Search

Full Text, Thesis (PhD Doctorate), Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Dept Account,Finance & Econ, Griffith Business School, Modern financial systems are highly interconnected. Institutions or individuals form connections with each other in different ways for different purposes. Networks, broadly understood as a collection of nodes and connections between nodes, can therefore be a useful representation of financial systems. Using social network analysis (SNA), this thesis provides novel empirical evidence on the effects of network centrality, which refers to an actor’s position and level of connectedness in a network, on Australian initial public offering (IPO) firms that went public between 2001 and 2017. The thesis includes three essays that aim to examine: (1) the relationship between investment bank networks and the accuracy of IPO prospectus earnings forecasts, (2) the overinvestment problem associated with excess cash in seasoned versus newly public firms, and whether investment bank networks affect the performance of IPO firms with excess cash, and lastly, (3) the relationships between board networks, cash holdings, and IPO firms’ performance. The first empirical essay investigates whether investment banks with more central network positions could improve earnings forecast accuracy in the context of Australian IPOs issued during the 2001-2017 period. Using SNA to construct investment bank network centrality, I show that IPOs backed by more central investment banks tend to have higher absolute offer price revision, exhibit greater forecast accuracy, and are associated with more pessimistic forecasts. Taken together, the results support the idea that, relative to their counterparts that are peripheral in the network, more central investment banks may produce more information in the IPO process and certify the quality of IPO issuers by encouraging more conservative and accurate earnings forecasts. This study makes an important contribution by adding to the burgeoning literature on network studies in the context of IPO investment banking. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the

Modern financial systems are highly interconnected. Institutions or individuals form connections with each other in different ways for different purposes. Networks, broadly understood as a collection of nodes and connections between nodes, can therefore be a useful representation of financial systems. Using social network analysis (SNA), this thesis provides novel empirical evidence on the effects of network centrality, which refers to an actor’s position and level of connectedness in a network, on Australian initial public offering (IPO) firms that went public between 2001 and 2017. The thesis includes three essays that aim to examine: (1) the relationship between investment bank networks and the accuracy of IPO prospectus earnings forecasts, (2) the overinvestment problem associated with excess cash in seasoned versus newly public firms, and whether investment bank networks affect the performance of IPO firms with excess cash, and lastly, (3) the relationships between board networks, cash holdings, and IPO firms’ performance. The first empirical essay investigates whether investment banks with more central network positions could improve earnings forecast accuracy in the context of Australian IPOs issued during the 2001-2017 period. Using SNA to construct investment bank network centrality, I show that IPOs backed by more central investment banks tend to have higher absolute offer price revision, exhibit greater forecast accuracy, and are associated with more pessimistic forecasts. Taken together, the results support the idea that, relative to their counterparts that are peripheral in the network, more central investment banks may produce more information in the IPO process and certify the quality of IPO issuers by encouraging more conservative and accurate earnings forecasts. This study makes an important contribution by adding to the burgeoning literature on network studies in the context of IPO investment banking. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the, Thesis (PhD Doctorate), Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Dept Account,Finance & Econ, Griffith Business School, Full Text

Het is voor ondernemers een bekend gebied: de zone waar je geld nodig hebt dat je niet hebt liggen en waar de bank terughoudend is om te helpen. Begrijpelijk wellicht, maar ook erg teleurstellend. En het kost kansen. Het Nationaal Groenfonds heeft zich ontwikkeld tot een investeringspartner voor juist deze projecten, boeren, leningen en kansen.

