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A majority of the nuclear reactors in the world use low-enriched uranium as fuel, and will produce plutonium during operation. This will happen when neutrons undergo capture in U238 instead of causing fission of U235, which is a likely reaction as low-enriched uranium is composed of >95% U238. While the plutonium can be used as fuel in the reactor, it is also a material highly desired by states producing nuclear weapons. Not all reactors produce plutonium of the same grade, which significantly impacts its usability in a nuclear weapon. For this reason, certain reactor technologies have been favored for military plutonium production. Heavy-water moderated reactors is one such family, that has been used in current or defunct nuclear weapons programmes by states such as India, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. A number of factors impact the rate and grade of plutonium production in a reactor. These include(but are not limited to) fuel design specifications (pellet radius, fuel density), operational temperature of the fuel as well as the coolant and moderator, and numerous other operational parameters such as specific power, cycle lengths and downtimes et cetera. The present study will look into investigating the relative sensitivity of plutonium production rate and grade towards these design and operational parameters. Based on the results from this evaluation, it is expected that we can better understand which parameters impact plutonium production quantity and quality the most. This will also help us understand the role and impact of uncertainties in these parameters and connect them to the plutonium content in the spent fuel produced by these reactors, Authors in the program for the conference: Cecilia Gustavsson, Isak Hedberg, Peter Andersson, Erik Branger, Sophie Grape, Vaibhav Mishra, Axel Hallander, Stina Fredriksson

A majority of the nuclear reactors in the world use low-enriched uranium as fuel, and will produce plutonium during operation. This will happen when neutrons undergo capture in U238 instead of causing fission of U235, which is a likely reaction as low-enriched uranium is composed of >95% U238. While the plutonium can be used as fuel in the reactor, it is also a material highly desired by states producing nuclear weapons. Not all reactors produce plutonium of the same grade, which significantly impacts its usability in a nuclear weapon. For this reason, certain reactor technologies have been favored for military plutonium production. Heavy-water moderated reactors is one such family, that has been used in current or defunct nuclear weapons programmes by states such as India, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. A number of factors impact the rate and grade of plutonium production in a reactor. These include(but are not limited to) fuel design specifications (pellet radius, fuel density), operational temperature of the fuel as well as the coolant and moderator, and numerous other operational parameters such as specific power, cycle lengths and downtimes et cetera. The present study will look into investigating the relative sensitivity of plutonium production rate and grade towards these design and operational parameters. Based on the results from this evaluation, it is expected that we can better understand which parameters impact plutonium production quantity and quality the most. This will also help us understand the role and impact of uncertainties in these parameters and connect them to the plutonium content in the spent fuel produced by these reactors, Authors in the program for the conference: Cecilia Gustavsson, Isak Hedberg, Peter Andersson, Erik Branger, Sophie Grape, Vaibhav Mishra, Axel Hallander, Stina Fredriksson

A majority of the nuclear reactors in the world use low-enriched uranium as fuel, and will produce plutonium during operation. This will happen when neutrons undergo capture in U238 instead of causing fission of U235, which is a likely reaction as low-enriched uranium is composed of >95% U238. While the plutonium can be used as fuel in the reactor, it is also a material highly desired by states producing nuclear weapons. Not all reactors produce plutonium of the same grade, which significantly impacts its usability in a nuclear weapon. For this reason, certain reactor technologies have been favored for military plutonium production. Heavy-water moderated reactors is one such family, that has been used in current or defunct nuclear weapons programmes by states such as India, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. A number of factors impact the rate and grade of plutonium production in a reactor. These include(but are not limited to) fuel design specifications (pellet radius, fuel density), operational temperature of the fuel as well as the coolant and moderator, and numerous other operational parameters such as specific power, cycle lengths and downtimes et cetera. The present study will look into investigating the relative sensitivity of plutonium production rate and grade towards these design and operational parameters. Based on the results from this evaluation, it is expected that we can better understand which parameters impact plutonium production quantity and quality the most. This will also help us understand the role and impact of uncertainties in these parameters and connect them to the plutonium content in the spent fuel produced by these reactors, Authors in the program for the conference: Cecilia Gustavsson, Isak Hedberg, Peter Andersson, Erik Branger, Sophie Grape, Vaibhav Mishra, Axel Hallander, Stina Fredriksson

