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In this paper I’m studying Toni Morrison’s short story Recitatif (2022) through the perspective of deconstruction. I theorise about conceptual meanings and differences that occur and can be found in structures. With deconstruction I can observe where in the text traces of metaphysics lay and what impact they have on the characters that live within the story. The study examines binary oppositions such as white and black; male and female; being rich and being poor; being somebody and being nobody. Questions are raised about found meaning in these categories, what they entail and say about perception of reality, and how all of these categories fit into one much bigger classification: the human. This study follows the text closely, exploring the story in chronological order and focuses on the two main characters, Twyla and Roberta, who symbolise two different ends of the binary opposition white and black skinned. Twyla and Roberta come to define themselves by their contrasts and that is also where deconstruction flows and exists. In the end, it’s the character Maggie – first seen as ”unimportant” – that comes to play a crucial part in the shaping of the story and Twyla and Roberta’s lives. Therefore, through deconstruction and its terms and notions, I further investigate Maggie’s character and her meaning and place in Recitatif. This study concludes with that while binary oppositions – and the perceptions they comprise – are firmly established around the characters and the world so are they not fully bound by them., I den här uppsatsen genomför jag en läsning av Toni Morrisons novell Recitatif (2022) utifrån det teoretiska perspektivet dekonstruktion. Genom dekonstruktion synliggör, analyserar och problematiserar jag konceptuella världsuppfattningar och strukturer. Jag observerar var i texten metafysik finns och vilken påverkan det har på karaktärerna i berättelsen. I uppsatsen undersöks dikotomier och binära motsättningar såsom vit och svart; man och kvinna; rik och fattig; att vara betydelsefull och att vara oväsentlig. Till följd av dessa strukturella indelningar och inramningar väcks frågor om verklighetsuppfattning och mening samt att de därutöver ingår i en gemensam kategori: människan. Denna uppsats gör en textnära läsning och följer berättelsen i kronologisk ordning med fokus på de två huvudkaraktärerna, Twyla och Roberta, som symboliserar två olika sidor i den binära motsättningar vit och svart hudfärg. Twyla och Robertas mening och föreställning om omvälden samt identitet uppstår genom att deras likheter och olikheter ställs i kontrast mot varandra vilken dekonstruktion blottlägger. Till slut visar det sig dock att karaktären Maggie – som man först inte tror spelar en stor roll i novellen – har en betydande inverkan på berättelsen och hon kommer att omdefiniera både Tywlas och Robertas verklighetsuppfattning. Därför, genom dekonstruktionsperspektivet, undersöker jag Maggies karaktär och vilken funktion den fyller i Recitatif. Uppsatsen avslutas med slutsatsen att medan binära motsättningar – och de konceptuella världsuppfattningar som uppstår till följd av dem – starkt påverkar karaktärerna och världen är de dock inte helt och hållet bundna att förhålla sig efter dem.

In this paper I’m studying Toni Morrison’s short story Recitatif (2022) through the perspective of deconstruction. I theorise about conceptual meanings and differences that occur and can be found in structures. With deconstruction I can observe where in the text traces of metaphysics lay and what impact they have on the characters that live within the story. The study examines binary oppositions such as white and black; male and female; being rich and being poor; being somebody and being nobody. Questions are raised about found meaning in these categories, what they entail and say about perception of reality, and how all of these categories fit into one much bigger classification: the human. This study follows the text closely, exploring the story in chronological order and focuses on the two main characters, Twyla and Roberta, who symbolise two different ends of the binary opposition white and black skinned. Twyla and Roberta come to define themselves by their contrasts and that is also where deconstruction flows and exists. In the end, it’s the character Maggie – first seen as ”unimportant” – that comes to play a crucial part in the shaping of the story and Twyla and Roberta’s lives. Therefore, through deconstruction and its terms and notions, I further investigate Maggie’s character and her meaning and place in Recitatif. This study concludes with that while binary oppositions – and the perceptions they comprise – are firmly established around the characters and the world so are they not fully bound by them., I den här uppsatsen genomför jag en läsning av Toni Morrisons novell Recitatif (2022) utifrån det teoretiska perspektivet dekonstruktion. Genom dekonstruktion synliggör, analyserar och problematiserar jag konceptuella världsuppfattningar och strukturer. Jag observerar var i texten metafysik finns och vilken påverkan det har på karaktärerna i berättelsen. I uppsatsen undersöks dikotomier och binära motsättningar såsom vit och svart; man och kvinna; rik och fattig; att vara betydelsefull och att vara oväsentlig. Till följd av dessa strukturella indelningar och inramningar väcks frågor om verklighetsuppfattning och mening samt att de därutöver ingår i en gemensam kategori: människan. Denna uppsats gör en textnära läsning och följer berättelsen i kronologisk ordning med fokus på de två huvudkaraktärerna, Twyla och Roberta, som symboliserar två olika sidor i den binära motsättningar vit och svart hudfärg. Twyla och Robertas mening och föreställning om omvälden samt identitet uppstår genom att deras likheter och olikheter ställs i kontrast mot varandra vilken dekonstruktion blottlägger. Till slut visar det sig dock att karaktären Maggie – som man först inte tror spelar en stor roll i novellen – har en betydande inverkan på berättelsen och hon kommer att omdefiniera både Tywlas och Robertas verklighetsuppfattning. Därför, genom dekonstruktionsperspektivet, undersöker jag Maggies karaktär och vilken funktion den fyller i Recitatif. Uppsatsen avslutas med slutsatsen att medan binära motsättningar – och de konceptuella världsuppfattningar som uppstår till följd av dem – starkt påverkar karaktärerna och världen är de dock inte helt och hållet bundna att förhålla sig efter dem.

"In Metaphysical Institutions, Caner K. Dagli explores the ultimate nature of the realities we call religions, cultures, civilizations, and traditions through the lens of a particular question often limited to religious studies, history, and anthropology, namely: "What is Islam?" The book is both a philosophical treatise about the nature of shared thinking that uses the encounter between the Modern Project and Islam as an illustrative example, and an exploration of the conceptualization of Islam in light of the metaphysics of consciousness and meaning. Dagli first develops a comprehensive theory of the institution and then expands its meaning to include a new category called "metaphysical institutions," with the goal of establishing both necessary and empirically variable features of all institutions, including those that deal with ultimate questions. The new model is then used to analyze questions of authority and autonomy, rationality and imitation, the universal and the particular, and other enduring questions." --Provided by publisher., Includes bibliographical references and index., Part I. Institutions -- 1. What Kind of Thing is Islam? -- 2. The Nature of Institutions and Shared Thinking -- Part II. Metaphysics: 3. The Metaphysics of Antidualism -- 4. The Metaphysics of Meaning -- 5. The Metaphysics of Paradox -- Part III. Islam and the Modern Project: 6. The Language Analogy -- 7. Project and Tradition -- 8. One Islam, Many Islams, or No Islam? -- Conclusion: The Sighted Men and the Elephant, "In Metaphysical Institutions, Caner K. Dagli explores the ultimate nature of the realities we call religions, cultures, civilizations, and traditions through the lens of a particular question often limited to religious studies, history, and anthropology, namely: "What is Islam?" The book is both a philosophical treatise about the nature of shared thinking that uses the encounter between the Modern Project and Islam as an illustrative example, and an exploration of the conceptualization of Islam in light of the metaphysics of consciousness and meaning. Dagli first develops a comprehensive theory of the institution and then expands its meaning to include a new category called "metaphysical institutions," with the goal of establishing both necessary and empirically variable features of all institutions, including those that deal with ultimate questions. The new model is then used to analyze questions of authority and autonomy, rationality and imitation, the universal and the particular, and other enduring questions." --Provided by publisher.

