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This chapter considers how diplomatic negotiations unfold in the digital context. It asks how digital devices, such as mobile phones, screens, or social media apps, challenge core diplomatic norms and procedures; and, more radically, considers what happens to diplomatic negotiations when the interaction itself is conducted virtually or in hybrid formats. Moving beyond an overview of how diplomatic negotiations can be theorized and studied empirically in digital contexts, we suggest that different approaches build on different understandings of ‘the digital’: as an advantage, a challenge, or as a negotiation in itself. We develop these strands in conversation with the IR literature on ‘digital diplomacy’ and illustrate our points with examples of digitalization and diplomatic practice in the European Union. We discuss critical issues, emerging trends, and procedural changes in diplomatic negotiations by relating them to broader societal digitalization trends. Diplomats’ (work) phones, individual digital competencies, and shared institutional norms co-constitute diplomatic negotiations in the digital context. Beyond a much-needed exploration of how diplomats handle digital devices in everyday negotiations, we suggest that emerging debates on the regulation, management, and limits of digital technology will be crucial for our understanding of diplomatic negotiations in the coming years.

Background: Wearable technology is used by consumers and researchers worldwide for continuous activity monitoring in daily life. Results of high-quality laboratory-based validation studies enable us to make a guided decision on which study to rely on and which device to use. However, reviews in adults that focus on the quality of existing laboratory studies are missing. Methods: We conducted a systematic review of wearable validation studies with adults. Eligibility criteria were: (i) study under laboratory conditions with humans (age ≥ 18 years); (ii) validated device outcome must belong to one dimension of the 24-hour physical behavior construct (i.e., intensity, posture/activity type, and biological state); (iii) study protocol must include a criterion measure; (iv) study had to be published in a peer-reviewed English language journal. Studies were identified via a systematic search in five electronic databases as well as back- and forward citation searches. The risk of bias was assessed based on the QUADAS-2 tool with eight signaling questions. Results: Out of 13,285 unique search results, 545 published articles between 1994 and 2022 were included. Most studies (73.8% (N = 420)) validated an intensity measure outcome such as energy expenditure; only 14% (N = 80) and 12.2% (N = 70) of studies validated biological state or posture/activity type outcomes, respectively. Most protocols validated wearables in healthy adults between 18 and 65 years. Most wearables were only validated once. Further, we identified six wearables (i.e., ActiGraph GT3X+, ActiGraph GT9X, Apple Watch 2, Axivity AX3, Fitbit Charge 2, Fitbit, and GENEActiv) that had been used to validate outcomes from all three dimensions, but none of them were consistently ranked with moderate to high validity. Risk of bias assessment resulted in 4.4% (N = 24) of all studies being classified as “low risk”, while 16.5% (N = 90) were classified as “some concerns” and 79.1% (N = 431) as “high risk”. Conclusion

Despite mounting evidence that women in foreign policy often bear the brunt of online hostility, the extent of online gender bias against diplomats remains unexplored. This paper offers the first global analysis of the treatment of women diplomats on social media. Introducing a multidimensional and multilingual methodology for studying online gender bias, it focuses on three critical elements: gendered language, negativity in tweets directed at diplomats, and the visibility of women diplomats. Our unique dataset encompasses ambassadors from 164 countries, their tweets, and the direct responses to these tweets in 65 different languages. Using automated content and sentiment analysis, our findings reveal a crucial gender bias. The language in responses to diplomatic tweets is only mildly gendered and largely pertains to international affairs and, generally, women ambassadors do not receive more negative reactions to their tweets than men, yet the pronounced discrepancy in online visibility stands out as a significant form of gender bias. Women receive a staggering 66.4% fewer retweets than men. By unraveling the invisibility that obscures women diplomats on social media, we hope to spark further research on online bias in international politics.

Despite mounting evidence that women in foreign policy often bear the brunt of online hostility, the extent of online gender bias against diplomats remains unexplored. This paper offers the first global analysis of the treatment of women diplomats on social media. Introducing a multidimensional and multilingual methodology for studying online gender bias, it focuses on three critical elements: gendered language, negativity in tweets directed at diplomats, and the visibility of women diplomats. Our unique dataset encompasses ambassadors from 164 countries, their tweets, and the direct responses to these tweets in 65 different languages. Using automated content and sentiment analysis, our findings reveal a crucial gender bias. The language in responses to diplomatic tweets is only mildly gendered and largely pertains to international affairs and, generally, women ambassadors do not receive more negative reactions to their tweets than men, yet the pronounced discrepancy in online visibility stands out as a significant form of gender bias. Women receive a staggering 66.4% fewer retweets than men. By unraveling the invisibility that obscures women diplomats on social media, we hope to spark further research on online bias in international politics.

