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Over an astonishing history dating back more than seven thousand years, Egypt maintained an advanced and relevant military force. This experience gave guidance for developing ways of war that were decisive in assuring victory in some of the most significant campaigns of Middle Eastern history, from Pharaonic times to the Egyptian Israeli conflict of 1973. This monograph provides an overview of that history, decisive campaigns, and the features of that military experience in former times that could be useful, in the opinion of the author, for the education of Egyptian military officers today and in the futures as one element in continuing improvement in Egyptian military and operational art. Some of the key lessons learned from Pharaonic, Islamic, and modern Egyptian military history are: The need for speed and mobility. The importance of support structures -- both an industrial base for producing weaponry, and strong logistical supply system for campaigns. Attention to strategic and tactical planning to assure that the enemy is engaged at times, in places, and under conditions of one's choosing The practice, following Clausewitz, of using war as a continuation of politics by other means. Conclusions and recommendations based on this analysis address how to apply learned lessons from Egyptian military history to current and future officer education. An advanced course, beyond the mid-career staff college, applying lessons from history to current doctrine, theories, and campaign planning, could provide a useful framework for using lessons learned from history for current and future military practice., The original document contains color images.

No military function is more critical to operational success than effective command and control (C2). There also is no more daunting military function to get right when it comes to the employment of complex multinational formations in the fast paced arena of crisis response. Since the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)--unique as an alliance with a permanent standing C2 structure--has ventured into a broader spectrum of missions and across a wider geographical area of operations, posing far greater C2 challenges than the single-mission, fixed territory defense of the past. Threats to NATO interests have increased, demanding military structures and capabilities that can be employed on shorter notice and further outside NATO territory. At the same time, more sophisticated information-based battle systems and technologies are driving the need for increasingly interoperable forces. A key factor for success in this new environment will be a more agile, flexible, and responsive NATO C2 architecture for the 21st century., The original document contains color images.

This thesis considers the extent to which Soviet ascendancy over Germany by late 1943 can be attributed to a resurgence of operational art. Discussion begins with an overview of operational art and the development of the theory up to 1937. It explains the significant differences between Soviet and western terminology and discusses the writings of key Russian and Soviet theorists, as well as the opinions of contemporary historians. The thesis proceeds to examine two campaigns. First, the Soviet Winter 1942-43 offensives and German counteroffensives. This period saw the surrender of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad but ended in operational defeat for the Red Army. Turning to the campaigns of summer 1943 that began with Operation CITADEL, the thesis examines the struggle better known as the Battle of Kursk. This study includes the Soviet 1943 summer offensives and concludes in October 1943, by which time the Germans had suffered a significant operational and strategic defeat. The thesis analyses the extent to which the reemergence of operational art was responsible for the reversal in Soviet fortunes. It also discusses other factors that contributed to Soviet success and to German failures.

This study is an analysis of the decisiveness of Israeli small-unit leadership on the Golan Heights during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. What allowed the Israeli brigades on the Golan Heights to defeat an Arab coalition that launched a surprise attack with a force that vastly outnumbered the Israelis in men, tanks and artillery? The one advantage the Israelis had was the quality of leadership at the small-unit level. This study begins with a brief review of the strategic and operational situation in the Middle East in 1973. This includes background information on the Israeli and Arab forces facing each other on the Golan Heights and their plans for the defense and attack respectfully prior to the start of hostilities. The majority of the thesis discussion is concerned with the actual battle on the Golan Heights. It highlights the contributions that small-unit leadership made during the battle that allowed the vastly outnumbered IDF to destroy a massive Soviet-style Arab army. This portion of the study also looks at the experiences of those Israeli leaders involved in the fighting. The study then looks at leadership from the Israeli perspective. I define what leadership is and why it is important at the small-unit level. I take a close look at how the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) picks and trains its leaders and what role the Israeli Military Culture plays in that process. The conclusion of the thesis is that the IDF was able to fight and win even though surprised and vastly outnumbered due to the quality of leadership at the small-unit level. This lesson may prove to be important still today as the armies of the Western societies continue to get smaller even though they still face the threat of fighting the massive Soviet-style armies of the 'Axis of Evil' for decades to come.

This study examines the U.S. Army's use of tank destroyers in World War II, particularly the origins and evolution of tank destroyer doctrine, changes in training at the tank destroyer school at Camp Hood, and selection of weapons systems taken to the field. The author will punctuate these events with three distinct battles that tank destroyers played a predominate role in and evaluate their successes and failures. Tank destroyers as a branch are unusual because they originated out of fear of an immense German armored threat, based on the early days of the war, particularly the German invasion of France in 1940. Once the U.S. Army found itself facing German armor, American forces found there was little practicality in using tank destroyers as the initial doctrine prescribed. This was not due to failures in the tank destroyers themselves or their doctrine, but changes in German armor and its employment. With the absence of large German armor formations, heaver German tanks, U.S. Army commanders at all levels, employed tank destroyers as they saw fit. Their nondoctrinal employment is usually interpreted as incorrect and a waste of tank destroyer assets. The author contends that this nondoctrinal employment was instead an evolution in the development of tank destroyers and necessary to allow the branch to grow from its peacetime concept to the realities of the battlefield.

