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Companies spend trillions of dollars on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) every year, and tens of thousands of new M&A deals are announced every year. However, despite the huge costs, only 10% to 30% of the M&As announced, get finalized (Christensen et al., 2011).There is extensive research conducted on why M&As fail, and their implications for the companies involved in the transaction. However, these large deals do not only impact the firms directly involved in the deal. Microsoft, one of the world’s most influential companies, made on the 18th of January 2022 an acquisition announcement regarding its intent to acquire Activation Blizzard, one of the world’s largest game studios. The announcement made headlines all over the world and resulted in protests from competitors of the two companies. One of these competitors, Sony, experienced a 13% drop in stock price due to the acquisition announcement. This thesis investigates the effect of acquisition announcements on the stock return of competitors to the target company. The study is examining the competitors stock return during the month leading up to the announcement, as well as the stock return during the month following the announcement. The authors have taken inspiration from a previous study “Acquisitions: A curse or blessing for direct competitors? The impact of target ownership structure” conducted by Mataigne et al. (2021). By reviewing over 700 market reactions to acquisition announcements over a 10-year period, the authors were able to statistically test the differences in mean stock return. The authors were able to conclude that acquisition announcements have a negative impact on the stock return of competitors, and thereby answer the proposed research question: “What is the effect of acquisitions announcements on the stock returns of target company’s competitors in Sweden?”. Competitors to the target firm of an acquisition will experience the most significant change in their stock returns

This study introduces Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium to neoclassical growth theory. It attempts to make neoclassical economic growth theory more robust in modelling the complexity of market structures. The model is constructed within the framework of the Solow-Uzawa two-sector model. The economy is composed of two sectors. The final goods sector is the same as in the Solow one-sector growth model which is characterized by perfect competition. The consumer goods sector is the same as the consumer goods sector in the Uzawa model but is characterized by Stackelberg duopoly. We model household behavior with Zhang’s concept of disposable income and utility. The model endogenously determines profits of duopoly which are equally distributed among the homogeneous population. We build the model and then identify the existence of an equilibrium point through simulation. We conduct comparative static analyses of some parameters. We also compare the economic performance of the traditional Uzawa model and the model with the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. We conclude that the imperfect competition increases national output, national wealth, and utility level in comparison to perfect competition., Cette étude introduit l’équilibre de Stackelberg-Nash dans la théorie néoclassique de la croissance. Elle tente de rendre la théorie néoclassique de la croissance économique plus robuste dans la modélisation de la complexité des structures du marché. Le modèle Solow-Uzawa est construit dans le cadre de deux secteurs. L’économie est composée de deux secteurs. Le secteur des biens finaux est le même que dans le modèle de croissance d’un secteur unique de Solow, caractérisé par une concurrence parfaite. Le secteur des biens de consommation est le même que le secteur des biens de consommation dans le modèle d’Uzawa, mais se caractérise par le duopole de Stackelberg. Nous avons modélisé le comportement des ménages avec le concept de Zhang de revenu disponible et de bénéfices. Le modèle détermine de manière endogène les avantages du duopole qui sont répartis équitablement au sein de la population homogène. Nous construisons le modèle, puis identifions l’existence d’un point d’équilibre par simulation. Nous effectuons des analyses statiques-comparatives de certains paramètres. Nous avons également comparé la performance économique du modèle traditionnel d’Uzawa et du modèle avec l’équilibre de Stackelberg-Nash. Nous concluons qu’une concurrence imparfaite augmente la production nationale, la richesse nationale et le niveau d’utilité par rapport à la concurrence parfaite., Este estudio introduce el equilibrio de Stackelberg-Nash en la teoría neoclásica del crecimiento. Intenta hacer que la teoría neoclásica del crecimiento económico sea más robusta en el modelado de la complejidad de las estructuras de mercado. El modelo de Solow-Uzawa se construye en el marco dos sectores. La economía se compone de dos sectores: el sector de bienes finales es el mismo que en el modelo de crecimiento de un solo sector de Solow, caracterizado por una competencia perfecta. El sector de bienes de consumo es el mismo que en el modelo de Uzawa, pero se caracteriza por el duopolio de Stackelberg. Se modela el comportamiento de los hogares con el concepto de Zhang de ingresos disponibles y utilidad. El modelo determina endógenamente los beneficios del duopolio que se distribuyen equitativamente entre la población homogénea. Se construye el modelo y luego se identifica la existencia de un punto de equilibrio a través de la simulación. Se realizan análisis estático-comparativos de algunos parámetros. También, se compara el rendimiento económico del modelo tradicional de Uzawa y el modelo con el equilibrio de Stackelberg-Nash. Se concluye que la competencia imperfecta aumenta la producción nacional, la riqueza nacional y el nivel de utilidad en comparación con la competencia perfecta.