Nel novembre 2019 Mediobanca ha aperto alla pubblica consultazione il suo archivio storico. La direzione de Il Politico mi ha chiesto un commento e ho pensato che fosse l’ora di favorire una revisione del giudizio di molti studiosi e politici sulla banca nella quale ho lavorato per 43 anni in totale indipendenza. Troppe vicende sono state distorte e pure inventate. Ora vi sono i documenti originali e penso che questi suggeriscano una profonda revisione. Ovviamente non per dire che non vi furono errori, ma per riformulare interpretazioni e critiche basandole su quanto realmente accaduto. Il mio scritto vuole essere un contributo per raccontare la storia della Mediobanca di Cuccia, finita nel 2003, lasciando a commentatori indipendenti la storiografia. Riservatezza, accuse di monopolio, rapporti con industriali e banchieri, capitalismo familiare, patti di sindacato, caso Olivetti, salotto buono., In November 2019, Mediobanca opened its historical archive for public consultation. The editors of "Il Politico" asked me for a comment and I thought it was time to encourage a review of the judgment of many scholars and politicians on the bank in which I worked for 43 years in total independence. Too many stories were distorted and even invented. Now the original documents are available and these I think suggest a profound revision. Obviously not to say that there were no mistakes, but to reformulate interpretations and criticism based on what really happened. This writing wants to be a contribution to tell the story of the Cuccia's Mediobanca, ended in 2003, leaving to others the historiography. Confidentiality, accusations of monopoly, relations with other bankers, family capitalism, voting agreements, Olivetti case, good drawing room.

This article aims to discuss the debate about the PAEG Reforms' inability to build a private and national long-term financing nucleous for the Brazilian economy after the 1964 Military Coup. We intend to contrast two diverging opinions regarding the failure of the investment banks project, that was unable to provide new funding sources for brazilian companies. According to the policy makers of Castello Branco Government, the inflation persistence, the financial statism and the savings scarcity blocked the expansion of long term loans. In opposion to these arguments, the PAEG critics do not recognize the savings rate as a prerequisite to credit increasement. So, the expansion of long term loans did not happen due to Brazilian historical and structural features (like the Brazilian firms' low propensity to finance theirs investments throught the financial market) and also due to Brazilian military government alliance with the international financial capital., O presente artigo visa reconstituir o debate entre economistas acerca da incapacidade do PAEG (Plano de Ação Econômica do Governo) em conformar uma base sólida de financiamento de longo prazo privada e nacional para a economia brasileira após o Golpe Militar de 1964. A ideia, portanto, é contrastar duas interpretações divergentes a respeito do fracasso do projeto dos bancos de investimento que visava prover novas fontes de financiamento para os investimento produtivos das empresas brasileiras.Conclui-se que, para os gestores do PAEG, a continuidade da inflação, o estatismo do mercado financeiro e a escassez de poupança impossibilitaram a expansão dos fundos privados de longo prazo. Por sua vez, os críticos do PAEG ressaltam que poupança não constitui pré-condição para a expansão do crédito. Assim, o fracasso da tentativa de dinamização dos empréstimos de longo prazo decorre de alguns traços estruturais do desenvolvimento capitalista brasileiro (tais como a baixa propensão das empresas privadas nacionais e estrangeiras ao uso de recursos de terceiros para financiar o investimento) e da opção política do Governo Castello Branco pela aliança com o capital financeiro internacional.

This article aims to discuss the debate about the PAEG Reforms' inability to build a private and national long-term financing nucleous for the Brazilian economy after the 1964 Military Coup. We intend to contrast two diverging opinions regarding the failure of the investment banks project, that was unable to provide new funding sources for brazilian companies. According to the policy makers of Castello Branco Government, the inflation persistence, the financial statism and the savings scarcity blocked the expansion of long term loans. In opposion to these arguments, the PAEG critics do not recognize the savings rate as a prerequisite to credit increasement. So, the expansion of long term loans did not happen due to Brazilian historical and structural features (like the Brazilian firms' low propensity to finance theirs investments throught the financial market) and also due to Brazilian military government alliance with the international financial capital., O presente artigo visa reconstituir o debate entre economistas acerca da incapacidade do PAEG (Plano de Ação Econômica do Governo) em conformar uma base sólida de financiamento de longo prazo privada e nacional para a economia brasileira após o Golpe Militar de 1964. A ideia, portanto, é contrastar duas interpretações divergentes a respeito do fracasso do projeto dos bancos de investimento que visava prover novas fontes de financiamento para os investimento produtivos das empresas brasileiras.Conclui-se que, para os gestores do PAEG, a continuidade da inflação, o estatismo do mercado financeiro e a escassez de poupança impossibilitaram a expansão dos fundos privados de longo prazo. Por sua vez, os críticos do PAEG ressaltam que poupança não constitui pré-condição para a expansão do crédito. Assim, o fracasso da tentativa de dinamização dos empréstimos de longo prazo decorre de alguns traços estruturais do desenvolvimento capitalista brasileiro (tais como a baixa propensão das empresas privadas nacionais e estrangeiras ao uso de recursos de terceiros para financiar o investimento) e da opção política do Governo Castello Branco pela aliança com o capital financeiro internacional.