A majority of the nuclear reactors in the world use low-enriched uranium as fuel, and will produce plutonium during operation. This will happen when neutrons undergo capture in U238 instead of causing fission of U235, which is a likely reaction as low-enriched uranium is composed of >95% U238. While the plutonium can be used as fuel in the reactor, it is also a material highly desired by states producing nuclear weapons. Not all reactors produce plutonium of the same grade, which significantly impacts its usability in a nuclear weapon. For this reason, certain reactor technologies have been favored for military plutonium production. Heavy-water moderated reactors is one such family, that has been used in current or defunct nuclear weapons programmes by states such as India, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. A number of factors impact the rate and grade of plutonium production in a reactor. These include(but are not limited to) fuel design specifications (pellet radius, fuel density), operational temperature of the fuel as well as the coolant and moderator, and numerous other operational parameters such as specific power, cycle lengths and downtimes et cetera. The present study will look into investigating the relative sensitivity of plutonium production rate and grade towards these design and operational parameters. Based on the results from this evaluation, it is expected that we can better understand which parameters impact plutonium production quantity and quality the most. This will also help us understand the role and impact of uncertainties in these parameters and connect them to the plutonium content in the spent fuel produced by these reactors, Authors in the program for the conference: Cecilia Gustavsson, Isak Hedberg, Peter Andersson, Erik Branger, Sophie Grape, Vaibhav Mishra, Axel Hallander, Stina Fredriksson

The physics of uranium nitride fuels used in CANDU-6 reactors has been assessed by means of full core Monte-Carlo simulations. It is shown that the application of Unat15N allows for increasing the average residence time of a fuel bundle from 210 to 360 days, as compared to a conventional UnatO2fuel. Whereas a 20% increase in coolant void worth is observed, the total power coefficient is reduced by half, due to a change in sign of the Doppler coefficient. Moreover, thanks to the better thermal conductivity of UN, the margin to fuel melt is raised considerably. Hence, uranium nitride could constitute a more efficient fuel for CANDU reactors, while possibly allowing to extend the grace time for actuation of shut-down during a power transient., QC 20210929

Of the roughly two dozen countries that have pursued or obtained nuclear weapons during the last fifty years, almost all of them depended importantly on foreign supplies. As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, illicit nuclear trade is likely to be conducted by several nations seeking nuclear weapons or wanting to maintain existing nuclear weapons arsenals or capabilities. Additional states in regions of proliferation concern may utilize smuggling methods to acquire advanced, ostensibly civilian, nuclear technology including uranium enrichment and plutonium production and separation capabilities. And despite many recent, particularly United States-led, successes, stopping this trade will remain difficult. Absent mitigating actions, several existing or expected trends are projected to make it easier for smugglers to succeed in acquiring nuclear and nuclear-related goods and technology. Future illicit trade can be stopped through measures taken today as long as the political will is there to foresee and address future threats. A range of countermeasures aimed at mitigating or eliminating these future threats must be employed today to stop them from emerging in the next five to ten years. Preventing the future world of illicit trade is imperative to U.S. and international security and to the creation of a world safer from the spread and use of nuclear weapons., Sponsored in part by DTRA.

Since 2005, the international community has sought to compel Iran to suspend the objectionable elements of its nuclear program, namely, its nuclear enrichment program, its heavy-water reactor program, and its ballistic missile program. Nonetheless, Iran continues to offer less than credible explanations for maintaining its nuclear program. Needless to say, all past efforts to convince Iran to be more transparent about its nuclear activities have been unsuccessful. After all these years, it remains a seemingly intractable dilemma. Because of the grave threat that a nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable Iran would pose to international peace and security, the international community must employ all of its instruments of foreign policy to counter this threat, including engagement, sanctions, covert actions, and the threat of and/or use of military force. The author recommends that the international community continue to flexibly employ three out of the four instruments of foreign policy mentioned above to convince Iran to suspend the objectionable elements of its nuclear program. The three recommended instruments of foreign policy are engagement, sanctions, and covert actions. The fourth instrument of foreign policy, the use of military force, should only be used as a last resort because it cannot lead to a long-term solution to this crisis; it would only delay Iran's quest to develop a nuclear weapon. Rather, skillful use of the three recommended instruments of foreign policy in a carrot-and-stick approach would ideally result in another fuel swap proposal similar to the one agreed upon at Geneva in October 2009. Like the original proposal, it must not allow any quantity of low-enriched uranium in Iran that could be enriched to weapons-grade. If such a proposal could be agreed upon by all parties, it could be a first step toward an ultimate resolution to this dilemma., Strategy Research Project.

