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Bankruptcy law is always an open and evolving system to adapt to the requirements of each economy at different stages. However, the rapid formation of multinational companies along with globalization in today's conditions demands economies to have a unified view of bankruptcy phenomena and close cooperation between countries to ensure collective economic security by minimizing disadvantages stemming from bankruptcy. In this article, we will delve deeper into asset handling issues for bankrupt businesses and suggest some contributions to perfecting the bankruptcy law for enterprises.

This article delves into the relationship between municipal bankruptcy law and modern federalism jurisprudence, particularly focusing on Chapter 9 reform proposals and its constitutional implications. Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic's economic challenges, the article explores the historical context of municipal bankruptcy, critiques of Chapter 9's limitations, and proposals for empowering bankruptcy courts. It analyzes key doctrines of federalism such as the Anti-Commandeering and Anti-Coercion Doctrines, as well as the Clear Statement Rule, to evaluate the constitutionality of expanding bankruptcy courts' powers. The article navigates through scholarly debates, proposing a nuanced perspective on the role of federalism, state sovereignty, and the separation of powers in addressing municipal fiscal crises and the restructuring of local governance.

This article critically examines the jurisprudential line developed in recent times by the civil chamber of the Chilean Supreme Court regarding the exclusion of credit with state guarantee for the financing of higher education studies of the bankruptcy liquidation procedure. After identifying the conditions of application of the specialty criterion and the principles that inform the bankruptcy proceedings, it is explained why, contrary to what the room maintains, the mechanisms contemplated in title V of Law No. 20.027 are not really special in view of the bankruptcy liquidation procedure regulated by Law No. 20.720. In general, it is maintained that not all regulations associated with general or special hypotheses of insolvency are part of bankruptcy law. To the extent that the regulation does not refer to a collective process, with bodies that tend to increase the recovery rate of creditors and/or safeguard the credit system and economic public order, the regulation is not part of bankruptcy law. In this understanding, it is concluded that the mechanisms contemplated by Law No. 20.027 are not part of bankruptcy law, since all of them are nothing more than means of individual protection, even when they are associated with a hypothesis of insolvency., El presente artículo examina críticamente la línea jurisprudencial desarrollada en el último tiempo por la Sala Civil de la Corte Suprema chilena en torno a la exclusión del crédito con garantía estatal para el financiamiento de estudios de educación superior del procedimiento concursal de liquidación. Luego de identificar las condiciones de aplicación del criterio de especialidad y los principios que informan a los procedimientos concursales, se explica por qué, contrariamente a lo que sostiene la Sala, los mecanismos contemplados en el título V de la Ley N.° 20.027 no son realmente especiales de cara al procedimiento concursal de liquidación regulado en la Ley N.° 20.720. En general, se sostiene que no toda regulación asociada a hipótesis generales o especiales de insolvencia forma parte del derecho concursal. En la medida que la regulación no se refiera a un procedimiento colectivo, con órganos que tiendan a aumentar la tasa de recuperación de los acreedores y/o salvaguardar el sistema de crédito y el orden público económico, la regulación no forma parte del derecho concursal. En este entendido, se concluye que los mecanismos contemplados por la Ley N.° 20.027 no forman parte del derecho concursal, pues todos ellos no son más que medios de tutela individual, aun cuando estén asociados a una hipótesis de insolvencia.

Medicare, the social insurance program for the elderly and disabled, is once again facing insolvency. Spending from the program’s hospital insurance trust fund is predicted to exceed the accumulated payroll taxes and other revenues that support the fund within the next five years, leaving Medicare unable to honor some of its obligations. Yet, what happens if and when Medicare becomes insolvent has not previously been explored in legal scholarship and is not addressed in statute or regulation. This Article confronts for the first time the major legal questions that Medicare insolvency would present. It explains what policymakers could do to make insolvency less unfair, less harmful, less likely, and more effective as a tool to promote compromise and cost control in the program. In short, this Article argues for the establishment, by law, of rules to govern Medicare bankruptcy. The Article’s analysis of how an insolvent Medicare program would work reveals several unsettled legal questions, resolution of which would determine insolvency’s harms, who would pay them, and when. Uncertainty surrounding the consequences of insolvency would be problematic from the ex-post perspective because it would increase the unfairness and magnitude of the associated harms. Further, such uncertainty is already problematic from the ex-ante perspective of a program in a five-decade cycle of insolvency because it inhibits compromise and disincentivizes Medicare’s powerful industry constituents from using their influence to promote cost control. In developing this normative insight, this Article for the first time applies the structural, ex-ante theoretical perspective developed in the municipal bankruptcy literature to the law and political economy of a federal spending program. It concludes by addressing the roles of Congress, the Department of Health and Human Services, and courts in clarifying the consequences of Medicare insolvency. Although a partial framework could and should be esta