This study introduces Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium to neoclassical growth theory. It attempts to make neoclassical economic growth theory more robust in modelling the complexity of market structures. The model is constructed within the framework of the Solow-Uzawa two-sector model. The economy is composed of two sectors. The final goods sector is the same as in the Solow one-sector growth model which is characterized by perfect competition. The consumer goods sector is the same as the consumer goods sector in the Uzawa model but is characterized by Stackelberg duopoly. We model household behavior with Zhang’s concept of disposable income and utility. The model endogenously determines profits of duopoly which are equally distributed among the homogeneous population. We build the model and then identify the existence of an equilibrium point through simulation. We conduct comparative static analyses of some parameters. We also compare the economic performance of the traditional Uzawa model and the model with the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. We conclude that the imperfect competition increases national output, national wealth, and utility level in comparison to perfect competition., Cette étude introduit l’équilibre de Stackelberg-Nash dans la théorie néoclassique de la croissance. Elle tente de rendre la théorie néoclassique de la croissance économique plus robuste dans la modélisation de la complexité des structures du marché. Le modèle Solow-Uzawa est construit dans le cadre de deux secteurs. L’économie est composée de deux secteurs. Le secteur des biens finaux est le même que dans le modèle de croissance d’un secteur unique de Solow, caractérisé par une concurrence parfaite. Le secteur des biens de consommation est le même que le secteur des biens de consommation dans le modèle d’Uzawa, mais se caractérise par le duopole de Stackelberg. Nous avons modélisé le comportement des ménages avec le concept de Zhang de revenu disponible et de bénéfices. Le modèle détermine de manière endogène les avantages du duopole qui sont répartis équitablement au sein de la population homogène. Nous construisons le modèle, puis identifions l’existence d’un point d’équilibre par simulation. Nous effectuons des analyses statiques-comparatives de certains paramètres. Nous avons également comparé la performance économique du modèle traditionnel d’Uzawa et du modèle avec l’équilibre de Stackelberg-Nash. Nous concluons qu’une concurrence imparfaite augmente la production nationale, la richesse nationale et le niveau d’utilité par rapport à la concurrence parfaite., Este estudio introduce el equilibrio de Stackelberg-Nash en la teoría neoclásica del crecimiento. Intenta hacer que la teoría neoclásica del crecimiento económico sea más robusta en el modelado de la complejidad de las estructuras de mercado. El modelo de Solow-Uzawa se construye en el marco dos sectores. La economía se compone de dos sectores: el sector de bienes finales es el mismo que en el modelo de crecimiento de un solo sector de Solow, caracterizado por una competencia perfecta. El sector de bienes de consumo es el mismo que en el modelo de Uzawa, pero se caracteriza por el duopolio de Stackelberg. Se modela el comportamiento de los hogares con el concepto de Zhang de ingresos disponibles y utilidad. El modelo determina endógenamente los beneficios del duopolio que se distribuyen equitativamente entre la población homogénea. Se construye el modelo y luego se identifica la existencia de un punto de equilibrio a través de la simulación. Se realizan análisis estático-comparativos de algunos parámetros. También, se compara el rendimiento económico del modelo tradicional de Uzawa y el modelo con el equilibrio de Stackelberg-Nash. Se concluye que la competencia imperfecta aumenta la producción nacional, la riqueza nacional y el nivel de utilidad en comparación con la competencia perfecta.