This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant., CRS Report for Congress.

In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted five resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1835) was adopted in September 2008. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, a November 2009 report from IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but El Baradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant., CRS Report for Congress.

In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted five resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1835) was adopted in September 2008. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, an August 2009 report from IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but El Baradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant., CRS Report for Congress.

In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted five resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1835) was adopted in September 2008. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, an August 2009 report from IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but El Baradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant., CRS Report for Congress.

In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the agency ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The agency has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted five resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1835) was adopted in September. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, a February 2009 report from IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but ElBaradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." According to ElBaradei's report, the IAEA has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant., CRS Report for Congress.

The history, background, and activities of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), also referred to as the People's Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI), offers a fascinating window into the contemporary importance played by the Islamic Republic of Iran in key decisions of U.S. foreign policy relating to the Middle East. The MEK is the largest militant group opposed to the current Islamic regime in Iran. The MEK was founded in 1963 by a group of college students from Tehran University, and it had as its goal the overthrow of Iran's pro-Western monarchy, the Pahlavi dynasty, and a return to the socialist system that former Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq was working towards in the 1950s. In the first several years of the group's founding, the MEK primarily focused on developing and spreading a coherent ideology that combined elements of a secular view of Islam with a Marxist philosophy. However, beginning in the early 1970s, and in keeping with their goal of weakening the Pahlavi regime and its prime benefactor, the United States, the MEK began carrying out a series of terrorist acts focused mainly on bombing various infrastructure targets within Iran. During this period, the United States had a fairly robust advisory presence in the country, and the MEK carried out several targeted assassinations of U.S. military and civilian personnel working on defense contracts with the Iranian government. Today's debate as to whether the MEK is a terrorist entity focuses mainly on this period of its activities. The memory of its attacks on U.S. citizens keeps the MEK on the State Department's list of terrorist entities. This paper also contains sections entitled "Enemies of the Revolution" and "U.S. Interest in the MEK," which focuses principally on the potential use of MEK members as sources of human intelligence on Iran.

In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the agency ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The agency has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted five resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1385) was adopted in September. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, a September 2008 report from IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but ElBaradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." A September 2008 report from ElBaradei stated that the IAEA "has not been able to make progress" on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant., CRS Report for Congress.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend sensitive activities in negotiations with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (EU-3), which broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement and reported Iran's case to the United Nations Security Council in February 2006. The Security Council called upon Iran to resuspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued its enrichment activities, failing to meet deadline after deadline. The Security Council passed UNSCR 1696 on July 31, 2006, and on December 23, 2006, the Security Council adopted limited sanctions under UNSCR 1737. The next deadline is February 23, 2007. This report will be updated as needed., CRS Report for Congress.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend sensitive activities in negotiations with Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3), which broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement and reported Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. The Security Council called upon Iran to resuspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued its enrichment activities, failing to meet deadline after deadline. On December 23, 2006, the Security Council adopted limited sanctions under UNSCR 1737 and gave Iran another 60 days. However, the February 21, 2007, deadline has passed with little progress, and further sanctions may be under consideration. This report will be updated as needed., CRS Report for Congress. The original document contains color images.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend sensitive activities in negotiations with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (European Union-3), which broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement and reported Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. The Security Council called upon Iran to resuspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. The Security Council passed UNSCR 1696 on July 31, 2006, and on December 23, 2006, the Security Council adopted limited sanctions under UNSCR 1737. Iran has continued its enrichment activities, failing to meet deadline after deadline, the most recent being February 21, 2007. This report will be updated as needed., CRS Report for Congress. The original document contains color images.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed almost two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend sensitive activities in exchange for promises of assistance from Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (EU-3), but negotiations broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement (GOV/2005/77) and voted (GOV/2006/14) on February 4, 2006, to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council called upon Iran to take steps requested of it by the IAEA Board in February: reinstate its suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued enrichment activities and has failed to meet the Security Council's request. The IAEA reported little progress at the end of April (GOV/2006/27). While the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P-5 +1) wait for positive Iranian action on their June 6th proposal, they continue efforts to craft a tough United Nations resolution. This report will be updated as needed., CRS Report for Congress.

