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This report summarizes the discussions at a seminar organized and hosted by the RAND Corporation at which a group of acting and former senior government and law enforcement officials, practitioners, and experts examined domestic intelligence operations and information sharing as these relate to terrorist threats. The collective experience of the participants spanned the breadth of the homeland security apparatus. The participants included officials who have served or are serving in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DoD), state and local law enforcement agencies, first-responder organizations, and state-level homeland security agencies. A similar group met three years ago to discuss lessons learned from avoiding terrorist attacks at home, the role of DHS's Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis, and the value and focus of fusion centers. One of the goals of the meeting reported here was to measure how much progress was being made (or not made, as the case may be) in several critical areas of homeland security. The seminar was conducted within RAND's continuing program of self-initiated research. Support for such research is provided, in part, by donors and by the independent research and development provisions of RAND s contracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and development centers.

The recovery earlier this year of a new, improved bomb designed to avoid detection by airport security underscores terrorists continuing determination to bring down commercial airliners. Like the bomb carried by Umar Abdulmutallab in his unsuccessful attempt to sabotage an airliner in 2009, the new device designed by al Qaeda s bomb-maker was intended to be concealed in the saboteur s underwear. The device was obtained by an intelligence operative who managed to persuade his al Qaeda handlers that he was ready to carry out that suicide mission. While it is necessary to investigate possible ways to counter this latest terrorist innovation, a more fundamental review of how we secure the airplanes that 2 million passengers board every day in the United States is imperative. Evolving terrorist tactics and technology pose new threats, as growing passenger loads and added security procedures are already straining airport screeners. And terrorists are not the only problem faced by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Airline passengers have become increasingly hostile to the very measures deployed to protect them, while TSA is under continuous assault in Congress. Aviation security is costly, controversial, and contentious; no other security measures directly affect such a large portion of the country s population. Because of the nature of the threat, aviation security is the most intrusive form of security, pushing hard on the frontier of civil liberties. And the threat is real: terrorists remain obsessed with attacking airplanes. At the same time, passenger loads are increasing, while security budgets are likely to decline. Performance suffers. Meanwhile, public tolerance and cooperation are beginning to fray. But the Transportation Security Administration is often blamed for things beyond its control. And post-catastrophe reviews can push us in the wrong direction, usually resulting in new security measures rather than a reexamination of strategy. After

There is a remarkably little consensus among analysts about the threat now posed by al Qaeda. Some view al Qaeda as a spent force, its demise hastened by bin Laden's death. Others point to al Qaeda's still active field commands, in particular al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); the spread of its ideology, especially on the Internet; its determination to acquire and employ weapons of mass destruction; and the still difficult situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qaeda is many things. It is an ideology of violence. It is the inspiration for a global terrorist campaign. It is a tiny army in Afghanistan. It is a loose collection of autonomous field commands and allies in North Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. It is a communications network. Increasingly, it is the conveyer of individual discontents. A thorough assessment would have to examine each component and aspect of its activities., Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.

This paper examines the extent of jihadist radicalization in the United States, discusses who is being recruited, and assesses the domestic terrorist threat posed by the recruits. It then looks at how the recruits were identified by U.S. authorities and asks what this means for domestic counterterrorist strategy. The findings should be of interest to local, state, and federal law enforcement authorities. Between September 11, 2001, and the end of 2009, 46 publicly reported cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism occurred in the United States; 13 of those cases occurred in 2009. Most of the would-be jihadists were individuals who recruited themselves into the terrorist role. Some provided assistance to foreign terrorist organizations; some went abroad to join various jihad fronts; some plotted terrorist attacks in the United States, usually with little success because of intervention by the authorities. The threat of large-scale terrorist violence has pushed law enforcement toward prevention rather than criminal apprehension after an event--or, as one senior police official put it, "staying to the left of the boom,"--which means stopping the explosions or attacks before they occur. This shift toward prevention requires both collecting domestic intelligence--always a delicate mission in a democracy--and maintaining community trust and cooperation.

The Mumbai attack was still ongoing when RAND initiated an analysis to determine what lessons might be learned from it. This analysis, part of RAND's continuing research on terrorism and homeland security, was documented in a report I co-authored along with other RAND analysts. Specifically, I contributed the sections on the terrorists' strategic motives and the execution of the attack., Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate.

