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This article is part of a new series in this regular feature. The series intend to serve as a road map by sharing expertise and drawing together trends that are relevant to both health science librarians and health informatics professionals. The present article is a collaboration of six medical and health sciences libraries in Belgium and the Flemish library and archive association (VVBAD, n.d. https://www.vvbad.be/). It aims to elucidate the extended, user-tailored approach provided by medical and health sciences libraries in Belgium motivated by the recent changes in user expectations and behaviour., 0, SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Theodore Roosevelt will try to write the introduction Oric Bates requested, but he is not willing to say that Africa is the possible birthplace of man.

Part I- land: Western Front; other fronts; enemy supplies and transportation; economic notes; political notes; and miscellaneous. Part II- air: summary of GAF activity in Western Europe to evening 7 June (offensive and defensive activity). Part III- sea: channel, U-boats, and Norway. Contains two illustrations of the Siegfried Line (the legends include frontier, mountainous or wooded zones, fortified areas, weakly fortified areas, and probable and possible fortified areas) as well as an aerial photograph of the Siegfried Line area southeast of Zweibrucken. Three additional maps capture the enemy order of battle in west Normandy with dates 5 June, 9 June, and 10 June, 1944.

Part I- land: enemy operations; enemy dispositions in the west; enemy capabilities; enemy supplies and transportation; economic notes; political notes; and miscellaneous. Part II- air: GAF activity on the Western Front, week ending 17 May; GAF operations in the Mediterranean and Balkans, week ending 14 May; and present value of the GAF Long Range Bomber Force. Part III- sea: small submarines; minelaying in the Baltic; and captured corvettes. Contains two illustrations detailing enemy dispositions in Italy (the line as of 11 May, 16 May, and 1200 hours 18 May, 1944), and order of battle in the west as of 18 May 1944 (legend details panzer training, panzer grenadier, infantry, field, L.E., and training).

Part I- land: enemy operations; enemy dispositions in the west; enemy capabilities; enemy supplies and transportation; economic notes; political notes; and miscellaneous. Part II- air: summary of GAF activity in Western Europe; GAF operations in the Mediterranean and Balkans- 22 to 28 May 1944; and fighting value of GAF. Part III- sea: USS Block Island; the channel; Anzio; dummy assault; and U-Boat war. A map- order of battle in the west as at 3 June 1944- has a legend detailing panzer location, panzer grenadier, and infantry- field , L.E., and training. An illustration detailing enemy dispositions in Italy also accompanies the document.

Part I- land: Western Front; other fronts; enemy supplies and transportation; economic notes; political notes; and miscellaneous. Part II- air: summary of GAF activity (Western Europe, Mediterranean and Balkans); and characteristics of pilotless aircraft. Part III- sea: channel and other theatres. Illustrations/maps are included which show the enemy order of battle in west Normandy (16 June 1944) and enemy order of battle in the west, 17 June 1944 (legend- Supreme Hq., Army Group, Army Hq., PZ Group, Corps Hq., division area, and Army BNDY).

Part I- land: enemy operations; enemy dispositions in the west; enemy capabilities; enemy supplies and transportation; economic notes; political notes; and miscellaneous. Part II- air: summary of GAF activity in Western Europe; GAF operations in the Mediterranean and Balkans- 22 to 28 May 1944; and fighting value of GAF. Part III- sea: USS Block Island; the channel; Anzio; dummy assault; and U-Boat war. A map- order of battle in the west as at 3 June 1944- has a legend detailing panzer location, panzer grenadier, and infantry- field , L.E., and training. An illustration detailing enemy dispositions in Italy also accompanies the document.

Part I- land: Western Front; other fronts; enemy supplies and transportation; economic notes; political notes; and miscellaneous. Part II- air: summary of GAF activity (Western Europe, Mediterranean and Balkans); and characteristics of pilotless aircraft. Part III- sea: channel and other theatres. Illustrations/maps are included which show the enemy order of battle in west Normandy (16 June 1944) and enemy order of battle in the west, 17 June 1944 (legend- Supreme Hq., Army Group, Army Hq., PZ Group, Corps Hq., division area, and Army BNDY).