Self-synchronization is an idea that comes directly from Network-Centric Warfare but its foundations lie in complexity theory and the ideas of self-organization and emergent behavior. In order to understand self-synchronization the basics of complexity theory, specifically self-organization and emergent behavior, must be explained. Then, by expanding on the accepted definition of self-synchronization as defined by Admiral Cebrowski in his early literature on NCW it is clear that self-synchronization is a combination of complexity theory s ideas of self-organization and emergent behavior and information technology. Next, by comparing the requirements and conditions of self-synchronization against the conditions and requirements of JOW s Adaptive Command and Objective Force Battle Command it is clear that self-synchronization (self-coordination in the 2003 Defense Transformation Guidance) is a feasible concept for future Joint and Army forces. In fact, current doctrine supports the basic ideas behind self-synchronization and current Objective Force experiments demonstrate self-synchronizing behavior., 18 Jun 2002 to 22 May 2003, "The original document contains color images"

Given that battle-management solutions in system-of-systems environment are separately designed and developed on various operating platforms in different languages, predicting battle-management behavior of system-of-systems is not possible. As a rule, battle-management is executed at the system level rather than the desired system-of-systems level. Typically, C4 systems are non-real-time systems. Traditionally, weapon systems are real-time systems. If we are to match the performance of weapon systems and avoid the negative impact of forcing synchronization of battle manager software with weapon systems for messaging, then we must develop the battle manager as real-time software. We advocate the development of battle-management software as a real-time set of system functionality that addresses warfighter usage. To achieve the level of desired predictable battle-management behavior, we maintain that it is essential to develop a formal representation that captures the desired battle manager system behavior and test the formal representation against the expected battle-management properties. Furthermore, we assert that it is critical to develop the battle manager as a real-time software-intensive system to ensure the schedulability of battlemanagement tasks and provide for concurrent execution of such tasks where applicable., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The Goliad Campaign of 1836 is regarded as an obscure debacle in the annals of the Texas War for Independence, especially when compared to the famous and romanticized Battle of the Alamo. Goliad, arguably, had greater strategic importance, was better fortified, and was far more defensible than the Alamo; yet the leaders of both campaigns are regarded as complete opposites. The likes of Travis, Bowie, and Crockett are enshrined as heroic icons to most Americans, while Colonel James Walker Fannin Jr., Commanding Officer of Goliad, left an infamous legacy of recklessness, and indecisiveness, and is still considered largely responsible for the worst massacre in Texas history. During the Goliad Campaign of 1836, Fannin made several fatal decisions, which ultimately led to the slaughter of 342 soldiers. This research provides a contextual account of the Goliad Campaign of 1836, chronicles Colonel Fannin's background, describes force composition and leadership, and finally examines how modern Army leadership doctrine may have been applied during the campaign and how it could have influenced Fannin's decision making process., The original document contains color images.

This paper examines the naval battle of Savo Island from a historical perspective and extracts the lessons learned from a strategic, operational and tactical perspective. The Battle of Savo Island occurred early in the morning on 9 August in 1942 when the Japanese 8th Fleet surprised the Allied Task Force shortly after the landing at Guadalcanal. In approximately 37 minutes, the Japanese Navy destroyed four heavy cruisers and killed more than 1000 American and Australian sailors handing the U.S. Navy the worst defeat in its history. There were many reasons for this debacle, however the one common thread through the entire disaster was the poorly framed command and control relationships. This article examines the command and control breakdowns along with the various contributing causes such as personality conflicts between various commanders of the allied force, communication and equipment shortfalls, common prejudices, and the superior night fighting ability of the Japanese force that caused this decisive defeat.

The Department of Defense has adopted Joint Vision 2020 as its approach to conflict in the future. Both Information Superiority and Decision Superiority are key components of JV2020, and future warfighting plans will be increasingly reliant upon high-speed interconnected information networks to identify targets, create and transmit plans, disseminate and share information, and carry out battles. This construct for the military is based on the ability to detect and track the enemy, move that information across continents, integrate and analyze it, then decide and take action, often under very tight time constraints; sometimes within minutes. It is the protection of this information upon which this Defense Science Board Task Force concentrated its efforts.

For the new millennium, the U.S. Navy has made a fundamental commitment to drastically reduced crew sizes. Automated systems can reduce crew size significantly, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of a ship. Automation must be continuously available and dependable under all conditions, including combat battle damage. To continue to work during the worst casualty conditions, command and control networks must automatically reconfigure around battle damage. By autonomously routing data around damaged components in an intelligent manner, network fragment healing dramatically improves distributed control system survivability. Dynamic reconfiguration, using network fragment healing, can provide the continuity of communications service that is required aboard U.S. Naval vessels during combat operations. To achieve survivable, distributed communication, an industry proven networking standard, ANSI-709.l Lon-Works, is extended to military applications. Specifically, the topology of a semi-mesh connection of rings is investigated through availability analysis. Hypercube and semi-mesh topologies are scalable. Furthermore, enhanced network fragment healing algorithms that route message traffic around damaged network components in a more efficient manner are investigated. In the future, these routing algorithms will be evaluated through network simulation, and validated with data obtained from network fragment healing tests performed aboard YP679, an Office of Naval Research test craft that is representative of a small scale combatant., The original document contains color images.