This study of the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008 is part of the RAND Corporation Occasional Papers series. The research for this report was completed in December 2008 and updated as of January 9, 2009. Much of the information available for this necessarily preliminary analysis comes from reporting by the news media, which in such circumstances is often inaccurate, and from information provided by well-placed Indian and U.S. Government sources, which sometimes is incomplete. For a thorough, and hopefully accurate reconstruction of events, we must await an official inquiry or government-sponsored independent investigation. With these caveats, this paper does the following: (1) identifies the operational and tactical features and technical capabilities displayed by the terrorists -- the extent to which the means employed in the attack were innovations or built on previous experiences; (2) evaluates the response of the Indian security forces; (3) draws out the implications of the incident for India, Pakistan, and the international community; and (4) derives the lessons learned from the attack and the Indian response. The goal of the study is to develop findings that may be helpful to counterterrorism authorities in India and elsewhere in preparing for or countering future terrorist attacks on urban centers., ISBN 978-0-8330-4667-3

Testimony focuses on the proposal to create a National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism. Mr. Jenkins warns one of the major challenges will be to correctly frame the issue, avoiding unsupported assumptions that lead to inappropriate strategies. He concludes by underscoring some principles to guide the proposed commission's work., Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment on June 14, 2007.

Madame Chair: I appreciate the opportunity to be here today where you have experienced homegrown terror firsthand to discuss the issues of radicalization and how to protect the homeland. Although the United States and its allies have achieved undeniable success in degrading the operational capabilities of jihadist terrorists worldwide, they have had less success in reducing the radicalization and recruitment that support the jihadist enterprise. My testimony today will simply highlight a few areas for further discussion: * Building an army of believers how the jihadists recruit * Radicalization and recruitment in the United States * How we might impede radicalization and recruitment, and * Guiding principles for any actions we might consider., Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment on April 5, 2007.

Brian Michael Jenkins is a Senior Advisor to the President of the RAND Corporation and professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. He is an expert in terrorism, counterinsurgency, and homeland security. These are his recommendations to the House Subcommittee on Homeland Security., Testimony presented before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security on January 30, 2007

Terrorist tactics have a long history, but contemporary international terrorism is a relatively recent phenomenon. The first airline hijacking for political ends occurred in 1968, and the first successful kidnapping of a diplomat by urban guerrillas in modern times took place in 1969. These events mark the beginning of terrorism as a new mode of conflict. Terrorism has changed dramatically since the events of the late 1960s. The most dramatic change has been the escalation of terrorism. This books looks at the current world situation, educating on the underlying principles, motives, and strategies of today's terrorists. The author then moves on to strategies for defeating terrorism and for strengthening American defenses against terrorists., ISBN-13: 978-0-8330-3891-3 (pbk. : alk. paper), ISBN-13: 978-0-8330-3893-7 (hardcover : alk. paper). The original document contains color images.

RAND Review is published periodically by the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit institution. The mission of the RAND corporation is to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. Titles of articles appearing in this publication include: Five Pillars of Democracy: How the West Can Promote an Islamic reformation; Redefining Counterterrorism: the Terrorist Leader as CEO; Redefining the Enemy, Swollen Waistlines, Swollen Costs (Obesity); and a commentary on wind tunnels. Issue also includes world news regarding military operations and military research., The original document contains color images. All DTIC reproductions will be in black and white.