Part I- land: Western Front; other fronts; enemy supplies and transportation; economic notes; political notes; and miscellaneous. Part II- air: summary of GAF activity in Western Europe to evening 7 June (offensive and defensive activity). Part III- sea: channel, U-boats, and Norway. Contains two illustrations of the Siegfried Line (the legends include frontier, mountainous or wooded zones, fortified areas, weakly fortified areas, and probable and possible fortified areas) as well as an aerial photograph of the Siegfried Line area southeast of Zweibrucken. Three additional maps capture the enemy order of battle in west Normandy with dates 5 June, 9 June, and 10 June, 1944.

Part I- land: enemy operations; enemy dispositions in the west; enemy capabilities; enemy supplies and transportation; economic notes; political notes; and miscellaneous. Part II- air: GAF activity on the Western Front, week ending 17 May; GAF operations in the Mediterranean and Balkans, week ending 14 May; and present value of the GAF Long Range Bomber Force. Part III- sea: small submarines; minelaying in the Baltic; and captured corvettes. Contains two illustrations detailing enemy dispositions in Italy (the line as of 11 May, 16 May, and 1200 hours 18 May, 1944), and order of battle in the west as of 18 May 1944 (legend details panzer training, panzer grenadier, infantry, field, L.E., and training).

The following report is not intended to represent a complete study on the campaign resulting in the "Destruction of the German Armies in Western Europe". However, it does represent the last report prepared by the Intelligence Branch, G-2 Section, 12th Army Group, on enemy operations. In it an attempt is made to trace the broad outline of events leading to the ultimate unconditional surrender of Germany. Contents: invasion- the battle of Normandy; St. Lo- the breakthrough in Normandy; encirclement at Argentan; battle of northern France; the fall campaign; the November offensive; the Ardennes offensive; offensive to the Rhine- 9 February - 7 March 1945; the crossing of the Rhine; the battle of the Ruhr; and divisions encountered on the western front from 6 June 1944 to 9 May 1945.

Ten-year-old Theodore Roosevelt documents his trip to Europe with his family in this diary. It begins on the steamship Scotia and includes Liverpool, Scotland, London, Holland, Switzerland and more.

Eleven-year-old Theodore Roosevelt continues chronicling his family trip through Europe in this diary. First entry is titled, "The continuation of my Journel [sic] in France December 3rd 1869." There are entries from across Western Europe including Naples, Rome, and Caserta. Lists at end of volume: "Accounts my money," "Hotel index," "Plan of hotels," and "Letters received."

In the World War Two (WWII) European Theater of Operations, Movement Control operations and structure began to formalize, and roles and responsibilities became more delineated and defined. For several decades post WWII, movement control experienced a high level of growth to the point of have a one-star movement control command. At the height of movement control growth, the Army sought to make way for growth in new units and technologies, while transforming for counter insurgency warfare. Through this, movement control structure frequently became the target as a bill-payer for the growth of other programs and units. As the Army transitions and returns to preparing for large scale combat operations, it must also learn from history to understand the future fight. WWII was the largest scale in which combat operations were ever executed and serves as the best example to follow in preparation for the future. Movement control in WWII Europe and Mediterranean provides a framework and guide to follow to understand the potential challenges and solutions for movement control in future operations.

This study started based on the fact that in spite of Korea's long history, it is difficult to determine if Korea has a unique way of war because there is a lack of research on the subject. This study seeks to verify whether there is a unique way of war in Korea and, if so, defines it by contrasting certain characteristics to the ways of war of Western Europe and China. The main research question of this thesis is "Is there a distinct Korean way of war?" Subsidiary research questions are: "What is a way of war?", "What factors contribute to a specific way of war?", "What are the ways of Western Europe and China?", "What are the key differences that characterize the different ways of war?", "If there is a distinct Korean way of war, what is it?", "What are the implications from this research?" This thesis is a comparative case study using descriptions of ways of war of both Western Europe and China as well as proposes a definition for a Korean way of war. They will be analyzed based on eight relevant questions drawn from four evaluation criteria related with four proposed characteristics of a Korean way of war.

Lecture given March 3, 1939 (The Honorable James Clement Dunn): "…the developments in Europe during most of the year had their final climax in the Czechoslovak crisis… For the present, however, I shall concern myself with the developments in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia, and the countries of Southeastern Europe, during this past year". Appendix regarding developments in Spain, April 1, 1938 – February 15, 1939, includes: military developments; internal developments; international developments; and Spain's international position.