Title: Price Wars and Consumer Surplus Seminar date: 2020-06-03 Course: FEKH19, Bachelor Degree Project in Strategic Management, 15 ECTS Authors: Felix Thunström, Malkolm Wester, Oliver Nilsson, Simon Taillefer Dellenholt Advisor: Niklas L. Hallberg Key words: Pharmacy, Price wars, Consumer surplus, VPC framework, Perfect competition Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate how a price war affects consumer surplus. Methodology: A quantitative study with a hypothesis testing deductive approach was conducted. The design of the study was a retrospective natural experiment with longitudinal elements. Data was collected through a digital survey directed towards consumers who had purchased products from Swedish pharmacies both before 2016 and recently. Variables were operationalised mainly with consideration to previous studies. Data were compiled and then statistically analysed in SPSS Statistics. Theoretical perspectives: The main theory in this paper is Heil & Helsen’s (2001) theory about price wars that both defines the phenomenon and explains that there is uncertainty about the effects on consumers. Furthermore, Hallberg’s (2017) article on value, consumer surplus and Tirole’s (1988) VPC framework is used. Other theoretical perspectives include perfect competition (Robinson, 1934; Hall, 1986; Amountzias, 2020; Slater, 1997), which is used to illustrate how price wars reasonably should lead to the society approaching a welfare maximising condition from a consumer perspective. Empirical foundation: Collection of data was made possible mainly through a consumer survey. A total of 118 respondents answered the survey of which 113 answers were used in the study’s data analysis. Conclusions: The study shows that the consumer surplus has increased since the commencement of the price war, as a consequence of a lower price and a higher value. Service quality and resource consumption in terms of time increased, while product quality decreased., Examensarbetets titel: Priskrig och konsumentöverskott Seminariedatum: 2020-06-03 Kurs: FEKH19, Examensarbete i Strategic Management på kandidatnivå, 15 hp Författare: Felix Thunström, Malkolm Wester, Oliver Nilsson, Simon Taillefer Dellenholt Handledare: Niklas L. Hallberg Nyckelord: Apotek, Priskrig, Konsumentöverskott, VPC-ramverket, Perfekt konkurrens Syfte: Syftet med detta arbete är att undersöka hur priskrig kan påverka konsumentöverskott. Metod: Denna kvantitativa studie genomfördes med hypotesprövande deduktiv ansats och designen var ett retrospektivt naturligt experiment med longitudinella inslag. Empiri insamlades från en webbaserad enkätundersökning riktad mot konsumenter som handlat på svenska apotek både före 2016 och nyligen. Variabler operationaliserades till stor del med utgångspunkt i tidigare forskning. Data sammanställdes och analyserades sedan statistiskt i SPSS Statistics. Teoretiska perspektiv: Uppsatsens utgångspunkt är Heil & Helsens (2001) teori om priskrig som både definierar fenomenet samt förklarar att det finns en ovisshet gällande påverkan på konsumenter. Vidare används Hallbergs (2017) artikel om värde, konsumentöverskott och Tiroles (1988) VPC-ramverk. Teorier om perfekt konkurrens (Robinson, 1934; Hall, 1986; Amountzias, 2020; Slater, 1997) används sedan för att illustrera hur priskrig rimligen bör leda till att samhället närmar sig ett välfärdsmaximerande tillstånd ur ett konsumentperspektiv. Empiri: Insamling av empiri möjliggjordes främst genom en enkätundersökning. Totalt 118 respondenter besvarade enkäten varav 113 svar låg till grund för studiens dataanalys. Resultat: Studien visar att konsumentöverskottet har ökat sedan priskrigets start, till följd av ett lägre pris och ett högre värde. Servicekvalitet och resursåtgång i termer av tid har förbättrats, samtidigt som produktkvaliteten har försämrats något.