While our attention understandably is focused on the war in Iraq, the worldwide war against al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist enterprises continues Unlike the fighting in Iraq, the campaign against the terrorists does not provide the continuing flow of televised images or battlefield displays. It is a war fought largely in the shadows. We measure its progress in the periodic arrests of terrorist leaders and the passage of time without a major terrorist attack. It has been nearly 19 months since September 11, 2001. Since then, we have made considerable progress in destroying al Qaeda's base in Afghanistan and in disrupting its operational capabilities, but much remains to be done, Our efforts to destroy al Qaeda and its successors will take years. My remarks today will address three issues: (1) the nature of the current terrorist threat, (2) goals of a counter-terrorist strategy, and (3) the use of intelligence in dealing with terrorism. My remarks derive partly from research at the RAND Corporation, but my observations and conclusions are entirely my own.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has achieved significant successes in its war on terrorism. Removing the Taliban government in Afghanistan, thereby eliminating al Qaeda's sanctuary and training camps, has broken an important link in the process that once provided al Qaeda's leadership with a continuing flow of recruits. Toppling the Taliban also demonstrated American resolve and international support, and it underscored the considerable risk run by governments that provide assistance to terrorists. Having achieved its initial goals in Afghanistan, the United States is now in a second, more complex phase of the war, where it must continue its efforts to destroy al Qaeda and at the same time attempt to combat terrorism as a mode of conflict Al Qaeda, along with its associates and its successors, will fight on, drawing upon a deep reservoir of hatred and a desire for revenge. It must be presumed that al Qaeda will exploit all of its ability to cause catastrophic death and destruction-there will be no self-imposed limits to its violence. It can also be presumed that the organization will continue its efforts to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD); that it will attack U.S. targets abroad where possible; and that it will attempt to mount attacks within the United States. Al Qaeda constitutes the most serious immediate threat to the security of the United States.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has achieved significant successes in its war on terrorism. Removing the Taliban government in Afghanistan, thereby eliminating al Qaeda's sanctuary and training camps, has broken an important link in the process that once provided al Qaeda's leadership with a continuing flow of recruits. Toppling the Taliban also demonstrated American resolve and international support, and it underscored the considerable risk run by governments that provide assistance to terrorists. Having achieved its initial goals in Afghanistan, the United States is now in a second, more complex phase of the war, where it must continue its efforts to destroy al Qaeda and at the same time attempt to combat terrorism as a mode of conflict. Al Qaeda, along with its associates and its successors, will fight on, drawing upon a deep reservoir of hatred and a desire for revenge. It must be presumed that al Qaeda will exploit all of its ability to cause catastrophic death and destruction there will be no self-imposed limits to its violence. It can also be presumed that the organization will continue its efforts to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD); that it will attack U.S. targets abroad where possible; and that it will attempt to mount attacks within the United States. Al Qaeda constitutes the most serious immediate threat to the security of the United States.

This monograph summarizes the findings of a six-month project on deterrence of terrorism conducted jointly by RAND and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). This study was initiated by a request to develop a framework for deterring terrorism. It was subsequently broadened to address, which greatly increased the operating space for our research, allowing us to consider measures ranging from co-optation to full-scale military attacks executed to deter future terrorist attacks (by al Qaeda or by others). This broadening of the problem also reflected a lesson gleaned from reviewing historical experience with terrorism: Successful strategies to combat terrorism spawned by serious, deep-rooted problems have involved first crushing the current threat and then bringing about changes to make terrorism's reemergence less likely. Thus, although concepts such as co-optation and inducement are not effective for dealing with terrorists who have the unshakable commitment of a bin Laden, they do apply to others that the United States must try to influence.

Despite the high level of anxiety the American people are currently experiencing, we may still not fully comprehend the seriousness of the current and near-term threats we confront or the longer-term consequences of the trends underscored so dramatically on September 11th. I say this not to arouse further alarm. I have never counted myself among the "Apocalyticians" who forecast scenarios of doom in lurid detail. In my own essays over the past 30 years, I have been skeptical of the notion that there is an inexorable progression in terrorism from car bombs to terrorist use of nuclear weapons. Rather, my purpose here is to warn against a return to complacency once the shock of September 11th has begun to wear off. Over the past decade, we have suffered a series of devastating terrorist attacks-attacks that in terms of the concentration and magnitude of casualties have been greater than anything experienced by other nations: The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was followed by the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which was, in turn, followed by the events of September 11th -each attack worse than the last. However, because those attacks have been sporadic, the passage of time between them has allowed us to go back to business as usual. This time must be different. In that light, let me begin by discussing the current and near-term threats we face, before turning to the longer-term consequences of the trends emerging from September 11th.

As part of its research on the phenomenon of terrorism, The Rand Corporation has maintained a chronology of incidents of international terrorism. This chronology, now consisting of approximately 1,400 incidents that have occurred since 1968, provides a useful historical record and a data base for analysis. The takeover of the American embassy in Teheran in November 1979, and of the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogota in February 1980, prompted a review of this particular terrorist tactic for possible emergent patterns or trends. This report examines 43 seizures and five attempted seizures of diplomatic facilites which occurred in the past decade., See also Rept. no. RAND/P-5905 dated Jul 1977.