La entrada en vigor del texto refundido de la ley concursal supuso un antes y después en la legislación española en esta materia, unificando la normativa hasta el momento dispersa. En el presente trabajo procederemos a examinar la legislación vigente en esta materia desde una perspectiva estrictamente procesal. Así, examinaremos tanto los institutos preconcursales como la regulación del proceso concursal desde su solicitud hasta su finalización, incluyendo el sistema de recursos. Además, introduciremos algunas pinceladas referentes a las modificaciones que se introducen en el anteproyecto de reforma de la ley concursal, publicado en agosto de 2021 por el ejecutivo., The entry into force of the Bankruptcy Law constituted a turning point in Spanish legal system, unifying the legal regulation that had been dispersed until that moment. In this thesis, we will exam the current legislation from a procedure law perspective. Thus, we will study Pre-Bankruptcy Institutions and also the Bankruptcy proceeding from its request to its termination, including the appeal system. Furthermore, we will introduce a few guidelines on draft bill to reform the Bankruptcy Law, which was published in August 2021.

En materia de rendición de cuentas el TRLC se separa de la LC tanto por exceso como por defecto. El exceso vulnera los límites de la refundición. El defecto no, ya que el TRLC se ha limitado a reconducir la rendición a su natural fisionomía eliminando la improcedente extensión que de ese precepto efectuaron ciertas resoluciones judiciales, incluyendo algunas del Tribunal Supremo, que, además, carece de competencia para pronunciarse sobre esta materia. Es, por tanto, indiscutible que no es posible aplicar en este aspecto la doctrina ultra vires., In terms of accountability, the TRLC is separated from the LC both by excess and by default. The excess violates the limits of consolidated legal text. The defect is not, since the TRLC has limited itself to redirecting the surrender to its natural physiognomy, eliminating the inappropriate extension of that precept made by certain judicial decisions, including some of the Supreme Court, which, in addition, lacks competence to rule on this matter . It is, therefore, indisputable that it is not possible to apply the ultra vires doctrine in this regard.

Individual debtors who file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy can discharge most of their pre-petition debts and emerge from bankruptcy with a financial “fresh start.” Student loan debt is one of the few exceptions to this general policy. Congress created the student loan discharge exception, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), to prevent student debtors from abusing the bankruptcy system. Specifically, Congress sought to prevent students who graduated from higher education programs from discharging their debts at bankruptcy, and then beginning lucrative careers. Congress, however, included an important carve-out to this exception for debtors whose loans impose an “undue hardship.” The undue hardship standard has created myriad problems for bankruptcy judges because Congress left the term undefined in the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, courts developed a variety of tests for undue hardship, most notably the Johnson, Bryant, Brunner, and Totality tests. The Brunner test, which the majority of bankruptcy courts apply, imposes an extremely demanding burden on debtors to show undue hardship. Today, with student debt and tuition costs reaching unprecedented levels, Congress should reconsider the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of student debt. This Note argues that Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to define undue hardship based on the Totality test used by a minority of courts. This change would promote national uniformity and would give honest student debtors an attainable opportunity for student loan discharge. In the context of the modern student debt crisis, this relatively moderate reform would significantly help millions of student debtors.

We investigate how individual factors moderate the impact of bankruptcy exemption levels—that is, the amount of wealth individuals can keep in case of bankruptcy—on entry into self-employment. Conceptually, we combine Prospect Theory’s axiom of diminishing sensitivity with insights from research on entrepreneurial failure. We hypothesize that individuals who face higher financial, social, or psychological costs because of bankruptcy will be less sensitive to higher exemption levels than will those who face lower costs across these dimensions. Our empirical results, which are based on a quasi-natural experiment in the United States, support our theoretical predictions.

We investigate how individual factors moderate the impact of bankruptcy exemption levels—that is, the amount of wealth individuals can keep in case of bankruptcy—on entry into self-employment. Conceptually, we combine Prospect Theory’s axiom of diminishing sensitivity with insights from research on entrepreneurial failure. We hypothesize that individuals who face higher financial, social, or psychological costs because of bankruptcy will be less sensitive to higher exemption levels than will those who face lower costs across these dimensions. Our empirical results, which are based on a quasi-natural experiment in the United States, support our theoretical predictions.

When a contract is reversed the principal rule under Swedish law is that each performance is to be returned, i.e. the object of the contract should be returned in kind and any monies received repaid. This is the case following avoidance according to the Sales of Goods Act, invalidity according to the Contracts Act and for recovery in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act. If, however, the object of the contract cannot be returned in kind the consequence is usually the payment of value compensation, or, in some cases, a prohibition of reversal. This study in law gives account for these, and other, consequences of reversal. The fundamental conflict of the study is between the actual object and the value it represents. How should value compensation be viewed – is it in fact a representation of the object itself meaning that any compensation has to cover a repurchase of the object and if so at what particular time? Or is value compensation a stand-alone issue? How does value compensation relate to unjust enrichment and damages? Could other ways to determine the amount of compensation be used? What is actually at stake when determining the value compensation? In this critical legal study of value compensation following a reversal of a contract, all of these questions are discussed.