Despite mounting evidence that women in foreign policy often bear the brunt of online hostility, the extent of online gender bias against diplomats remains unexplored. This paper offers the first global analysis of the treatment of women diplomats on social media. Introducing a multidimensional and multilingual methodology for studying online gender bias, it focuses on three critical elements: gendered language, negativity in tweets directed at diplomats, and the visibility of women diplomats. Our unique dataset encompasses ambassadors from 164 countries, their tweets, and the direct responses to these tweets in 65 different languages. Using automated content and sentiment analysis, our findings reveal a crucial gender bias. The language in responses to diplomatic tweets is only mildly gendered and largely pertains to international affairs and, generally, women ambassadors do not receive more negative reactions to their tweets than men, yet the pronounced discrepancy in online visibility stands out as a significant form of gender bias. Women receive a staggering 66.4% fewer retweets than men. By unraveling the invisibility that obscures women diplomats on social media, we hope to spark further research on online bias in international politics.

This article develops a new theoretical approach to digitalisation in diplomacy, resituating conventional understandings of the relationship between diplomacy and technological transformation. Challenging the conception that ‘traditional’ diplomacy is being supplemented or challenged by new forms of ‘digital diplomacy’, we show how the ubiquity of digital devices and technologies makes disentangling analogue from digital diplomatic practices practically impossible today. The argument is developed through ethnographic observations of everyday diplomatic work in the European Union (EU) multilateral setting in Brussels as well as interviews with ambassadors, attachés, seconded diplomats, spokespersons and interpreters. To understand the place of digital technologies in diplomatic work, we develop the concept of blended diplomacy by which we mean the dual process of the entanglement of technical and social doings and the contestation regarding how this entanglement impacts professional diplomatic imaginaries and relations. Drawing on insights from practice theory and the sociology of science, technology and professions, we show how diplomatic actors demarcate their professional territory and protect their positions through boundary work. They draw horizontal boundaries between what they see as ‘real’ diplomatic work and distractions and vertical boundaries between themselves and other diplomatic actors, ranking people around status and skills. Overall, digital technologies are implicated in deeper struggles regarding what it means to be a diplomat. A focus on the blended character of diplomatic practice opens new avenues for research on how digitalisation, in contradictory and uneven ways, shapes norms, identities, and social relations and how it – through reflexivity, anxieties and contestation – may shape international politics.

We study how citizens engage with misinformation on Twitter in Denmark during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that misinformation regarding facemasks is not corrected through counterarguments or fact-checking. Instead, many tweets rejecting misinformation use humor to mock misinformation spreaders, whom they pejoratively label wearers of “tinfoil hats.” Tweets rejecting misinformation project a superior social position and leave the concerns of misinformation spreaders unaddressed. Our study highlights the role of status in people’s engagement with online misinformation.

How should health authorities communicate to motivate the public to comply with health advice during a prolonged health crisis such as a pandemic? During the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, for example, people have had to comply with successive restrictions as the world faced multiple races between controlling new waves of the virus and the development and implementation of vaccines. Here, we examine how health authorities and governments most effectively motivate the public by focusing on a specific race: between the Alpha variant and the implementation of the first generation of COVID-19 vaccinations in the winter of 2021. Following prior research on crisis communication, we focus on appeals to fear and hope using communicative aids in the form of visualizations based on epidemiological modelling. Using a population-based experiment conducted in United States (N= 3 , 022), we demonstrate that a hope-oriented visual communication aid, depicting the competing effects on the epidemic curve of (1) a more infectious variant and (2) vaccinations, motivates public action more effectively than a fear-oriented visual communication, focusing exclusively on the threat of the new variant. The importance of the implementation of such hope-oriented messages is further highlighted by cross-national representative surveys from eight countries (N= 3 , 995), which demonstrate that feelings of fear towards the Alpha variant alone were insufficient to activate strong compliance. Overall, these findings provide general insights into the importance of hope as a health communication strategy during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond.

This article develops a new theoretical approach to digitalisation in diplomacy, resituating conventional understandings of the relationship between diplomacy and technological transformation. Challenging the conception that ‘traditional’ diplomacy is being supplemented or challenged by new forms of ‘digital diplomacy’, we show how the ubiquity of digital devices and technologies makes disentangling analogue from digital diplomatic practices practically impossible today. The argument is developed through ethnographic observations of everyday diplomatic work in the European Union (EU) multilateral setting in Brussels as well as interviews with ambassadors, attachés, seconded diplomats, spokespersons and interpreters. To understand the place of digital technologies in diplomatic work, we develop the concept of blended diplomacy by which we mean the dual process of the entanglement of technical and social doings and the contestation regarding how this entanglement impacts professional diplomatic imaginaries and relations. Drawing on insights from practice theory and the sociology of science, technology and professions, we show how diplomatic actors demarcate their professional territory and protect their positions through boundary work. They draw horizontal boundaries between what they see as ‘real’ diplomatic work and distractions and vertical boundaries between themselves and other diplomatic actors, ranking people around status and skills. Overall, digital technologies are implicated in deeper struggles regarding what it means to be a diplomat. A focus on the blended character of diplomatic practice opens new avenues for research on how digitalisation, in contradictory and uneven ways, shapes norms, identities, and social relations and how it – through reflexivity, anxieties and contestation – may shape international politics.