This report documents a study undertaken to develop a methodology for analyzing terrorist groups. A conceptual framework for analysis was devised and was then used to test several hypotheses concerning terrorist groups and their actions. The study also resulted in the creation of an extensive database of information on 29 selected terrorist groups. The report describes an analytical framework developed at Rand for studying the characteristics of terrorist groups and illustrates how that framework can be used to address broad questions about terrorists and their actions. This conceptual framework is based on data concerning 150 specific attributes of terrorist groups. These attributes fall into the following categories: (1) Organization; (2) Leadership; (3) Demography; (4) Ideology, doctrine, and goals; (5) Psychology, mindset, and decisionmaking; (6) Funding and logistics; (7) Operations and modus operandi; (8) Communications; (9) External relations; (10) Environmental and government response.

As it applies to Rand's current research, the term 'terrorism' is used generically to describe research on a wide range of related topics, including: the theory and tactics of terrorism; the organization of the U.S. government for combatting terrorism, the analysis of intelligence on terrorist threats; heuristic modeling and the use of remote access computers in the management of low-level crises; the policy and tactics of dealing with political kidnapping and hostage situations; the effects of being held hostage; U.S. military capabilities for subconventional missions (the extrication or rescue of U.S. nationals abroad, the recovery of facilities seized by terrorists); new vulnerabilities in a society increasingly dependent on technology; trends and potentialities in terrorism, nuclear safeguards and security; subnational nuclear capabilities; and the assessment of nuclear threat messages.

Increasingly spectacular acts of terrorism have led to growing concern that terrorists will move beyond the symbols of society and directly attack its technological and industrial vulnerabilities. Offshore platforms have been frequently mentioned among the potential targets terrorists might attack. This concern, however, has not resulted in extensive research like that devoted to possible threats to nuclear facilities, which have also been frequently mentioned as possible future targets of terrorists. For one thing, offshore drilling does not invoke the fear inherent in the word nuclear, a fear that translates directly into heavy security for the nuclear industry. Neither does the construction of offshore platforms provoke anything like the kind of protest generated by the construction of nuclear facilities. Theses. (JES)

To explore the possibilities of Soviet-American cooperation in combatting terrorism, a small group of American and Soviet scholars and journalists met in Moscow in 1989. The participants suggested the creation of a standing bilateral group and a channel of communication for the exchange of information about terrorism, the provision mutual assistance in the investigation or resolution of terrorist incidents; cooperation at the diplomatic level in expanding and strengthening international conventions against terrorism; greater controls on the transfer of military explosives and certain categories of weapons; joint efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring the means of mass destruction; the exchange of technology that may be useful in preventing or combatting terrorism; and the conduct of joint exercises and simulations for the purpose of exploring Soviet-American cooperation during terrorist threats of incidents.

The current administration in Washington has officially recognized the problem of terrorism as an issue of paramount importance. These official statements must now be followed by concrete measures. It is a breathtaking plunge from speeches against terrorism to effective action against it. Governments are almost always at a disadvantage in dealing with terrorism. Terrorists create dramas in which they and their victims are the central figures. Except for the occasional successful commando rescue, governments seldom get to play the roles of heroes. More often, governments are seen as reactive, incompetent, impotent. Intelligence has failed, security has been demonstrably breached, the government is now forced to make concessions to save the lives of hostages or appear callous and indifferent to human life if it does not. It is unable to satisfy the public's appetite for action against terrorists. Between spectacular incidents, the measures that governments can take against terrorism seem prosaic. If terrorists seize embassies, governments may allocate funds to increase security at diplomatic facilities for the following fiscal year, a logical and useful step, but somehow dissatisfying. As terrorism affects the United States now, or as terrorism may affect the United States in the future, we face three discrete problems yet related from the standpoint of their policy implications: (1) terrorism directed against American officials and other citizens abroad; (2) a possible campaign or campaigns of terrorism in the United States; and (3) a terrorist event of great magnitude involving a major direct or indirect threat to public safety., This report replaces ADE750327. The RAND Paper Series. Presented at the State Department conference on "Terrorism in the 1980s" held on 21-22 May 1981.