This chapter provides an overview of the development of commercial banking—defined as taking deposits payable on demand and originating loans to private and corporate customers—from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. Two characteristics are underlined: state regulation, primarily dictated by concerns about banks’ position as deposit takers; and banks’ role in the financing of industry and more generally in economic growth including their assigned responsibility. The changing nature of these two features has shaped the development of commercial banks since the onset of industrialization. In all countries, with the exception of England, commercial banks developed into some kind of universal bank in the course of the nineteenth century. This converging movement ended in the interwar years, when in many countries commercial banks were separated from investment banks. Universal banking became dominant again in the late twentieth century, but in the form of banking conglomerates.

El banco de inversión J. S. Morgan & Co. tomó el control del Ferrocarril Gran Oeste Argentino para proteger el valor de los títulos de dicha compañía que conservaba en su poder. La crisis de 1890 había puesto en peligro la supervivencia de la empresa de transportes. La consulta de los documentos que se conservan en el archivo del banco, que se encuentra en la Guildhall Library de Londres, permite reconstruir la forma en que ejerció ese control, los pasos seguidos para lograr que la empresa superara los efectos de la crisis y las ventajas que obtuvo respecto de otros inversores por su posición dominante., The merchant bank J. S. Morgan & Co. took control of the Argentine Great Western Railway Company to safeguard the shares and debentures value that the bank had purchased before the Baring Crisis of 1890. The research on the files of the Morgan Bank Archive which is kept in the Guildhall Library, London, leads to the reconstruction of the way followed by the bank to take control and get the railway recovered. Also, the documents show how the merchant bank J. S. Morgan & Co. was put in a more favourable position in relation to other investors in the railway company.

El banco de inversión J. S. Morgan & Co. tomó el control del Ferrocarril Gran Oeste Argentino para proteger el valor de los títulos de dicha compañía que conservaba en su poder. La crisis de 1890 había puesto en peligro la supervivencia de la empresa de transportes. La consulta de los documentos que se conservan en el archivo del banco, que se encuentra en la Guildhall Library de Londres, permite reconstruir la forma en que ejerció ese control, los pasos seguidos para lograr que la empresa superara los efectos de la crisis y las ventajas que obtuvo respecto de otros inversores por su posición dominante., The merchant bank J. S. Morgan & Co. took control of the Argentine Great Western Railway Company to safeguard the shares and debentures value that the bank had purchased before the Baring Crisis of 1890. The research on the files of the Morgan Bank Archive which is kept in the Guildhall Library, London, leads to the reconstruction of the way followed by the bank to take control and get the railway recovered. Also, the documents show how the merchant bank J. S. Morgan & Co. was put in a more favourable position in relation to other investors in the railway company.

Underwriters underprice Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and often, immediately after, repurchase shares in an attempt to stabilize the price. This ancillary service is not mandatory and can be provided by underwriters in the first month of trading. Using a sample of Italian IPOs, we investigate whether the price stabilization activity is carried out when actually needed. We document that only half of the IPOs that require this service are actually stabilized after going public. The fees charged by underwriters are not informative about the provision of this ancillary activity. Rather, the underwriter's reputation is negatively associated with the stabilization activity. Negative price revisions and negative (or low) underpricing also drive the provision of price stabilization.