Background: Wearable technology is a leading fitness trend in the growing commercial industry and an established method for collecting 24-hour physical behavior data in research studies. High-quality free-living validation studies are required to enable both researchers and consumers to make guided decisions on which study to rely on and which device to use. However, reviews focusing on the quality of free-living validation studies in adults are lacking. Objective: This study aimed to raise researchers' and consumers' attention to the quality of published validation protocols while aiming to identify and compare specific consistencies or inconsistencies between protocols. We aimed to provide a comprehensive and historical overview of which wearable devices have been validated for which purpose and whether they show promise for use in further studies. Methods: Peer-reviewed validation studies from electronic databases, as well as backward and forward citation searches (1970 to July 2021), with the following, required indicators were included: protocol must include real-life conditions, outcome must belong to one dimension of the 24-hour physical behavior construct (intensity, posture or activity type, and biological state), the protocol must include a criterion measure, and study results must be published in English-language journals. The risk of bias was evaluated using the Quality Assessment of Diagnostic Accuracy Studies-2 tool with 9 questions separated into 4 domains (patient selection or study design, index measure, criterion measure, and flow and time). Results: Of the 13,285 unique search results, 222 (1.67%) articles were included. Most studies (153/237, 64.6%) validated an intensity measure outcome such as energy expenditure. However, only 19.8% (47/237) validated biological state and 15.6% (37/237) validated posture or activity-type outcomes. Across all studies, 163 different wearables were identified. Of these, 58.9% (96/163) were validated only once.

We study how citizens engage with misinformation on Twitter in Denmark during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that misinformation regarding facemasks is not corrected through counterarguments or fact-checking. Instead, many tweets rejecting misinformation use humor to mock misinformation spreaders, whom they pejoratively label wearers of “tinfoil hats.” Tweets rejecting misinformation project a superior social position and leave the concerns of misinformation spreaders unaddressed. Our study highlights the role of status in people’s engagement with online misinformation.

How do Danes interact with misinformation on social media? Which statements and arguments do they use to spread and reject misinformation? We investigate digital misinformation during the Covid-19 pandemic and analyze how citizens spread and reject information about facemasks on Twitter in Denmark. Our study shows that the amount of misinformation is limited, but that false claims are not predominantly countered through fact-checking or dialogue. Instead, users who reject the misinformation often use irony and condescending comments to distance themselves from those who spread misinformation and whose concerns are thus not taken seriously. Our findings question citizens’ ability to effectively correct misinformation online and point to the importance of group affiliation and social status not only in spreading, but also in rejecting digital misinformation.

Vi må opgive tanken om, at korrekt viden i sig selv er nok til at korrigere misinformation på sociale medier. Den rammer nemlig forskelligt afhængigt af politisk observans og identitet, mener professor

International relations are made up of thick layers of meaning and big streams of data. How can we capture the nuances and scales of increasingly digitalised world politics, taking advantage of the possibilities that come with ‘big data’ and ‘digital methods’ in our discipline of International Relations (IR)? What is needed, we argue, is a methodological twin-move of making big data thick and thick data big. Taking diplomacy, one of IR's core practices as our case, we illustrate how anthropological and computational approaches can be merged in IR research. We report from our experiences with the project DIPLOFACE: Diplomatic Face-Work between Confidential Negotiations and Public Display, investigating how digital communication technologies influence both the study and conduct of age-old and traditionally analogue practices of inter-state diplomacy.

International relations are made up of thick layers of meaning and big streams of data. How can we capture the nuances and scales of increasingly digitalised world politics, taking advantage of the possibilities that come with ‘big data’ and ‘digital methods’ in our discipline of International Relations (IR)? What is needed, we argue, is a methodological twin-move of making big data thick and thick data big. Taking diplomacy, one of IR's core practices as our case, we illustrate how anthropological and computational approaches can be merged in IR research. We report from our experiences with the project DIPLOFACE: Diplomatic Face-Work between Confidential Negotiations and Public Display, investigating how digital communication technologies influence both the study and conduct of age-old and traditionally analogue practices of inter-state diplomacy.