This dissertation explores and defends non-eliminative mereological nihilism (‘NEN’). NEN is not a single view: many views can be non-eliminative and nihilist. An eliminative view is one that denies the existence of many kinds of ordinary objects: things like planets, cats, and chairs. A non-eliminative view is one that accepts the existence of all ordinary objects. Mereological nihilism is the view that composition never occurs, that composites (objects with proper parts) do not exist. NEN views are, therefore, those that accept all ordinary objects exist but deny any composites exist. NEN is an often overlooked—and so, underexplored—kind of view. Hence my intention to explore and defend it in this dissertation, which consists of consists of four, self-standing chapters. In chapter 1, I argue a particular NEN view does not conflict with Mooreanism. Mooreanism, very roughly, is a methodological approach espousing the intuitive and commonsensical in the face of philosophical arguments to the contrary. The main claim of the chapter is that, in accepting ordinary objects exist and (in some sense) have parts, NEN can avoid conflict with Mooreanism. NEN avoiding this conflict would be a significant theoretical virtue in the eyes of many Mooreans. Likewise, it gives (Moorean-inclined) nihilists reason to prefer NEN over eliminative forms of nihilism—assuming eliminativism conflicts with Mooreanism, which, prima facie, seems highly plausible. In chapter 2, I defend two NEN views against a “reference trivialisation” objection. Briefly, the objection is that the things to which those NEN views claim our ordinary object terms refer—their ‘reference-candidates’ for ordinary object terms—are objectionably dissimilar to what we take them to refer to. Put another way, the NEN reference-candidates fail to sufficiently satisfy the ‘psychological associated descriptions’ (PADs) for our ordinary object terms. And so, those NEN views “trivialise reference”. In response, I argue the NE

In this thesis, I examine Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy, with a particular focus on individual moral agency and its relation to the broader social context. I evaluate criticism against Murdoch regarding her alleged overemphasis on the individual, which some argue neglects broader social and collective forces in moral life, thus presenting an unrealistic picture of moral formation and attributing too much individual responsibility. To address this critique, I first explore Murdoch’s metaphysical views, contrasting them with dominant philosophical schools of her time, primarily existentialism and behaviorism. By elucidating the metaphysical underpinnings that inform her Platonic-influenced moral realism, I argue that understanding her moral philosophy necessitates an understanding of her metaphysics. I then delve into the central problem in Murdoch’s moral philosophy: transcending the ego that typically obscures our perception of reality with egocentric fantasies of all kinds. Murdoch contends that gaining insight into moral reality hinges largely on how we deploy our attention, positing that a 'just and loving gaze' is requisite for perceiving what is real. When this attention is properly directed, we can experience 'unselfing,' a state in which our egocentric perspectives recede, allowing reality to manifest itself. I argue that, when examined within Murdoch’s metaphysical framework, the criticism against Murdoch ultimately lacks validity, primarily because it relies on overly narrow conceptions of selfhood, and what can constitute egoistic fantasies.

In this thesis, I examine Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy, with a particular focus on individual moral agency and its relation to the broader social context. I evaluate criticism against Murdoch regarding her alleged overemphasis on the individual, which some argue neglects broader social and collective forces in moral life, thus presenting an unrealistic picture of moral formation and attributing too much individual responsibility. To address this critique, I first explore Murdoch’s metaphysical views, contrasting them with dominant philosophical schools of her time, primarily existentialism and behaviorism. By elucidating the metaphysical underpinnings that inform her Platonic-influenced moral realism, I argue that understanding her moral philosophy necessitates an understanding of her metaphysics. I then delve into the central problem in Murdoch’s moral philosophy: transcending the ego that typically obscures our perception of reality with egocentric fantasies of all kinds. Murdoch contends that gaining insight into moral reality hinges largely on how we deploy our attention, positing that a 'just and loving gaze' is requisite for perceiving what is real. When this attention is properly directed, we can experience 'unselfing,' a state in which our egocentric perspectives recede, allowing reality to manifest itself. I argue that, when examined within Murdoch’s metaphysical framework, the criticism against Murdoch ultimately lacks validity, primarily because it relies on overly narrow conceptions of selfhood, and what can constitute egoistic fantasies.

Una parte del contexto actual en el que se interpreta a Hegel tiene un profundo sesgo kantiano. Por ello, es acuciante reivindicar la independencia y originalidad de Hegel frente a Kant. Con este fin, en este artículo explico la relevancia de la concepción de la metafísica y la lógica en Hegel. En un primer periodo en Jena es cierto que Hegel sigue las ideas de Kant, pero en Núremberg su Ciencia de la lógica marca la separación final entre él y Kant., Part of the current context in which Hegel is interpreted has a strong Kantian bias. herefore, it is imperative to vindicate Hegel’s independence and originality with respect to Kant. For this purpose, in this article I explain the relevance of Hegel’s conception of metaphysics and logic. It is true that in the first period in Jena, Hegel follows Kant’s ideas; however, in the Nuremberg period the Science of Logic represents the final sepa- ration between Hegel and Kant.

Bakalářská práce se zabývá tématem hudby v Schopenhauerově filosofii, jejími vyjadřovacími limity a významem pro lidský život jako lék na pesimismus. Tato práce si dává za cíl podat ucelený náhled na Schopenhauerovu metafysiku hudby a zhodnotit její relevanci pro současné a budoucí zkoumání. Celý výklad tohoto pojetí se nese v duchu návaznosti na Platónovu a Kantovu metafysiku, nicméně Schopenhauerův vlastní záběr do této problematiky převládá. Jelikož výklad hudby stojí na rozsáhlém metafysickém základu, první část práce se soustředí na předpoklady potřebné k vnímání hudby tímto způsobem., The bachelor thesis is concerned with Schopenhauer's take on music in his philosophy, limits of its expression and its signifikance for human life as an antidote to pessimism. This thesis aims to give a holistic account of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music and to assess its relevance for temporary and future research. The whole interpretation will be done in spirit of connection towards Platonic and Kantian metaphysics, however Schopenhauer's own outlook into this problematic remains dominant. Since the interpretation of music stands on wide metaphysical groundwork the first part of this thesis focuses on the prerequisites needed in order to conceive music in such a way., Fakulta filozofická, Michal Švorc seznámil komisi se svou bakalářskou prací na téma Shopenhauerovo pojetí hudby a její význam pro lidský život. Po přečtení posudku vedoucího a oponenta reagoval na výtky směrem k obsahu a formě práce., Dokončená práce s úspěšnou obhajobou

There are various approaches regarding poverty in which a key index of philosophy repeatedly shines: the call to live a just and happy life, inseparable from its form, and at the same time, radically open to being expropriated by the inappropriable. The confession and gift of the Holy Spirit in Saint Augustine, the essential link of Western peoples with the Free-liberating, thus being open to their historical and ontological destiny in Martin Heidegger, the neutral, neither animal nor human, in a connection with the inappropriable in Giorgio Agamben. In each of these cases, the tradition of metaphysics that culminated in nihilism, the will to power, and the logic of value is called into question. Revisiting the issue of poverty is relevant not only to contemplate an avenue for moving beyond metaphysics and biopolitics but also to explore the extent to which Christianity transcends the history of metaphysics., La filosofía ha tratado a la pobreza como riqueza desde diversas aproximaciones. Sin embargo, en cada una de ellas es esencial la llamada a vivir una vida justa y feliz, inseparable de su forma y que, a la vez, abierta radicalmente a la expropiación por lo inapropiable. Confesión y don del Espíritu Santo en San Agustín, vínculo esencial de los pueblos de Occidente con lo Libre-liberante y, así, abiertos a su destino histórico y ontológico en Martin Heidegger, lo neutro ni animal ni humano en un vínculo con lo inapropiable en Giorgio Agamben. En cada uno de estos casos se pone en jaque a la tradición de la metafísica que culminó en el nihilismo, la voluntad de poder y la lógica del valor. Resulta relevante volver a la cuestión de la pobreza tanto para pensar una vía de salida a la metafísica y a la biopolítica, como también para indagar en qué medida el cristianismo excede a la historia de la metafísica.