While hundreds of volumes exist on the Gettysburg Campaign, most examine the battle's tactical framework and focus on the activities of brigades and regiments. However, of more interest to the serving military professional may be an analysis of the degree to which the Confederacy's design and execution exemplify attributes of what is now known as the operational art. This monograph provides just such a study. The importance of the operational level of war and its supporting art cannot be overstated. Only with a recognition of this level between those of strategy and tactics and a mastery of its art can commanders have the appropriate frame of reference to link strategic goals assigned by national authorities with the tactical activities of their subordinate commanders. Although U.S. Army doctrine may have been late in formally recognizing the existence and significance of the operational level of war and its supporting art, it may have appeared very early in our military history. Indeed, without being named as such, the concept may have been placed into effect as early as the American Civil War. Providing a brief background of the Campaign s plan and events, these same are then analyzed against seven characteristics of the operational level of war. Among these characteristics are the degree to which the Confederacy s plan for the campaign (and its subsequent execution) evidenced operational vision, planned and executed distributed operations in the framework of a distributed campaign, and was supported and enabled by continuous logistics and instantaneous command and control. Application of the criteria to the planning and execution of the Gettysburg Campaign reveals that the Gettysburg Campaign does not provide an earlier birth date of the operational art. The following issues prove most significant. First, while Lee s operational vi, The original document contains color images.

Operational art, subject to a transformation of meaning over time, is today more a vaguely defined phenomenon than a clearly defined term. On the whole, the concept of operational art is the result of the hierarchical organization of warfare derived from practical experience rather than the product of a thorough theoretical analysis. This study is designed to empirically approach the nature of the interpretation of operational art through the lens of military history. The focus is an examination of operational art against a background of era-related historical experience to determine the consistency and change in operational art since World War I and the factors responsible. The application of this analysis perhaps will provide practical answers to the challenges of modem warfare. The industrialized, modem war is characterized by a reduction in the significance of purely military factors. Simultaneously, the dependence of warfare on the economic and technological potential of society has increased. The destruction or attrition of military resources is only one factor impacting operational art and its contribution to the decision of war.

Information being made available to those on the battlefield is increasing at a rapid rate. The emerging networks that the Services are readying for the battlefield offer improvement to commanders' ability to obtain information they need, when they need it, and in usable form. However, with this increase, battlefield commanders will also need tools with which to employ the information to make winning decisions in high tempo battles. Intelligent agents appear to be one tool for obtaining and displaying information in a timely fashion. The objective of this effort was to examine the extent to which the military is developing information technology, specifically intelligent agents, to assist commanders in obtaining decision superiority on the next-generation battlefield. The task attempted to answer the following questions: (1) Can intelligent agents aid in extracting data, processing data into knowledge useful to commanders, and presenting knowledge in a form commanders can quickly use? Can they do it in a timely fashion? (2) Can such intelligent agents be available in time to support the next-generation battlefield? (3) Can use of intelligent agents lead to decision superiority on the next-generation battlefield? IDA contacted the Joint and Service organizations and DoD agencies involved in the advanced concept definition and development of battlefield command and control (C2) systems. From these, we determined the main DoD and Service organizations working on information technology, specifically intelligent agents, including contractors and universities. The team obtained briefings by these organizations, reviewed documentation provided, and met with principals of ongoing agent-based efforts. It is clear that the military expects intelligent agents to provide a significant advantage for wanfighters. However, although work is ongoing, the team found no applications ready for near-term fielding.

Command and control operations became increasingly more complex if not chaotic under real battle conditions. At the same time the importance of psychosocial factors in battle management operations increases. Thus the uncertainty of decision making is enhanced. The aim of our research is to augment the cognitive utility in command and control management processes using new information technologies of dynamic sociometry for the analysis of systems based on uncertain, ambiguous, and poorly defined elements., Presented at the RTO Human Factors and Medicine Panel Symposium, Oslo, Norway, 10-13 Apr 2000,p6-1/6-3. This article is from ADA389629 Usability of Information in Battle Management Operations (1'Exploitation de l'information dans les operations de gestion du champ de bataille)

This study investigates whether the methods of instruction in the Captains Career Course have evolved to account for technological advancements to train the cognitive domain. The Army is investing considerable resources in the development of information systems to assist the soldier in visualizing his battles pace. This study looks at the impact of these innovations on the cognitive demands of company command and the resulting requirements on the institutional training base. This study traces the historical background of institutional instruction of captains, then analyzes the current Armor course against both the theory and training regulation requirements. This analysis leads to the synthesis of a framework for a future model. A brief interlude incorporates the framework into a model set in the year 2005. The study concludes with recommendations to Training and Doctrine Command on how to incorporate technological advancements in cognitive instruction.