What happens to the diplomatic encounter when it is digitally mediated? This article investigates how multilateral diplomats, who understand themselves as bringing people and polities together, cope with and resist the move to online settings, replacing handshakes with touchless greetings in videoconferences. Our starting point is the Covid-19 pandemic, but the article theorizes the effects of digital technological mediation already under way years before. Translating Knorr Cetina's notion of “synthetic situation” into the discipline of international relations (IR), we address how the very composition of diplomatic interaction is undergoing transformation. Building on immersive and remote fieldwork, among ambassadors, attachés, interpreters, and journalists constituting the field of European Union diplomacy, our argument speaks to IR debates on international practice, face-to-face interactions, digital technologies, and the political sociology of diplomacy. We show how practicing diplomacy online and with restrictions on in-person meetings involves (re)constructions of its dramaturgy, props, symbols, and authenticity as well as “heroic” fantasies of duty and exceptionalism; we analyze how diplomacy is practiced in “screen worlds” through scopic media enabling “response presence” or virtual co-presence across geographic and professional/private sites; and we trace how resistance to syntheticism emerges as screen fatigue spreads. Overall, we find that the pandemic has accelerated the ongoing transformation of diplomacy from “naked” face-to-face interactions to digitally mediated “synthetic situations,” producing new interpretations of who is “essential” in diplomacy. We conclude by questioning the term “digital diplomacy,” suggesting that virtual practices are in fact not simply “online” but embodied offline, and sometimes actively resisted. In the screen world, diplomats’ bodies (and home offices) become key sites of IR.

What happens to the diplomatic encounter when it is digitally mediated? This article investigates how multilateral diplomats, who understand themselves as bringing people and polities together, cope with and resist the move to online settings, replacing handshakes with touchless greetings in videoconferences. Our starting point is the Covid-19 pandemic, but the article theorizes the effects of digital technological mediation already under way years before. Translating Knorr Cetina's notion of “synthetic situation” into the discipline of international relations (IR), we address how the very composition of diplomatic interaction is undergoing transformation. Building on immersive and remote fieldwork, among ambassadors, attachés, interpreters, and journalists constituting the field of European Union diplomacy, our argument speaks to IR debates on international practice, face-to-face interactions, digital technologies, and the political sociology of diplomacy. We show how practicing diplomacy online and with restrictions on in-person meetings involves (re)constructions of its dramaturgy, props, symbols, and authenticity as well as “heroic” fantasies of duty and exceptionalism; we analyze how diplomacy is practiced in “screen worlds” through scopic media enabling “response presence” or virtual co-presence across geographic and professional/private sites; and we trace how resistance to syntheticism emerges as screen fatigue spreads. Overall, we find that the pandemic has accelerated the ongoing transformation of diplomacy from “naked” face-to-face interactions to digitally mediated “synthetic situations,” producing new interpretations of who is “essential” in diplomacy. We conclude by questioning the term “digital diplomacy,” suggesting that virtual practices are in fact not simply “online” but embodied offline, and sometimes actively resisted. In the screen world, diplomats’ bodies (and home offices) become key sites of IR.

I en artikel i Jyllands-Posten af Jesper Kongstad og Jette Elbæk Maressa kommenterer Rebecca Adler-Nissen på udnævnelsen af Venstres Kristian Jensen som særlig diplomatisk repræsentant. Hun anser det for at være en glidebane, hvor regeringer fremover kan bruge attraktive poster i Udenrigsministeriet til deres politiske vinding. Hun frygter, at det vil gå udover kvaliteten af det danske diplomati, idet det ikke længere nødvendigvis er kompetencer der er afgørende for ansættelser.

The Liberal International Order (LIO) is currently undermined not only by states such as Russia but also by voters in the West. We argue that both veins of discontent are driven by resentment towards the LIO’s status hierarchy, rather than just economic grievances. Approaching discontent historically and sociologically, we show that there are two strains of recognition struggles against the LIO: one in the core of the West, driven by populist politicians and their voters, and one on the semi-periphery, fuelled by competitively authoritarian governments and their supporters. At this particular moment in history, these struggles are digitally, ideologically and organisationally interconnected in their criticism of LIO institutions, amplifying each other. The LIO is thus being hollowed out from within at a time when it is also facing some of its greatest external challenges.

The Liberal International Order (LIO) is currently undermined not only by states such as Russia but also by voters in the West. We argue that both veins of discontent are driven by resentment towards the LIO’s status hierarchy, rather than just economic grievances. Approaching discontent historically and sociologically, we show that there are two strains of recognition struggles against the LIO: one in the core of the West, driven by populist politicians and their voters, and one on the semi-periphery, fuelled by competitively authoritarian governments and their supporters. At this particular moment in history, these struggles are digitally, ideologically and organisationally interconnected in their criticism of LIO institutions, amplifying each other. The LIO is thus being hollowed out from within at a time when it is also facing some of its greatest external challenges.