In this article I propose to explore the ontological question in Marx’s thought, focusing on the treatments devoted to it by two authors usually placed on the margins of Marxism’s own interests: Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida. From critical or deconstructive perspectives, their interpretations were characterized by situating Marx within the metaphysical tradition based on the understanding of his philosophy as an ontology of labor or, in Werner Hamacher’s words, as an ergontology. The article, then, is devoted to analyze the philosophical arguments employed first by Heidegger and then by Derrida to question, in a differentiated way, although in a close relation of continuity, the metaphysical privilege of labor in Marxist discourse, without neglecting the political implications of their respective questionings., En este artículo propongo explorar la cuestión ontológica en el pensamiento de Marx, poniendo el foco en los tratamientos que le dedicaron dos autores habitualmente colocados al margen de los intereses propios del marxismo: Martin Heidegger y Jacques Derrida. Desde perspectivas críticas o deconstructivas, sus interpretaciones se caracterizaron por situar a Marx dentro de la tradición metafísica a partir de la comprensión de su filosofía como una ontología del trabajo o, al decir de Werner Hamacher, como una ergontología. El artículo, entonces, se dedica a analizar los argumentos filosóficos empleados primero por Heidegger y luego por Derrida para cuestionar, de forma diferenciada, aunque en estrecha relación de continuidad, el privilegio metafísico del trabajo en el discurso marxista, sin descuidar las implicaciones políticas de sus respectivos cuestionamientos.

The paper reconstructs the perspectivist theory of G.W. Leibniz. At first, the epistemological aspect of Leibnizian perspectivism is analysed. The theory of cognitive clarity-darkness allows, at that initial moment, to characterize the perceptual particularity like a perspective of the universe. Leibniz’s writings on perspective science, recently transcribed, are used to analyse the senses of the concepts, coming from the said science, that the German thinker uses to explain the cognitive act.  The perspectivist explanation of cognition gives rise to an immanent conception of perception: substance’s perspective is the result of the relationship between the force of representation and the universe. It is analysed, then, how the concept of point of view allows to describe the cognitive function of mediation that the body plays between the force of representation and the universe. That perspectivist explanation of perceptual particularity is, at the same time, an affirmation of the metaphysical plurality of the universe., En el artículo se reconstruye la teoría perspectivista de G.W. Leibniz. En un primer momento, se analiza el sentido epistemológico del perspectivismo leibniziano. La teoría de la claridad-oscuridad cognitiva permite, en ese momento inicial, caracterizar la particularidad perceptiva como una perspectiva del universo. Se utilizan los escritos de Leibniz sobre ciencia perspectiva, recientemente transcritos, para analizar los sentidos de los conceptos, procedentes de dicha ciencia, que el pensador alemán usa para explicar el acto cognitivo. La explicación perspectivista de la cognición da lugar a una concepción inmanente de la percepción: la perspectiva sustancial es el resultado de la relación entre la fuerza de representación y el universo. Se analiza, entonces, cómo el concepto de punto de vista permite describir la función cognitiva de mediación que el cuerpo desempeña entre la fuerza de representación y el universo. Esta explicación perspectivista de la particularidad perceptiva es, al mismo tiempo, una defensa de la pluralidad metafísica del universo.

The article examines the poporo (Sugi/Yo’buru/Dumburru) of the Kogi, Iku, Wiwa, and Kankuama cultures, which inhabit the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, located in Northern Colombia. The research articulates a series of conversations with indigenous people from the SNSM during the last five years. The methodological approach used was shared ethnography. From this research study, an analysis shows the mythical considerations about the poporo of each one of the indigenous groups and exposes the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical contents that it is possible to derive from the action of poporear. The obtained findings constitute the possibility of carrying out a dialogue between cultures and perspectives on the fundamental elements of a worldview: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, together with how they are related and presented. The gathered evidence allows us to recognize that in the ancestral societies that populate the SNSM, it is possible to distinguish the distinctive elements of a worldview conceptually. Such indication, however, does not imply the possibility of specializing in executing one of them to the detriment of the others., O artigo está dedicado ao estudo do poporo (Sugi/Yo'buru/Dumburru) das culturas Kogi, Iku, Wiwa e Kankuama que habitam na Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (SNSM), localizado no norte da Colômbia. A pesquisa articula uma série de conversas com os povos indígenas na SNSM durante os últimos cinco anos. A abordagem metodológica utilizada tem sido a etnografia compartilhada. Com base nas pesquisas, é feita uma análise das considerações míticas sobre o poporo de cada um dos grupos indígenas e são expostos os conteúdos metafísicos, epistemológicos e éticos derivados da ação de poporear. As descobertas constituem a possibilidade de um diálogo entre culturas e perspectivas sobre os elementos fundamentais de uma cosmovisão: metafísica, epistemologia e ética, juntamente com a forma como são relacionadas e apresentadas. As evidências fornecidas permitem reconhecer que nas sociedades ancestrais que habitam na SNSM é possível distinguir conceitualmente os elementos distintivos de uma cosmovisão; tal indicação, entretanto, não implica, para esses grupos, a possibilidade de se especializar na execução de um deles em detrimento dos outros., El artículo examina el poporo (Sugi/Yo’buru/Dumburru) de las culturas Kogi, Iku, Wiwa y Kankuama que habitan la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (SNSM), situada al norte de Colombia. La investigación articula una serie de conversaciones con indígenas de la SNSM durante los últimos seis años. El acercamiento metodológico utilizado ha sido la etnografía compartida. A partir de la investigación, se adelanta un análisis de las consideraciones míticas sobre el poporo de cada uno de los grupos indígenas y se exponen los contenidos metafísicos, epistemológicos y éticos que se derivan de la acción de poporear. Los hallazgos obtenidos constituyen la posibilidad de realizar un diálogo entre culturas y perspectivas sobre los elementos fundamentales de una cosmovisión: metafísica, epistemología y ética, junto con la manera en la que se relacionan y se presentan. La evidencia allegada permite reconocer que en las sociedades ancestrales que pueblan la SNSM es posible distinguir conceptualmente los elementos distintivos de una cosmovisión; tal indicación, sin embargo, no implica, para estos grupos, la posibilidad de especializarse en la ejecución de uno de ellos en desmedro de los otros.

D. H. Lawrence claims that art comes into being through the emergence of metaphysics. He evinces a deep anxiety about metaphysics deteriorating because of the scientific and societal developments in early 20th-century Europe. This paper demonstrates that his attempt to realise his ideal art — art that is completely dependent on metaphysics — is seen in his first novel, The White Peacock, which is not generally regarded as a philosophical work. First, the paper defines the close relationship between Lawrence’s art creation and modern European civilisation and conducts a philosophical analysis of the narrative discourse with reference to the ideas of Arthur Schopenhauer — a considerable influence for Lawrence at the time of writing. Second, it verifies the idea that metaphysics is a substantial motive in Lawrence’s novel, one that enables him to approach the problems of modern European civilisation through the medium of literature.

D. H. Lawrence claims that art comes into being through the emergence of metaphysics. He evinces a deep anxiety about metaphysics deteriorating because of the scientific and societal developments in early 20th-century Europe. This paper demonstrates that his attempt to realise his ideal art — art that is completely dependent on metaphysics — is seen in his first novel, The White Peacock, which is not generally regarded as a philosophical work. First, the paper defines the close relationship between Lawrence’s art creation and modern European civilisation and conducts a philosophical analysis of the narrative discourse with reference to the ideas of Arthur Schopenhauer — a considerable influence for Lawrence at the time of writing. Second, it verifies the idea that metaphysics is a substantial motive in Lawrence’s novel, one that enables him to approach the problems of modern European civilisation through the medium of literature.