This report outlines an approach for quantitative operations analysis of aspects of Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs) using the methodology underlying the Battlespace Information War (BAT/IW) analytical tool. The general approach of this analysis methodology is to focus on a specific experimental initiative from one or more FBEs, such as Time Critical Targeting (TCT). BAT/IW models are then tailored to the experimental situation using actual data obtained from one or more experiments and the experiment systems architecture. After the models and actual data are reconciled, further analysis tasks are undertaken, such as predictions of the effects of attack intensity, and/or of C4ISR response time reduction. BAT/IW modeling helps analyze and understand the system-level impact of sensor data quality, including timeliness, as one contributor to total operation/campaign success. BAT/IW modeling also accounts for the latency involved in processing information, including communications delays, decision time, waiting, etc. An example is developed to show how operational data obtained during FBE Foxtrot can be quantitatively analyzed to indicate important sensitivities.

This research develops a prototype relational database system for storing and managing Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) data. It is the first step in constructing a knowledge-base system for such data. The objective is to create a relational database capable of generating information from past experiments for analysis and lessons learned to benefit future experiments. Research methodology included literature research of application development methodologies and database systems, as well as observing a FBE and gathering system requirements information from personnel that plan, configure, and participate in FBEs and war games. Development of the system involved designing a schema (data model) that consists of entities, attributes, and relationships of the FBE environment. The data model is transaction- (event-) based and concentrates on information flow in order to categorize and store the data. These events provide the logical links between the identified entities and the capability to query the system for desired information. Finally, a prototype application against the data model was developed to facilitate data entry, modification, and querying.

There is consensus within the U.S. Army that the Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) system is ineffective in coordinating airspace users to accomplish assigned missions. The two comprehensive studies completed within the past decade cite the basic reasons for its failure as the Army's inability to follow its own doctrine. However, critically lacking within the studies is an analysis of the validity of the doctrine itself. The current basis of A2C2 doctrine is the primary reliance upon procedural control, essentially de- conflicting airspace through the use of graphical control measures. The question this monograph addresses is not how should the Army improve its current A2C2 doctrine, but should the Army continue to rely primarily on procedural control as the basis of its A2C2 doctrine? In determining the validity of procedural control as the basis for A2C2 doctrine, this monograph is divided into three major sections. The first section addresses what current A2C2 doctrine is and why it came to rely on procedural control. The second section examines the Army's adherence to current A2C2 doctrine based on the Army's Title 10 responsibilities to organize, train and equip its forces. The third section evaluates the adequacy of procedural control if it were properly organized, trained and equipped. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XX1 Operations provides the criteria against which procedural control is examined: compatibility with joint operations; inter-connectivity within Army and Joint systems; adequacy for current battle command systems; and adequacy for operations with higher tempos.

The world may be on the verge of a new era of warfare, one where battles are not only fought within the biosphere of the earth but also in the space surrounding it. Recent conflicts have shown the tremendous advantages conferred upon those who have the advantage of space-based assets, limited though they are, to helping forces navigate, communicate, and spy upon their enemies. Some argue that fighting in space itself is inevitable, while others hold that space should be maintained as a sanctuary, free of weapons. The purpose of this study is not to argue for or against the weaponization of space, but rather to examine the kinds of weapons that have been pro - posed for use in space and compare their capabilities with those of their surface-based counterparts. In making this analysis, the efficacy of various concepts will be measured by balancing three measures: cost, technical feasibility, and each weapon's ability to provide the advantages of using space to the United States (US) and her allies or denying such advantages to an enemy.

The paradox is as prevalent today as it ever was-almost all the outstanding geniuses that Russia has seen have been out of favor with its leaders for most of their careers. There are two reasons for this: they were often more talented than the leaders themselves; and, however great they were, they served Russia rather than themselves or their superiors. Zhukov arose as a great military leader thanks to his natural talent and the influences of those historical events and vital conditions that predetermined his fate. Not one of the talented military leaders from the Second World War can be compared to Zhukov in the profundity, breadth, and foresight of his strategic thought, in his will power, and organizational capabilities.

The world may be on the verge of a new era of warfare, one where battles are not only fought within the biosphere of the earth but also in the space surrounding it. Recent conflicts have shown the tremendous advantages conferred upon those who have the advantage of space-based assets, limited though they are, to helping forces navigate, communicate, and spy upon their enemies. Some argue that fighting in space itself is inevitable, while others hold that space should be maintained as a sanctuary, free of weapons. The purpose of this study is not to argue for or against the weaponization of space, but rather to examine the kinds of weapons that have been proposed for use in space and compare their capabilities with those of their surface-based counterparts. In making this analysis, the efficacy of various concepts will be measured by balancing three measures: cost, technical feasibility, and each weapon's ability to provide the advantages of using space to the United States (US) and her allies or denying such advantages to an enemy.