This Note reviews trends in international terrorism and nuclear incidents abroad during the period 1980-1981. From the perspective of protecting U.S. nuclear and energy facilities from hostile attack, information on both of these aspects of terrorism is useful. Incidents of international terrorism, particularly those that require high levels of skill and organization, demonstrate the types of capabilities and weapons that adversaries might bring to bear against nuclear or other energy facilities. Overall trends in global terrorism may also lead to the creation of a climate that is conducive to nuclear and energy-related crime. More specifically, the record of nuclear-related incidents overseas provides valuable information about the possible motivations, capabilities, actions, and targets of potential adversaries of nuclear facilities in the United States. Between 1980 and 1981, incidents of international terrorism increased dramatically. There were 250 such incidents in 1980 and 326 in 1981, a nearly 100 percent increase over the previous two-year period. The number of incidents with fatalities also increased. Six basic tactics accounted for 95 percent of the total-incidents: bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, barricade and hostage situations, and hijackings. Diplomatic facilities continued to be a popular target for terrorist seizures. Diplomats are the most common target in incidents of international terrorism, and this trend is increasing. In 1980 and 1981, numerous incidents also were directed against nuclear facilities abroad by political terrorists, antinuclear extremists, and foreign governments. Section II analyzes incidents of international terrorism. Section III examines nuclear incidents abroad. Appendixes A and B provide, respectively, chronologies of significant international terrorist incidents and nuclear-related incidents abroad during 1980-1981., This report replaces ADE750878.

A discussion of international measures required to combat terrorism. The United States does not have control over the policies of foreign governments against terrorist actions. Therefore, a very real requirement for international cooperation and agreement exists. Only common policies can bind together nations that hold different views about the rationale and consequences of terrorist activity.

Overshadowed by events of grander scale-India's invasion of Pakistan, the October War the fall of Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the war between Iran and Iraq-terrorists waged a hundred little wars during the 1970s on the boulevards and back streets from Beirut to Buenos Aires, from Belfast to Bogota. International terrorism, a relatively new phenomenon in 1970, captured headlines throughout the succeeding decade. Growing worldwide terrorism aroused the concern of governments, attracted the attention of scholars, and was the theme of a growing volume of literature. Through their sponsorship of research and conferences, governments supported an increasing body of analysis on the topic. In March 1976, the U.S. Department of State convened a major international conference on terrorism that brought together, in Washington, D.C., government officials and members of the academic and research communities. It was followed in 1977 by a second conference on terrorism, in Evian, France. Subsequent international conferences were held in Berlin in 1978 and in Tel Aviv in 1979.

In 1982 and 1983, government authorities in several countries scored impressive successes against international terrorist groups. Governments have become more proficient at combatting terrorism, and physical security around likely terrorist targets also has increased greatly. It is harder now, but nonetheless possible, to smuggle weapons aboard airliners. Embassies have become like fortresses. Diplomats and top executives often travel in armored limousines with armed bodyguards Specialized tactics and skills have been developed for use in hostage situations and for combatting terrorism in general. Italy has been particularly successful in exploiting "repentants"-apprehended terrorists, primarily members of the Red Brigades-who have taken advantage of a new law providing reduced sentences in exchange for information. German police captured the operational heads of the most notorious and dangerous group in West Germany, the Red Army Faction, in December 1983. Eleven members of the FALN, a Puerto Rican separatist group, were apprehended in Illinois three years ago, and one of the most wanted Puerto Rican separatist bombers was recently captured in Mexico.