Mysticism is a term so irresponsibly applied in English Literature that it has become the first duty of thosewho use it to explain what they mean by it. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1911), after defining a mystic as“one who believes in spiritual apprehension of truths beyond the understanding” adds, “Whence mysticism.”Whatever maybe the precise force of the remarks in the brackets, it is unquestionably true that mysticism isoften used in a semi- contemptuous way to vaguely denote any kind of occultism or spiritualism or anyespecially curious or fantastic views about God and the universe. My paper aims towards justifying therelevance of mysticism in Literary works throughout the centuries with special focus on the old EnglishLiterature.

Versión final del artículo aceptada para publicación, Impure Eliminativism about Categories is the idea that ontological categories are not wholly eliminable insofar as they have epistemic value to understand the nature of ordinary and scientific objects. From the perspective of Impure Eliminativism, different criticisms have been addressed to substantialist approaches in metaphysics and, in particular, to John Heil’s substance-mode two-category ontology. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this critical project by extending its scope to C. B. Martin’s substantialism. The thesis I defend is that Martin’s substratum-trope two-category ontology satisfies the elimination criterion of Impure Eliminativism for ontological categories because either it is inconsistent or else it supplies a non-exhaustive and non-exclusive categorization of those objects and their properties. First, I introduce Impure Eliminativism and its novel elimination criterion for ontological categories, and I survey recent criticisms of substantialism from that perspective. Second, I show that nothing satisfies Martin’s definition of substratum in a way that is consistent with Martin’s view on tropes. Third, I note that the attempts to avoid the inconsistency make the categorization supplied by Martin’s ontology either non- exhaustive (positing entities that fall outside the categorization and leaving unaccounted relevant phenomena concerning ordinary and scientific objects, as similarity and emergence) or non-exclusive (categorizing one and the same entity as both a substratum and a trope). I then conclude that Martin’s substratum-trope categorial system should be eliminated in accordance with the criterion of categorial elimination of Impure Eliminativism., Depto. de Filosofía y Sociedad, Fac. de Filosofía, TRUE, pub

This paper shows how José Ortega y Gasset’s philosophy, one of the most important thinkers of the first half of the twentieth century, has biological science as its basis and constant reference. This idea, defended by some interpreters must, nonetheless, be remarked and emphasize by analyzing how the orteguian ratiovitalist philosophy is an eminently biological. Addressing the influence of various scientists—especially J. von Uexküll—we will posit such thesis, highlighting as well the potentiality of Ortega’s thought for the present moment, when biological science has risen as the paradigmatic science of our time., Depto. de Salud Pública y Materno - Infantil, Fac. de Medicina, TRUE, pub

Research towards this article was funded by the European Commission (Marie-Curie project number 329430, call identifier FP7-PEOPLE-2012-IEF: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/329430) and the Spanish Government (DGCyT project number FFI2014-57064-P), and was conducted within the framework of the ProbPropCond (probpropcond.blogs.sas.ac.uk) research project that I directed while employed at the University of London (School of Advanced Study) during the 2013–14 and 2014–15 academic years. I thank the participants at the regular meetings and seminars, particularly Dorothy Edgington, Hugh Mellor, and Luke Glynn, for their comments, as well as the participants in the final workshop entitled ‘Propensities, Chances and Statistics’. Thanks also to audiences at the BSPS 2014 and 2015 conferences, and the EPSA2015 conferences for reactions to related material., This article argues that if propensities are displayed in objective physical chances, then the appropriate representation of these chances is as indexed probability functions. Two alternative formal models or accounts for the relation between propensity properties and their chancy or probabilistic manifestations, in terms of conditionals and conditional probability, are first reviewed. It is argued that both confront important objections, which are overcome by the account in terms of indexed probabilities. A number of furthera dvantages of the indexed probability account are discussed, which suggest that it is promising as a general theory of objective physical chance. The article ends with a discussion of the indexical character of the objective chances that are grounded in propensities, Comisión Europea, Agencia Estatal de Investigación, Depto. de Lógica y Filosofía Teórica, Fac. de Filosofía, TRUE, pub

This essay follows Nietzsche’s criticism on Wagner through to three steps. First, I acknowledge the Young philosopher’s admiration for Wagnerian opera considered as a rebirth of ancient musical drama. Second, I explore his progressive disappointment in the light of Schopenhauer’s influence on Wagner. Finally, the essay focuses on Nietzsche’s mature criticism on Wagner noting the XIXth century prolegomena of the general transformation of art into spectacle in a contemporary sense., El presente ensayo explora el itinerario de la crítica que Nietzsche ejerció sobre el arte de Wagner en tres pasos. Primero, se trata de reconocer la juvenil admiración del filósofo por la ópera wagneriana entendida como un renacimiento del drama musical antiguo. Luego, se explora el tránsito hacia su desilusión en la clave de la influencia de Schopenhauer sobre Wagner. Finalmente, el ensayo remata en la crítica madura de Nietzsche sobre Wagner, donde se advierten los prolegómenos decimonónicos de la transformación general del arte en espectáculo en el sentido contemporáneo.

This paper explores Kant’s notion of appearance [Schein] as developed in his Critique of pure reason and related works. It will be argued that Kant’s critique must be understood in relation to the previous metaphysical tradition —«dogmatic metaphysics»— and that the notion of appearance is a privileged standpoint to tackle this issue. Additionally a distinction between logical and transcendental appearance proposed by G. Lebrun will be considered. Finally, the resulting status of ontology and metaphysics after the Kantian critical intervention will be outlined., En este trabajo se investiga el concepto de apariencia [Schein] que Kant desarrolla en la Crítica de la razón pura y textos complementarios. Se sostendrá que la propuesta crítica de Kant ha de ser comprendida en relación con la tradición metafísica previa —«metafísica dogmática»— y que el concepto de apariencia constituye un punto de anclaje privilegiado para abordar esta relación, además de situar a Kant como pensador moderno. Asimismo, se ofrece, siguiendo a G. Lebrun, una propuesta de distinción entre apariencia lógica y trascendental. Finalmente se demarca el lugar de la ontología y la metafísica tras la operación crítica kantiana.

In this article we analyze boredom and its derivatives in Greek mythology, drawing on contempo- rary philosophers such as Nietzsche, Jankélévitch and Camus. Through the analysis of Homer’s epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, as well as the myths of Prometheus and Sisyphus, we examine how Greek gods and heroes cope with boredom and seek to make sense of their lives. First, we look at how the gods in Greek mythology, despite their immortality and power, also experience divine boredom. Their eternal existence leads them to seek entertainment and sti- mulation through intervention in the lives of mortals. However, this quest for entertainment often comes at a price for humans, becoming pawns in the divine game. Mortal boredom, the experience of which can have dire consequences for existence, is also discussed. These questions raise interes- ting considerations about human fulfillment and authentic existence., En este artículo analizamos el aburrimiento y sus derivadas en la mitología griega apoyándonos en filósofos contemporáneos como Nietzsche, Jankélévitch y Camus. A través del análisis de las epopeyas de Homero, la Ilíada y la Odisea, así como de los mitos de Prometeo y Sísifo, examinamos cómo los dioses y los héroes griegos enfrentan el aburrimiento y buscan dar sentido a sus vidas. En primer lugar, observamos cómo los dioses en la mitología griega, a pesar de su inmortalidad y poder, también experimentan el aburrimiento divino. Su existencia eterna los lleva a buscar entretenimiento y estímulos a través de la intervención en la vida de los mortales. Sin embargo, esta búsqueda de entretenimiento a menudo tiene un precio para los humanos, convertirse en peones en el juego divino. Asimismo, se analiza el aburrimiento mortal, cuya vivencia puede tener consecuencias nefastas para la existencia. Estas cuestiones plantean interesantes consideraciones sobre la plenitud humana y la existencia auténtica.

