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Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att jämföra indexeringen av humoristiska romaner i svenska bibliotekskataloger med sociala taggar på samma romaner på den sociala plattformen Goodreads, för att kunna utreda om sociala taggar har potential att fungera som ett komplement för indexeringen. Det ansågs relevant på grund av att tidigare forskning säger att även om sociala taggar kommer med många brister språkligt, kan de bidra med att täcka de luckor som missats vid indexeringen. Detta studerades under tre olika datainsamlingar. Den första tog 25 titlar från Goodreads som hade humor som populär tagg, och jämförde dessa titlar med deras poster på fyra olika bibliotekskataloger för att se om de hade indexerats med humor. Den andra insamlingen tog i stället 25 titlar från en bibliotekskatalog och jämförde med posterna på Goodreads om humor var en populär genre, detta för att se om där fanns en överlappning hos användarnas och indexerarnas syn på humor. Den sista insamlingen såg ut som den första fast med fantasy i ställer för humor för att jämföra indexeringen med en mer populär genre. En komparativ analys har använts och med hjälp av den teoretiska ramen som bestod av begrepp som aboutness, subjektivitet, oändlig semiosis, folksonomi och kontrollerad vokabulär har resultatet diskuterats. Resultatet visade att en minoritet av de humoristiska romanerna faktiskt hade indexerats med den genretermen, och jämfört med hur väl fantasyböckerna hade indexerats går det att dra slutsatsen att det inte är alla genrer som försummas i katalogerna. Studien kunde konfirmera tidigare forskning att sociala taggar ger en stor rad varianter på termer, detta till trots anses taggar kunna fungera som ett komplement till indexeringen. Studiens begränsningar ligger i urvalet: det är endast en bråkdel som har fått representera alla humoristiska romaner, bibliotekskataloger och indexerare vilket egentligen inte är möjligt.

In his theory of truthmaker content, Kit Fine has provided many insights concerning the relation of aboutness, allowing us to understand why a unique subject matter can be associated to a sentence, what is the relation between the subject matter of a sentence and its truth conditions, and why necessary sentences can be distinguished with respect to what they are about.The aim of this chapter is to consider these insights critically, compare them to the notion of subject matter developed by Lewis, and put forward a unified account giving us the resources to overcome some of their limits. The resulting theory characterizes the relation of aboutness by combining in a consistent framework Lewis’s intuition on how sentences are related to the questions they possibly answer with Fine’s intuition on how sentences are related to their truthmakers.

Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att jämföra indexeringen av humoristiska romaner i svenska bibliotekskataloger med sociala taggar på samma romaner på den sociala plattformen Goodreads, för att kunna utreda om sociala taggar har potential att fungera som ett komplement för indexeringen. Det ansågs relevant på grund av att tidigare forskning säger att även om sociala taggar kommer med många brister språkligt, kan de bidra med att täcka de luckor som missats vid indexeringen. Detta studerades under tre olika datainsamlingar. Den första tog 25 titlar från Goodreads som hade humor som populär tagg, och jämförde dessa titlar med deras poster på fyra olika bibliotekskataloger för att se om de hade indexerats med humor. Den andra insamlingen tog i stället 25 titlar från en bibliotekskatalog och jämförde med posterna på Goodreads om humor var en populär genre, detta för att se om där fanns en överlappning hos användarnas och indexerarnas syn på humor. Den sista insamlingen såg ut som den första fast med fantasy i ställer för humor för att jämföra indexeringen med en mer populär genre. En komparativ analys har använts och med hjälp av den teoretiska ramen som bestod av begrepp som aboutness, subjektivitet, oändlig semiosis, folksonomi och kontrollerad vokabulär har resultatet diskuterats. Resultatet visade att en minoritet av de humoristiska romanerna faktiskt hade indexerats med den genretermen, och jämfört med hur väl fantasyböckerna hade indexerats går det att dra slutsatsen att det inte är alla genrer som försummas i katalogerna. Studien kunde konfirmera tidigare forskning att sociala taggar ger en stor rad varianter på termer, detta till trots anses taggar kunna fungera som ett komplement till indexeringen. Studiens begränsningar ligger i urvalet: det är endast en bråkdel som har fått representera alla humoristiska romaner, bibliotekskataloger och indexerare vilket egentligen inte är möjligt.

There are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts and terms themselves).

There are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts and terms themselves).

There are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts and terms themselves).

There are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts and terms themselves).

There are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts and terms themselves).

