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This article analyses the visibility of unpaid care work in Scotland by examining the (non-)development of discourse on unpaid care work in economic policy documents. Drawing on the problem approach to policy analysis, the article engages with the Equality Budget Statements (EBS) as policy documents that not only inform the government’s spending plans but are foremost statements of values and norms pursued by the government. This critical reading reveals that certain discourses give different meanings to women’s lives through the political significance of what remains unproblematized as part of the ensuing care discourse in Scotland. The developing discourse on economic policy and equality suggests that equality in Scotland is presupposed on labour market participation. This shrinks discourse on unpaid care work; the problem of unpaid care work is silenced, while the problem of women’s access to employment is redefined to mean a problem of difference and costly childcare only. The way certain issues have or have not appeared in governmental documents is explanatory of the importance and relevance of unpaid care work to the political discourse.

We analyze the short and long-run effects of demographic ageing - increased longevity and reduced fertility - on per-capita growth. The OLG model captures direct effects, working through adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, and capital deepening, and indirect effects, working through changes of taxes, government spending components and the retirement age in politico-economic equilibrium. Growth is driven by capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by public investment. The closed-form solutions of the model predict taxation and the retirement age in OECD economies to increase in response to demographic ageing and per-capita growth to accelerate. If the retirement age was held constant, the growth rate in politico-economic equilibrium would essentially remain unchanged, due to a surge of social-security transfers and crowding out of public investment., 2

We analyze the short and long run effects of demographic ageing - increased longevity and reduced fertility - on per-capita growth. The OLG model captures direct effects, working through adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, and capital deepening, and indirect effects, working through changes of taxes, government spending components and the retirement age in politico-economic equilibrium. Growth is driven by capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by public investment. The closed-form solutions of the model predict taxation and the retirement age in OECD economies to increase in response to demographic ageing and per-capita growth to accelerate. If the retirement age were held constant, the growth rate in politico-economic equilibrium would essentially remain unchanged, due to a surge of social security transfers and crowding out of public investment.

We analyze the short and long run effects of demographic ageing - increased longevity and reduced fertility - on per-capita growth. The OLG model captures direct effects, working through adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, and capital deepening, and indirect effects, working through changes of taxes, government spending components and the retirement age in politico-economic equilibrium. Growth is driven by capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by public investment. The closed-form solutions of the model predict taxation and the retirement age in OECD economies to increase in response to demographic ageing and per-capita growth to accelerate. If the retirement age were held constant, the growth rate in politico-economic equilibrium would essentially remain unchanged, due to a surge of social security transfers and crowding out of public investment.

We analyze the short and long run effects of demographic ageing - increased longevity and reduced fertility - on per-capita growth. The OLG model captures direct effects, working through adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, and capital deepening, and indirect effects, working through changes of taxes, government spending components and the retirement age in politico-economic equilibrium. Growth is driven by capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by public investment. The closed-form solutions of the model predict taxation and the retirement age in OECD economies to increase in response to demographic ageing and per-capita growth to accelerate. If the retirement age were held constant, the growth rate in politico-economic equilibrium would essentially remain unchanged, due to a surge of social security transfers and crowding out of public investment.

We analyze the short and long run effects of demographic ageing - increased longevity and reduced fertility - on per-capita growth. The OLG model captures direct effects, working through adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, and capital deepening, and indirect effects, working through changes of taxes, government spending components and the retirement age in politico-economic equilibrium. Growth is driven by capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by public investment. The closed-form solutions of the model predict taxation and the retirement age in OECD economies to increase in response to demographic ageing and per-capita growth to accelerate. If the retirement age were held constant, the growth rate in politico-economic equilibrium would essentially remain unchanged, due to a surge of social security transfers and crowding out of public investment.

Social spending programs are important political issues, and it would be interesting to know how political systems affect the amount spent by the public sector. Much of the cross-country data is difficult to interpret, because richer countries simultaneously have different political systems (they tend to be more democratic) and more generous government budgets for old age, medical, and other social programs. Since South American countries seem to have a much weaker association between economic and political situations, we can mitigate this collinearity by comparing South American countries with each other and with the world. All of our data show that democracies spend the same or somewhat less on social programs as economically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Pension spending has grown relative to nonpension social spending (1960-90), but some of our evidence suggests that this change in the composition of spending has been more pronounced in countries that were initially nondemocratic., Los programas de gasto social son políticamente importantes, por lo que es interesante saber la manera en que los sistemas políticos afectan los montos gastados por el sector público. La información de corte transversal es de difícil interpretación porque las naciones más ricas tienden a tener simultáneamente sistemas políticos distintos (tienden a ser más democráticas) y presupuestos fiscales más generosos para programas sociales. Dado que América del Sur parece tener una asociación más débil entre sus situaciones políticas y económicas, es posible mitigar la colinealidad al comparar naciones de este continente entre sí y con otras naciones en el mundo. Nuestros resultados muestran que regímenes democráticos gastan lo mismo o menos en programas sociales que regímenes no democráticos con características económicas y demográficas similares. A pesar de que los gastos en pensiones crecieron respecto a otros gastos sociales entre 1960 y 1990, parte de nuestra evidencia sugiere que este cambio en composición fue más pronunciada en países inicialmente no democráticos.

Social spending programs are important political issues, and it would be interesting to know how political systems affect the amount spent by the public sector. Much of the cross-country data is difficult to interpret, because richer countries simultaneously have different political systems (they tend to be more democratic) and more generous government budgets for old age, medical, and other social programs. Since South American countries seem to have a much weaker association between economic and political situations, we can mitigate this collinearity by comparing South American countries with each other and with the world. All of our data show that democracies spend the same or somewhat less on social programs as economically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Pension spending has grown relative to nonpension social spending (1960-90), but some of our evidence suggests that this change in the composition of spending has been more pronounced in countries that were initially nondemocratic., Los programas de gasto social son políticamente importantes, por lo que es interesante saber la manera en que los sistemas políticos afectan los montos gastados por el sector público. La información de corte transversal es de difícil interpretación porque las naciones más ricas tienden a tener simultáneamente sistemas políticos distintos (tienden a ser más democráticas) y presupuestos fiscales más generosos para programas sociales. Dado que América del Sur parece tener una asociación más débil entre sus situaciones políticas y económicas, es posible mitigar la colinealidad al comparar naciones de este continente entre sí y con otras naciones en el mundo. Nuestros resultados muestran que regímenes democráticos gastan lo mismo o menos en programas sociales que regímenes no democráticos con características económicas y demográficas similares. A pesar de que los gastos en pensiones crecieron respecto a otros gastos sociales entre 1960 y 1990, parte de nuestra evidencia sugiere que este cambio en composición fue más pronunciada en países inicialmente no democráticos.

When completed, the base at Kings Bay, Georgia, will support one of the Navy's most vital weapon systems, the Trident Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile System and the Ohio class submarines. The expansion of the base required more than $1 billion of construction, created more than 2,300 construction jobs during peak program years in FY 1985 and FY 1986, and will result in the eventual influx of approximately 13,000 military and civilian jobs by 1998. The local population, which increased from 12,400 in 1979 to 30,443 in 1990, is expected to exceed 38,000 by the final year of the expansion in 1998. By 1998, over 13,000 new jobs and $403 million in annual new salaries will have been brought to Camden County.