O presente artigo pretende analisar as noções de “fim” e “transição” no contexto do pensamento tardio do filósofo alemão Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Tema que gira em torno da conferência Fim da filosofia e a tarefa do pensamento (GA 14), cuja polêmica afirmação de um “fim da filosofia” tinha como intenção indicar não apenas uma “dissolução da Filosofia nas ciências tecnicizadas”, mas também, e, justamente por isso, uma espécie de necessidade de retorno elucidativo ao problema do fundamento (Das Problem des Grundes) por meio de uma meditação originária que transita na “linha” que divide o primeiro começo (ersten Anfang) da história do ser do outro começo (anderen Anfang) do pensar., This article intends to analyze the notions of “end” and “transition” in the context of the later thought of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Theme that revolves around the conference The End of Philosophy and the Task of thinking (GA 14), whose polemical statement of “the end of philosophy” was intended to indicate not only a “dissolution of Philosophy in the technicized sciences”, but also, and precisely because of this, a kind of need for an elucidative return to the problem of the foundation (Das Problem des Grundes) through an original meditation that transits the line that divides the first beginning (ersten Anfang) of the history of being from the other beginning (anderen Anfang) of thinking.

En este trabajo se va a tratar el tema de la belleza platónica desde dos perspectivas: su importancia en la obra de Platón; y su influencia en las obras de neoplatónicos posteriores, especialmente Plotino y Ficino. El estudio se apoya, sobre todo, en tres obras capitales para el tema de la belleza y el amor en la visión platónica: El Banquete de Platón; la Enéada I,6 de Plotino; y el De Amore de Ficino. Este trabajo pretende demostrar que el amor nos sirve de guía hacia la sabiduría y lo divino, y no es un tema menor., This paper discusses Neoplatonic beauty from two points of view: first, its importance with in Plato'swork; and second, its influence on the writings of laterNeoplatonics, especially those of Plotinus and Ficino. This study is mainly base don three capital works on Platonic beauty and love: Plato's Banquet, Plotinus' Ennead I,6 and Ficino's De Amore. This paper argues that love serves as a guide to wardswisdom and the divine, and that it is not merely a second arytopic., Departamento de Filosofía (Filosofía, Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Teoría e Historia de la Educación, Filosofía Moral, Estética y Teoría de las Artes), Grado en Filosofía

In this paper, I analyze Henri Bergson’s insightful and contrasted vision of poetry. First, I show in what sense Bergson sympathizes with the idea that the poet must be credited to surpass the novelist in offering to us an unparalleled emotional apprehension of the world. Second, I nonetheless underline how Bergson grants the product of the poet, i.e., the poem itself, a problematic linguistic status, inasmuch as the focus of his analysis shifts from an intersubjective poetical apprehension of feelings to their individual poetic appreciation, or from the spiritual dimension of poetry to its material dimension. Third, I further suggest to reconduct both the poet’s inspiration and the poem’s intention to their living matrix within the creative dimension of the poïen, whose main hallmark might be found in Bergson’s concept of addition. As a whole, the article argues that Bergson’s approach of poetry helps one in clarifying the delicate distinction that he draws between three possible attitudes that humans take vis-à-vis reality: that is, the standpoint of philosophy, or more accurately of metaphysics; the standpoint of art, or rather of literature in the context of my paper; and the standpoint of science, in its inherent ambiguity. In addition, I unveil some stimulating paradoxes regarding Bergson’s conception of language, and discuss his fascinating hypothesis concerning the absolute object of art.

In this paper, I analyze Henri Bergson’s insightful and contrasted vision of poetry. First, I show in what sense Bergson sympathizes with the idea that the poet must be credited to surpass the novelist in offering to us an unparalleled emotional apprehension of the world. Second, I nonetheless underline how Bergson grants the product of the poet, i.e., the poem itself, a problematic linguistic status, inasmuch as the focus of his analysis shifts from an intersubjective poetical apprehension of feelings to their individual poetic appreciation, or from the spiritual dimension of poetry to its material dimension. Third, I further suggest to reconduct both the poet’s inspiration and the poem’s intention to their living matrix within the creative dimension of the poïen, whose main hallmark might be found in Bergson’s concept of addition. As a whole, the article argues that Bergson’s approach of poetry helps one in clarifying the delicate distinction that he draws between three possible attitudes that humans take vis-à-vis reality: that is, the standpoint of philosophy, or more accurately of metaphysics; the standpoint of art, or rather of literature in the context of my paper; and the standpoint of science, in its inherent ambiguity. In addition, I unveil some stimulating paradoxes regarding Bergson’s conception of language, and discuss his fascinating hypothesis concerning the absolute object of art.

In this paper, I analyze Henri Bergson’s insightful and contrasted vision of poetry. First, I show in what sense Bergson sympathizes with the idea that the poet must be credited to surpass the novelist in offering to us an unparalleled emotional apprehension of the world. Second, I nonetheless underline how Bergson grants the product of the poet, i.e., the poem itself, a problematic linguistic status, inasmuch as the focus of his analysis shifts from an intersubjective poetical apprehension of feelings to their individual poetic appreciation, or from the spiritual dimension of poetry to its material dimension. Third, I further suggest to reconduct both the poet’s inspiration and the poem’s intention to their living matrix within the creative dimension of the poïen, whose main hallmark might be found in Bergson’s concept of addition. As a whole, the article argues that Bergson’s approach of poetry helps one in clarifying the delicate distinction that he draws between three possible attitudes that humans take vis-à-vis reality: that is, the standpoint of philosophy, or more accurately of metaphysics; the standpoint of art, or rather of literature in the context of my paper; and the standpoint of science, in its inherent ambiguity. In addition, I unveil some stimulating paradoxes regarding Bergson’s conception of language, and discuss his fascinating hypothesis concerning the absolute object of art.

Wie ist die Struktur der Wirklichkeit organisiert und wie können wir sie erkennen? Gibt es Realitätszuweisung nur in Bezug der tatsächlich existierenden Entitäten, oder ist es nicht vielmehr so, dass auch nichtexistenten Dingen Wesenscharakter zugesprochen werden kann, bedingt dadurch, dass sie jederzeit in ein wirkliches Sein übergehen können? Aristoteles ist vom Letzteren überzeugt, denn im Kontext seiner Untersuchungen bezüglich des „Seienden als solches“ entsteht im Zusammenwirken der Dynamis und Energeia, also der Möglich- und Wirklichkeit, die individuelle Substanz. Es ist die ontologische Struktur des Hylemorphismus und der Priorität der Energeia, die sich quer durch das gesamte aristotelische Denken zieht und die Grundlage dafür bildet, was die Neo-Aristotelische Ontologie des E. J. Lowe ausmacht. Dieser baut am metaphysischen Realismus auf und entwickelt ein Konzept, nach dem wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis nur durch wechselseitiges Zusammenwirken des Möglichen und Wirklichen, des a priori und a posteriori, gelingen kann. Nur im Rahmen der metaphysischen Modalität kann das Wesen einer Entität erfasst werden, und zwar noch vor ihrer tatsächlichen Existenz. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, die Ontologien (mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Dynamis und Energeia) von Aristoteles und Lowe auszubreiten, um anschließend in einer Gegenüberstellung Gemeinsamkeiten, Abweichungen und Anknüpfungspunkte zu unter-suchen., How is the structure of reality organized and how can we recognize it? Is there an assignment of reality only in relation to the real existing entities, or is it not rather the case that also non-existing things can be assigned character of being, conditioned by the fact that they can transform into a real being at any time? Aristotle is convinced of the latter, because in the context of his investigations on "being qua being" the individual substance arises in the interplay of dunamis and energeia, i.e. of possibility and reality. It is the ontological structure of hylemorphism and the priority of energeia that pervades all Aristotelian thought and forms the basis for the neo-Aristotelian ontology of E. J. Lowe. He builds on metaphysical realism and develops a concept according to which scientific knowledge can succeed only through the mutual interaction of possibility and actuality, of a priori and a posteriori. Only within the framework of metaphysical modality the essence of an entity can be grasped even before it actually exists. The aim of the present work is to extend the ontologies (with special regard to dunamis and energeia) of Aristotle and Lowe, in order to subsequently examine commonalities, divergences and points of connection in a comparison., Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers, Masterarbeit Universität Innsbruck 2023