The purpose of this report is to document the design, development, and demonstration of a prototype training package to improve staff performance and a prototype performance evaluation package for staffs using advanced command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) systems. These prototypes were implemented in a simulation-based experiment to examine the impact of digital systems on future Battle Command at the battalion and brigade level. This report first presents a review of previous research and relevant literature on training design and evaluation issues. The design and development of the prototype training and evaluation packages are described and are followed by discussions of formative results and lessons learned. The major research products associated with training and evaluation for the implementation are presented in the five-volume set of materials entitled Training and Measurement Support Package, Battle Command Reengineering III, Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Lab. The formative evaluation provided valuable information for revisions and additional trials of the prototype training and evaluation package are required to validate its efficacy and utility. Future implementation should lead to further development of this prototype training and evaluation package that targets higher-order cognitive skills needed on the digital battlefield.

The United States Army is currently evolving from its Cold War structure to the more force-projection- oriented army of Force XXI. This transition will be complete by 2010. Beyond Force XXI is the Army After Next (AAN) which is projected to be implemented between 2020 and 2025. The Pentomic Division of the 1950s and the AAN Battle Force concepts appear to have many similarities between them. These similarities include, but are not limited to, non-linear style operations, dependence upon air lines of communications, "island" support concept, ultra reliable vehicles, battle rhythm and reliance upon new technology to support the concept. Both of these concepts tried/try to leverage technology to drive the concept to fruition. With the ultimate failure of the Pentomic Division's ability to conduct continuous combat operations it becomes relevant to compare the two concepts to determine if there are any substantial differences between them which will enhance the AANs probability of success. If there are not any discernable differences between the AAN and Pentomic concepts, is the Army headed down the same path forty years later? The AAN and Pentomic concepts are critically compared against one another using the five basic Tenets of Army Operations of initiative, agility, depth, synchronization and versatility contained in Army Field Manual 100-5, dated 14 June 1993.

The Russo-Japanese War was the first major conflict to occur after the founding of the Army War College in 1901. While extensively studied at the time, it has been overshadowed in the warfighters historical lexicon by more modern and more "Western" conflicts. The implications from this first major war of the Twentieth Century still merit examination by the men and women who will prosecute war in the Twenty-First Century. Thematic historical constants; the effects of technological change on the battlefield, the will of the leadership and the psychological connection to their fighting forces, power projection, logistics, and economic effects, were all evident on the bloody fields of this war. How Russia and Japan, reacted or failed to react, in context to these time-honored themes teach important lessons to tomorrow's leaders. More importantly, they echo haunting warnings from the past that we must get it right or pay the ultimate price in the next war with the lives of future generations of Americans.

This report documents the analysis, design, and development of the Division Level Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) training product. The division level MDMP product is a computer-based, stand alone training support package envisioned to be used by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) to augment existing CGSC instruction on the MDMP. The product, a computer disk, provides a self-paced, detailed discussion of the steps of the MDMP, focusing on the battle staff at the division-level. Field Manual 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations served as the doctrinal source reference. The course also contains selected tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that aid the CGSC student in conducting staff integration and coordination during mission planning. This project was coordinated with the CGSC.

Since the implementation of the Battle Stations program in July 1996 into the recruit training pipeline at Recruit Training Center Great Lakes, it has received much publicity and many accolades from notable military and civilian leaders. They claim that Battle Stations has advanced recruit training further and has meet the changing cultural environment of recruits and the Navy better than any other training program in recent history. The Navy also declares Battle Stations as a rite of passage for Sailors, similar to the Marine Corps' recruit training event, The Crucible. This thesis examines the creation, implementation, and outputs of the Battle Stations program to determine its overall effectiveness as a training program and as a rite of passage. Literature reviews on instructional systems design and rites of passage were conducted to compare it to the Battle Stations program. As a result, Battle Stations was determined to be questionable as a functional training program with little background research performed on design and implementation rationale, and minimally effective as a rite of passage. The Navy should conduct a formal training analysis utilizing models and criteria presented in this thesis to properly determine what changes should be conducted or even if a Battle Stations-type program is needed to meet the Navy's boot camp concerns.

This report provides a foundation for future research and development on battle staff training by providing examples of structured training programs for the battle staff. Critical deficiencies in battle staff training were highlighted for both individual and collective skills. Reviews were performed for: (1) military articles on how to improve battle staff performance, centering on use of simulations in a structured training program, and (2) research and development programs to improve battle staff training. Also, possible future directions for battle staff training were discussed.

The analysis of a weapon system must employ a variety of methods to reduce errors, assure completeness and identify critical conditions that stress the system. Such analyses are conducted at various levels of the system as shown as well as the phase of system development. The application in this paper is theater missile defense acquisition support. Two levels of primary concern are battle (many-on-many) and engagement analysis (few-on-few or one-on-one). A central point for both of these levels of analysis is to ascertain the objective of the analysis. The objectives range from comparisons to requirements with commensurate increases in the range of conditions examined. One incentive for using analytical methods is in establishing the driving parameters. The ability to do so with the simpler methods is because single engagements for TMD do reflect a significant result of what can occur at the battle level. Examples analytical methods for TMD analysis will be drawn from three such methods. JEM (Joint Effectiveness Model), MONGO (not an acronym) and TABS (Technique for Analysis of the Battle Space), which span varying ranges of detail in the models and focus in terms of the emphasis of the system operation.