En materia de rendición de cuentas el TRLC se separa de la LC tanto por exceso como por defecto. El exceso vulnera los límites de la refundición. El defecto no, ya que el TRLC se ha limitado a reconducir la rendición a su natural fisionomía eliminando la improcedente extensión que de ese precepto efectuaron ciertas resoluciones judiciales, incluyendo algunas del Tribunal Supremo, que, además, carece de competencia para pronunciarse sobre esta materia. Es, por tanto, indiscutible que no es posible aplicar en este aspecto la doctrina ultra vires., In terms of accountability, the TRLC is separated from the LC both by excess and by default. The excess violates the limits of consolidated legal text. The defect is not, since the TRLC has limited itself to redirecting the surrender to its natural physiognomy, eliminating the inappropriate extension of that precept made by certain judicial decisions, including some of the Supreme Court, which, in addition, lacks competence to rule on this matter . It is, therefore, indisputable that it is not possible to apply the ultra vires doctrine in this regard.

When a contract is reversed the principal rule under Swedish law is that each performance is to be returned, i.e. the object of the contract should be returned in kind and any monies received repaid. This is the case following avoidance according to the Sales of Goods Act, invalidity according to the Contracts Act and for recovery in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act. If, however, the object of the contract cannot be returned in kind the consequence is usually the payment of value compensation, or, in some cases, a prohibition of reversal. This study in law gives account for these, and other, consequences of reversal. The fundamental conflict of the study is between the actual object and the value it represents. How should value compensation be viewed – is it in fact a representation of the object itself meaning that any compensation has to cover a repurchase of the object and if so at what particular time? Or is value compensation a stand-alone issue? How does value compensation relate to unjust enrichment and damages? Could other ways to determine the amount of compensation be used? What is actually at stake when determining the value compensation? In this critical legal study of value compensation following a reversal of a contract, all of these questions are discussed.

Since the 1990s, “vulture” hedge funds have made fabulous returns by pursuing a controversial strategy: buying bonds issued by countries in or near default and then suing those countries for full repayment. Vulture funds’ investments have resulted in chaotic, drawn-out default episodes and an enormous redistribution of wealth from developing countries to billionaire investors. Despite the real benefits vultures provide to the secondary market for sovereign debt, something must be done to dull their talons. Lamentably, however, no viable solution currently exists. This Note argues that a nonprofit fund designed to compete with vultures could at least mitigate harm to developing nations during the next wave of defaults.

Many healthcare providers are experiencing financial distress, and if the predicted wave of healthcare bankruptcies materializes, the entire U.S. economy could suffer. Unfortunately, healthcare providers are part of a growing group of “bankruptcy misfits,” in the sense that bankruptcy does not work for them the way it works for other businesses. This is so for two primary reasons. First, the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) is insufficiently specific with respect to healthcare debtors. Second, the Code lacks an organizing principle to allow courts to reconcile the competing players and interests in healthcare bankruptcy cases. Previous attempts to address these issues have not succeeded. Notably, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 scattered reforms across the Code, which made bankruptcy more complicated for healthcare debtors. As a result, some have argued that these debtors are better off using bankruptcy alternatives, such as state receiverships, to address their debts. This Article asserts that despite their bankruptcy misfit status, healthcare providers can realize distinct benefits from bankruptcy relief. To be effective, however, this relief must respond to healthcare providers’ unique needs. Creating separate Code subchapters for healthcare business bankruptcies would allow Congress to clarify many aspects of healthcare bankruptcy and enable the development of specific procedures and a distinct organizing principle unique to healthcare provider bankruptcies. Although this proposal contemplates a significant structural change to the Code, this Article explains why this change is warranted as part of the Code’s necessary evolution.

On February 26, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III) held that Congress did not intend to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity through the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the U.S. Code. In so holding, the Sixth Circuit split from the Ninth Circuit and emphasized the long-held principle that all ambiguities in statutes be construed in a manner that favors the Indian tribes. This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit properly applied the standard that the Ninth Circuit failed to respect: namely, that Congress must express an unequivocal intent to abrogate an Indian tribe’s sovereign immunity.

Following the financial crisis, many home mortgage borrowers found themselves living in properties encumbered by debt that far exceeded their value. The result was an increase in mortgage default rates, followed by a wave of foreclosures as lenders scrambled to minimize the financial damage to their investments. From the wreckage, a new creature emerged that threatened to devastate borrowers who believed that foreclosure was their chance for a fresh start: the zombie mortgage. With a spike in lenders failing or declining to foreclose on properties, borrowers were unexpectedly facing an unwanted burden of homeownership that would cause them and their communities severe distress. As states and courts began to fight back, the number of zombie mortgages declined. Yet to this day, zombies can be found across the country and the risk that more will rise is quite real. This Note argues that a potential solution is for state legislatures to enact forced vesting provisions. Specifically, this Note evaluates the potential effect of such laws through a law and economics lens and concludes that such provisions would be beneficial.