Title: Price Wars and Consumer Surplus Seminar date: 2020-06-03 Course: FEKH19, Bachelor Degree Project in Strategic Management, 15 ECTS Authors: Felix Thunström, Malkolm Wester, Oliver Nilsson, Simon Taillefer Dellenholt Advisor: Niklas L. Hallberg Key words: Pharmacy, Price wars, Consumer surplus, VPC framework, Perfect competition Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate how a price war affects consumer surplus. Methodology: A quantitative study with a hypothesis testing deductive approach was conducted. The design of the study was a retrospective natural experiment with longitudinal elements. Data was collected through a digital survey directed towards consumers who had purchased products from Swedish pharmacies both before 2016 and recently. Variables were operationalised mainly with consideration to previous studies. Data were compiled and then statistically analysed in SPSS Statistics. Theoretical perspectives: The main theory in this paper is Heil & Helsen’s (2001) theory about price wars that both defines the phenomenon and explains that there is uncertainty about the effects on consumers. Furthermore, Hallberg’s (2017) article on value, consumer surplus and Tirole’s (1988) VPC framework is used. Other theoretical perspectives include perfect competition (Robinson, 1934; Hall, 1986; Amountzias, 2020; Slater, 1997), which is used to illustrate how price wars reasonably should lead to the society approaching a welfare maximising condition from a consumer perspective. Empirical foundation: Collection of data was made possible mainly through a consumer survey. A total of 118 respondents answered the survey of which 113 answers were used in the study’s data analysis. Conclusions: The study shows that the consumer surplus has increased since the commencement of the price war, as a consequence of a lower price and a higher value. Service quality and resource consumption in terms of time increased, while product quality decreased., Examensarbetets titel: Priskrig och konsumentöverskott Seminariedatum: 2020-06-03 Kurs: FEKH19, Examensarbete i Strategic Management på kandidatnivå, 15 hp Författare: Felix Thunström, Malkolm Wester, Oliver Nilsson, Simon Taillefer Dellenholt Handledare: Niklas L. Hallberg Nyckelord: Apotek, Priskrig, Konsumentöverskott, VPC-ramverket, Perfekt konkurrens Syfte: Syftet med detta arbete är att undersöka hur priskrig kan påverka konsumentöverskott. Metod: Denna kvantitativa studie genomfördes med hypotesprövande deduktiv ansats och designen var ett retrospektivt naturligt experiment med longitudinella inslag. Empiri insamlades från en webbaserad enkätundersökning riktad mot konsumenter som handlat på svenska apotek både före 2016 och nyligen. Variabler operationaliserades till stor del med utgångspunkt i tidigare forskning. Data sammanställdes och analyserades sedan statistiskt i SPSS Statistics. Teoretiska perspektiv: Uppsatsens utgångspunkt är Heil & Helsens (2001) teori om priskrig som både definierar fenomenet samt förklarar att det finns en ovisshet gällande påverkan på konsumenter. Vidare används Hallbergs (2017) artikel om värde, konsumentöverskott och Tiroles (1988) VPC-ramverk. Teorier om perfekt konkurrens (Robinson, 1934; Hall, 1986; Amountzias, 2020; Slater, 1997) används sedan för att illustrera hur priskrig rimligen bör leda till att samhället närmar sig ett välfärdsmaximerande tillstånd ur ett konsumentperspektiv. Empiri: Insamling av empiri möjliggjordes främst genom en enkätundersökning. Totalt 118 respondenter besvarade enkäten varav 113 svar låg till grund för studiens dataanalys. Resultat: Studien visar att konsumentöverskottet har ökat sedan priskrigets start, till följd av ett lägre pris och ett högre värde. Servicekvalitet och resursåtgång i termer av tid har förbättrats, samtidigt som produktkvaliteten har försämrats något.

This paper argues that product differentiation is compatible with perfect competition under free entry and exit and small firm size relative to size of market. Despite Chamberlin’s view, monopolistic competitors are price takers, even though each firm’s product has no perfect substitute. There is a difference between perfect competition with product homogeneity and perfect competition with differentiated products, however. Advertising can pay off with differentiated products because products have separate identities—and price depends on quality—even though firms are price takers for any given quality. A differentiated oligopoly may resemble monopolistic competition a la Chamberlin in some ways.