How are images, emotions, and international politics connected? This article develops a theoretical framework contributing to visuality and emotions research in International Relations. Correcting the understanding that images cause particular emotional responses, this article claims that emotionally laden responses to images should be seen as performed in foreign policy discourses. We theorise images as objects of interpretation and contestation, and emotions as socially constituted rather than as individual 'inner states'. Emotional bundling - the coupling of different emotions in discourse - helps constitute political subjectivities that both politicise and depoliticise. Through emotional bundling political leaders express their experiences of feelings shared by all humans, and simultaneously articulate themselves in authoritative and gendered subject positions such as 'the father'. We illustrate the value of our framework by analysing the photographs of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian-Kurdish boy who drowned in September 2015. 'Kurdi' became an instant global icon of the Syrian refugee crisis. World leaders expressed their personal grief and determination to act, but within a year, policies adopted with direct reference to Kurdi's tragic death changed from an open-door approach to attempts to stop refugees from arriving. A discursive-performative approach opens up new avenues for research on visuality, emotionality, and world politics.

How are images, emotions, and international politics connected? This article develops a theoretical framework contributing to visuality and emotions research in International Relations. Correcting the understanding that images cause particular emotional responses, this article claims that emotionally laden responses to images should be seen as performed in foreign policy discourses. We theorise images as objects of interpretation and contestation, and emotions as socially constituted rather than as individual 'inner states'. Emotional bundling - the coupling of different emotions in discourse - helps constitute political subjectivities that both politicise and depoliticise. Through emotional bundling political leaders express their experiences of feelings shared by all humans, and simultaneously articulate themselves in authoritative and gendered subject positions such as 'the father'. We illustrate the value of our framework by analysing the photographs of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian-Kurdish boy who drowned in September 2015. 'Kurdi' became an instant global icon of the Syrian refugee crisis. World leaders expressed their personal grief and determination to act, but within a year, policies adopted with direct reference to Kurdi's tragic death changed from an open-door approach to attempts to stop refugees from arriving. A discursive-performative approach opens up new avenues for research on visuality, emotionality, and world politics.

How are images, emotions, and international politics connected? This article develops a theoretical framework contributing to visuality and emotions research in International Relations. Correcting the understanding that images cause particular emotional responses, this article claims that emotionally laden responses to images should be seen as performed in foreign policy discourses. We theorise images as objects of interpretation and contestation, and emotions as socially constituted rather than as individual 'inner states'. Emotional bundling - the coupling of different emotions in discourse - helps constitute political subjectivities that both politicise and depoliticise. Through emotional bundling political leaders express their experiences of feelings shared by all humans, and simultaneously articulate themselves in authoritative and gendered subject positions such as 'the father'. We illustrate the value of our framework by analysing the photographs of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian-Kurdish boy who drowned in September 2015. 'Kurdi' became an instant global icon of the Syrian refugee crisis. World leaders expressed their personal grief and determination to act, but within a year, policies adopted with direct reference to Kurdi's tragic death changed from an open-door approach to attempts to stop refugees from arriving. A discursive-performative approach opens up new avenues for research on visuality, emotionality, and world politics.

How does technology influence international negotiations? This article explores ‘track-change diplomacy’ – how diplomats use information and communication technology (ICT) such as word processing software and mobile devices to collaboratively edit and negotiate documents. To analyze the widespread but understudied phenomenon of track-change diplomacy, the article adopts a practice-oriented approach to technology, developing the concept of affordance: the way a tool or technology simultaneously enables and constrains the tasks users can possibly perform with it. The article shows how digital ICT affords shareability, visualization and immediacy of information, thus shaping the temporality and power dynamics of international negotiations. These three affordances have significant consequences for how states construct and promote national interests; how diplomats reach compromises among a large number of states (as text edits in collective drafting exercises); and how power plays out in international negotiations. Drawing on ethnographic methods, including participant observation of negotiations between the EU’s member states as well as in-depth interviews, the analysis casts new light on these negotiations, where documents become the site of both semantic and political struggle. Rather than delivering on the technology’s promise of keeping track and reinforcing national oversight in negotiations, we argue that track-change diplomacy can in fact lead to a loss of control, challenging existing understandings of diplomacy., How does technology influence international negotiations? This article explores ‘track-change diplomacy’ – how diplomats use information and communication technology (ICT) such as word processing software and mobile devices to collaboratively edit and negotiate documents. To analyze the widespread but understudied phenomenon of track-change diplomacy, the article adopts a practice-oriented approach to technology, developing the concept of affordance: the way a tool or technology simultaneously enables and constrains the tasks users can possibly perform with it. The article shows how digital ICT affords shareability, visualization and immediacy of information, thus shaping the temporality and power dynamics of international negotiations. These three affordances have significant consequences for how states construct and promote national interests; how diplomats reach compromises among a large number of states (as text edits in collective drafting exercises); and how power plays out in international negotiations. Drawing on ethnographic methods, including participant observation of negotiations between the EU’s member states as well as in-depth interviews, the analysis casts new light on these negotiations, where documents become the site of both semantic and political struggle. Rather than delivering on the technology’s promise of keeping track and reinforcing national oversight in negotiations, we argue that track-change diplomacy can in fact lead to a loss of control, challenging existing understandings of diplomacy.