Across the criminal and civil justice systems, research regarding procedural justice shows that people’s positive perceptions of legal processes are fundamental to the legal system’s effectiveness and to the rule of law. Approximately one million people file bankruptcy every year, making the consumer bankruptcy system the part of the federal court system with which the public most often comes into contact. Given the importance of bankruptcy to American families and the credit economy, there should exist a rich literature theorizing and investigating how people’s perceptions of consumer bankruptcy’s procedures advance the system’s goals. Instead, bankruptcy’s procedures have received strikingly little scholarly attention. This Article begins to fill this significant gap by combining procedural justice and related research with what is known about the people who file bankruptcy to craft a theory of consumer bankruptcy’s procedural deficiencies. If consumer bankruptcy is procedurally bankrupt, as this Article posits, then the “fresh start” delivered to struggling households is not nearly as fresh as presumed, hampering people’s return to their communities and to the credit economy. As such, this Article proposes two sets of changes to the consumer bankruptcy process—one modest and one more drastic. Both of these new deals for debtors promise to enhance people’s perceptions of bankruptcy’s procedural justice and thereby the legitimacy of the system.

On January 12, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held, in In re Tempnology, that forcing specific performance of a trademark license after a contract rejection in a bankruptcy case would be contrary to the plain-language of Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code and conflict with the goal of providing debtors with a “fresh start.” In so doing, the First Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit in a split with the Seventh Circuit, which has characterized a contract rejection as a breach in the context of non-bankruptcy law, therefore not extinguishing any trademark license rights. This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit approach is the correct one as it takes legislative intent into consideration, does not impede a debtor’s ability to have a fresh start, and will likely not have any detrimental economic effects.

On February 27, 2017, in In re Cowen, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that only affirmative actions to either obtain possession or exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate constitute violations of the automatic stay provision. In doing so, the court concluded that the passive retention of an asset that was acquired pre-petition was not a violation of the automatic stay, and that the creditor had no obligation to relinquish the asset to the bankruptcy estate. This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit misinterpreted the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, disregarding clear policy considerations and legislative history, which evidence Congress’s intent behind the provision’s 1984 amendment.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt is nondischargeable if it is obtained by “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.” In 2017, in In re Appling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a false oral statement by a debtor to his creditor regarding a single asset constituted a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition, allowing the debtor to discharge his liability to pay the debt. This ruling deepened a split among the courts as to whether a false statement regarding a single asset is a “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.” This Comment argues that a statement must be substantial enough to actually provide insight as to the debtor’s financial condition to meet the requirements of Section 523(a), and further contends that the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of “respecting” is inconsistent in its application of Supreme Court precedent to the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.