Production of meat and processing of meat products is a very significant part of the food industry. In order to secure economic growth and development, especially in the meat industry, it is very important to provide free competition for the business entities that operate within it. Therefore, the main purpose of this study was to measure market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), in order to determine the competition level in the Serbian market. Furthermore, the HHI should provide evidence of any business entities that hold monopolistic or oligopolistic positions on the market. Moreover, another aim of this study was to define to what extent business entities in the Serbian meat industry export products and goods to international markets. The 350 companies that reported the highest revenues during 2013-2017 and which are registered in this sector were studied., Proizvodnja mesa I mesnih prerađevina je veoma značajan deo prehrambene industrije. Da bi se postigao ekonomski rast I razvoj, posebno u mesnoj industriji, veoma je važno obezbediti slobodnu konkurenciju za privredna društva koji posluju u njoj. Stoga, glavni cilj ovog rada je da se, pomoću Herfindahl-Hirschman indeksa (HHI), izmeri koncentracija tržišta, kao I da se utvrdi nivo konkurencije na srpskom tržištu, ali I da se utvrdi da li postoje subjekti koji na tržištu imaju poziciju monopola ili oligopola. Drugi cilj ovog rada je da se definiše u kojoj meri poslovni subjekti iz srpske mesne industrije izvoze svoje proizvode I robu na međunarodnom tržištu I da li je nivo koncentracije isti. U istraživanju je korišćen uzorak od 350 privrednih društava registrovanih u ovom sektoru, a koja su obelodanila najviše prihode u izveštajnom periodu od 2013. do 2017. godine.

Production of meat and processing of meat products is a very significant part of the food industry. In order to secure economic growth and development, especially in the meat industry, it is very important to provide free competition for the business entities that operate within it. Therefore, the main purpose of this study was to measure market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), in order to determine the competition level in the Serbian market. Furthermore, the HHI should provide evidence of any business entities that hold monopolistic or oligopolistic positions on the market. Moreover, another aim of this study was to define to what extent business entities in the Serbian meat industry export products and goods to international markets. The 350 companies that reported the highest revenues during 2013-2017 and which are registered in this sector were studied., Proizvodnja mesa I mesnih prerađevina je veoma značajan deo prehrambene industrije. Da bi se postigao ekonomski rast I razvoj, posebno u mesnoj industriji, veoma je važno obezbediti slobodnu konkurenciju za privredna društva koji posluju u njoj. Stoga, glavni cilj ovog rada je da se, pomoću Herfindahl-Hirschman indeksa (HHI), izmeri koncentracija tržišta, kao I da se utvrdi nivo konkurencije na srpskom tržištu, ali I da se utvrdi da li postoje subjekti koji na tržištu imaju poziciju monopola ili oligopola. Drugi cilj ovog rada je da se definiše u kojoj meri poslovni subjekti iz srpske mesne industrije izvoze svoje proizvode I robu na međunarodnom tržištu I da li je nivo koncentracije isti. U istraživanju je korišćen uzorak od 350 privrednih društava registrovanih u ovom sektoru, a koja su obelodanila najviše prihode u izveštajnom periodu od 2013. do 2017. godine.

We consider the testable implications of the Cournot model of market competition. Our approach is nonparametric in the sense that we abstain from imposing any functional specification on market demand and firm cost functions. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for (reduced form) equilibrium market price and quantity functions to be consistent with the Cournot model. In addition, we present identification results for the corresponding inverse market demand function and the firm cost functions. Finally, we use our approach to derive testable restrictions for the models of perfect competition, collusion and conjectural variations. This identifies the conditions under which these different models are empirically distinguishable from the Cournot model. We also investigate empirical issues (measurement error and omitted variables) related to bringing our testable restrictions to data. © 2013 Elsevier Inc., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We consider the testable implications of the Cournot model of market competition. Our approach is nonparametric in the sense that we abstain from imposing any functional specification on market demand and firm cost functions. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for (reduced form) equilibrium market price and quantity functions to be consistent with the Cournot model. In addition, we present identification results for the corresponding inverse market demand function and the firm cost functions. Finally, we use our approach to derive testable restrictions for the models of perfect competition, collusion and conjectural variations. This identifies the conditions under which these different models are empirically distinguishable from the Cournot model. We also investigate empirical issues (measurement error and omitted variables) related to bringing our testable restrictions to data. © 2013 Elsevier Inc., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The paper is focused on causes of graduate transformation of individual currency markets towards perfect competition model. Agents of this transformation implicate graduating difficulties in exploitation of competitive advantage in individual, corporate and institutional portfolios. The paper is divided in two main parts. First part discusses resemblance of currency markets to the perfect competition model. The second part describes main factors that impede assumptions within the microeconomic model. Ending part of the paper presents ideas for employing a strategy that provides the participant with efficiency in currency market operations.