This report provides information concerning Battlefield Function (BF) 20, Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle, as performed by a battalion task force (Bn TF) which is digitally equipped. The components, or sections, of this analysis are products which can be used to support development of a training strategy for the Bn TF. This analysis identifies the critical tasks and supporting tasks undertaken by the Bn TF commander, his staff and the subordinate/ supporting commanders. The approach included revising and upgrading an existing Bn TF analysis, augmenting the analysis to incorporate processes associated with the digital enhancements currently available to the selected division, and conducting an external review., Prepared in cooperation with Human Resource Research Organization, Alexandria, VA; PRC, Inc., McLean, VA.

This study reviews the life, battles, and campaigns of the Carthaginian General Hannibal while attempting to illustrate the leadership values and primary characteristics of Hannibal that contributed to his success on the battlefield. Hannibal won extraordinary victories against his opponents (primarily Romans), and usually against overwhelming odds, with a mercenary army composed of many different nations. This study demonstrates that Hannibal was one of the "Great Captains" of the past and, more importantly, that studying his life today has great relevance for modern soldiers. The leadership values of Hannibal are core values that to one extent or another can be found in all great leaders of both the past and present. This study concludes by identifying Hannibal's fmest leadership values and characteristics, then demonstrating their relevancy by comparing them with current United States Army doctrine, and by showing these values through examples in the lives of nineteenth century and twentieth century U. S. military leaders. Thus the purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the lives of leaders, such as Hannibal (who lived 2,000 years ago), have relevance to military leaders today and the application of their leadership values and characteristics can produce success on the battlefield.

The Army plans to increase the exchange of information on the battlefield through the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) Program. The goal is to "digitize" the forces--create an automated information network at the brigade level and below by installing computers on individual battlefield platforms and linking those computers by radio. The Army plans to equip a division with this capability by the end of fiscal year 2000. As requested, we reviewed the Army's acquisition plans for FBCB2. Specifically, we evaluated the program's significance to the Army's battlefield digitization goal, the Army's derivation of cost estimates, and the feasibility of the Army's fielding schedule. We also collected information on experimental performance results to date. FBCB2 will be the principal digital command and control system for the Army at the brigade level and below and will constitute the third major component of the Army's Battle Command System. Currently, the Battle Command System comprises the (1) Global Command and Control System-Army located at strategic and theater levels, which interoperates with other theater, joint, and multinational command and control systems, and with Army systems at the corps and levels below and (2) Army Tactical Command and Control System, which meets the command and control needs from corps to battalion., Report to the Chairman Subcommittee on National Security Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives.

The purpose of the overall research program was to document the synchronization required by command and control tasks performed within the armored brigade, to include combat support and combat service support units. The immediate application of the documentation was to support developers of staff training in two related projects: Battle Staff Training System and Staff Group Trainer. The documentation was also intended to assist with the planning and execution of collective training. The documentation approach was to apply function analysis (FA) techniques for battlefield functions (BFs) in the Command and Control battlefield operating system. Thirteen FAs were developed for the brigade headquarters and four supporting units: direct support field artillery battalion, engineer battalion, forward support battalion, and air defense artillery battery. The FAs were revised through a formative evaluation process that included internal review and successive external reviews by combat training centers, proponent agencies, and a review Council representing potential users of the FAS. The final products include the FAs, a use's guide, and assessment packages for the BFs. This report provides the FA and use's guide for BF 20 as performed by a heavy brigade headquarters., Prepared in Collaboration with PRC, Inc., McLean, VA.

The purpose of the overall research program was to document the synchronization required by command and control tasks performed within the armored brigade, to include combat support and combat service support units. The immediate application of the documentation was to support developers of staff training in two related projects: Battle Staff Training System and Staff Group Trainer. The documentation was also intended to assist with the planning and execution of collective training. The documentation approach was to apply function analysis (FA) techniques for battlefield functions (BFs) in the Command and Control battlefield operating system. Thirteen FAs were developed for the brigade headquarters and four supporting units: direct support field artillery battalion, engineer battalion, forward support battalion, and air defense artillery battery. The FAs were revised through a formative evaluation process that included internal review and successive external reviews by combat training centers, proponent agencies, and a review council representing potential users of the FAs. The final products include the FAs, a use's guide, and assessment packages for the BFs. This report provides the assessment package for BF 20 as performed by the forward support battalion., Prepared in cooperation with PRC, Inc., McLean, VA 22102. ADA343604

The purpose of the overall research program was to document the synchronization required by command and control tasks performed within the armored brigade, to include combat support and combat service support units. The immediate application of the documentation was to support developers of staff training in two related projects: Battle Staff Training System and Staff Group Trainer. The documentation was also intended to assist with the planning and execution of collective training. The documentation approach was to apply function analysis (FA) techniques for battlefield functions (BFs) in the Command and Control battlefield operating system. Thirteen FAs were developed for the brigade headquarters and four supporting units: direct support field artillery battalion, engineer battalion, forward support battalion, and air defense artillery battery. The FAs were revised through a formative evaluation process that included internal review and successive external reviews by combat training centers, proponent agencies, and a review council representing potential users of the FAs. The final products include the FAs, a use's guide and assessment packages for the BFs. This report provides the FA and use's guide for BF 20 as performed by the forward support battalion., ADA343605

This is an annotated briefing on trends in land combat that have persisted for extended periods of time (decades or even centuries). It specifically addresses the following topics relative to land combat operations: (1) rates of advance, (2) battle durations, (3) personnel strengths and attrition, (4) evolution of U.S. Army force structure, (5) Lanchester parameter values, and (6) the frequency and severity of wars.