Prior Out-of-Court Insolvency Proceedings under the Prepackaged Chapter Eleven of the United States Bankruptcy CodeO processo de falência extrajudicial prévio no Código de Falências dos Estados Unidos (o ‘Prepackaged Chapter Eleven’ do U.S. Code)The study examines the Prepackaged Chapter Eleven (hereinafter referred to as the PCE), which is an out-of-court, alternative bankruptcy procedure where a restructuring plan is agreed in advance of a company declaring its insolvency. These so-called “pre-packaged” bankruptcy plans can be used in a Chapter Eleven filing under the US Bankruptcy Code. They are part of the bankruptcy system in the United States that covers preventive solutions to insolvency in that country, the purpose of which is to preserve and virtually save a company from disappearance, both economically and as a legal entity. It is known by the name of its respective chapter; namely, Chapter Eleven of Title Eleven of the United States Bankruptcy Code, a federal norm on insolvency that covers a range of subjects in its different chapters. The following topics are addressed in the study: the PCE in the context of United States law on bankruptcy; the variables that justify choosing between the PCE and the traditional bankruptcy process provided for in Chapter Eleven; the other extrajudicial or out-of-court ways to reorganize a business; a description of the PCE and the scope of its application; its historical background; the legislative policy in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978; the possibilities and advantages of the procedures prior to a Chapter Eleven filing; a comparison between the out-of-court process of the PCE and the judicial process outlined in Chapter Eleven; cases in which the PCE is not convenient or pertinent; types or variations of the PCE; techniques for a successful PCE; the procedural requirements for soliciting a pre-insolvency vote; the risks in a PCE; some recent developments; the effects of the 2005 bankruptcy reform, and the effectiven, O processo de falência extrajudicial prévio no Código de Falências dos Estados Unidos (o ‘Prepackaged Chapter Eleven’ do U.S. Code)Prior Out-of-Court Insolvency Proceedings under the Prepackaged Chapter Eleven of the United States Bankruptcy CodeEste trabalho estuda o Prepackaged Chapter Eleven (PCE), processo extrajudicial prévio ou alternativo ao processo de Chapter Eleven, que constitui uma parte do sistema de falência dos Estados Unidos que abrange as soluções preventivas da quebra nesse país, cuja finalidade é preservar e, virtualmente, salvar a empresa de seu desaparecimento econômico e jurídico, é conhecido pelo nome de seu respectivo capítulo, o Capítulo Onze do Title Eleven do United States Bankruptcy Code, lei de falência federal que engloba numerosas matérias em seus diferentes capítulos. Os tópicos abordados no trabalho são: o PCE no contexto do direito de falência estadunidense; as variáveis que justificam a escolha entre o PCE e o tradicional processo de falência do Chapter Eleven; as restantes vias extrajudiciais de reorganização empresarial; uma descrição do PCE e de seu contexto de aplicação; seus antecedentes históricos; a política legislativa da reforma de falência de 1978; as possibilidades e vantagens dos procedimentos prévios ao Chapter Eleven; uma comparação entre o processo extrajudicial do PCE e o processo judicial do Chapter Eleven; os casos nos quais não é conveniente ou pertinente o PCE; os tipos ou variantes do PCE; as técnicas para um PCE bem-sucedido; os requisitos processuais para uma solicitação de votos pré-falência; os riscos que se correm num PCE; alguns desenvolvimentos recentes; os efeitos da reforma de falência de 2005 e a eficácia do PCE. Na parte das conclusões, realiza-se uma avaliação crítica dessas instituições.Para citar este artigo:Héctor José Miguens, “El proceso concursal extrajudicial previo en el Código de Quiebras de Estados Unidos (el Prepackaged Chapter Eleven del U.S. Code)”, en Dikaion, 27, 2 (2018), pp. 231-281, Prior Out-of-Court Insolvency Proceedings under the Prepackaged Chapter Eleven of the United States Bankruptcy CodeO processo de falência extrajudicial prévio no Código de Falências dos Estados Unidos (o ‘Prepackaged Chapter Eleven’ do U.S. Code)El presente trabajo estudia el Prepackaged Chapter Eleven (en adelante denominado PCE), proceso extrajudicial previo o alternativo al proceso del Chapter Eleven, el cual constituye una parte del sistema concursal de los Estados Unidos que abarca las soluciones preventivas de la quiebra en ese país, cuya finalidad es preservar y, virtualmente, salvar a la empresa de su desaparición económica y jurídica; este es conocido por el nombre de su respectivo capítulo, el Capítulo Once del Title Eleven del United States Bankruptcy Code, norma concursal federal que engloba numerosas materias en sus distintos capítulos. Los tópicos abordados en el trabajo son: el PCE en el contexto del derecho concursal estadounidense; las variables que justifican la elección entre el PCE y el tradicional proceso concursal del Chapter Eleven; las restantes vías extrajudiciales de reorganización empresarial; una descripción del PCE y su ámbito de aplicación; sus antecedentes históricos; la política legislativa de la reforma concursal de 1978; las posibilidades y ventajas de los procedimientos previos al Chapter Eleven; una comparación entre el proceso extrajudicial del PCE y el proceso judicial del Chapter Eleven; los casos en los que no es conveniente o pertinente el PCE; los tipos o variantes del PCE; técnicas para un PCE exitoso; los requisitos procesales para una solicitación de votos preconcursal; los riesgos que se corren en un PCE; algunos desarrollos recientes; los efectos de la reforma concursal de 2005, y la eficacia del PCE. En la parte conclusiva se realiza una valoración crítica de estas instituciones.Para citar este artículo:Héctor José Miguens, “El proceso concursal extrajudicial previo en el Código de Quiebras de Estados Unidos (el Prepac

In this article, I shall explore three reasons why Bankruptcy Procedural Law is one of the normative subsets in which the considerations of efficiency in economic analysis of law are applied. To that end, I shall concentrate on the examination of the need to pay outstanding debt obligations which results from bankruptcy proceedings. With regards to this, bankruptcy procedural law seeks to increase existing wealth in order to satisfy these needs. In this context, bankruptcy procedural law avails of a series of instruments which seek to increase the debt pool; likewise and where essential, it observes the rules of receivables (only where necessary to deal with the problem of collective proceedings on the part of creditors in which insolvency can result), and finally, it allows the justification of efficiency in the preferences of those who participate in bankruptcy proceedings., En este artículo exploro tres razones por las cuales el Derecho Procesal Concursal es uno de los subconjuntos normativos donde tienen aplicación las consideraciones de eficiencia del análisis económico del Derecho. Para tal efecto, nos centraremos en el examen de las necesidades de pago de créditos que originan un procedimiento concursal. Al respecto, el Derecho Procesal Concursal buscará incrementar la riqueza existente con miras a satisfacer esas necesidades. En ese contexto, el Derecho Procesal Concursal posee una serie de instrumentos que persiguen incrementar la masa activa; asimismo, respeta en lo indispensable las reglas de titularidad de créditos (en lo necesario para enfrentar el problema de acción colectiva de los acreedores que surge con la insolvencia) y, finalmente, permite justificar la eficiencia en las preferencias de los mismos sujetos participantes del procedimiento concursal.