International terrorism is the name we give to a low-level, world-wide war waged by many groups against many nations on behalf of many causes. It is a war in which diplomats are on the front line. More than 25 percent of all international terrorist incidents are directed against diplomats, embassies, and consulates. This review of terrorism against diplomats and related targets is based on the Rand chronology of terrorist incidents, which lists 574 attacks against diplomats since 1968. To get an idea of how improved international cooperation could help solve the problem, the author considers five types of terrorist activity that are directed against the diplomatic community and possible international remedies for each of them: (1) terrorist attacks on diplomats that are associated with guerrilla warfare, insurgency, or ongoing terrorist activity; (2) attacks by ethnic, emigre, or exile groups against the diplomatic representatives of a nation or regime they oppose; (3) worldwide attacks on foreign diplomats by terrorists operating abroad as part of a larger campaign against a government; (4) isolated terrorist attacks against diplomats by indigenous groups to protest the actions of a foreign government; and (5) government use of terrorist tactics or employment of terrorist groups to attack foreign diplomats abroad as a continuation of a local armed conflict or as a mode of surrogate warfare against a foreign foe. The paper also discusses the number of attacks on diplomatic targets, their geographic distribution, the number of nations attacked, tactics used, the diplomats (nations) most frequently attacked, the most prominent terrorist groups, the locations (nations) most frequently attacked, and the costs and risks of protection., Presented at the Conference on International Terrorism: The Protection of Diplomatic Premises and Personnel held in Bellagio, Italy, on 8-12 Mar 1982.

Terrorists seize foreign officials as a means of gaining international attention and exerting leverage over the local government, upon whom they usually levy their demands. A political kidnapping is an act of propaganda, inherent within it is a desire to communicate. Holding a hostage guarantees that the kidnappers will be heard. On the other side, the government not only is concerned with obtaining the safe release of the hostage or hostages; it also wants to communicate its position in the contest with the terrorists. When the hostage belongs to another government, that government also must communicate its concerns about the safety of one or more of its citizens, its policy with regard to political kidnappings, and its attitude toward the local government. Political kidnappings create many communications problems Resolution of these kidnappings requires communication between at least two parties: the terrorist kidnappers and the government. Governments themselves are, of course, complex organizations comprised of separate entities that sometimes act independently of one another, each having its own means of communicating This magnifies the problem. When opinions are divided on how to handle the kidnapping, the government may be saying several things at once.

Following the revelations of abuses by government agencies in intelligence collection during the civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s and the crimes and excesses that came to light in the Watergate scandal, more stringent controls and limitations were placed on the intelligence operations of law-enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. These controls limited inquiry surveillance, and the keeping of files on certain persons and organizations; established strict criteria for tile use of intelligence gathering techniques; limited the time that information could be retained in government files, restricted the transfer of information from one government agency to another; compelled government agencies that maintain certain categories of information to routinely report what they have in their files, or to reveal it to the subject upon request; and established oversight groups and procedures to ensure compliance The rules are set forth in federal legislation, executive orders, federal department, agency, and service directives, state legislation, local-level guidelines, and court rulings., ISBN 0-8330-0539-1.

Growing concern with privacy rights, together with revelations of abuses of power by government in the Watergate acts, illegal FBI counterintelligence activities, and excesses of the CIA, led in the 1970s to increased restrictions on the collection, retention, dissemination, and use of intelligence information at all levels of government. The present study compares the impacts of post-Watergate restrictions on terrorist-related intelligence activities by comparing investigatory and prosecutorial efficacy in the period 1960-1974 with that in 1975-1980. On December 4, 1981, after this study was completed, President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12333 on United States Intelligence Activities, which liberalizes authority to assist and cooperate with state and local law-enforcement agencies. Pursuant to this Order, new guidelines for intelligence activities of federal agencies have modified some of the constraints on intelligence activities relating to terrorist incidents or crimes within the United States. This Note does not consider cases prosecuted during the Reagan Administration, nor does it examine impacts of regulatory changes affecting intelligence agencies in this period.

In the age of mass communications, the role of the news media cannot be separated from acts of terrorism. To talk about the psychological effects of terrorism is to talk about the psychological effects of terrorism as reported by the news media. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching. By carrying out inherently dramatic, deliberately shocking acts of violence, terrorists hope to attract attention to their causes and project themselves as forces to be reckoned with. To reach their audience terrorists depend on the news media. This sometimes puts the news media in the uncomfortable role of appearing to be an accomplice to the terrorist and has led to allegations that by their reporting the media exaggerate the problem of terrorism, spread alarm and provoke overreaction, aggrandize and romanticize the terrorists, even bestow a degree of legitimacy upon them, and inspire others to become terrorists. A closer examination of these assertions shows some of them to be at least partially correct. But some surprises also appear. Do the news media provide too much coverage of terrorism and thereby exaggerate its significance? By giving incidents of terrorism enormous coverage, do the news media encourage acts of terrorism? This paper discusses these issues and the psychological effects of media coverage of terrorist incidents on the public., Expanded version of a paper presented at an international seminar on Terrorism and the Mass Media held in Sicily on 3-5 Apr 1981.