Recognition, or the lack of it, is a central concern in International Relations (IR). However, how states cope with international misrecognition has so far not been thoroughly explored in IR scholarship. To address this, the article presents a theoretical framework for understanding international misrecognition by drawing on discursive and psychoanalytical theories of collective identity formation and humour studies. The article conceptualises international misrecognition as a gap between the dominant narrative of a national Self and the way this national Self is reflected in the ‘mirror’ of the international Other. We argue that humour offers an important way of coping with misrecognition by ridiculing and thereby downplaying international criticism. The significance for international relations is illustrated through an analysis of the public diplomacy campaign, ‘Presenting Israel’, which, through parodying video clips, mobilised ordinary Israeli citizens to engage in peer-to-peer public diplomacy to explain Israel when traveling abroad. Public diplomacy campaigns are commonly seen by scholars and practitioners as attempts to improve the nation’s image and smoothen or normalise international Self/Other relations. However, after analysing the discursive and visual components of the campaign – which parodied how European media portrayed Israel as primitive, violent and exotic – this article observes that in the context of international misrecognition, such coping attempts can actually contribute to further international estrangement., Recognition, or the lack of it, is a central concern in International Relations. However, how states cope with international misrecognition has so far not been thoroughly explored in International Relations scholarship. To address this, the article presents a theoretical framework for understanding international misrecognition by drawing on discursive and psychoanalytical theories of collective identity formation and humour studies. The article conceptualises international misrecognition as a gap between the dominant narrative of a national Self and the way in which this national Self is reflected in the ‘mirror’ of the international Other. We argue that humour offers an important way of coping with misrecognition by ridiculing and thereby downplaying international criticism. The significance for international relations is illustrated through an analysis of the public diplomacy campaign ‘Presenting Israel’, which, through parodying video clips, mobilised ordinary Israeli citizens to engage in peer-to-peer public diplomacy to explain Israel when travelling abroad. Public diplomacy campaigns are commonly seen by scholars and practitioners as attempts to improve the nation’s image and smoothen or normalise international Self–Other relations. However, after analysing the discursive and visual components of the campaign — which parodied how European media portrayed Israel as primitive, violent and exotic — this article observes that in the context of international misrecognition, such coping attempts can actually contribute to further international estrangement.

This article advances a practice‐approach to differentiated (dis)integration in European security and defence in light of Brexit. We propose that understanding how differentiation in the area of security and defence is given meaning on the ground requires examining the everyday social practices of officials and military professionals. Therefore, we focus on the “low politics” of security and defence cooperation in Europe. We do so by entering the diplomatic “engine room” in the EU's Political and Security Committee. We show how arguments that Brexit will be the ultimate death blow to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy or that it will be the catalyst for deeper military cooperation, fail to take account of the social dynamics and the historical path of existing security and military cooperation in Europe. Future research on differentiation should pay particular attention to how such mechanisms plays out in everyday social negotiation of meaning among practitioners.

Despite concerns about the effects of pro-Russian disinformation on Western public opinion, evidence of its reach remains scarce. We hypothesize that conservative individuals will be more likely than liberals to be potentially exposed to pro-Russian disinformation in digital networks. We evaluate the hypothesis using a large data set of U.S.-based Twitter users, testing how ideology is associated with disinformation about the 2014 crash of the MH17 aircraft over eastern Ukraine. We find that potential exposure to disinformation is concentrated among the most conservative individuals. Moving from the most liberal to the most conservative individuals in the sample is associated with a change in the conditional probability of potential exposure to disinformation from 6.5% to 45.2%. We corroborate the finding using a second, validated data set on individual party registration. The results indicate that the reach of online, pro-Russian disinformation into U.S. audiences is distinctly ideologically asymmetric.

How does technology influence international negotiations? This article explores ‘track-change diplomacy’ – how diplomats use information and communication technology (ICT) such as word processing software and mobile devices to collaboratively edit and negotiate documents. To analyze the widespread but understudied phenomenon of track-change diplomacy, the article adopts a practice-oriented approach to technology, developing the concept of affordance: the way a tool or technology simultaneously enables and constrains the tasks users can possibly perform with it. The article shows how digital ICT affords shareability, visualization and immediacy of information, thus shaping the temporality and power dynamics of international negotiations. These three affordances have significant consequences for how states construct and promote national interests; how diplomats reach compromises among a large number of states (as text edits in collective drafting exercises); and how power plays out in international negotiations. Drawing on ethnographic methods, including participant observation of negotiations between the EU’s member states as well as in-depth interviews, the analysis casts new light on these negotiations, where documents become the site of both semantic and political struggle. Rather than delivering on the technology’s promise of keeping track and reinforcing national oversight in negotiations, we argue that track-change diplomacy can in fact lead to a loss of control, challenging existing understandings of diplomacy., How does technology influence international negotiations? This article explores ‘track-change diplomacy’ – how diplomats use information and communication technology (ICT) such as word processing software and mobile devices to collaboratively edit and negotiate documents. To analyze the widespread but understudied phenomenon of track-change diplomacy, the article adopts a practice-oriented approach to technology, developing the concept of affordance: the way a tool or technology simultaneously enables and constrains the tasks users can possibly perform with it. The article shows how digital ICT affords shareability, visualization and immediacy of information, thus shaping the temporality and power dynamics of international negotiations. These three affordances have significant consequences for how states construct and promote national interests; how diplomats reach compromises among a large number of states (as text edits in collective drafting exercises); and how power plays out in international negotiations. Drawing on ethnographic methods, including participant observation of negotiations between the EU’s member states as well as in-depth interviews, the analysis casts new light on these negotiations, where documents become the site of both semantic and political struggle. Rather than delivering on the technology’s promise of keeping track and reinforcing national oversight in negotiations, we argue that track-change diplomacy can in fact lead to a loss of control, challenging existing understandings of diplomacy.