This Review Essay situates Christopher Bruner’s new book, Re-imagining Offshore Finance, within the literature examining the regulation of cross-border finance and highlights its import for thinking about the complicated (and contested) relationship between territorially-configured domestic laws and the increasingly liberal movement of capital. Part I sets out the book’s central thesis. In addition to highlighting Bruner’s novel framework identifying the factors that propel certain small jurisdictions into becoming magnets for cross-border finance, I outline the limits of the framework in accounting for the stability in the overall demand for the commercialization of sovereignty, only one of which is facilitating international tax evasion. Part II examines the rise of offshore financial havens as they relate to the territorially-configured domestic rules — a subject that has yet to attract the attention that it deserves. While the rise of offshore financial havens has been viewed as typifying the continued dominance of territorial sovereignty, I show that it is private choice and juridical rules that have been privileged over strictly territorial conceptions of the law. I use recent developments in corporate law and bankruptcy law to show that domestic laws governing certain financial transactions are already ceding to privately-curated juridical rules, albeit not without resistance.

Spain’s recent efforts to encourage an “entrepreneurial culture” are certainly inspired by the american dream’s most renowned ideals of success and wealth. This whole social movement may also act as an influential key factor with regards to the legal treatment of personal bankruptcy, by means of establishing its ultimate goal: a fresh start (aka discharge and exemption laws) and how it must be conducted (aka its legal procedure). For this reason, it is our aim to examine from a comparative law perspective the U.S. Bankruptcy Law and its procedure rules, considering its main benefits and downsides in contrast with the Spanish Insolvency Act, La tan reiterada cultura del emprendedor esconde una innegable fuente de inspiración en el ámbito sociocultural estadounidense. Este familiar vocablo de moda, aclamado política y socialmente, también guarda su importancia en el último escalón sustantivo y jurisdiccional de la regulación de la insolvencia de una persona física: su salida de tal insolvencia -parte sustantiva- y cómo articularla -parte jurisdiccional-. Todo ello motiva, junto con el interés propio de cualquier estudio de derecho comparado, la elección del derecho concursal estadounidense como fuente de estudio, crítica y contraste con nuestra Ley Concursal.

This Article identifies the conflicts between social enterprise legislation and bankruptcy law and presents a normative argument for a legal regime that would harmonize the two. Focusing on benefit corporations, the most widely adopted social enterprise form, this Article observes that existing law leaves uncertainty as to the role of directors at a time of financial distress and will produce outcomes that are at odds with the core goals of social enterprise legislation. Then, drawing on academic proposals for contract-based systems of bankruptcy, this Article argues that just as a firm may opt out of a corporate governance norm of pure shareholder wealth maximization through the selection of the benefit corporation form, a firm should be permitted to opt out of a bankruptcy norm of pure creditor wealth maximization through that same selection. A firm and its creditors could thus effectively contract into a unique bankruptcy regime for benefit corporations. Looking to the distinctive treatment of nonprofits and railroads in bankruptcy as precedent, this Article proposes a regime in which the same stakeholder interests that must be considered by the directors of a solvent benefit corporation would be required to be considered by such directors, and by the court, in a bankruptcy proceeding. Finally, this Article argues that the availability of such a regime as a default rule for benefit corporations would on the whole produce more efficient bankruptcy outcomes. Investors in benefit corporations exhibit a preference for trading off some degree of wealth maximization in exchange for the in-kind returns associated with reducing the negative externalities, and increasing the positive externalities, of corporate behavior. By opting into a stakeholder-friendly bankruptcy system, investors could similarly trade off some degree of wealth maximization, by virtue of a higher cost of debt, in order to reduce the negative externalities and increase the positive externalities of f

Corporate directors committed to a failed business strategy or unduly influenced by the company’s debtholders need a dissenting voice—they need shareholder nominees on the board. This article examines the bias, conflicts, and external factors that impact board decisions, particularly when a company faces financial distress. It challenges the conventional wisdom that debt disciplines management, and it suggests that, in certain circumstances, the company would benefit from having the shareholders’ perspective more actively represented on the board. To that end, the article proposes a bylaw that would give shareholders the ability to nominate directors upon the occurrence of predefined events. Such targeted proxy access would incentivize boards to manage difficult operational and financial situations more proactively, while creating a reasonable oversight mechanism for shareholders if those efforts fail. The article also discusses ways for shareholders to use general proxy access in distressed situations to strengthen the shareholder perspective in, and add value to, boards’ negotiations with debtholders. Yet failing the utility of traditional, general proxy methodology, the article suggests that targeted proxy access is a more tailored solution that mitigates many of the concerns articulated in the proxy access debate and provides a better balance between management autonomy and accountability.