The following paper identifies two areas of ignorance in the current study of the phenomenon of terrorism: how terrorists think (is there such a thing as a terrorist mind?) and how terrorists groups make their decisions. The organization, financing weaponry, and tactics of terrorist groups have been studied. We have acquired a great deal of what might be called 'order of battle' information about terrorist groups. In some cases, a sizable portion of their membership has been identified; we know their names. Articles, or in some cases, books have been written about a few of the more notable leaders of terrorists groups: Ulrike Meinhof, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, Leila Khaled, Yasir Arafat. A few have written about their own experiences in terrorist groups; Sean MacStiofain about his Irish Republican Army career and Susan Stern about her experiences in the Weather Underground. Some terrorists in prison have agreed to interviews. Some terrorists still at large have even been interviewed by journalists. It has been reported that the West German Bundeskriminalamt maintains a vast file that includes information on the reading habits, dental records, and musical preferences of known terrorists.

It is not the primary purpose of this paper to argue the probability of nuclear terrorism, which in the final analysis remains a matter of speculation, but instead to presume that a serious incident of nuclear terrorism has occurred, and then to examine the consequences. Will it significantly alter the political landscape of the world? Will it change attitudes about nuclear arms or nuclear energy? Will it lead to a new international regime of cooperation and control? Will it increase the likelihood of further use of nuclear weapons by States or terrorists?

Terrorism is the use of criminal violence to force a government to change its course of action, usually to withdraw from or desist from undertaking something. It puts pressure on a government both directly and through overt threats and actions, and indirectly through instilling fear in the population. In general, terrorists prefer to target people rather than installations and often choreograph their actions to attract media attention. It is difficult to defend against terrorists, because their objectives are often outside the defender's control, and because they always have the advantage of surprise. The prevention of terrorist attacks requires an understanding and awareness of this unconventional type of warfare, knowledge of past terrorist tactics, methods, motivations, and modus operandi, which in turn requires special intelligence operations and heavy reliance on advanced defensive technology. Retaliation operations are hampered by the elusive nature of the adversary and the inevitable collocation of innocent civilians. Terrorists have always done less damage on the whole than they must be considered capable of. For the near future, the antiterrorist mission of the Air Force will be to deal with terrorism at lower levels. (Author)

This paper examines the possibility that terrorists or other kinds of criminals might attempt to seize or sabotage a nuclear facility, steal nuclear material, or carry out other criminal activities in the nuclear domain which has created special problems for the security of nuclear programs. This paper analyzes the potential threat. Our tasks was to describe the potential criminal adversary, or rather the spectrum of potential adversaries who conceivably might carry out malevolent criminal actions against nuclear programs and facilities. We were concerned with both the motivations as well as the material and operational capabilities likely to be displayed by various categories of potential nuclear adversaries.

This report summarizes extensive oral and written statements by 27 former high-ranking South Vietnamese military officers and civilians on their perceptions of the causes of the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975. The causes cited were many and interwoven--shortcomings in South Vietnam's political and military leadership, planning, and organization--but all were tied to what the interviewees saw as the overarching cause for the collapse: the American role in Vietnam. They viewed the withdrawal of American troops, the loss of U.S. manpower, and the reduction of aid after the Paris Agreements as making defeat inevitable. Other factors included irresolution and reversals of strategy by Vietnamese leaders, and failure of commanders to stay with their units in battle. Finally, some of the respondents saw the events as part of the fundamental struggle between East and West, in which Communism, in their view, had the advantage. Most seem to agree on one point--that the U.S. South Vietnamese interaction was largely a failure.

This paper provides a chronological listing and description of incidents of international terrorism. Incidents that occurred between 1968 and April 1974 but which were not reported in the earlier volume are described, along with a chronology of incidents between May and December 1974. The two reports together serve as a reference work on recent acts of international terrorism and as a basis for examining possible trends. An index to frequently cited activist groups is also included., Supplement to Rept. no. R-1597-DOS/ARPA dated Mar 1975, ADA008354.