The paper is focused on causes of graduate transformation of individual currency markets towards perfect competition model. Agents of this transformation implicate graduating difficulties in exploitation of competitive advantage in individual, corporate and institutional portfolios. The paper is divided in two main parts. First part discusses resemblance of currency markets to the perfect competition model. The second part describes main factors that impede assumptions within the microeconomic model. Ending part of the paper presents ideas for employing a strategy that provides the participant with efficiency in currency market operations.

5 January 2010 marks the 100th anniversary of the death of one of the most important economists of the 19th and 20th centuries, Marie-Ésprit Léon Walras. The authors of the article wanted, in connection with this anniversary, to present Léon Walras as a person and as an economist. The main objective is to put forth a possibly new interpretation of the Walrasian General Equilibrium Theory and to demonstrate that seemingly complex equations can be identified by a standard optimization of decisions made by economic agents.

This whole article deals with phenomenon of perfect competition. The Internet is one of possibilities for establishing this kind of market structure. It should be the best way because of being new place for business transactions. There are considered conditions for perfect competition, possibilities of realization via Internet and real face of affairs in this sphere of business in this article.

This paper considers the coordination failure under perfect competition in an overlapping generations model. If the marginal propensity to consume decrease, then the outputs decrease. There is a continuum of Pareto-ranked equilibria with respect to the marginal propensity to consume.

We study multiline insurance companies with limited liability and limited capital, creating the possibility of insurer default. Insurance premiums are determined by no-arbitrage option pricing methods. The results are developed under the realistic assumption that the losses created by insurer default are allocated among policyholders following an ex post, pro rata, sharing rule. In general, the ratio of default costs to expected claims, and thus the ratios of premiums to expected claims vary across insurance lines. Moreover, capital and related costs are allocated across lines in proportion to each line’s share of a digital default option on the insurer. Our results differ from those derived elsewhere in the literature.

We study multiline insurance companies with limited liability and limited capital, creating the possibility of insurer default. Insurance premiums are determined by no-arbitrage option pricing methods. The results are developed under the realistic assumption that the losses created by insurer default are allocated among policyholders following an ex post, pro rata, sharing rule. In general, the ratio of default costs to expected claims, and thus the ratios of premiums to expected claims vary across insurance lines. Moreover, capital and related costs are allocated across lines in proportion to each line’s share of a digital default option on the insurer. Our results differ from those derived elsewhere in the literature.

We develop a model of endogenous growth in an economy with competitive markets. Technical change arises from the intentional actions of entrepreneurs looking for profits. Opportunities for such profits stem from inframarginal rents. This provides a counterexample to the widespread view that endogenous technical change is possible only if innovating firms can expect to reap monopoly or oligopoly rents. The model has a unique equilibrium, which involves steady growth at a positive rate. Equilibrium growth is inefficiently low because knowledge spillover effects are neglected. The inefficiency can be eliminated by an interest rate subsidy.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

We develop a model of endogenous growth in an economy with competitive markets. Technical change arises from the intentional actions of entrepreneurs looking for profits. Opportunities for such profits stem from inframarginal rents. This provides a counterexample to the widespread view that endogenous technical change is possible only if innovating firms can expect to reap monopoly or oligopoly rents. The model has a unique equilibrium, which involves steady growth at a positive rate. Equilibrium growth is inefficiently low because knowledge spillover effects are neglected. The inefficiency can be eliminated by an interest rate subsidy.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