Este trabajo pretende poner de relieve el creciente y sostenido avance de lo que se ha denominado el «triunfo de la autonomía privada en el ámbito concursal», exponiéndose al respecto algunos pormenores de la fisonomía básica y real alcance de la denominada «concepción privatista del Derecho concursal», para posteriormente efectuar una mención a sus principales exponentes o «espejos» legislativos, a propósito de instituciones consagradas en la legislación chilena vigente en la materia (Ley Núm. 20.720, de 9 enero 2014, con vigencia diferida a partir de octubre del mismo año), como en la Ley concursal española (22/2003, de 9 de julio), incorporando al hilo de la exposición algunas referencias a otras legislaciones Iberoamericanas, tales como, Argentina, Colombia y Brasil., This work aims to highlight the growing and sustained progress of what has been called the «triumph of private autonomy in the bankruptcy field», exposing some details about the basic appearance and actual scope of the so-called «privatizing conception of law insolvency», later to make a mention of its main exponents or «mirror» legislation, concerning Chile enshrined in legislation in this area (Law Núm. 20.720, of January 9, 2014, with deferred effective as of October of the same year), and the Spanish bankruptcy Act (22/2003 of 9 July), incorporating the theme of the exhibition some references to other Latin American, such as Argentina, Colombia and Brazil legislation.

Este trabajo pretende poner de relieve el creciente y sostenido avance de lo que se ha denominado el «triunfo de la autonomía privada en el ámbito concursal», exponiéndose al respecto algunos pormenores de la fisonomía básica y real alcance de la denominada «concepción privatista del Derecho concursal», para posteriormente efectuar una mención a sus principales exponentes o «espejos» legislativos, a propósito de instituciones consagradas en la legislación chilena vigente en la materia (Ley Núm. 20.720, de 9 enero 2014, con vigencia diferida a partir de octubre del mismo año), como en la Ley concursal española (22/2003, de 9 de julio), incorporando al hilo de la exposición algunas referencias a otras legislaciones Iberoamericanas, tales como, Argentina, Colombia y Brasil., This work aims to highlight the growing and sustained progress of what has been called the «triumph of private autonomy in the bankruptcy field», exposing some details about the basic appearance and actual scope of the so-called «privatizing conception of law insolvency», later to make a mention of its main exponents or «mirror» legislation, concerning Chile enshrined in legislation in this area (Law Núm. 20.720, of January 9, 2014, with deferred effective as of October of the same year), and the Spanish bankruptcy Act (22/2003 of 9 July), incorporating the theme of the exhibition some references to other Latin American, such as Argentina, Colombia and Brazil legislation.

When a company is worth more as a going concern than on a liquidation basis, what creates that additional value? Is it the people, management decisions, the simple synergies of the operating business, or some combination of these types of soft variables? And perhaps more importantly, who owns or has an interest in these soft variables? This article explores these questions under existing legal doctrine and practice norms. Specifically, it discusses the characterization of soft variables under applicable law and in financing documents, and it surveys related judicial decisions. It also considers the overarching public policy and Constitutional implications of the treatment of soft variables in and outside of the federal bankruptcy scheme. The article concludes by considering the optimal treatment of soft variables in corporate reorganizations.

When a company is worth more as a going concern than on a liquidation basis, what creates that additional value? Is it the people, management decisions, the simple synergies of the operating business, or some combination of these types of soft variables? And perhaps more importantly, who owns or has an interest in these soft variables? This article explores these questions under existing legal doctrine and practice norms. Specifically, it discusses the characterization of soft variables under applicable law and in financing documents, and it surveys related judicial decisions. It also considers the overarching public policy and Constitutional implications of the treatment of soft variables in and outside of the federal bankruptcy scheme. The article concludes by considering the optimal treatment of soft variables in corporate reorganizations.