Despite concerns about the effects of pro-Russian disinformation on Western public opinion, evidence of its reach remains scarce. We hypothesize that conservative individuals will be more likely than liberals to be potentially exposed to pro-Russian disinformation in digital networks. We evaluate the hypothesis using a large data set of U.S.-based Twitter users, testing how ideology is associated with disinformation about the 2014 crash of the MH17 aircraft over eastern Ukraine. We find that potential exposure to disinformation is concentrated among the most conservative individuals. Moving from the most liberal to the most conservative individuals in the sample is associated with a change in the conditional probability of potential exposure to disinformation from 6.5% to 45.2%. We corroborate the finding using a second, validated data set on individual party registration. The results indicate that the reach of online, pro-Russian disinformation into U.S. audiences is distinctly ideologically asymmetric.

Recognition, or the lack of it, is a central concern in International Relations (IR). However, how states cope with international misrecognition has so far not been thoroughly explored in IR scholarship. To address this, the article presents a theoretical framework for understanding international misrecognition by drawing on discursive and psychoanalytical theories of collective identity formation and humour studies. The article conceptualises international misrecognition as a gap between the dominant narrative of a national Self and the way this national Self is reflected in the ‘mirror’ of the international Other. We argue that humour offers an important way of coping with misrecognition by ridiculing and thereby downplaying international criticism. The significance for international relations is illustrated through an analysis of the public diplomacy campaign, ‘Presenting Israel’, which, through parodying video clips, mobilised ordinary Israeli citizens to engage in peer-to-peer public diplomacy to explain Israel when traveling abroad. Public diplomacy campaigns are commonly seen by scholars and practitioners as attempts to improve the nation’s image and smoothen or normalise international Self/Other relations. However, after analysing the discursive and visual components of the campaign – which parodied how European media portrayed Israel as primitive, violent and exotic – this article observes that in the context of international misrecognition, such coping attempts can actually contribute to further international estrangement., Recognition, or the lack of it, is a central concern in International Relations. However, how states cope with international misrecognition has so far not been thoroughly explored in International Relations scholarship. To address this, the article presents a theoretical framework for understanding international misrecognition by drawing on discursive and psychoanalytical theories of collective identity formation and humour studies. The article conceptualises international misrecognition as a gap between the dominant narrative of a national Self and the way in which this national Self is reflected in the ‘mirror’ of the international Other. We argue that humour offers an important way of coping with misrecognition by ridiculing and thereby downplaying international criticism. The significance for international relations is illustrated through an analysis of the public diplomacy campaign ‘Presenting Israel’, which, through parodying video clips, mobilised ordinary Israeli citizens to engage in peer-to-peer public diplomacy to explain Israel when travelling abroad. Public diplomacy campaigns are commonly seen by scholars and practitioners as attempts to improve the nation’s image and smoothen or normalise international Self–Other relations. However, after analysing the discursive and visual components of the campaign — which parodied how European media portrayed Israel as primitive, violent and exotic — this article observes that in the context of international misrecognition, such coping attempts can actually contribute to further international estrangement.

The concept of ‘duty of care’ for citizens abroad is grounded in a political rationality where the population is seen as an object for protection by the state. In today’s globalised world, however, this rationality is challenged by increased citizen mobility, budget cuts, new information technologies and the proliferation of new security threats. In recent years the state’s duty of care has received fresh political and scholarly attention, but Diplomatic Studies have so far overlooked how the recent waves of neoliberal reforms have introduced a new political rationality into policy-making circles, where the population is not seen only as an object for protection, but also as a resource for mobilisation. Developing insights from studies of governmentality, this article argues that when this neoliberal political rationality becomes predominant in diplomatic circles, it leads to inversion of the duty of care through new citizen-based practices, steered at a distance by the state.