L’économiste italien Enrico Barone (1859-1924) est principalement connu pour ses contributions à la théorie de la productivité marginale et au débat sur la planification socialiste. Ce papier analyse les contributions de Barone à la théorie de la concurrence parfaite, contributions largement ignorées dans la littérature secondaire. Il inclut sa méthodologie; la définition, les conditions et les conséquences de la concurrence parfaite; son contexte institutionnel; et le processus d’ajustement. Il contient également certains graphiques de Barone qui illustrent le fonctionnement de la concurrence parfaite. Le papier démontre que Barone mérite une place dans l’histoire de la théorie de la concurrence parfaite., The Italian economist Enrico Barone (1859-1924) is best known for his contributions to marginal productivity theory and the socialist planning debate. This paper analyzes Barone’s contributions to the theory of perfect competition which are largely ignored in the secondary literature. It includes his methodology; the definition, conditions and outcomes of perfect competition; the institutional context of perfect competition; and the adjustment process. It also includes some of Barone’s graphs that illustrate the working of perfect competition. The paper demonstrates that Barone deserves a place in the history of the theory of perfect competition.JEL classification: B61, B31, D41, D5

RésuméL’interprétation traditionnelle à propos de l’analyse de la concurrence parfaite chez Edgeworth établit un lien direct entre cet auteur et la théorie contemporaine des jeux coopératifs. Cette interprétation repose essentiellement sur le théorème de convergence entre le noyau et les allocations d’équilibre walrasiennes démontré par Debreu et Scarf. Cet article tente de montrer que cette interprétation peut être mise en question à l’égard des textes d’Edgeworth. Nous montrons que la notion de « combination » a été mal interprétée par la tradition des jeux coopératifs. Ce papier expose une vision alternative de ce concept afin de proposer une interprétation de l’analyse edgeworthiennne de la concurrence parfaite permettant de montrer son originalité. En particulier, cette nouvelle façon de comprendre la pensée d’Edgeworth nous conduit à penser que la notion de concurrence parfaite fondée comme un cas limite d’un marché dont le nombre d’agents tend vers l’infini est contraire aux idées de l’auteur anglais. Les caractéristiques institutionnelles de nature informationnelle seraient alors au centre de l’analyse edgeworthienne. Par ailleurs, l’hypothèse walrasienne traditionnelle d’agents preneurs de prix n’a pas de place dans la notion de concurrence parfaite chez Edgeworth.JEL classification: B13, B31, C71, D50, We discuss the traditional interpretation of Edgeworth’s conception of competition neo-Walrasian authors developed following the Debreu-Scarf ’s theorem legacy. This interpretation presents Edgeworth as the forerunner of the cooperative-games approach based on the notion of the core as a solution concept. We appraise those notions using Edgeworth’s texts. This allows us to plead in favour of Edgeworth’s originality and of the need to rescue his theory of perfect competition from a misleading way.Textual evidence allows us to assert that the language of the cooperative game theory, and the subsequent modern theory of the core, do not correspond to Edgeworth’s theory. The modern notion of coalition seems to be an interpretation of Edgeworth’s concept of “combination” and of “cooperative associations.” Both notions deeply differ from the traditional concept of coalition when one examines them more carefully. Edgeworth clearly establishes a difference between a group of agents entering in a series of bilateral contract relations and a “combination.” The logic of the former is purely individual in the sense of an individual improvement accepting bilateral contracts within a new group rather than the bilateral contracts she have formerly agreed within another group. In fact, within the new improving-group all contracts continue to be bilaterally established and, more important, these kind of association does not necessary imply giving up all previous exchanges outside this group. From this alternative interpretation about Edgeworth’s notion of “combination” we extract a completely different conclusion than that implied by the coalitional formation presented in the cooperative game theoretical framework. In this framework, the core of an economy is simply reduced by the presence of an increasing number of agents forming this kind of coalitions. From the Egeworthian point of view, the