The following report is a study of various aspects of the relationship between heavy water and the development of the civilian and military uses of atomic energy. It begins with a historical sketch which traces the heavy water storyfrom its discovery by Harold Urey in 1932 through its coming of age from scientific curiosity to strategic nuclear material at the eve of World War II and finally into the post-war period, where the military and civilian strands have some- times seemed inextricably entangled. The report next assesses the nonproliferation implications of the use of heavy water- moderated power reactors; several different reactor types are discussed, but the focus in on the natural uranium, on- power fueled, pressure tube reactor developed in Canada, the CANDU. The need for and development of on-power fueling safe- guards is discussed in some detail. Also considered is the use of heavy water in plutonium production reactors as well as the broader issue of the relative nuclear leverage that suppliers can bring to bear on countries with natural ura- nium-fueled reactors as compared to those using enriched designs. The final chapter reviews heavy water production methods and analyzes the difficulties involved in implemen- ting these on both a large and a small scale. It concludes with an overview of proprietary and nonproliferation constraints on heavy water technology transfer. Our major conclusions are as follows: 1. On-power fueling of CANDU reactors leads to special, well recognized safeguarding problems. These have been addres- sed by a safeguards development program, encompassing both systems analysis and hardware development, jointly sponsored by Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL), the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The approach involves surveillance, containment, and item-counting of irradiated fuel bundles. Although the complete system has not as yet been tested on an operating reactor

The following report is a study of various aspects of the relationship between heavy water and the development of the civilian and military uses of atomic energy. It begins with a historical sketch which traces the heavy water storyfrom its discovery by Harold Urey in 1932 through its coming of age from scientific curiosity to strategic nuclear material at the eve of World War II and finally into the post-war period, where the military and civilian strands have some- times seemed inextricably entangled. The report next assesses the nonproliferation implications of the use of heavy water- moderated power reactors; several different reactor types are discussed, but the focus in on the natural uranium, on- power fueled, pressure tube reactor developed in Canada, the CANDU. The need for and development of on-power fueling safe- guards is discussed in some detail. Also considered is the use of heavy water in plutonium production reactors as well as the broader issue of the relative nuclear leverage that suppliers can bring to bear on countries with natural ura- nium-fueled reactors as compared to those using enriched designs. The final chapter reviews heavy water production methods and analyzes the difficulties involved in implemen- ting these on both a large and a small scale. It concludes with an overview of proprietary and nonproliferation constraints on heavy water technology transfer. Our major conclusions are as follows: 1. On-power fueling of CANDU reactors leads to special, well recognized safeguarding problems. These have been addres- sed by a safeguards development program, encompassing both systems analysis and hardware development, jointly sponsored by Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL), the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The approach involves surveillance, containment, and item-counting of irradiated fuel bundles. Although the complete system has not as yet been tested on an operating reactor

Soon after the United States has removed a major threat to American and regional interests with the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime, Washington has to come to terms with the looming challenge of Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. The good news is that assertive multilateral diplomacy still has some running room for negotiating a stall or derailment of Iran's nuclear weapons program. The bad news is that the prospects are dim for achieving this end without the resort to force over the coming years. The Iraqi War is the backdrop for the evolving policy debate on Iran. The Iraq situation pits competing views of U.S national security strategy after 9/11 against one another. On one side, critics of the Iraq war are posturing that if weapons of mass destruction (WMD) failed to be a sufficient justification for waging war against Iraq, then concerns about WMD have even less merit for forcibly challenging the Iranian regime over its nuclear weapons aspirations. On the other side, the threat posed by WMD -- with the associated risk that terrorists might get their hands on WMD -- is emerging as a worldview to replace the grand unifying scheme of containment that governed American and Western policy during the Cold War. Those in this camp view the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq as models for other policy challenges that involve WMD and potential support for terrorist groups coming from the likes of Iran and North Korea. There are pitfalls, though, of viewing the Iran policy debate entirely through the Iraq policy prism. Just as a prism bends rays of light, Iraq and Iran, while they share many features, are distinct problems that require the modulation of policy tools. This article seeks to illuminate the commonalities and variations between past Iraq and today's Iran as well as the strengths and weaknesses of American policy options for dealing with the growing security challenge posed by Tehran's quest for nuclear weapons., Published in Parameters, v34 p31-45, Autumn 2004.