This paper reviews the pattern of bank failures during the financial crisis and asks whether there was a link with corporate governance. It revisits the theory of bank governance and suggests a multi-constituency approach that emphasizes the role of weak creditors. The empirical evidence suggests that, on average, banks with stronger risk officers, less independent boards, and executives with less variable remuneration incurred fewer losses. There is no evidence that institutional shareholders opposed aggressive risk-taking. The Financial Stability Board published Principles for Sound Compensation Practices in 2009, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued principles for enhancing corporate governance in 1999, 2006, and 2010. The reports have in common that shareholders retain residual control and executive pay continues to be aligned with shareholder interests. However, we argue that bank governance is different and requires more radical departures from traditional governance for non-financial firms. © The Authors 2012. Published by Oxford University Press., 0, SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This paper reviews the pattern of bank failures during the financial crisis and asks whether there was a link with corporate governance. It revisits the theory of bank governance and suggests a multi-constituency approach that emphasizes the role of weak creditors. The empirical evidence suggests that, on average, banks with stronger risk officers, less independent boards, and executives with less variable remuneration incurred fewer losses. There is no evidence that institutional shareholders opposed aggressive risk-taking. The Financial Stability Board published Principles for Sound Compensation Practices in 2009, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued principles for enhancing corporate governance in 1999, 2006, and 2010. The reports have in common that shareholders retain residual control and executive pay continues to be aligned with shareholder interests. However, we argue that bank governance is different and requires more radical departures from traditional governance for non-financial firms. © The Authors 2012. Published by Oxford University Press., 0, SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We investigate the valuation and the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by investment banks for a unique dataset of 49 IPOs on Euronext Brussels in the 1993-2001 period. We find that for each IPO several valuation methods are used, of which Discounted Free Cash Flow (DFCF) is the most popular. The offer price is mainly based on DFCF valuation, to which a discount is applied. Our results suggest that DDM tends to underestimate value, while DFCF produces unbiased value estimates. When using multiples, investment banks rely mostly on future earnings and cash flows. Multiples based on post-IPO forecasted earnings and cash flows result in more accurate valuations.

This study shows how environmental information is used by financial analysts when valuing companies. Unlike the previous studies on analysts' perceptions, we use content analysis to examine the actual use of environmental information in valuations. Research reports from large investment banks in the USA and Europe are collected. The sample consists of reports from two industries, oil and chemicals, where the operations have a considerable impact on the environment. The results show that analysts do use environmental information in 35% of the valuations. Most of the information utilised is for environmental expenditures and risk assessment. For instance, the information about environmental provisions and emissions is of relative importance. We also find that analysts use environmental information not only for the evaluations of risk, but also for the assessment of the future upside potential when valuing chemical companies. They make use of this information to motivate the relative valuations.

Het realiseren van de millenniumdoelstellingen van de Verenigde Naties is niet een kwestie van de beschikbaarheid van geld. Deze uitspraak deed Jeroen van der Sommen, directeur van het NWP in het interview met hem in H2O nummer 3 van dit jaar. Toch is de financiering van waterprojecten vaak een cruciaal punt. Ook profileren algemene banken zich niet of nauwelijks als financiers van waterprojecten. Ruim twee jaar geleden kondigde SNS REAAL echter aan zich wel actief in de watersector te willen gaan opstellen. Aanleiding voor een gesprek met drs. Kajetan Hetzer, beheerder van het SNS REAAL Waterfonds, in het monumentale pand van dit bedrijf aan de Nieuwezijds Voorburgwal in Amsterdam, ooit gebouwd voor de Handels Vereniging Amsterdam en nog altijd rijk aan herinneringen aan ons koloniale verleden

Onderzoekers worden steeds vaker ingeschakeld door het onderwijs als het om duurzaam ondernemerschap gaat. Het zijn vaak losse projecten, en soms veel van hetzelfde. Onderzoekers die ingeschakeld worden willen meer afstemming en meer uitwisseling, maar het moet nog wel van de grond komen

Een indruk wordt getoond hoe de bankwereld in Vlaanderen en Nederland staat tegenover kredietaanvragen voor verdubbeling van de bedrijfsomvang en melkcapaciteit