The concept of ‘duty of care’ for citizens abroad is grounded in a political rationality where the population is seen as an object for protection by the state. In today’s globalised world, however, this rationality is challenged by increased citizen mobility, budget cuts, new information technologies and the proliferation of new security threats. In recent years the state’s duty of care has received fresh political and scholarly attention, but Diplomatic Studies have so far overlooked how the recent waves of neoliberal reforms have introduced a new political rationality into policy-making circles, where the population is not seen only as an object for protection, but also as a resource for mobilisation. Developing insights from studies of governmentality, this article argues that when this neoliberal political rationality becomes predominant in diplomatic circles, it leads to inversion of the duty of care through new citizen-based practices, steered at a distance by the state.

This article explores the dynamics of digital (dis)information in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. International Relations scholars have presented the online debate in terms of ‘information warfare’—that is, a number of strategic campaigns to win over local and global public opinion, largely orchestrated by the Kremlin and pro-western authorities. However, this way of describing the online debate reduces civil society to a mere target for manipulation. This article presents a different understanding of the debate. By examining the social media engagement generated by one of the conflict's most important events—the downing of the Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) over Ukraine—we explore how competing claims about the cause of the plane crash are disseminated by the state, media and civil society. By analysing approximately 950,000 tweets, the article demonstrates how individual citizens are more than purveyors of government messages; they are the most active drivers of both disinformation and attempts to counter such information. These citizen curators actively shape competing narratives about why MH17 crashed and citizens, as a group, are four times more likely to be retweeted than any other type of user. Our findings challenge conceptualizations of a state-orchestrated information war over Ukraine, and point to the importance of citizen activity in the struggle over truths during international conflicts.

This article explores the dynamics of digital (dis)information in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. International Relations scholars have presented the online debate in terms of ‘information warfare’—that is, a number of strategic campaigns to win over local and global public opinion, largely orchestrated by the Kremlin and pro-western authorities. However, this way of describing the online debate reduces civil society to a mere target for manipulation. This article presents a different understanding of the debate. By examining the social media engagement generated by one of the conflict's most important events—the downing of the Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) over Ukraine—we explore how competing claims about the cause of the plane crash are disseminated by the state, media and civil society. By analysing approximately 950,000 tweets, the article demonstrates how individual citizens are more than purveyors of government messages; they are the most active drivers of both disinformation and attempts to counter such information. These citizen curators actively shape competing narratives about why MH17 crashed and citizens, as a group, are four times more likely to be retweeted than any other type of user. Our findings challenge conceptualizations of a state-orchestrated information war over Ukraine, and point to the importance of citizen activity in the struggle over truths during international conflicts.

This article argues that the symbolic interactionist sources of the first generation of constructivists in IR theory are worth recovering because of their ability to address what constructivists have always wanted to understand – the social construction of world politics. Symbolic interactionism is more or less implicit in key claims of canonical works of the first generation of constructivism in International Relations (IR) theory. However, constructivism lost some of its potential to address everyday experiences and performances of world politics when it turned to norm diffusion and socialisation. The second generation of constructivists generated rich insights on the construction of national identities and on patterns of foreign policy, but did not fully exploit constructivism's analytical potentials. Contrary to what most IR scholars have come to believe, symbolic interactionists saw the self as a deeply social – not a psychological or biological – phenomenon. Symbolic interactionism is interested in how inherently incomplete and fragile selves are constructed and deconstructed through processes of inclusion, exclusion and shaming. Today, third generation constructivists are returning to the sociology of Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel and other symbolic interactionists to address problems of identity, power and deviance in international politics.

This article argues that the symbolic interactionist sources of the first generation of constructivists in IR theory are worth recovering because of their ability to address what constructivists have always wanted to understand – the social construction of world politics. Symbolic interactionism is more or less implicit in key claims of canonical works of the first generation of constructivism in International Relations (IR) theory. However, constructivism lost some of its potential to address everyday experiences and performances of world politics when it turned to norm diffusion and socialisation. The second generation of constructivists generated rich insights on the construction of national identities and on patterns of foreign policy, but did not fully exploit constructivism's analytical potentials. Contrary to what most IR scholars have come to believe, symbolic interactionists saw the self as a deeply social – not a psychological or biological – phenomenon. Symbolic interactionism is interested in how inherently incomplete and fragile selves are constructed and deconstructed through processes of inclusion, exclusion and shaming. Today, third generation constructivists are returning to the sociology of Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel and other symbolic interactionists to address problems of identity, power and deviance in international politics.

Professor Rebecca Adler-Nissen var den 10. juni 2017 i Kristeligt Dagblad i forbindelse med hendes TED Talk på TED konferencen i Danmark. Her talte Adler-Nissen om international diplomati. Adler-Nissen ser TED formatet som en måde at øge kendskabet til emnet international diplomati, da formatet kræver, at man kombinere ens viden med kreativ og underholdning formidling. Adler-Nissen håber herved at kunne gøre international diplomati mere nærværende for folk ved gennem sin tale at give folk et indblik i den dramatiske og krævende verden som diplomati er.