Imogen Dickie's book Fixing Reference promises to reframe the investigation of mental intentionality, or what makes thoughts be about particular things. Dickie focuses on beliefs, and argues that if we can show how our ordinary means of belief formation sustain a certain connection between what our beliefs are about and how they are justified, we will have explained the ability of these ordinary means of belief formation to generate beliefs that are about particular objects. A worry about Dickie's approach is that the explanation it offers is circular and thus not a genuine explanation of mental aboutness. This article develops a version of that worry in detail and turns it aside. Nonetheless, I argue that the explanatory value of the account remains unclear. While it does promise a dialectical advance over traditional theorizing about aboutness, it does not reveal how our ordinary means of belief formation make beliefs be about what they are about.

Imogen Dickie's book Fixing Reference promises to reframe the investigation of mental intentionality, or what makes thoughts be about particular things. Dickie focuses on beliefs, and argues that if we can show how our ordinary means of belief formation sustain a certain connection between what our beliefs are about and how they are justified, we will have explained the ability of these ordinary means of belief formation to generate beliefs that are about particular objects. A worry about Dickie's approach is that the explanation it offers is circular and thus not a genuine explanation of mental aboutness. This article develops a version of that worry in detail and turns it aside. Nonetheless, I argue that the explanatory value of the account remains unclear. While it does promise a dialectical advance over traditional theorizing about aboutness, it does not reveal how our ordinary means of belief formation make beliefs be about what they are about.

Imogen Dickie's book Fixing Reference promises to reframe the investigation of mental intentionality, or what makes thoughts be about particular things. Dickie focuses on beliefs, and argues that if we can show how our ordinary means of belief formation sustain a certain connection between what our beliefs are about and how they are justified, we will have explained the ability of these ordinary means of belief formation to generate beliefs that are about particular objects. A worry about Dickie's approach is that the explanation it offers is circular and thus not a genuine explanation of mental aboutness. This article develops a version of that worry in detail and turns it aside. Nonetheless, I argue that the explanatory value of the account remains unclear. While it does promise a dialectical advance over traditional theorizing about aboutness, it does not reveal how our ordinary means of belief formation make beliefs be about what they are about.

Imogen Dickie's book Fixing Reference promises to reframe the investigation of mental intentionality, or what makes thoughts be about particular things. Dickie focuses on beliefs, and argues that if we can show how our ordinary means of belief formation sustain a certain connection between what our beliefs are about and how they are justified, we will have explained the ability of these ordinary means of belief formation to generate beliefs that are about particular objects. A worry about Dickie's approach is that the explanation it offers is circular and thus not a genuine explanation of mental aboutness. This article develops a version of that worry in detail and turns it aside. Nonetheless, I argue that the explanatory value of the account remains unclear. While it does promise a dialectical advance over traditional theorizing about aboutness, it does not reveal how our ordinary means of belief formation make beliefs be about what they are about.

Imogen Dickie's book Fixing Reference promises to reframe the investigation of mental intentionality, or what makes thoughts be about particular things. Dickie focuses on beliefs, and argues that if we can show how our ordinary means of belief formation sustain a certain connection between what our beliefs are about and how they are justified, we will have explained the ability of these ordinary means of belief formation to generate beliefs that are about particular objects. A worry about Dickie's approach is that the explanation it offers is circular and thus not a genuine explanation of mental aboutness. This article develops a version of that worry in detail and turns it aside. Nonetheless, I argue that the explanatory value of the account remains unclear. While it does promise a dialectical advance over traditional theorizing about aboutness, it does not reveal how our ordinary means of belief formation make beliefs be about what they are about.

Imogen Dickie's book Fixing Reference promises to reframe the investigation of mental intentionality, or what makes thoughts be about particular things. Dickie focuses on beliefs, and argues that if we can show how our ordinary means of belief formation sustain a certain connection between what our beliefs are about and how they are justified, we will have explained the ability of these ordinary means of belief formation to generate beliefs that are about particular objects. A worry about Dickie's approach is that the explanation it offers is circular and thus not a genuine explanation of mental aboutness. This article develops a version of that worry in detail and turns it aside. Nonetheless, I argue that the explanatory value of the account remains unclear. While it does promise a dialectical advance over traditional theorizing about aboutness, it does not reveal how our ordinary means of belief formation make beliefs be about what they are about.