In the Mexican law for insolvency, Bankruptcy is a procedure provided by law to resolve a merchant's situation who has failed to fulfill his due obligations. The insolvency law provides for the possibility that the merchant can be rehabilitated and continues to develop his activities with the help of the Federal Institute of Insolvency Specialists. This Institute is a subsidiary body of the Federal Administration of Justice that works through the following officials: the visitor, who assesses the status of the failed merchant; the conciliator, who advises on the commercial activity of the failed merchant, elaborates the list of creditors and proposes the settlement agreement (when this cannot be achieved, he declares the Bankruptcy of the merchant with the sale of his property for the payment of the creditors), which is carried out with the participation of the liquidator., En el derecho mexicano de la insolvencia, el concurso mercantil es el procedimiento previsto por la ley para solucionar la situación del comerciante que ha incumplido sus obligaciones vencidas. La ley concursal contempla la posibilidad de que el comerciante pueda ser rehabilitado y continúe desarrollando sus actividades con el auxilio del Instituto Federal de Especialistas en Concursos Mercantiles. Dicho instituto es un órgano auxiliar de la administración de justicia federal que funciona a través de los siguientes funcionarios: el visitador, que realiza una evaluación de la situación del comerciante; el conciliador, quien asesora la actividad comercial del comerciante fallido, elabora la lista de acreedores y propone el convenio de solución (cuando esto no se logra, se declara la quiebra del comerciante con la venta de sus bienes para el pago a los acreedores), lo cual se realiza con la participación del síndico.

Este trabajo pretende poner de relieve el creciente y sostenido avance de lo que se ha denominado el «triunfo de la autonomía privada en el ámbito concursal», exponiéndose al respecto algunos pormenores de la fisonomía básica y real alcance de la denominada «concepción privatista del Derecho concursal», para posteriormente efectuar una mención a sus principales exponentes o «espejos» legislativos, a propósito de instituciones consagradas en la legislación chilena vigente en la materia (Ley Núm. 20.720, de 9 enero 2014, con vigencia diferida a partir de octubre del mismo año), como en la Ley concursal española (22/2003, de 9 de julio), incorporando al hilo de la exposición algunas referencias a otras legislaciones Iberoamericanas, tales como, Argentina, Colombia y Brasil., This work aims to highlight the growing and sustained progress of what has been called the «triumph of private autonomy in the bankruptcy field», exposing some details about the basic appearance and actual scope of the so-called «privatizing conception of law insolvency», later to make a mention of its main exponents or «mirror» legislation, concerning Chile enshrined in legislation in this area (Law Núm. 20.720, of January 9, 2014, with deferred effective as of October of the same year), and the Spanish bankruptcy Act (22/2003 of 9 July), incorporating the theme of the exhibition some references to other Latin American, such as Argentina, Colombia and Brazil legislation.

Este trabajo pretende poner de relieve el creciente y sostenido avance de lo que se ha denominado el «triunfo de la autonomía privada en el ámbito concursal», exponiéndose al respecto algunos pormenores de la fisonomía básica y real alcance de la denominada «concepción privatista del Derecho concursal», para posteriormente efectuar una mención a sus principales exponentes o «espejos» legislativos, a propósito de instituciones consagradas en la legislación chilena vigente en la materia (Ley Núm. 20.720, de 9 enero 2014, con vigencia diferida a partir de octubre del mismo año), como en la Ley concursal española (22/2003, de 9 de julio), incorporando al hilo de la exposición algunas referencias a otras legislaciones Iberoamericanas, tales como, Argentina, Colombia y Brasil., This work aims to highlight the growing and sustained progress of what has been called the «triumph of private autonomy in the bankruptcy field», exposing some details about the basic appearance and actual scope of the so-called «privatizing conception of law insolvency», later to make a mention of its main exponents or «mirror» legislation, concerning Chile enshrined in legislation in this area (Law Núm. 20.720, of January 9, 2014, with deferred effective as of October of the same year), and the Spanish bankruptcy Act (22/2003 of 9 July), incorporating the theme of the exhibition some references to other Latin American, such as Argentina, Colombia and Brazil legislation.

Este trabajo pretende poner de relieve el creciente y sostenido avance de lo que se ha denominado el «triunfo de la autonomía privada en el ámbito concursal», exponiéndose al respecto algunos pormenores de la fisonomía básica y real alcance de la denominada «concepción privatista del Derecho concursal», para posteriormente efectuar una mención a sus principales exponentes o «espejos» legislativos, a propósito de instituciones consagradas en la legislación chilena vigente en la materia (Ley Núm. 20.720, de 9 enero 2014, con vigencia diferida a partir de octubre del mismo año), como en la Ley concursal española (22/2003, de 9 de julio), incorporando al hilo de la exposición algunas referencias a otras legislaciones Iberoamericanas, tales como, Argentina, Colombia y Brasil., This work aims to highlight the growing and sustained progress of what has been called the «triumph of private autonomy in the bankruptcy field», exposing some details about the basic appearance and actual scope of the so-called «privatizing conception of law insolvency», later to make a mention of its main exponents or «mirror» legislation, concerning Chile enshrined in legislation in this area (Law Núm. 20.720, of January 9, 2014, with deferred effective as of October of the same year), and the Spanish bankruptcy Act (22/2003 of 9 July), incorporating the theme of the exhibition some references to other Latin American, such as Argentina, Colombia and Brazil legislation.