Since WWII, historians have lionized General Patton for his bold and daring leadership during Allied campaigns. His many biographers have highlighted his ability to instill discipline, remove incompetent leaders, and form an effective staff. While these attributes evolved in his persona through his military training, Patton applied his intellect to develop a deep understanding of the new methods of warfare that armies encountered on the battlefields of WWII. The application of operational art now required knowledge grounded in the close coordination of air, sea, and land assets to achieve victories at both the strategic and tactical level. While historical examples of daring victories demonstrate what western culture loves in a war hero, a critical analysis of Patton's actions reveal a more compelling story. Closer examination of his actions in the latter stages of the Tunisian campaign, during the Sicilian campaign, and in Western Europe from Normandy to the Rhineland, demonstrate that he excelled at achieving tactical successes, but did not perform well when integrating those tactical successes in campaigns to achieve strategic aims. Patton developed a reputation as a bold and daring leader; however, analysis of WWII campaigns reveals that he did not apply what the US Army now refers to as operational art.

With a need to project power globally, US Army planners must prepare for expeditionary operations. History shows that such operations often take place in austere environments. Operational planners must therefore ensure that lodgment exists in the theater of operations from which commanders can extend their operational reach as required to accomplish the mission. Austere conditions often require planners to find various means to establish logistics bases because the existing infrastructure either does not support operations or friendly forces do not control that infrastructure. This monograph examined several cases in which logistics bases played a key role in twentieth century American military history. Each case study provides an analysis of several factors affecting a base's usefulness to the commander: operational reach, capability to prevent culmination, and the commanders' arrangement of operations. Case studies of the US Army during World War II focus on the usefulness of three seaports in Western Europe as logistics bases for the Allies--the port at Cherbourg, the artificial Mulberry harbors, and the port at Antwerp. Each of these ports offered different capabilities and challenges for the Allies as they sought to expand their initial lodgment after the Cross-Channel Attack. The final case examines the usage of airports as logistics bases in Panama during Operation Just Cause. The findings from this analysis illustrate the similarities and differences of these different types of logistics bases, and provide future planning considerations for establishing either a seaport or airport as a logistics base to extend the operational reach in a new theater of operations.

In the past two decades, Radical Islam rooted in Europe became an obvious security threat. This monograph argues that Western Europeans are partially responsible for permitting or not preventing the presence of radical Islamists in the Balkans and therefore in EU. While Islam came in Western Europe with the wave of immigration from African and Asian Muslim countries in the 1970s and 1980s, Islam in the Balkans existed for centuries. Radical Islam in Europe was initially imported from the mujahedeens that came to fight in the Balkan wars in the 1990s, and only later boosted by the events of the post 9/11 world. To define a valid problem statement, this monograph offers understanding of the cultural differences between the Western European Muslims and the Balkan Muslims. While the Balkan Muslims that lived on European soil for centuries are among the most secular in the world, Western European Muslims that are recent immigrants are showing high level of intolerance and radicalism, opposing the democratic values embedded in Western European culture. The Western European states failed to integrate Muslims into their societies and declared the idea of multiculturalism as a failed project, at the same time asking the Balkans governments to accommodate Muslims, indirectly facilitating the infiltration of radical Islam. The purpose of this monograph is to evaluate the intensity of radical Islam in the Balkans compared with the same problem that Western Europe has, by explaining the connections between Balkans Islam and Western European Islam. The patterns show that radical Islamists' strategic objective is Western Europe, and not the Balkans itself. Balkan countries are merely a safe haven for radical Islam and base for further operations into Western Europe. The Muslim population in several Balkan states is vulnerable to the emergence of radical Islam that in the past two decades is targeting moderate Muslims using the social-economic instability in the Balkans and support

The crusade of Nicopolis, in 1396, intended to expel the Turks from the Balkans, but it ended with the disastrous defeat. Sigismund of Luxemburg, the King of Hungary and Holy Roman Emperor, achieved much to fortify the southern border of Hungary and he had the power to mobilize the unwilling Hungarian nobility when it was needed. After his death none of his successors to the throne was able force his will upon the nobility to react on the growing Ottoman threat. In these critical times, János Hunyadi, born from low nobility, was the only person who was able to present the skills and capabilities which could balance the expansion efforts of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. By using his experiences gained in the condottiere wars in Italy and in the Hussite Wars in Bohemia, he was able to defend the Hungarian borders, and successfully attacked the Turks on their territory. For his outstanding performance on the frontier of Europe he earned the honorable "Defender of Christendom" title. Without the achievements of János Hunyadi between 1439 and 1456, Hungary could not have been the defensive Bastion of Europe.