The main purpose of this paper is to refute the ‘methodological continuity’ argument supporting epistemic realism in metaphysics. This argument aims to show that scientific realists have to accept that metaphysics is as rationally justified as science given that they both employ inference to the best explanation, i.e. that metaphysics and science are methodologically continuous. I argue that the reasons given by scientific realists as to why inference to the best explanation (IBE) is reliable in science do not constitute a reason to believe that it is reliable in metaphysics. The justification of IBE in science and the justification of IBE in metaphysics are two distinct issues with only superficial similarities, and one cannot rely on one for the other. This becomes especially clear when one analyses the debate about the legitimacy of IBE that has taken place between realists and empiricists. The metaphysician seeking to piggyback on the realist defense of IBE in science by the methodological continuity argument presupposes that the defense is straightforwardly applicable to metaphysics. I will argue that it is, in fact, not. The favored defenses of IBE by scientific realists make extensive use of empirical considerations, predictive power and inductive evidence, all of which are paradigmatically absent in the metaphysical context. Furthermore, even if the realist would concede the methodological continuity argument, I argue that the metaphysician fails to offer any agreed upon conclusions resulting from its application in metaphysics.

Is it possible to draw a border line between ontology and epistemology? A positive answer to this question looks attractive, mainly because it reflects convictions deeply entrenched in our common sense view of the world. However, anyone wishing to clarify the distinction between the ontological and the epistemological dimensions meets problems. This is due to the fact that the separation between factual and conceptual is not clean, but rather fuzzy. It is certainly correct to state that science means to offer correct information about the world, but the extent to which it succeeds in accomplishing this task is always questionable. We cannot claim that the picture provided by today science - our current scientific image of the world - is absolutely correct, because the history of science itself shows us that any such statement is likely to be rejected by future generations. While it may be recognized that science purports to offer a correct description of the real world, the past experience should also prompt us to accept its claims sub condicione, and to view them as merely provisional.

There are many pragmatisms, and it is a little misleading to present this variegated trend of thought as if it were a monolithic doctrine. The founding fathers, too, were all but unanimous. Peirce was not in agreement with James on many issues. Dewey, in turn, did not like various aspects of both Peirce’s and James’ philosophy, while C.I. Lewis’ views on logic were quite different from those held by Dewey. It should not be surprising, then, to find the same amount of disagreement in contemporary neo-pragmatism, where Rescher and Rorty, who both define themselves pragmatists, display different opinions on most subjects. I shall draw some comparisons between the ideas of these two thinkers.

This paper aims to tackle the ethics of pain which is presented in Miguel de Unamuno´s thought. For this purpose, based on his fundamental writings, it is analysed the impact of death and pain on the vital behavior of the human being, and also is studied his conception of love as a consolation healing the tragic sense of life. Finally, the direct influence of Blaise Pascal in the unamunian ethics of pain is shown. Thus, as far as the value of suffering in life is revealed, it is concluded that pain guarantees our existence, meanwhile a suffering existence guarantees us the love and the hope in the immortality of the human soul. &nbsp, El presente artículo tiene por objeto desarrollar la ética del dolor que se nos presenta en el pensamiento de Miguel de Unamuno. Para este quehacer, basándonos en sus escritos fundamentales, nos adentramos en el impacto que tiene la muerte y el dolor en la conducta vital del ser humano, además de sumergirnos en su concepción del amor como consuelo sanador del sentimiento trágico de la vida. Por último, se analiza la influencia directa de Blaise Pascal en la ética del dolor unamuniana. De esta suerte, al descubrir el valor del sufrimiento en la vida, concluimos que el dolor mismo nos garantiza la existencia, y la existencia sufriente nos garantiza tanto el amor como la esperanza en la inmortalidad del alma humana.

Does luck lead to ignorance? According to mainstream views, either ignorance is lack of knowledge and epistemic luck always leads to ignorance, or ignorance is lack of true belief, and never does. As this dissertation shows, however, these views are vulnerable to compelling counterexamples which show that luck only sometimes leads to ignorance. This opens the door to develop a more nuanced view of ignorance in terms of epistemic access to the world, irreducible to either knowledge or true belief. Is luck incompatible with moral responsibility? Philosophers who see a tension between the fairness of morality and luck have assumed that luck is lack of control. But by understanding luck modally (as what happens and yet could have easily not happened), we can not only dissolve the tension between luck and morality’s fairness, but also develop a new solution to the moral luck problem: the effects of luck on our actions don’t undermine our ascriptions of moral responsibility.

Some kinds that, upon reflection, seem to be in some sense “made up by us,” can nevertheless appear natural. For instance, there are reasons to think that races and genders lack a biological essence of the sort associated with paradigmatic natural kinds, and yet they are widely regarded as natural categories. This phenomenon of a kind appearing natural calls out for explanation. One kind of explanation that has been given is that such kinds are in fact unified by a social position. This dissertation critically examines this explanation and the metaphysical view implied by it. It also defends another way of explaining the phenomenon of interest, namely, by thinking about representations and certain mechanisms involving those representations.In this dissertation, I examined the question of how a kind that appears natural could be social. I studied the ways that the claim that some kind is socially constructed has been understood and evaluated prominent proposals for how to understand such claims while also considering existing critiques of those proposals. I studied how the notion of an explanation has typically been understood in various subfields, as well as the various ways one might understand the claim that some phenomenon is distinctly social. I came to the view that for a kind to be social, for a kind to be socially constructed in an important sense, is for the kind to be featured in regularities that are explained in part by joint intentional mechanisms involving certain sorts of covertly normative contents. I argued that this proposal provides a more direct answer to the question I sought to answer, the appearance question, than does the prominent approach to understanding the notion of social construction and of social kinds while also avoiding some of what I take to be practical and theoretical shortcomings of that approach.

The person is not alone and isolated, but in a social setting. Although I am a changing reality, not an identical one, I am the same as before, and as after; there is, therefore, an essential selfhood of the «I», which is not «identity» in the sense in which this word is applied to things, and still less the identity of ideal objects. According to this new logic and new metaphysics, I see myself as unmistakably someone, a concrete and unique person, a historical reality, not as a «something», a «who» and as such different from all the «whats», with a proper name. I feel myself to be free and therefore responsible, capable of making choices and decisions. My life is mine, and so is the life of each person; it is unique and unrepeatable. But, since Greek philosophers, there are a long series of attempts to convert humanity into a «thing»: the old logic and metaphysics (based on identity and immobility) see person as a substance., La persona no está sola y aislada, sino en convivencia. Aunque yo sea una realidad cambiante, no idéntica, soy el mismo que antes y que después; hay, por tanto, una esencial mismidad, que no es «identidad» en el sentido de las cosas o, más aún, de los objetos ideales. Según esta nueva lógica y nueva metafísica, yo me veo a mí mismo como alguien inconfundible, una persona concreta y única, una realidad histórica, no «algo», «quién» unido a mi «qué», con nombre propio. Me siento libre y, por tanto, responsable, capaz de elección y decisión. Mi vida es mía, la de cada cual, única e irrepetible. Pero, desde los griegos, hay una larga serie de intentos de «cosificación» del hombre: las viejas lógica y metafísica (basadas en la identidad y en la inmovilidad) ven a la persona como sustancia.