The topic of this paper is the question of in virtue of what first person thoughts are about what they are about. I focus on a dilemma arising from this question. On the one hand, approaches to answering this question that promise to be satisfying seem doomed to be inconsistent with the seeming truism that first-person thought is always about the thinker of the thought. But on the other hand, ensuring consistency with that truism seems doomed to make any answer to the question unsatisfying. Contrary to a careful and enticing recent effort to both sharpen and escape this dilemma by Daniel Morgan, I will argue that the dilemma remains pressing both for broadly epistemic and broadly causal-acquaintance-based accounts of the aboutness of first-person thought.

Experimental approaches are widely employed to benchmark the performance of an information retrieval (IR) system. Measurements in terms of recall and precision are computed as performance indicators. Although they are good at assessing the retrieval effectiveness of an IR system, they fail to explore deeper aspects such as its underlying functionality and explain why the system shows such performance. Recently, inductive (i.e., theoretical) evaluation of IR systems has been proposed to circumvent the controversies of the experimental methods. Several studies have adopted the inductive approach, but they mostly focus on theoretical modeling of IR properties by using some metalogic. In this article, we propose to use inductive evaluation for functional benchmarking of IR models as a complement of the traditional experiment-based performance benchmarking. We define a functional benchmark suite in two stages: the evaluation criteria based on the notion of "aboutness," and the formal evaluation methodology using the criteria. The proposed benchmark has been successfully applied to evaluate various well-known classical and logic-based IR models. The functional benchmarking results allow us to compare and analyze the functionality of the different IR models.

Information retrieval (IR) is driven by a process which decides whether a document is about a query. Recent attempts spawned from logic-based information retrieval theory have formalized properties characterizing aboutness, but no consensus has yet been reached. The proposed properties are largely determined by the underlying framework within which aboutness is defined. In addition, some properties are only sound within the context of a given IR model, but are not sound from the perspective of the user. For example, a common form of aboutness, namely overlapping aboutness, implies precision degrading properties such as compositional monotonicity. Therefore, the motivating question for this paper is: Independent of any given IR model, and examined within an information- based, abstract framework, what are commonsense properties of aboutness (and its dual, non-aboutness)? We propose a set of properties characterizing aboutness and non-aboutness from a commonsense perspective. Special attention is paid to the rules prescribing conservative behaviour of aboutness with respect to information composition. The interaction between aboutness and non-aboutness is modeled via normative rules. The completeness, soundness and consistency of the aboutness proof systems are analyzed and discussed. A case study based on monotonicity shows that many current IR systems are either monotonic or non-monotonic. An interesting class of IR models, namely those that are conservatively monotonic, is identified.

Information retrieval (IR) is driven by a process which decides whether a document is about a query. Recent attempts spawned from logic-based information retrieval theory have formalized properties characterizing aboutness, but no consensus has yet been reached. The proposed properties are largely determined by the underlying framework within which aboutness is defined. In addition, some properties are only sound within the context of a given IR model, but are not sound from the perspective of the user. For example, a common form of aboutness, namely overlapping aboutness, implies precision degrading properties such as compositional monotonicity. Therefore, the motivating question for this paper is: Independent of any given IR model, and examined within an information- based, abstract framework, what are commonsense properties of aboutness (and its dual, non-aboutness)? We propose a set of properties characterizing aboutness and non-aboutness from a commonsense perspective. Special attention is paid to the rules prescribing conservative behaviour of aboutness with respect to information composition. The interaction between aboutness and non-aboutness is modeled via normative rules. The completeness, soundness and consistency of the aboutness proof systems are analyzed and discussed. A case study based on monotonicity shows that many current IR systems are either monotonic or non-monotonic. An interesting class of IR models, namely those that are conservatively monotonic, is identified.

Experimental approaches are widely employed to benchmark the performance of an information retrieval (IR) system. Measurements in terms of recall and precision are computed as performance indicators. Although they are good at assessing the retrieval effectiveness of an IR system, they fail to explore deeper aspects such as its underlying functionality and explain why the system shows such performance. Recently, inductive (i.e., theoretical) evaluation of IR systems has been proposed to circumvent the controversies of the experimental methods. Several studies have adopted the inductive approach, but they mostly focus on theoretical modeling of IR properties by using some metalogic. In this article, we propose to use inductive evaluation for functional benchmarking of IR models as a complement of the traditional experiment-based performance benchmarking. We define a functional benchmark suite in two stages: the evaluation criteria based on the notion of "aboutness," and the formal evaluation methodology using the criteria. The proposed benchmark has been successfully applied to evaluate various well-known classical and logic-based IR models. The functional benchmarking results allow us to compare and analyze the functionality of the different IR models.