The purpose of the overall research program was to document the synchronization required by command and control tasks performed within the armored brigade, to include combat support and combat service support units. The immediate application of the documentation was to support developers of staff training in two related projects: Battle Staff Training System and Staff Group Trainer. The documentation was also intended to assist with the planning and execution of collective training. The documentation approach was to apply function analysis (FA) techniques for battlefield functions (BFs) in the Command and Control battlefield operating system. Thirteen FAs were developed for the brigade headquarters and four supporting units: direct support field artillery battalion, engineer battalion forward support battalion, and air defense artillery battery. The FAs were revised through a formative evaluation process that included internal review and successive external reviews by combat training centers, proponent agencies, and a review council representing potential users of the FAs. The final products include the FAs, a user's guide, and assessment packages for the BFs. This report provides the FA and user's guide for BF20 as performed by the engineer battalion supporting a heavy brigade., Prepared in cooperation with PRC, Inc., McLean, VA.

Successful combat operations require application of joint warfighting systems throughout the battlefield depth. Engagement capabilities available within joint forces include indirect, direct, and aviation delivered fires. Clearly relating these engagement capabilities within the joint force forms the basis for applying combat power throughout the battlefield depth. Central to the relationship to engagement capability and addressing the battlefield depth is the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) In the past, shallow ranges of surface fires often warranted FSCLs closer to ground forces and allowed air interdiction (Al) to dominate the deep battlefield. Limited long range surface delivered fires led ground commanders to look to air support to shape the close fight. Furthermore, the lack of organic deep fire capability within the ground force resulted in ignoring deep battle planning or shifting responsibility to the US Air Force. Today's extended helicopter and rocket ranges change this equation. Now a ground commander seeks a deeper FSCL to accommodate employment of all his systems with close air support (CAS) and ground maneuver. Theoretically this provides the ground commander the opportunity to shape his close fight. Joint doctrine calls for integrated combined arms approaches throughout the battlespace. Effective combined arms employment requires a common understanding of terms and doctrine within the joint community. However, Service background, doctrine, and perspective impact upon a clear understanding within the joint community. This monograph examines whether the current definition of the FSCL facilitates efficient air support of ground operations.

This paper analyzes the Second Punic War using the Contextual and Operational Elements found in the Campaign Planning Model to determine how Rome and Carthage conducted the war, and whether they maintained congruency as each respective country pursued their national objective. It examines how they selected their grand strategy, and how that strategy was interpreted and executed at the operational and tactical levels. The model highlights flaws in Carthage ssss formulation and application of its grand strategy which, combined with the lack of strategic insight at the operational level, kept them from satisfying their objectives. This paper also shows that Rome's formulation and execution of its grand strategy, even with several interim changes in operational strategy, flawlessly applied the tenets of the Campaign Planning Model and enabled Rome to always keep its strategic perspective firmly in view to secure eventual victory. This paper also recommends further study of Rome ssss operational strategy, in particular the campaign of its commanding general, Publius Cornelius Scipio. Scipio's campaign provides excellent examples of the principles of surprise and concentration, and demonstrates how innovation and mobility can produce an indirect strategy that can not only defeat a larger enemy, but also maintain flawless congruency with strategic objectives. Scipio provides an outstanding study in military genius, indirect strategy application, innovation, and statesmanship. He most closely embodies the soldier-statesman needed in modern coalition warfare.

This study examines the adequacy of current doctrine for operations in the deep battle area and beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). Lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm and contentious operational issues between the Army and Air Force, indicate a lack of consensus on who is responsible for the integrated employment of assets beyond the FSCL. This lack of consensus divided rather than integrating combat operations. The FSCL was used as the dividing line for separating areas of responsibility between the Services. It s intended purpose has always been facilitating integration. The study first analyzes the role of doctrine in the integration process at the operational level. An assessment of basic guidelines, terminology, and control measures is then conducted. The results are contrasted with lessons learned and current operational issues to arrive at shortfalls or fallacies in doctrine. Considering the results of this comparative analysis, suggested corrective actions are made to resolve the issues. The study uses Operation Desert Storm (ODS) as the basis since it encompasses the latest doctrine and technology. The study concludes that current joint doctrine does not adequately establish procedures for integrating assets beyond the FSCL (deep battle area). The most prevalent shortfalls are comprehensive terminology, control measures, and doctrinal references, that result in unified and complementary operations between the Services in deep battle operations.