This thesis examines the dissemination of T.S. Eliot's poem "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" through the twentieth century. While scholars seem interested in "Prufrock" as an influential poem, it seems there is limited scholarship on how its influence was propagated. This thesis posits that Bohemianism was the cultural milieu by which "Prufrock" gained popularity and was subsequently appropriated. This thesis looks to Virginia Woolf's The Waves (1931), Julio Cortázar's Hopscotch (1963; English translation 1966), and Jack Kerouac's Big Sur (1962) as hypertexts of "Prufrock" and as examples of how Bohemianism acted as a factor in its appropriation. This thesis finds that Bohemianism, as a culture of collaboration built on its own myth, is a powerful source of intertextuality that likely could have subsumed "Prufrock" as part of that myth.

Technology can be an insight into how humanities’ needs have changed along the centuries and how science has been applied in order to solve these conundrums, to make the world our own and understand it to learn about what surrounds, what is true, and what is unchangeable. The Antikythera Mechanism’s complexity and recent discoveries allow the academy to know its functions and how exact it was, as a new model has been proposed that shows that it was a device to unravel one of the biggest mysteries of antiquity: The Cosmos and the Stars. Along with the help of the perspective of Collingwood’s sense II and sense III, this paper aims to define and analyse the epistemological and methodological significance of the Antikythera Mechanism, by looking into what is says about the old world and how it contrasts with the new., La tecnología muestra una mirada perspicaz hacia cómo las necesidades de la humanidad han cambiado a lo largo de los siglos, y cómo la ciencia ha sido aplicada para resolver estos acertijos, para hacer el mundo nuestro y entenderlo para aprender lo que rodea, lo que es cierto y lo que es inmutable. La complejidad del mecanismo de Antikythera y recientes descubrimientos permiten a la academia saber sus funciones y qué tan exacto era, ya que un nuevo modelo ha sido propuesto que muestra que era un dispositivo para descifrar uno de los más grandes misterios de la antigüedad: El cosmos y las estrellas.Con la ayuda de la perspectiva del sentido II y el sentido III de Collingwood, este artículo busca definir y analizar el significado epistemológico y metodológico del mecanismo de Antikythera, al estudiar lo que dice del viejo mundo y cómo contrasta con el nuevo.

This article explores some general notions of what could be called a “Homeric metaphysics”, as it underlies the poems, setting some philosophical problems. In the first place, the Homeric arché is analyzed as the explanatory principle of the gods and the totality of the cosmos through theogonic and cosmogonic allusions in the Iliad. Then, the structural principles of the divine order and its projection in the human and natural cosmos are presented, closely linked to the limits of Zeus’s power as ruler of the universe, along with its direct implications on the political level. Thirdly and lastly, the notion of time in the poems is briefly analyzed, as a metaphysical concept that operates in human reality and on which an ethical-existential dimension of the hero is projected, as will be seen in the case of Achilles., En este artículo se exploran algunas nociones generales de lo que podría denominarse una “metafísica homérica”, tal como subyace en los poemas, planteando y suscitando algunos problemas filosóficos. En primer lugar, se analiza la arché homérica como el principio explicativo de los dioses y la totalidad del cosmos por medio de las alusiones teogónicas y cosmogónicas en la Ilíada. Luego, se presentan los principios estructurales del orden divino y su proyección en el cosmos humano y natural, estrechamente vinculados a los límites del poder de Zeus como regente del universo, junto con sus implicancias directas en el plano político. En tercer y último lugar, se analiza brevemente la noción de tiempo en los poemas, como concepto metafísico que opera en la realidad humana y sobre el que se proyecta una dimensión ético-existencial del héroe, como se ve será en el caso de Aquiles.

The topic proposed here goes beyond the limits of an essay because it focuses on a writer as erudite and encyclopedic as Borges. But it is not an exception. In fact, any proposal about his work usually faces the same risk. With this idea in mind, my essay tries to give a summary of the meeting points that Borges maintains with some representatives of the Enlightenment, such as Berkeley, Hume, Jonathan Swift, Kant and Leibniz. In this sense, my approach outlines an epistemological course by delving into theories of knowledge that, refuting metaphysical and theological postulates, install human life, as José Isaacson would say, on the endless slope of the question., O tema aqui proposto extrapola os limites de um ensaio porque se debruça sobre Borges, um escritor erudito e enciclopédico. Mas não é exceção, na verdade qualquer proposta sobre sua obra costuma correr o mesmo risco. Com essa ideia em mente, meu ensaio tenta fazer uma síntese dos pontos de encontro que Borges mantém com alguns representantes do Iluminismo, como Berkeley, Hume, Jonathan Swift, Kant e Leibniz. Nesse sentido, minha abordagem traça um percurso epistemológico ao mergulhar em teorias do conhecimento que, refutando postulados metafísicos e teológicos, instalam a vida humana, como diria José Isaacson, na ladeira sem fim da questão., El tema aquí propuesto rebasa los límites de un ensayo por centrarse en un escritor tan erudito y enciclopédico como Borges. Pero no se trata de una excepción, en realidad cualquier propuesta sobre su obra suele afrontar el mismo riesgo. Con esta idea en mente, mi ensayo intenta dar un resumen de los puntos de encuentro que Borges mantiene con algunos representantes de la Ilustración, como Berkeley, Hume, Jonathan Swift, Kant y Leibniz. En este sentido mi enfoque bosqueja un derrotero epistemológico al adentrarse en teorías del conocimiento que, refutando postulados metafísicos y teológicos, instalan la vida humana, como diría José Isaacson, en la pendiente interminable de la pregunta.

In addition to considering metaphysics as a "branch of fantastic literature," Borges developed his own philosophy throughout his essays, poems, and stories. And he did it discreetly, attributing his thesis to other authors. Jaime Rest once spoke of the nominalism of the Argentine writer, but in this nominalism, Borges introduced a hermeneutical and semiotic orientation that related him to two of his contemporaries: Martin Heidegger and Claude Lévi-Strauss., Além de considerar a metafísica como um "ramo da literatura fantástica", Borges desenvolveu sua própria filosofia ao longo de seus ensaios, poemas e contos. E o fez discretamente, atribuindo suas teses a outros autores. Jaime Rest já falou do nominalismo do escritor argentino, mas, neste nominalismo, Borges introduziu uma orientação hermenêutica e semiótica que o relacionou a dois de seus contemporâneos: Martin Heidegger e Claude Lévi-Strauss., Además de considerar a la metafísica como una “rama de la literatura fantástica”, Borges fue desarrollando su propia filosofía a lo largo de sus ensayos, sus poemas y sus cuentos. Y lo hizo discretamente, atribuyéndoles sus tesis a otros autores. Jaime Rest habló alguna vez del nominalismo del escritor argentino, pero en este nominalismo Borges introdujo una orientación hermenéutica y semiótica que lo emparenta con dos de sus contemporáneos: Martin Heidegger y Claude Lévi-Strauss.

Se hace una reseña del libro de Iván Almeida: La ilustre incertidumbre. Ensayos sobre Borges y la filosofía. Pittsburgh: Centro Borges-Universidad de Pittsburgh, 341 páginas.