Onderzoekers worden steeds vaker ingeschakeld door het onderwijs als het om duurzaam ondernemerschap gaat. Het zijn vaak losse projecten, en soms veel van hetzelfde. Onderzoekers die ingeschakeld worden willen meer afstemming en meer uitwisseling, maar het moet nog wel van de grond komen

Immediately following public offerings, underwriters often repurchase shares of poorly performing IPOs in an apparent attempt to stabilize the price. Using proprietary Nasdaq data for a large sample of IPOs, I study the price effects and cross-sectional determinants of price support. Some of the key findings are: (1) Price stabilization is substantial, inducing significant price rigidity at and below the offer price. Stabilization appears, at least in the short run, to raise the equilibrium stock price. (2) Many studies suggest that stabilization helps to mitigate information asymmetry problems in the IPO market. I find no evidence that stocks with larger ex-ante information asymmetries are stabilized more strongly. (3) The characteristics of the lead underwriter emerge as the strongest determinants of price support. Larger and more reputable investment banks stabilize more, perhaps to protect their reputations with investors. But there are substantial differences in price support even among the largest underwriters (after controlling for IPO characteristics and underwriter size). (4) Investment banks with retail brokerage operations stabilize much more than other large investment banks. This puzzling result seems inconsistent with the common view that stabilization benefits primarily institutional investors, and I outline and examine several alternative explanation

Immediately following public offerings, underwriters often repurchase shares of poorly performing IPOs in an apparent attempt to stabilize the price. Using proprietary Nasdaq data for a large sample of IPOs, I study the price effects and cross-sectional determinants of price support. Some of the key findings are: (1) Price stabilization is substantial, inducing significant price rigidity at and below the offer price. Stabilization appears, at least in the short run, to raise the equilibrium stock price. (2) Many studies suggest that stabilization helps to mitigate information asymmetry problems in the IPO market. I find no evidence that stocks with larger ex-ante information asymmetries are stabilized more strongly. (3) The characteristics of the lead underwriter emerge as the strongest determinants of price support. Larger and more reputable investment banks stabilize more, perhaps to protect their reputations with investors. But there are substantial differences in price support even among the largest underwriters (after controlling for IPO characteristics and underwriter size). (4) Investment banks with retail brokerage operations stabilize much more than other large investment banks. This puzzling result seems inconsistent with the common view that stabilization benefits primarily institutional investors, and I outline and examine several alternative explanation

The "variations of truth in plantation forestry" is a study on the Teakwood investment program. Teakwood offered the general public in The Netherlands the opportunity to directly invest in a teak plantation in Costa Rica. The program was pioneered in 1989 and truly gained momentum when it was joined by the world's largest environmental organization WWF and an insurance and banking company called OHRA in 1993. Thousands of people invested, many millions of Guilders were transferred and about a dozen teak investment programs in The Netherlands alone followed in its wake. Teakwood offered 'green gold' (OHRA, Summer 1993), it was heralded as 'modern development work' and it attracted broad media attention. The strong proposition of Teakwood attracted the involvement of the Government of The Netherlands (Romeijn, April 18, 1996). From November 1995 onward, the Teakwood investment program increasingly met with opposition. OHRA terminated its Teakwood investment program in the autumn of 1996.The Teakwood investment program was introduced to the market as being based on solid and conservative assumptions on timber yield and financial return. The present study presents a description of the erosion of the credibility of these assumptions by following key statements over time. These statements, or "variations of truth" come from the Teakwood contract partners themselves and from organizations and individuals which the Teakwood contract partners have recognized as authoritative, including the Rainforest Alliance and the Forest Stewardship Council, FSC. The Rainforest Alliance is based in the USA and it certified the Flor y Fauna forest operation as 'well managed' in 1995. The FSC is an organization which is based in Mexico. The FSC accredits forest certification organizations worldwide and it endorsed the Rainforest Alliance certificate for the Flor y Fauna plantation management in January 1998. However, the Flor y Fauna plantations management were found to show no evidence of