International restrictions on the supply or highly enriched uranium have resulted in the requirement to fuel research reactors with a lower-enrichment uranium fuel. A study has been made of the feasibility of using low-enrichment fuels of a new type in the DIDO and PLUTO reactors. This work has been done as a contribution to the studies currently being carried out internationally on the implications of using lower-enrichment fuels in heavy-water-moderated research reactors. The uranium content of the U/Al alloy at present used cannot be increased sufficiently to maintain the requisite U235 content without undesirable effects on the physical properties of the alloy. A different type of fuel will therefore be required to maintain the desired nuclear characteristics. A possible solution to the problem is the use of a cermet (U3O8/Al) fuel material. This paper describes a preliminary study of the feasibility of this concept from the heat-transfer and safety viewpoints. (Author)

This report contains information concerning the nuclear developments of the following countries: (1) Hong Kong, (2) Poland, (3) Latin America; Argentina, Brazil, (4) Near East and South Asia; Egypt, India, Pakistan, (5) China, and (6) West Europe; Ireland, Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey.

This report contains information concerning the nuclear developments of the following countries: (1) East Asia; Australia, Hong Kong, (2) Bulgaria, (3) Argentina, (4) Near East and South Asia; India, Morocco, and (5) West Europe; Ireland, Turkey.

Progress is reported on the design, developmentAND DELIVERY SCHEDULES FOR THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT: Transmitter - unit 1; receiver - unit 2; indicator, radar display - unit 3; control, radar set - unit 4; control, radar set, auxiliary - unit 8; power supply-azimu h sweep unit - unit 5; and antenna - unit 6.

Contents: Proton Resonance States in Si28; Aphid Pigments; Natural Polyacetylenes; Preston's Method of Measuring Turbulent Shear; Technique Employed on Mount Everest for Measuring Respiratory Exchanges; Open-Circuit Oxygen Equipment Used by the British Mount Everest Expedition; and Proceedings of the Kjeller Conference on Heavy Water Reactors.

The report includes the following: (1) a comparison of the response of selected structural steels to irradiation at 550 and 650F to high neutron fluences, (2) the through-thickness Charpy-V notch ductility performance of a 10-1/2-in.-thick plate of irradiated A302-B steel, (3) an investigation of the effects of oxygen and nitrogen contents on the radiation embrittlement sensitivity of 7-1/2Ni-Cr-Mo steel at 250F, (4) the notch ductility behavior of irradiated 12Ni-5Cr-3Mo maraging steel weldments, (5) the response of A350-LF1 (Modified) steel to postirradiation annealing at temperatures in the range of 550 to 590F, (6) the notch ductility behavior of A350-LF1 (Modified) steel with cyclic 430F irradiation-168 hour annealing, (7) the preirradiation mechanical properties of the MH-1A reactor pressure vessel steel, (8) the notch ductility of several reactor structural steels after irradiation in a heavy water moderated reactor, (9) the modification, installation, and initial operation of a remotely operated, tape-controlled milling machine, and (10) a description of newly acquired remotely operated precision measuring equipment. (Author)

The report includes the following: (1) status of reactor radiation damage surveillance programs in several power reactors, (2) the effect of neutron spectra on properties of steels exposed in light water, heavy water, and graphite-moderated reactors, (3) the alleviation of neutron embrittlement of A350-LF1 steel by thermal annealing treatment, and (4) through-thickness Charpy V-notch ductility characteristics of a 4-in. A302-B plate., See also AD-621 867.

Contents: Graphite-moderated reactors; Heavy-water-moderated reactors., Trans. of mono. Voprosy Konstruktovaniya Yadernykh Reaktorov, Moscow, 1971 p117-183.