workshop provided a forum for academic, interagency, military, and international organizations to exchange the latest information on alternative ways to analyze the future. Specifically, the workshop was designed to promote further discourse, study, and research on the application of Proteus Insights to strategic issues, focusing on the refinement, continued development, and use of the Proteus lenses in future scenarios. It also provided a venue to assist strategic and high-operational level decision makers, planners, and analysts in creative consideration and critical analysis of national security, military and intelligence issues within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environment. Representatives from U.S. government agencies, think tanks, academia, and international organizations participated. The workshop participants exchanged information regarding ongoing efforts to analyze future complexity. This report reflects their thoughts.

Threatened with the loss of federal funding for Homeland Security and emergency management preparedness programs, state and local entities must implement the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, which includes the Incident Command System, Unified Command, and the Multiagency Coordination System. Although mandated by Congress and implemented by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, underdeveloped areas of Indian country and small towns, especially farming and ranching communities and agriculturally-based counties are likely to find that they do not have the capacity to fully implement these mandated federal response programs. A theoretical terrorist-induced multistate Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak is used to examine the impact of implementing newly established federally mandated response management programs on rural and tribal communities in agrarian states. Recovering from such an agroterrorism bioattack would require a coordinated multi-disciplinary response that is heavily dependent on local, tribal, state, and private sector personnel. However, because the United States has not experienced an outbreak of FMD since 1929, many of the skills required to quickly diagnose and respond may no longer exist. This thesis identifies potential methods for obtaining and deploying the FMD virus in a coordinated bioattack on the U.S. economy., The original document contains color images.

There are many potential targets for terrorists in the United States, one of which is the food supply system. An attack on the food supply system would create great need for information to many audiences, primarily the general public, about the risk resulting from such an attack. The Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture, a collaborative effort of 10 states, has identified the need for development of a strategy for communicating to the public the risk resulting from an agroterrorism incident. Before the Partnership begins development of a strategy, however, it must take into consideration the factors that are important when communicating about agroterrorism risk: recognition that communication of risk about food carries with it specific challenges; the public's level of trust in government will affect how it perceives and accepts risk messages; and Americans' post-September II, 2001 fear associated with terrorism alters perception and acceptance of risk. Recognition of the existence of these factors is not enough, however. The Partnership must recognize, as well, that these factors may present barriers to effective communication. To overcome these barriers, the Partnership should apply tried-and-true risk communication principles, tailored to specifically address the factors that make agroterrorism risk communication unique., The original document contains color images.

Non-PR, IFPRI1; Theme 10; Subtheme 10.1; GRP1; Pro-poor science and technology policies; Governance; PBS, EPTD, In some developing countries the potential exists for agroterrorism to cause widespread disruption through loss of sustenance, income and production. Defense of agriculture may also be problematic because of the lack stability and basic biosecurity infrastructure for the detection and prevention of diseases or invasive species. Currently new methodological approaches for terrorism risk assessments are being actively explored for resource prioritization. One such methodology for risk based allocation of resources is Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence (TVC) Analysis. A qualitative application of the TVC framework is used to analyze the risk of agroterrorism in developing countries relative to industrialized countries. The analysis suggests that evidence exists to demonstrate general terrorist threats, vulnerability of agriculture and, depending on the country, potentially serious consequences arising from argoterrorism. Where specific threats emerge, action may be needed by the international community to strengthen biosecurity systems in developing countries through: increasing global cooperation, capacity building in monitoring, remediation and risk analysis technologies, and the dissemination of novel technologies for control of pests and diseases.-- Authors' Abstract

The 2005 Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice report Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism was used as a framework for analyzing the State of Florida’s capabilities for preparing and responding to an agroterrorism attack. A series of desired capabilities were developed from the report’s conclusions and recommendations, and research was conducted to establish Florida law enforcement’s current capabilities. From these two points of reference, gap analysis identified the deficiencies in Florida’s capabilities. Research and analysis found Florida’s preparation capability gaps revolve around a general lack of intelligence and information sharing focused on the agriculture sector. The key recommendation is creation of a state agriculture intelligence and analysis unit interacting with the fusion centers, critical infrastructure protection program, and the food and agriculture sector. Florida’s response capabilities were found to be quite robust. Gaps found in the area of response could be closed with relatively minor policy and strategy enhancements., http://archive.org/details/floridlawenforce1094544528, Captain, Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