Some notes which are displayed here will probably allow us to begin to understand the remarkable connections between Chinese thought and the work of Borges. Some side considerations on links to other aspects of Middle Eastern cultures are also provided here. In general, this article tries to show that fundamental concepts of Chinese thought come into powerful harmony with the literature, and even with what can be considered a philosophy, of Borges., Apresentam-se aqui alguns apontamentos que nos permitem começar a compreender as ligações notáveis entre o pensamento chinês e a obra de Borges. Algumas considerações secundárias sobre conexões para outros aspectos das culturas do Oriente Médio também são oferecidas. De modo geral, procura mostrar que conceitos fundamentais do pensamento chinês entram em poderosa sintonia com a literatura, e mesmo com o que se pode considerar uma filosofia, de Borges., Se despliegan aquí algunas notas que permiten empezar a entender las notables conexiones entre el pensamiento chino y la obra de Borges. También se ofrecen algunas consideraciones laterales sobre los vínculos con otros aspectos de las culturas de Oriente Medio. En general, se intenta mostrar que conceptos fundamentales del pensamiento chino entran en poderosa armonía con la literatura, y aun con lo que puede considerarse una filosofía, de Borges.

Perhaps one of the reasons why the tendency of human beings to ask questions that exceed their possibilities is so problematic is that it is impossible for us to deny or ignore it. Asking metaphysical questions seems to be a characteristically human trait, inseparable from the body. Nietzsche shows that the methodological presuppositions of the metaphysical procedure arise from physiological tensions and demands, for the human body's relationship to its environment entails the need for certain forms of understanding the world. Blumenberg builds on this idea insofar as the absence of biological means to defend oneself against the dangers of reality forces human beings to use their intellect and creativity. This brings a form of indirect and mediated, that is, metaphorical, relationship with the world. This article aims to show how the Blumenbergian perspective complements and integrates the Nietzschean criticisms of metaphysics so that it is possible to conceive man's natural inclination to metaphysical questions as an anthropological feature characteristic of his physiology., Tal vez una de las razones por las cuales la tendencia del ser humano a plantearse preguntas que exceden sus posibilidades resulta tan problemática es que nos es imposible negarla o ignorarla. Hacerse preguntas metafísicas pareciera ser un rasgo característicamente humano, e indisociable de su propio cuerpo. Nietzsche muestra que los presupuestos metodológicos del proceder metafísico surgen de tensiones y exigencias fisiológicas, pues la propia relación del cuerpo humano con su entorno conlleva precisamente a la necesidad de ciertas formas de comprensión del mundo. Blumenberg se apoya en esta idea en la medida en que la ausencia de medios biológicos para defenderse de los peligros de la realidad obligan al ser humano a hacer uso de su intelecto y creatividad. Esto conlleva a una forma de relación indirecta y mediada, es decir, metafórica, con el mundo. El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar cómo la perspectiva blumenbergiana complementa e integra las críticas nietzscheanas a la metafísica, de manera que es posible concebir la inclinación natural del hombre a las preguntas metafísicas como su rasgo antropológico característico de su fisiología.

Contrary to panpsychist ontologies present in the work of authors such as Alfred North Whitehead and Gottfried Leibniz, Martin Heidegger proposes an emergentist perspective illustrated by his well known distinction in which the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world and men is world-forming. By admitting the qualitative ontological surpassing between matter and life or non-intentionality and intentionality, Heidegger advocates for a phenomenological justified emergentism. That being said, the paper demonstrates how Heidegger’s ontology presupposes a qualitative distinction between physical, biological and human spheres by describing the concept of organism proposed by the german philosopher., Ao contrário de ontologias de cunho pampsiquista presente na obra de autores como Alfred North Whitehead e Gottfried Leibniz, Martin Heidegger propõe uma perspectiva emergentista ilustrada em sua célebre distinção na qual se afirma que a pedra é sem mundo, o animal é pobre de mundo e o homem é formador de mundo. Admitindo a ultrapassagem ontológica qualitativa que há entre matéria e vida ou não-intencionalidade e intencionalidade, Heidegger advoga por um emergentismo fenomenologicamente justificado. Dito isso, o artigo visa demonstrar como a ontologia heideggeriana pressupõe a distinção qualitativa entre esfera física, biológica e humana ao examinarmos o conceito de organismo proposto pelo filósofo alemão.

The rupture established by quantum physics in relation to classical physics led to a redefinition of scientific objectivity, which has since relied on mathematical formalism for the knowledge of wave functions. This conception of a "weak objectivity" motivated Werner Heisenberg to resort to Plato's idealism to explain the internal constitution of the material world from geometric structures. However, faced with an idealist paradigm incompatible with modern science, Heisenberg conceived that Kant's philosophy would be the most acceptable reference for interpreting quantum phenomena within the empiricist limits of scientific research. This article presents Hegel's idealism of the absolute as a philosophical horizon for a possible overcoming of the rigidity of the Kantian limits, aiming at a metaphysical interpretation of quantum physics., A ruptura estabelecida pela física quântica em relação à física clássica conduziu a uma redefinição da objetividade científica, que desde então se baseou no formalismo matemático para o conhecimento das funções de onda. Essa concepção de uma "objetividade fraca" motivou Werner Heisenberg a recorrer ao idealismo de Platão para explicar a constituição interna do mundo material a partir de estruturas geométricas. Entretanto, face a um paradigma idealista incompatível com a ciência moderna, Heisenberg concebeu que a filosofia de Kant seria a referência mais aceitável para interpretar os fenômenos quânticos dentro dos limites empiricistas da pesquisa científica. O presente artigo apresenta o idealismo de absoluto de Hegel como horizonte filosófico para uma possível superação da rigidez dos limites kantianos, visando a uma interpretação metafísica da física quântica.

In this research we will try to make explicit to what extent Being and Time is a kind of attempt to take up again, in a correct way, the original philosophical project that Kant unfolded in his Critique of Pure Reason. In order to justify our conjecture, we will focus especially on Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). In this text we will find a controversial interpretation that the Meßkirch thinker developed of Immanuel Kant’s opus magnum. This interpretation could suggest that his Being and Time would not only be twinned with the Critique of Pure Reason, but that it would be a correct continuation of the path traced there by the philosopher from Königsberg., En esta investigación intentaremos explicitar hasta qué punto Ser y Tiempo es una suerte de tentativa por retomar, en forma correcta, el originario proyecto filosófico que Kant desplegó en su Crítica de la razón pura. Para lograr justificar nuestra conjetura nos centraremos especialmente en la obra de Heidegger Kant y el problema de la Metafísica (1929). En dicho texto nos encontraremos con una controvertida interpretación que el pensador de Meßkirch elaboró del opus magnum de Immanuel Kant. Interpretación que, justamente, podría sugerirnos que su Ser y Tiempo, no sólo estaría hermanado con la Crítica de la razón pura, sino que vendría a ser una correcta continuación del camino allí trazado por el filósofo de Königsberg.

The present article explores the third and last confrontation of Shelling`s Freedom Treatise which Heidegger taught in 1941. The aim of this study is about to explain the context of the consummation of the Metaphysic of German Idealism to analyze the Heidegger position on the later philosophy Shelling`s notions of distinction and will. Therefore, the study explores that through the abysm of will can be shown the intersection of the Shelling`s freedom philosophy and the Heidegger`s ontology of event., El artículo estudia la tercera y última confrontación con el Tratado de la libertad de Schelling que Heidegger sostuvo en 1941. El objetivo consiste en explicar el contexto del problema del acabamiento de la metafísica del idealismo alemán, para analizar la posición que tiene Heidegger de las nociones de diferencia y voluntad forjadas por la filosofía tardía de Schelling; de esta manera, a partir del abismo de la voluntad se muestra la intersección entre la filosofía de la libertad de Schelling y la ontología del evento de Heidegger.