This paper examines airpower in the Battle of St. Mihiel in terms of the principles of war and does so with an airmindedness perspective. The four day long air battle at St. Mihiel is briefly reviewed. Next, the nine principles of war described in the March 1992 edition of Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force are reviewed and specific examples of their application during the St. Mihiel Offensive discussed. The principles: are objective, offensive, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity, mass, maneuver, and economy of force. World War I historical records and pilot memoirs were researched for details on the Allied planning and conduct of the air war at St. Mihiel. From this material, examples of the principles of war were taken. Although the principles of war are not immutable, examples of the principles of war (from an airmen's perspective) can be found in the first American led battle of World War I. These examples are as valid today as they were in September 1918.

The purpose of the overall research program was to document the synchronization required by command and control tasks performed within the armored brigade, to include combat support and combat service support units. The immediate application of the documentation was to support developers of staff training in two related projects: Battle Staff Training System and Staff Group Trainer. The documentation was also intended to assist with the planning and execution of collective training. The documentation approach was to apply function analysis (FA) techniques for battlefield functions (BFs) in the Command and Control battlefield operating system. Thirteen FAs were developed for the brigade headquarters and four supporting units: direct support field artillery battalion, engineer battalion, forward support battalion, and air defense artillery battery. The FAs were revised through a formative evaluation process that included internal review and successive external reviews by combat training centers, proponent agencies, and a review council representing potential users of the FAs. The final products include the FAs, a user's guide, and assessment packages for the BFs. This report provides the assessment package for BF 19 as performed by the engineer battalion supporting a heavy brigade., Prepared in cooperation with PRC, Inc., McLean, VA and Human Resources Research Organization, Alexandria, VA.

NPS Combat Systems students learn about robots and autonomous weapons during group design projects in the SE 3015 course sequence. This sequence is designed to provide experience in combat systems development. The capstone project is the Robot Wars Competition, where pairs of student- designed autonomous robots battle each other. This thesis extends this competition into the arena of simulation and modeling. Our motivation is to further students' understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of computer modeling and simulation in combat systems design and testing. This thesis creates a simulation foundation of the Robot Wars Competition. The simulation has been designed in two main parts, a C++ program that manipulates the Simbots on the playing field and generates data files of their movements, and a 3D graphical visualization that allows the user to see the Simbots in action. The C++ program uses a Simbot class to instantiate two Simbots which are composed of three basic components: base, optics and weapons. The graphics portion uses data files created in the main simulation and displays in 3D animation. The simulation correctly replicates the logical and physical aspects of the robot competition. Future research on the physical aspects of the component parts and the graphics package can be integrated with this foundation.

NPS Combat Systems students learn systems engineering through a series of courses in design, development, implementation, and testing and evaluation. In the last of this series of courses, students design an autonomous robot capable of searching, acquiring, and tracking another autonomous robot having similar capabilities. The project culminates in the Robot Wars Competition, where groups of students have their robots battle each other. This thesis is the second in a series designed to realistically simulate the robot wars battles. The end-to-end functionality of the optical detection system is modeled, and the necessary physics are implemented for effective simulation and depiction. The model uses a transfer function approach and includes all physical processes, from initial optical beacon emission to final digital control signal. Exercising the model over time using realistic robot inputs yields a simulation that closely replicates real behavior. A Virtual Reality Modeling Language (VRML) program uses data files of each Simbot's movement to generate a 3-dimensional animated scene of the detection sequence. This implemented optical model effectively simulates the SE 3015 robot optical detection system and can reproduce an actual detection and tracking sequence between two robots.

The FORECAS planning tool was designed to assist medical requirements specialists in determining the resource needs of specific ground combat operations. The FORECAS tool provides projections of wounded-in- action, killed-in-action, and diseaselnonbanle injury incidence for infantry, support, and service support troops under various combat conditions. FORECAS was constructed in two phases: development of a simulation tool that reflects the statistical trends observed in previous combat scenario, and assessment and quantification of the adjustments necessary to enable FORECAS projections to reflect contemporary scenarios. The FORECAS simulations were found to re resent the trends observed in the historical data.

The Theater Missile Defense Advanced Warfighting Experiment (TMD AWE), being conducted from July 1994 to October 1995, is a key component of the Joint Venture Campaign Plan for Force XXI and one of TRADOC's pivotal efforts for 1995. Conducted by the Air Defense Artillery School, in partnership with the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab, this experiment will help the Army correct long-standing deficiencies in its ability to provide theater missile defense protection to U.S. and allied forces. Thus, it is important to understand the purpose of this AWE, how it is progressing, and what insights we expect to gain from it. The TMD AWE really consists of two major components. The first is a live exercise conducted as part of EXERCISE ROVING SANDS 95, an integrated air defense exercise sponsored by USACOM and executed by FORSCOM. The second is Joint Project Optic Cobra (JPOC), the CINCENT's joint TMD exercise that is conducted in conjunction with ROVING SANDS. Both exercises were held from 28 April to 8 May 1995 at Fort Bliss and White Sands Missile Range.