CHDS State/Local, There are many potential targets for terrorists in the United States, one of which is the food supply system. An attack on the food supply system would create great need for information to many audiences, primarily the general public, about the risk resulting from such an attack. The Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture, a collaborative effort of 10 states, has identified the need for development of a strategy for communicating to the public the risk resulting from an agroterrorism incident. Before the Partnership begins development of a strategy, however, it must take into consideration the factors that are important when communicating about agroterrorism risk: recognition that communication of risk about food carries with it specific challenges; the public's level of trust in government will affect how it perceives and accepts risk messages; and Americans' post-September 11, 2001 fear associated with terrorism alters perception and acceptance of risk. Recognition of the existence of these factors is not enough, however. The Partnership must recognize, as well, that these factors may present barriers to effective communication. To overcome these barriers, the Partnership should apply tried-and-true risk communication principles, tailored to specifically address the factors that make agroterrorism risk communication unique., http://archive.org/details/agroterrorismris109452222, Civilian, Public Affairs Manager, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

CHDS State/Local, Threatened with the loss of federal funding for Homeland Security and emergency management preparedness programs, state and local entities must implement the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, which includes the Incident Command System, Unified Command, and the Multiagency Coordination System. Although mandated by Congress and implemented by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, underdeveloped areas of Indian country and small towns, especially farming and ranching communities and agriculturally-based counties are likely to find that they do not have the capacity to fully implement these mandated federal response programs. A theoretical terrorist-induced multistate Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak is used to examine the impact of implementing newly established federally mandated response management programs on rural and tribal communities in agrarian states. Recovering from such an agroterrorism bioattack would require a coordinated multi-disciplinary response that is heavily dependent on local, tribal, state, and private sector personnel. However, because the United States has not experienced an outbreak of FMD since 1929, many of the skills required to quickly diagnose and respond may no longer exist. This thesis identifies potential methods for obtaining and deploying the FMD virus in a coordinated bioattack on the U.S. economy., http://archive.org/details/statendlocalpoli109452305, Director, Idaho Bureau of Disaster Services, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The United States agricultural industry generates more than $1 trillion in annual economic activity and provides an abundant food supply for the United States and other countries. Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States government has recognized the vulnerability of the agriculture industry and the potential for the deliberate introduction of animal and plant diseases or agroterrorism. An agroterrorist attack could have enormous economic consequences, disrupt the entire system of critical infrastructure and affect all Americans. The federal and state governments must establish a comprehensive foreign animal disease strategy that is equal to the risk posed by agroterrorism and/or natural outbreaks. Critical elements of this strategy must reconcile conflicting worldviews and existing tensions between the federal and state government to synchronize all remediation efforts while increasing the nation's preparedness. Finally, the national strategy must address the population of first responders by recognizing the unique authorities, restrictions, and capabilities they possess. The Department of Defense (DoD) has the opportunity to mitigate the risk of agroterrorism to the nation because it possesses the inherent dimension, organization and equipment to rapidly deploy, and conduct operations in austere and geographically distributed areas of operation.

In the post 9/11 world, the U.S. must focus its security efforts on everything from airports to al-Qaeda. With resources stretched thin and priorities focused on prosecuting the Global War on Terror (GWOT), our current government structures and capabilities are not suited to manage an attack using biological warfare (BW) on humans or agriculture. The fact that the U.S. has made no arrests in connection with the September 18, 2001 anthrax attacks in Florida, New York and Washington are a stark reminder of how ill-prepared our local, state and federal agencies are in defending against BW attacks. Of the potential BW targets in the U.S. the least protected are the agricultural industry’s animals. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the agricultural industry is the most likely target of a BW attack, and the pathogen which produces foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is the most likely pathogen to create significant economic and social devastation in the U.S. The American agricultural industry produces the world’s safest and cheapest food, but those systems which make the industry so reliable also make it vulnerable. Individuals who desire to disrupt the U.S. economy could introduce a small quantity of plant or animal pathogens into the many unprotected nodes of the agricultural system creating the most devastating attack the U.S. has ever seen. Providing 13% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employing 15% of the U.S. population and producing more than $50 billion yearly in exports, agriculture is one of the primary industries in the U.S. and one of the few industries with a positive trade balance. Although a single attack on the agricultural industry may not result in its destruction, an attack would result in the interruption of food supplies, disruption of interstate travel and trade embargos placed on the U.S. The psychological impacts of a major agroterrorist attack would be similar to the impact 9/11 had on the airline industry. In the event of a maj