This report contains the testimony given by the author before the Committee on Energy and Diminishing Materials of the California State Assembly, November 19, 1975. He summarizes research on the problem of international terrorism, conducted under his direction, aimed at providing the concerned U.S. government agencies with a better understanding of terrorist tactics, trends, and potentialities.

Surprisingly few hostages bear any grudge against their captors for turning them into human pawns; indeed, they frequently develop positive relationships with them. Some of the reasons are simple and obvious. Others reveal how the human mind deals with the maximum threat. The hostage instantly tries to establish his own identity, some human bond with his captors. The hostage also quickly recognizes that his interests and those of his captors coincide. Both would like to see the demands met. The hostage's life depends on it. Another process is also taking place that the hostage may not be aware of. Its essential ingredient is the inescapable threat of death. It is entirely up to the captor, omnipotent, a virtual god, with absolute power over life and death before whom the hostage is helpless, frightened, and humiliated. Under these circumstances, the hostage unconsciously begins to assimilate -- and even imitate -- the attitudes of his captors.

The report presents a chronology of incidents of international terrorism that took place between 1968-1974. Most of the material is based on press reports, although other sources were used as well. Only incidents that had clear international repercussions were included--incidents in which terrorists went abroad to strike their targets, selected victims or targets that had connections with a foreign state (e.g., diplomats, executives or the offices of foreign corporations), or created international incidents by attacking airline passengers, personnel and equipment. International activities of such groups--an IRA bombing in London, for example, or the kidnapping of a foreign diplomat in Uruguay--were included. The thousands of reported acts of terrorism in Indochina and the numerous cross-border raids by Arab guerrillas and Israeli commandos were excluded, except for the major episodes., Sponsored in part by the Department of State.

Among the countermeasures that the United States might employ against terrorists, why not assassination? Do we deny ourselves an effective instrument simply because terrorists do not fit neatly into our traditional methods of law enforcement or waging war? This essay examines the arguments for and against assassination as a means of combatting terrorism.

This report presents a synthesis of policy-relevant conclusions and recommendations from three areas of Rand's continuing research on terrorism: (1) response to hostage situations, (2) use of force against terrorism, and (3) the long-term campaign against terrorism. The purpose is to provide insights that may clarify policy issues and inform policy decisions.

The author attempts to explain North Vietnamese military strategy and North Vietnamese reasons for continuing the war.

The results of an unconventional war strategy are considered in which a losing side ignores its losses and continues until the winning side gets tired and withdraws.

The Army's doctrine, its tactics, its organization, its weapons -- its entire repertoire of warfare was designed for conventional war in Europe. In Vietnam, the Army simply performed its repertoire even though it was frequently irrelevant to the situation. Changes were proposed, repeatedly, but few changes were made. Our Army seemed to be prevented by its won doctrinal and organizational rigidity from making any changes in the way in which it has fought this war. Among the institutional obstacles to change are the belief that the changes proposed might not work; the conviction that what we are doing now is working satisfactorily; the belief that what has been needed is simply more of the same, therefore changes are not necessary; the belief that organizational changes are impossible in the midst of a war; the view that the war in Vietnam is an aberration and does not represent the future demands that the Army might have to face; the bureaucratic rejection of new doctrines as exotic and of marginal importance; the unaltered career incenties to continue what we are doing now; the sense of institutional loyalty that rejects external pressure for change even when it coincides with private convictions; the twelve-month tour, which condemns us to repeat our errors; adn the lack of a single commander to impose his will on the entire system., Prepared in cooperation with Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA. Rept. no. RAND/RM-6278-1-ARPA, Contracts DAHC15-67-C-0142 and ARPA Order-189-1. Supersedes report dated Nov 70, AD-878 330.

The author briefly discusses what terrorism is, how it operates, how and why it seeks especially international attention. The author further discusses terrorism's new targets and new capabilities, and it's effect on international order.

The author examines terrorism in general and kidnapping in particular. The author discusses the theory of terrorism, its utility and its effectiveness seen from the terrorists' point of view, the reason for its apparent increase in recent years, and some recent and possible future trends. The author further discusses kidnapping by terrorist groups, some of the motives for kidnapping, and the reasons why kidnapping is still a very unpopular crime in this country.